This paper purports to provide a fresh cashing out of Debasing Scepticism: the type of Scepticism put on the map in a recent article by Jonathan Schaffer, with a view to demonstrating that the Debasing Sceptic’s argument is not so easily dismissed as many of Schaffer’s commentators have thought. After defending the very possibility of the Debasing Sceptic’s favoured sceptical scenario, I lay out a framework for thinking of the agent’s power to hold their beliefs in the light of reasons (...) which I argue has initial plausibility. I then attempt to show that with this framework in tow, the Debasing Sceptic has an argument for their sceptical conclusion available to them which Schaffer’s commentators have failed to undermine, and which is independently interesting. (shrink)

The world is currently facing a wave of data centre construction. Fuelled by an explosion of data production and the emergence of edge computing, our cities are witnessing the materialisation of new architectural typologies that increasingly convolute notions of digital and bodily distinction. Whilst the last 2 decades have seen the proliferation of separate human and post-human urban environments, here we consider the agency and performativity of human communities within increasingly tangled contexts. As edge computing continues to bring the material (...) reality of data processing closer to our physical bodies, perhaps its time to reassess who, or what, our cities now serve. In an age of unprecedented digital transformation, when our identities seem to be ever more intangible, how we might perform within environments that are increasingly catering to our digital rather than bodily needs? Today, the Anthropocene expels nature to the periphery. Tomorrow, humans become marginalised—“weeds”, thriving in an epoch of data. (shrink)

This review provides an overview of Eva Schmidt's impressively thorough and detailed book on the Conceptualist/Nonconceptualist debate in the philosophy of perception, and briefly sketches two objections to Schmidt. First, I suggest that a certain dilemma for the Conceptualist Schmidt raises in the context of her discussion of the fineness of grain argument is surmountable. Second, I question whether Schmidt's response to the epistemological motivation for Conceptualism is sound.

The primary focus of Susanne Mantel’s excellent 'Determined by Reasons' is to develop a distinctive abilities-based account of acting in response to normative reasons, one which is clearly modelled on extant ability-theoretic accounts of knowledge. This review sketches Mantel’s account and raises a worry: that the account fails to characterise the sort of abilities constitutively involved in responding to reasons because it allows that agents can act for the reason that p even if their belief that p is not accessible (...) to conscious reasoning. (shrink)