In “Epistemological Duties,” Richard Feldman uses three main questions to illuminate the topic of epistemological duties. What are our epistemological duties? After suggesting that epistemological duties pertain to the development of appropriate cognitive attitudes, Feldman asks What makes a duty epistemological? and How do epistemological duties interact with other kinds of duties? His pursuit of contributes to his response to in that he uses it to argue that a concept of distinctly epistemological duty must exclude practical and moral (...) duties that pertain to belief, and include only duties that pertain to epistemological success. (shrink)

We argue that the value of authenticity does not explain the value of self-knowledge. There are a plurality of species of authenticity; in this paper we consider four species: avoiding pretense (section 2), Frankfurtian wholeheartedness (section 3), existential self-knowledge (section 4), and spontaneity (section 5). Our thesis is that, for each of these species, the value of (that species of) authenticity does not (partially) explain the value of self-knowledge. Moreover, when it comes to spontaneity, the value of (that species of) (...) authenticity conflicts with the value of self-knowledge. (shrink)

The badness of having conflicting emotions is a familiar theme in academic ethics, clinical psychology, and commercial self-help, where emotional harmony is often put forward as an ideal. Many philosophers give emotional harmony pride of place in their theories of practical reason.1 Here we offer a defense of a particular species of emotional conflict, namely, ambivalence. We articulate an conception of ambivalence, on which ambivalence is unresolved inconsistent desire (§1) and present a case of appropriate ambivalence (§2), before considering two (...) alternative defenses of emotional conflict (§3). We then argue that inconsistent desires can be fitting (§4) and that it can be reasonable not to resolve inconsistent desires (§5), before considering an objection (§6) and concluding the discussion (§7). (shrink)

A theory that treats language not as an abstract symbol system but as a function of our brains and experience, integrating recent findings from biology, ...

Passages in Leibniz which have been understood to contain his statement of Leibniz law do not in fact contain any statement of that principle. Some of these passages contain a statement of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, While others contain a statement of a principle about concept identity. The latter principle states that a concept, A, Is identical with a concept, B, If and only if a can be substituted for b in any proposition without change of truth (...) value. (shrink)

A new theory of how the brain constructs emotions that could revolutionize psychology, health care, law enforcement, and our understanding of the human mind Emotions feel automatic, like uncontrollable reactions to things we think and experience. Scientists have long supported this assumption by claiming that emotions are hardwired in the body or the brain. Today, however, the science of emotion is in the midst of a revolution on par with the discovery of relativity in physics and natural selection in biology--and (...) this paradigm shift has far-reaching implications for us all. Leading the charge is psychologist and neuroscientist Lisa Feldman Barrett, whose theory of emotion is driving a deeper understanding of the mind and brain, and shedding new light on what it means to be human. Her research overturns the widely held belief that emotions are housed in different parts of the brain and are universally expressed and recognized. Instead, she has shown that emotion is constructed in the moment, by core systems that interact across the whole brain, aided by a lifetime of learning. This new theory means that you play a much greater role in your emotional life than you ever thought. Its repercussions are already shaking the foundations not only of psychology but also of medicine, the legal system, child-rearing, meditation, and even airport security. Why do emotions feel automatic? Does rational thought really control emotion? How does emotion affect disease? How can you make your children more emotionally intelligent? How Emotions Are Made answers these questions and many more, revealing the latest research and intriguing practical applications of the new science of emotion, mind, and brain. (shrink)

Psychological construction constitutes a different paradigm for the scientific study of emotion when compared to the current paradigm that is inspired by faculty psychology. This new paradigm is more consistent with the post-Darwinian conceptual framework in biology that includes a focus on (a) population thinking (vs. typologies), (b) domain-general core systems (vs. physical essences), and (c) constructive analysis (vs. reductionism). Three psychological construction approaches (the OCC model, the iterative reprocessing model, and the conceptual act theory) are discussed with respect to (...) these ideas. (shrink)

