Con miras al futuro, y en una interacción continua entre el individuo, el colectivo y el espacio, se plantea abordar los problemas urbanos a partir de las necesidades ligadas a los modos de vida que dan forma a la ciudad. Con esta base y con la experiencia del confinamiento, retomamos los resultados de un proyecto anterior en lo que respecta la dimensión del encuentro, a las prácticas del espacio y al uso de las TIC, que pueden dar aportes interesantes para (...) la concepción de los espacios futuros. (shrink)

The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency -- the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some draw from historical sources (...) while others focus on recent developments; some rely on the tools of analytic philosophy while others cite the latest empirical research on human action. All agree, however, on the centrality of the CTA in the philosophy of action. The contributors first consider metaphysical issues, then reasons-explanations of action, and, finally, new directions for thinking about the CTA. They discuss such topics as the tenability of some alternatives to the CTA; basic causal deviance; the etiology of action ; teleologism and anticausalism; and the compatibility of the CTA with theories of embodied cognition. Two contributors engage in an exchange of views on intentional omissions that stretches over four essays, directly responding to each other in their follow-up essays. As the action -oriented perspective becomes more influential in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science, this volume offers a long-needed debate over foundational issues. Contributors: Fred Adams, Jesús H. Aguilar, John Bishop, Andrei A. Buckareff, Randolph Clarke, Jennifer Hornsby, Alicia Juarrero, Alfred R. Mele, Michael S. Moore, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Josef Perner, Johannes Roessler, David-Hillel Ruben, Carolina Sartorio, Michael Smith, Rowland Stout The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

Grit, which is originally conceptualized as passion and perseverance for long-term goals, has been associated with optimal performance. Although previous meta-analytic and systematic reviews summarized how grit relates to performance outcomes, they possess considerable shortcomings, such as (a) absence of summary on the association of grit with well-being outcomes; (b) absence of discussion on social, psychological, and emotional mechanisms linking grit to well-being; and (c) lack of elaboration on how alternative models can resolve fundamental problems in the grit construct. This (...) integrative review provides a comprehensive summary on the link of grit to performance and well-being outcomes. Importantly, it elaborates how alternative models can potentially address flaws in the existing grit theory. Future research directions are discussed on how to move forward the science of grit. (shrink)

In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism. These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which not (...) only appear to warrant H&M’s initial claims but also seem to point to further uneasy tensions within the AE framework. The paper goes beyond H&M by tracing the roots of these criticisms and apparent tensions to phenomenology and the role it plays in AE’s distinctive conception of strong life-mind continuity. It is highlighted that this phenomenological dimension of AE contains certain unexamined anthropomorphic and anthropogenic leanings which do not sit comfortably within its wider commitment to life-mind continuity. In light of this analysis it is suggested that AE will do well to rethink this role or ultimately run the risk of remaining theoretically unstable. The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical development of AE by highlighting potential internal tensions within its framework which need to be addressed in order for it to continue to evolve as a coherent paradigm. (shrink)

The connection between scientific knowledge and our empirical access to realityis not well explained within the structuralist approach to scientific theories. I arguethat this is due to the use of a semantics not rich enough from the philosophical pointof view. My proposal is to employ Sellars–Brandom's inferential semantics to understand how can scientific terms have empirical content, and Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics to analyse how can theories be empirically tested. The main conclusions are that scientific concepts gain their meaning through `basic (...) theories' grounded on `common sense’, and that scientific method usually allows the pragmatic verification and falsification of scientific theories. (shrink)

There is a central doctrine in Aristotle that usually isn’t recognized in its importance: the affirmation of the difference and the plurality. In the course of the centuries, Aristotelism lost which was perhaps its most characteristic and specific feature versus Platonism, that is, its criticism of unity and its defense of plurality. The first principle is not the One but the plurality. The horizon of thinking is not the unity but the diversity of the logos. The unity of the logos (...) presupposes the differences within reality. Heidegger attracted attention to the peculiarity of the practical philosophy of Aristotle. It was the case of dialectics, rhetoric, poetics, ethics, politics, etc. We are referring to knowledges that are art rather than science. Nothing is so differentiated as human action, as it is always performed from a new starting point. Dialectic and rhetorical speeches are always circumscribed to the individual. (shrink)

