Intellectual history in the United States has long borne a peculiarly close kinship to social history. The twin fields rose together a century ago in a filial revolt against the cloistered, conservative study of political institutions. Sharing a progressive interest in social thought and social reform, they joined in the self-styled “social and intellectual history” of the interwar decades. After mid-century, however, they moved in divergent directions. Many social historians adopted the quantitative methods of the social sciences, documenting the diverse (...) experiences of workers, women, immigrants, slaves, native peoples, and others often marginalized in the textual record as well as the property regimes, modes of production, patterns of inheritance and mobility, and large-scale demographic and environmental forces that governed their lives. Intellectual historians tended to favor the qualitative evidence gleaned from the more cohesive letters and libraries of traditional elites, specializing in close readings of the intricate discursive, aesthetic, and spiritual templates of social experience found in religion, science, philosophy, political theory, and art and literature. Both subdisciplines had come into parallel crises by the 1980s, chastened by postmodern attacks on “master narratives” of any kind, whether idealist or materialist. In the decades since, social historians have sought a more nuanced consideration of thought and culture, while intellectual historians have at once broadened the range of their subjects and sources and limited more carefully the claims they make for them. (shrink)

Nicholas Biddle, the president of the Second Bank of the United States during its fateful battle with the Jackson Administration, was the nation’s first true central banker. He was also a prolific writer whose widely followed speeches, reports, and expository letters to editors and legislators made him the nation’s leading spokesperson for the rising power of finance capital. Relating Biddle’s little-studied legal, legislative, and literary experience to his better-known banking career, this paper considers in turn two fundamental problems of early (...) American finance that Biddle confronted. One was a problem of regulation: while they were entrusted with quasi-sovereign authority over the money standard in the early United States, commercial banks could not actually control the circulation and value of the competing currencies they produced. Central banking, as Biddle conceived it, came partly in answer to bankers’ need to regulate the money supply as sovereigns once had. The second problem was one of representation: just when men of little or no property were gaining political power in the United States, and just when ordinary people were coming to rely on monetary transactions in qualitatively new ways, control over the supply of cash and credit was ceded to unelected bankers and faceless corporations. The logic of popular sovereignty appeared increasingly in tension with the sovereign privileges bestowed on state-chartered banks. Biddle’s vision of central banking arose, in large measure, in response to the ideological challenge of justifying the growing authority of banks and bankers in Jacksonian America. (shrink)