It is now medically possible for a baby to have two biological mothers. A fertilized ovum from one woman can be implanted into a second woman for gestation in her uterus. In fact, there have been several such cases. The ova donor is the mother in the genetic sense: her genetic material,along with that of the sperm donor,appears in the developing baby. The uterine hostess is the birth mother: she gestates the fetus and gives birth to it. In essence, the (...) two female reproductive functions, genetic and gestational, can be and have been divided from each other. Our current conception of biological maternity has lagged behind these technological marvels and still assumes that both functions will be performed by the same woman. At a time when two "biological mothers" can and do make claims for the same child,each on the ground that she is the "true mother", it is crucial to examine our concepts of biological maternity and their relation to our social policies about maternity in these cases. In this paper I will argue that the best social and legal policy would involve a prima facie preference for the claims of the gestational mother over the claims of the genetic mother for custody of the child in a contest (if there is no question of parental unfitness on either side). That is, in any dispute, presumption should be in favor of the gestational mother. This argument is made independent of considerations about pre-birth and pre-conception contracts, because the issues raised about the roles of gestational and genetic maternity are substantial in themselves and have obvious implications about the acceptability of such contracts.Rather, I argue that a revision of our concept of biological maternity which emphasizes the importance of gestation and which would prefer the claims of the gestational over the genetic mother would have positive benefits for both women and newborns. (shrink)

Among the important themes in Roderick Chisholm's epistemology are his commitment to internalism, his defense of the independence of epistemology from empirical science, and his assumption that we do know most of what we initially think we know. In “Roderick Chisholm and the Shaping of American Epistemology” Hilary Kornblith argues that Chisholm's views lead to a radical divorce between the factors that justify beliefs and the factors that cause beliefs, that Chisholm's views have the consequence that there is no connection (...) between justification and truth, and that Chisholm's kind of epistemology is unable to give epistemic advice. I argue that Chisholm's views do not have these consequences. (shrink)

Don Isaac Abravanel was one of the main leaders of medieval Spanish Jewry. This work presents a systematic exposition of Abravanel's defence of Judaism, analyzing and evaluating his views on the basic issues of medieval philosophy and theology.

Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This book is a collection of essays, mostly jointly authored, that support and apply evidentialism.

This article considers an apparent tension between, on the one hand, a widespread belief among literature teachers that the appreciation of a poem involves an experience of form-content inseparability and, on the other hand, these same teachers’ use of paraphrase to encourage appreciation. Using Terrence Deacon’s model of art experience, I argue that the tensions of this ‘paraphrase paradox’ mirror tensions inherent in poetic experience. Section II draws upon work by Rafe McGregor, Peter Lamarque, and Peter Kivy to frame an (...) approach to the form-content distinction, and to offer a brief overview of the paraphrase paradox. Sections III-IV summarize Deacon’s model of aesthetic experience, and argue that this model implies that poetic experience both triggers an impulse towards paraphrase, and frustrates this impulse. Section V looks at implications for the poetry teacher’s attempts to navigate the paraphrase paradox. Section VI tests these implications through an analysis of Philip Larkin’s poem ‘Faith Healing’. (shrink)

Within the context of service inquiries, and the specialized inferential logic associated with the particularized activities there is a gap in the orientations of customers and service representatives. Specifically, one problem that arises in customer service encounters is that customers and service representatives appear to arrive at different understandings of what constitutes a relevant response to a service inquiry. By examining one type of customer service context, calls to an electronic repair facility, this article offers a conversation analytic account of (...) how customers use formulations to collaboratively achieve a mutually agreed upon answer to their service inquiry and close the gap in the underlying logics that emerge in these calls. (shrink)

In Chapter 17 of his magnificent Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit asks what he describes as an ‘awesome question’: ‘How many people should there ever be?’ For a utilitarian like me, the answer seems simple: there should be however many people it takes to make the world best. Unfortunately, if I answer Parfit's awesome question in this way, I may sink myself in a quagmire of axiological confusion. In this paper, I first describe certain aspects of the quagmire. Then I (...) introduce and explain some of the elements of a novel axiological view – ‘justicism’. Justicism is derived from some ideas originally suggested by Franz Brentano. It was developed in an effort to solve certain other problems confronting utilitarianism – problems explicitly about justice. I think, however, that as a sort of happy by-product, justicism also generates a plausible answer to Parfit's awesome question. This may come as a bit of surprise, since justicism is a form of totalism, and it is widely thought that no totalistic theory can provide a satisfactory answer to Parfit's question. After presenting and explaining my proposed solution, I address some objections. (shrink)

Philosophers, accounted wise in their generation and even beyond their generation, have enthroned the unchanging and sung the praises of fatality and acquiescence. But there is a voice even more authoritative than that of the sages—the voice of the LifeShaper himself. Perched on the height of the human soul, he has set two watchmen, more sagacious and knowing than the Metaphysicians who weave words “About it and about” in the taverns beneath; their names are Wonder and Surprise. Wonder spies out (...) novelty, and Surprise discerns change. Wonder arises at that which is beyond expectation; Surprise at that which is contrary to expec tation. What could completely surpass expectation save the completely novel? What could so drastically dismantle expectation save the hurricane onset of change? (shrink)