La presente intervención va constar de dos partes. En la primera, trataré de desentrañar aquello que al decir de Husserl es lo propio y definitorio de la cultura Europea, es decir, aquello que caracterizaría su identidad y la diferenciaría de las demás culturas: el descubrimiento de la universalidad en sentido estricto. O dicho de otro modo, para Husserl, aquello que es peculiar de la cultura occidental es su pretensión de conducir la vida de los humanos según una idea de racionalidad (...) universal. Esta nueva manera de mirar el mundo, que se articula y desarrolla por primera vez en un discurso coherente en Grecia de la mano de la filosofia, será para el padre de la fenomenología un acontecimiento epocal que no sólo singulariza a la cultura Europea frente a cualquier otra, sino que la convertirá en el telas de la humanidad, en el fin al que todas las culturas deben tender si en algún momento pretende alcanzarse una convivencia harmónica entre los humanos. En este sentido, el viejo de maestro de Prostnitz sostendrá, en expresa contraposición al padre de la historia moderna, el gran Otto von Ranke, que no todas las épocas históricas ni todas las culturas son iguales ante Dios, es decir, que la tesis relativista tan en boga hoy en día según la cual todas las tradiciones o formas de vida son equiparables y no pueden ser evaluadas más que dentro de propios y peculiares parámetros es incorrecta y contraria, frente a lo que se pudiera pensar, al ideal de tolerancia. En la segunda parte de la ponencia, y tomando como base un conocido texto de Derrida, se abordará una acusación que frecuentemente se le hace a la fenomenología Husserliana a la luz de la tesis precedente: la de ser un pensamiento eurocéntrico. Contra semejante aseveración, se intentará mostrar que el supuesto imperialismo eurocéntrico husserliano no es· otra cosa que una defensa de la razón común. Y ello, frente a los intentos de imponer la particularidad de cualquier cultura, sobre todo la europea fáctica, como norma universal. (shrink)

This paper reads Husserl’s phenomenology as an attempt to solve the crisis of our civilization. It is well known that for him the deep roots of this crisis are related to a misunderstanding of the idea of rationality that leads to skepticism and relativism. It is also well known that in order to overcome this situation Husserl will propound a new idea of reason and rationality that will supposedly fulfill the old dream with which philosophy was born in Greece: To (...) be episteme, rigorous science valid at all times and in all places. Taking this general thesis into account, the paper will defend that Husserl is a foundationalist thinker and that the idea of philosophy as strenge Wissenschaft is present throughout his whole work, including, of course, Ideen I. This in some way “classic” interpretation tries to discuss other recent ways of understanding the whole Husserlian project, particularly Dan Zahavi’s reading, in which the foundationalist position is downplayed. (shrink)

Este articulo presenta una compresion fenomenologica de la ciudad, problematizando dos enfoques teoricos utiles para lograr una descripcion esclarecedora, sobre todo, en su version contemporanea. Se exploraran tesis en las que se habla de un habitat humano donde reinan la desatencion cortes, el cooperativismo competitivo y las relaciones instrumentales, resultado del desarrollo biotico sublimado en la organizacion social y la cultura; en razon de esto, la ciudad sera entendida como un producto de la naturaleza humana o, si se quiere, como (...) la maxima expresión de lo humano en tanto ser natural-cultural. Por otro lado, esta una comprension de la ciudad como un gran zoologico humano donde conviven: el individualismo, la ansiedad, el aburrimiento, el estres, la represion y la tension; razon por la cual los urbanitas se hallan, cada vez mas, en constante peligro de enloquecer. Al analizar ambas perspectivas, la ciudad se revela como un campo de interacciones del animal humano, caracterizadas por la cruenta competitividad, las relaciones fragmentadas, egoistas, intermitentes, microscopicas, fugaces y liquidas, basadas en la heterogeneidad, la hibridacion y el juego de mascaras en diversos micro-eventos, pero tambien en la estructuracion de una serie de pautas que garantizan minimos de convivencia entre un conglomerado de desconocidos que luchan cada uno por sobrevivir y hacer pervivir sus representaciones de la realidad. (shrink)

The claims of some authors to have introduced a new type of explanation in cosmology, based on the anthropic principle, are examined and found wanting. The weak anthropic principle is neither anthropic nor a principle. Either in its direct or in its Bayesian form, it is a mere tautology lacking explanatory force and unable to yield any prediction of previously unknown results. It is a pattern of inference, not of explanation. The strong anthropic principle is a gratuitous speculation with no (...) other support than previous religious commitment or the assumption of an actual infinity of universes, for which there is no the slightest empirical hint. But even assuming so much, it does not work. In particular, the assumption of an infinity of different universes is no guarantee of finding among them one like this one. The loose anthropic way of reasoning does not stand up to the usual methodological standards of empirical science. And it does not signal any anthropocentric turn in contemporary science. (shrink)

O mundo das afeições e das emoções ocupa um posto certamente secundário na história da filosofia. Seu caráter difuso e ambíguo não se enquadra no modelo clássico de filosofia inspirado na certeza do conhecimento matemático. De mãos dadas à irrupção da fenomenologia, tratamos de mostrar como se produz uma reabilitação do componente afetivo e corporal da existência humana; a tal afeto, tomamos em conta o significado filosófico que Heidegger e Scheler outorgam respectivamente aos sentimentos da angustia e do amor ao (...) momento de abrir e compreender o mundo. (shrink)

