This volume explores the range of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy and his relevance to contemporary philosophical traditions.

Understanding the relationship between experts and laypeople is crucial for understanding today’s world of post-truth and the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy. The emergence of post-truth has been linked to various phenomena such as a flawed social and mass media ecosystem, poor citizen education, and the manipulation tactics of powerful interest groups. The paper argues that the problem is, however, more profound. The underlying issue is laypeople’s inevitable epistemic dependence on experts. The latter is part and parcel of the “risk (...) society” in which people question the scientific consensus and thus are able to manipulate the facts. It is a powerful weapon in the hands of illiberal democrats, though liberal democrats can make no use of it. The latter downplay the problem of citizens’ epistemic deficits and of the epistemic asymmetries between them. The third and fourth generations of deliberative democrats are a perfect example. The paper argues that the concepts of interactional expertise and epistemic dependence explain why understanding between experts and laypeople is impossible. The said phenomena undermine liberalism’s unrealistic assumptions concerning citizens’ decision-making competence. (shrink)

Once regarded as cellular ‘debris’ extracellular vesicles (EVs) emerge as one of the most intriguing entities in cancer pathogenesis. Intercellular trafficking of EVs challenges the notion of cancer cell autonomy, and highlights the multicellular nature of such fundamental processes as stem cell niche formation, tumour stroma generation, angiogenesis, inflammation or immunity. