Results: We analyzed 1,402 surveys and 15 in-depth interviews. Many (32%) CL participants reported greater difficulty refilling medications and a minority (14%) reported greater difficulty accessing HIV care during the pandemic. Most (99%) Opt4Mamas participants reported no difficulty refilling medications or accessing HIV/pregnancy care. Among the CL participants, older women were less likely (aOR = 0.95, 95% CI: 0.92–0.98) and women with more children were more likely (aOR = 1.13, 95% CI: 1.00–1.28) to report difficulty refilling medications. Only 2% of (...) CL participants reported greater difficulty managing FP and most (95%) reported no change in likelihood of using FP or desire to get pregnant. Qualitative analysis revealed three major themes: (1) adverse organizational/economic implications of the pandemic, (2) increased importance of pregnancy prevention during the pandemic, and (3) fear of contracting COVID-19. (shrink)

A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW), if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics (a failure that is justified, in part, by Kripke’s text) to recognize and (...) understand his distinction between a “physically isolated” individual (PII) and an individual “considered in isolation” (ICl) . It is only an ICI for whom rule following and language are rendered impossible by KW. l then show that an lel speaks a necessarily private language. Thus, KW’s private language argument gives us, at best, the same story about the impossibility of private language as pre-Kripke accounts of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. (shrink)

The alleged paradox begins with a sceptical inquiry about my right to claim that my past usage of '+' (i.e., my past usage of the plus sign) was used to denote the function plus rather than the function quus. The definition of quus is: x quus y = x + y, if x, y < 57; otherwise, x quus y = 5. (Kripke uses an encircled plus sign to represent the quus sign. I can't reproduce that sign here so I'll (...) just use 'quus'). Basically, the problem is that on all of the problems that I have done so far, the plus and quus functions demand the same answers. So, whether I know it or not, my past responses to computations have been in accord with plus just as much as they have been in accord with quus. Thus, there seems to be no reason at all to prefer the claim that I've been plussing to the claim that I've been quussing, given my hypothetical past history. After all, the two functions are identical over the cases that I am allowed to appeal to so far. Given this setup, Kripke boldly asks: "Who is to say that [quus] is not the function I previously meant by '+'?" The sceptic claims that no one can legitimately claim that quus is not the function I previously meant by '+', given the hypothetical situation he proposes, because no one can find a fact that shows that I meant plus rather than quus. More specifically, the sceptic challenges those of us who disagree with him to produce a fact that shows that I meant plus rather than quus. Also, the sceptic requires that the fact in question "must, in some sense, show how I am justified in giving the answer '125' to '68 + 57'" (rather than '5'). (K, p. 11). (I have always seen the second form of the challenge, as Kripke calls it, viz., the requirement that the fact show how I am justified in answering '125' rather than '5', as simply a way of clarifying the task at hand. After all, challenging someone to produce a fact that I meant plus rather than quus is not the most obvious challenge in the world, for a variety of reasons. Since it's clear that if I such a fact could be produced, it would justify my saying '125' rather than '5', the second form of the challenge does not impose a new task on us.. (shrink)

The goal of this study is to reconsider Nietzsche's early metaphysics. Nietzsche has been understood both as the last metaphysician and as the first western thinker to overcome metaphysics. Most of Nietzsche's readers who have been concerned with this issue, however, have concentrated entirely on his conception of the will-to-power which appears in his later work and have completely ignored his early artists-metaphysics which is only to be found in his first book, The Birth of Tragedy. If the metaphysical foundations (...) of this work are mentioned at all, readers assume that, because of the prominence awarded to the Apollinian and the Dionysian, the two art-drives are the first principles of the Artisten-Metaphysik. Based on this assumption, these same readers conclude that Nietzsche left his early metaphysics behind as he developed his conception of the will-to-power; the Artisten-Metaphysik has no relation to the will-to-power. ;In contrast to this treatment of the Artisten-Metaphysik, I argue that the first principle of Nietzsche's early metaphysics is the primordial-one , the world artist. On the basis of this hypothesis, I demonstrate that if the Ur-Eine is indeed the first principle of the Artisten-Metaphysik, the two art-drives are derivative of this principle. The Apollinian and the Dionysian burst forth from nature without the intervention of the human artist; each of the two art-drives represents a different creative tendency of the primordial artist. ;The significance of my re-evaluation of the Artisten-Metaphysik is far-reaching. Although previous interpretations of The Birth of Tragedy have prevented readers from seeing any connection between the early metaphysics and the will-to-power, my reconstruction of the Artisten-Metaphysik invites the reader to compare Nietzsche's early metaphysics with his later philosophical thought. And while I do not deny the differences between the Artisten-Metaphysik and the will-to-power, my interpretation enables the reader to appreciate the similarities between Nietzsche's early and his later philosophical work. Nietzsche is no longer understood as either the last metaphysician or the first western thinker to overcome metaphysics; rather, I emphasize the importance of Nietzsche's role as a transitional thinker in the western philosophical tradition. Indeed, Nietzsche emerges as one who adopts the will-to-power in an attempt to overcome metaphysics. And while he thinks of himself as an "untimely one" and one of the first thinkers to have overcome metaphysics, from the vantage point of this investigation elements of metaphysical thought may be identified in his philosophy. (shrink)

A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein , if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics to recognize and understand his distinction between a “physically isolated” individual and an (...) individual “considered in isolation” . It is only an ICI for whom rule following and language are rendered impossible by KW. l then show that an lel speaks a necessarily private language. Thus, KW’s private language argument gives us, at best, the same story about the impossibility of private language as pre-Kripke accounts of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. (shrink)

A common complaint against Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that whereas the aim of “the real” Wittgenstein’s private language argument is to establish the impossibility of a necessarily private language, the communitarian account of meaning proposed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW), if successful, would establish the impossibility of a contingently private language. I show that this common complaint is based on a failure of Kripke’s critics (a failure that is justified, in part, by Kripke’s text) to recognize and (...) understand his distinction between a “physically isolated” individual (PII) and an individual “considered in isolation” (ICl). It is only an ICI for whom rule following and language are rendered impossible by KW. l then show that an lel speaks a necessarily private language. Thus, KW’s private language argument gives us, at best, the same story about the impossibility of private language as pre-Kripke accounts of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. (shrink)

Oddity One : Kripke claims that Wittgenstein has invented "a new form of scepticism", one which inclines Kripke "to regard it as the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced" (K, p. 60). However, Kripke also claims that there are analogies (and sometimes the analogies look very much like identities) between Wittgenstein's sceptical argument and the work of at least three and maybe four (...) other philosophers, viz., Quine, Goodman, Hume and Berkeley. Strange stuff indeed. The originality of Wittgenstein's work is especially difficult to see after Kripke claims that Wittgenstein presents a problem concerning the nexus between past . . . 'meanings' and present practice" (K, p. 62), and says that Hume is said to have questioned "the causal nexus whereby a past event necessitates a future one, and the inductive inferential nexus from the past to the future." (K, p. 62). Whither the originality? And the connection with Goodman's work with 'grue' is even closer than that between Kripke's Wittgenstein and Hume. Given that Kripke had read Goodman before "discovering" the rule-following paradox in Wittgenstein, one ought to be sceptical of Kripke's claim that Wittgenstein has invented a new form of scepticism. It would be much more accurate to say that Kripke has strapped Wittgenstein with a hybrid scepticism drawn from Hume and Goodman. (shrink)

This paper is a critical analysis of Putnam’s “consistency objection,” an objection made against a particular reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics (“up-to-us-ism”). I show that Putnam’s objection presupposes a rather unlikely version of Wittgenstein’s “up-to-us-ism” and is unable to undermine a more likely anti-Platonist version. I also show that a companion argument, (the “something more” argument) is unable to overturn this more sophisticated anti-Platonist version of Wittgenstein’s up-to-us-ism. Along the way I try to clarify Wittgenstein’s anti-Plalonist account of mathematics, (...) so that others do not repeat Putnam’s mistake. (shrink)

This paper is a critical analysis of Putnam’s “consistency objection,” an objection made against a particular reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics (“up-to-us-ism”). I show that Putnam’s objection presupposes a rather unlikely version of Wittgenstein’s “up-to-us-ism” and is unable to undermine a more likely anti-Platonist version. I also show that a companion argument, (the “something more” argument) is unable to overturn this more sophisticated anti-Platonist version of Wittgenstein’s up-to-us-ism. Along the way I try to clarify Wittgenstein’s anti-Plalonist account of mathematics, (...) so that others do not repeat Putnam’s mistake. (shrink)

IN the recently published Life by I.eslie Stephen of his brother, Fitz-James, there is an account of a school to which the latter went when he was a boy. The teacher, a certain Mr. Guest, used to converse with his pupils in this wise: "Gurney, what is the difference between justification and sanctification?- Stephen, prove the omnipotence of God " etc. In the midst of our Harvard freethinking and indifference we are prone to imagine that here at your good old (...) orthodox College conversation continues to be somewhat upon this order; and to show you that we at Harvard have not lost all interest in these vital subjects, I have brought with me tonight something like a sermon on justification by faith to read to you, --I mean an essay in justification of faith, a defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced. 'The Will to Believe,' accordingly, is the title of my paper. (shrink)

_Private Language_ is that it almost universally sees KW as offering, in his sceptical solution, an account of meaning attributions (i.e., statements of the form, "X means such-and-so by 's'"; hereafter, MAs) which takes their legitimate attribution to be a function of something other than facts or truth conditions. KW is almost universally read as having rejected any account of meaning attributions which takes them to be stating facts or corresponding to facts. In a word, KW is understood as offering (...) a nonfactualist account of MAs. And given that KW's sceptical challenge to the possibility of meaning rests on his negative assertions that there are no meaning facts, and that KW offers a sceptical solution to the sceptic's claim that meaning is impossible, i.e., a solution that by definition "begins . . . by conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable" (K, p. 66), it seems impossible that there would be any doubts about the accuracy of the "almost universal" reading of KW as a nonfactualist. (shrink)

Depoliticization: The Political Imaginary of Global Capitalism follows in the path blazed by Hannah Arendt and Cornelius Castoriadis, where politics is seen as a mode of freedom; the possibility for individuals to consciously and explicitly create the institutions of their own societies. Starting with such problem as: What is capital? How can we characterize the dominant economic system? What are the conditions for its existence, and how can we create alternatives?, the articles examine the central institutions of modern Western societies, (...) market capitalism, representative liberal democracy, and science. To elucidate the problem of depoliticization, the authors engage a number of thinkers from Karl Marx, Max Weber, Thorstein Veblen to Cornelius Castoriadis, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, and Stanley Kubrick. -/- . (shrink)