In this work, a new intelligent control strategy based on neural networks is proposed to cope with some external disturbances that can affect quadrotor unmanned aerial vehicles dynamics. Specifically, the variation of the system mass during logistic tasks and the influence of the wind are considered. An adaptive neuromass estimator and an adaptive neural disturbance estimator complement the action of a set of PID controllers, stabilizing the UAV and improving the system performance. The control strategy has been extensively tested with (...) different trajectories: linear, helical, circular, and even a lemniscate one. During the experiments, the mass of the UAV is triplicated and winds of 6 and 9 in Beaufort’s scale are introduced. Simulation results show how the online learning of the estimator increases the robustness of the controller, reducing the effects of the changes in the mass and of the wind on the quadrotor. (shrink)

In this paper, an attempt is made to solve various problems posed to current theories of verisimilitude: the problem of linguistic variance; the problem of which are the best scientific methods for getting the most verisimilar theories; and the question of the ontological commitment in scientific theories. As a result of my solution to these problems, and with the help of other considerations of epistemological character, I conclude that the notion of 'Tarskian truth' is dispensable in a rational interpretation of (...) the scientific enterprise. As a logical result, however, falsificationism will be vindicated. (shrink)

Este artículo muestra que la ética del discurso en versión de la ética cordis contribuye a mantener una actitud crítica de discernimiento ante las tecnologías de la inteligencia artificial. Propone distinguir entre opinión pública y razón pública, para destacar el sentido crítico del uso público de la razón en la línea de Kant, Rawls, Habermas y Cortina. Y afrontar las dificultades para ejercer la razón pública en la era digital: impacto de la inteligencia artificial en la comunicación, hiperconectitividad, datificación, “panóptico (...) digital” y la espiral del silencio, que ponen en peligro el uso de la razón y la intimidad personal. (shrink)

A phenomenological model is developed as an alternative to current analyses of the imagination in sport philosophy, heirs to an Enlightenment notion that conceptualizes imaginings as abstract, eidetic, and representational. EC describes how Eidetic and Corporeal Imaginings phenomenologically structure our imaginative undertakings. EIs keep the ‘ideal’ aspect, but CIs—enacted, corporeal, non-representational—are more fundamental and foundational. Sports are particularly suited to express CIs’ muscular imaginings, which result in novel performances. An enactive framework theorizes CIs as non-representational interactions.

We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988 ). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical and epistemic rationality, (...) building on Williamson’s ( 2002 ) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa ( 2007, 2011, 2015, 2021 ), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman ( 2000, 2009 ). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent . In a recent set of papers, Pritchard has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (...) , Jarvis or Littlejohn in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence (...) of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here (...) highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds. (shrink)

La idea de que la fenomenología de Husserl representa una suerte de filosofía reflexiva, basada en una metodología que desarrolla la tradición cartesiana, se ha convertido en una creencia ampliamente difundida en la literatura filosófica. Este énfasis puesto por Husserl en la reflexión fue arduamente criticado por Heidegger. Desde entonces resulta frecuente encontrarse con la afirmación de que Husserl y Heidegger desarrollan dos conceptos de fenomenología diferentes, incluso antagónicos. No se trata de seguir alimentando esta discusión historiográfica. Aquí, por una (...) parte, se muestra el complejo proceso de desarrollo de la fenomenología hermenéutica de Heidegger en el transcurso de sus primeras lecciones de Friburgo (1919-1923) y Marburgo (1924-1928) y, por otra, se sopesan algunas de las observaciones críticas de Heidegger a Husserl a la luz de evidencias textuales de la fenomenología husserliana, ignoradas no sólo por Heidegger, sino también por un sorprendente número de reconocidos especialistas en el campo de la filosofía, de las ciencias cognitivas y de la filosofía de la mente. (shrink)

According to enactivism all living systems, from single cell organisms to human beings, are ontologically endowed with some form of teleological and sense-making agency. Furthermore, enactivists maintain that: there is no fixed pregiven world and as a consequence all organisms “bring forth” their own unique “worlds” through processes of sense-making. The first half of the paper takes these two ontological claims as its central focus and aims to clarify and make explicit the arguments and motivations underlying them. Our analysis here (...) highlights three distinct but connected problems for enactivism: these arguments do not and cannot guarantee that there is no pregiven world, instead, they end up generating a contradiction whereby a pregiven world seems to in fact be tacitly presupposed by virtue of a reliance on a tacit epistemic perspectivalism which is also inherently representationalist and as a consequence makes it difficult to satisfactorily account for the ontological plurality of worlds. Taking these considerations on board, the second half of the paper then aims to develop a more robust ontologically grounded enactivism. Drawing from biosemiotic enactivism, science and technology studies and anthropology, the paper aims to present an account which both rejects a pregiven world and coherently accounts for how organisms bring forth ontologically multiple worlds. (shrink)

The scientist's decision of accepting a given proposition is assumed to be dependent on two factors: the scientist's 'private' information about the value of that statement and the proportion of colleagues who also accept it. This interdependence is modelled in an economic fashion, and it is shown that it may lead to multiple equilibria. The main conclusions are that the evolution of scientific knowledge can be path, dependent, that scientific revolutions can be due to very small changes in the empirical (...) evidence, and that not all possible equilibria are necessarily efficient, neither in the economic nor in the epistemic sense. These inefficiencies, however, can be eliminated if scientists can form coalitions. (shrink)

This paper presents a series of meta-analyses of the validity of general mental ability (GMA) for predicting five occupational criteria, including supervisory ratings of job performance, production records, work sample tests, instructor ratings, and grades. The meta-analyses were conducted with a large database of 467 technical reports of the validity of the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) which included 630 independent samples. GMA showed to be a consistent predictor of the five criteria, but the magnitude of the operational validity was (...) not the same across the five criteria. Results also showed that job complexity is a moderator of the GMA validity for the performance criteria. We also found that the GMA validity estimates are slightly smaller than the previous ones obtained by Hunter (1983a; Hunter & Hunter, 1984). Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for the research and practice of personnel selection. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the politics of nostalgia’s history as a fatal disease between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, especially as it was applied to slaves in late eighteenth-century Cuba. I trace nostalgia’s medical history beginning with its inauguration in Swiss medicine in 1688, and then describe the contours of its transformation into a military disease primarily affecting white soldiers in France and the United States. Finally, I translate and analyze key elements of Francisco Barrera y Domingo’s work on nostalgia (...) as experienced by slaves in sugar mills in Havana. I show that Barrera uses his analysis of nostalgia and its treatment to describe the slaves’ harrowing conditions and homesickness. Nevertheless, in denying slaves the ability to return home and in failing to propose the abolition of the slave system in the wake of the Haitian Revolution, I argue, Barrera in fact deploys the diagnosis of nostalgia in order to medicalize and pathologize the slaves’ reactions and resistance to their captivity. Thus, despite his sympathy to the slaves, I conclude that for Barrera, nostalgia functions as a tool to better manage the slaves as laborers and as property. (shrink)

Scientific research is reconstructed as a language game along the lines of Robert Brandom's inferentialism. Researchers are assumed to aim at persuading their colleagues of the validity of some claims. The assertions each scientist is allowed or committed to make depend on her previous claims and on the inferential norms of her research community. A classification of the most relevant types of inferential rules governing such a game is offered, and some ways in which this inferentialist approach can be used (...) for assessing scientific knowledge and practices are explored. Some similarities and differences with a game-theoretic analysis are discussed. (shrink)

Se presenta una panorámica de diferentes aspectos éticos vinculados con los procesos de investigación y de publicación académica. Se describen algunas interacciones entre los componentes del sistema de investigación, que pueden influir en conductas inapropiadas de los investigadores al realizar su trabajo y publicar sus resultados. Se destacan los principales valores y conocimientos que deben servir como marco de referencia a los investigadores para trabajar de forma honesta y hacer publicaciones balanceadas, justas y legales, dentro de un estilo académico riguroso (...) y claro. Se destacan algunas de las principales consecuencias del fraude académico y se hace un exhorto para fomentar una cultura de buenas prácticas académicas a los estudiantes durante su formación. (shrink)

An epistemic notion of verisimilitude (as the 'degree in which a theory seems closer to the full truth to a scientific community') is defined in several ways. Application to the structuralist description of theories is carried out by introducing a notion of 'empirical regularity' in structuralist terms. It is argued that these definitions of verisimilitude can be used to give formal reconstructions of scientific methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism and normal science.

Scientists can choose different claims as interpretations of the results of their research. Scientific rhetoric is understood as the attempt to make those claims most beneficial for the scientists' interests. A rational choice, game-theoretic model is developed to analyze how this choice can be made and to assess it from a normative point of view. The main conclusion is that `social' interests (pursuit of recognition) may conflict with `cognitive' ones when no constraints are put on the choices of the authors (...) of scientific papers, as in an `ideal free speech situation'. Scientific institutions may help to solve this conflict. Lastly, some empirical predictions are offered that can inspire future social research of the refereeing process. (shrink)