This paper attempts to place Goodman's "New Riddle of Induction" within the context of a subjectivist understanding of inductive logic. It will be argued that predicates such as 'grue' cannot be denied projectible status in any a priori way, but must be considered in the context of a situation of inductive support. In particular, it will be argued that questions of projectibility are to be understood as a variety of questions about the ways a given sample is random. Various examples (...) are considered, including cases when 'grue' (as opposed to 'green') should be projected, and some remarks are offered on what is meant when it is claimed that a sample is random (in ways relevant to inductive support) and how such randomness is determined. The view presented helps to make clear the relation between such apparently non-projectible predicates as 'grue' and the concept of being examined. (shrink)

"Drawing upon recent work in theoretical archaeology, and on case studies from the prehistoric Near East, medieval Europe, early modern North America, and Mesoamerica, John Moreland challenges many of the assumptions which have hitherto underpinned archaeological research in historic periods, arguing that we will only fully understand these pasts when we begin to appreciate the historically specific ways in which both documents and artefacts were 'activated' in the reproduction and transformation of power and identity. A concluding chapter warns that any (...) contribution these arguments may make to the better understanding of the historical past will be negated if we fail to appreciate the very real dangers posed, to all the peoples of the past, by the recent 'linguistic turn' in both disciplines."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

It is argued that in beginning ``being and nothingness'' with the absolute ontological distinction between the for-itself (pure nothingness) and the in-itself (pure being), sartre makes it impossible to understand how the phenomenological account of experience which comes later in the work could be correct. attention is paid almost entirely to the critique of sartre implicit in the chapter of merleau-ponty's ``phenomenology of perception'' titled 'the cogito'. merleau-ponty's divergence from sartre is seen to center around his critique of sartre on (...) the nature of the in-itself, the world, and the pre-reflective 'cogito'. (shrink)

Archaeology, and in particular the study of ceramics, lies at the heart of the interpretive schemes that underpin Framing the Early Middle Ages. While this is to be welcomed, it is proposed that even more extensive use of archaeological evidence - especially that generated through the excavation of prehistoric burial-mounds and rural settlements, as well as the study of early medieval coins - would have produced a rather more dynamic and nuanced picture of the transformations in social and political structures (...) that marked the passage from late Roman Britain to Anglo-Saxon England. (shrink)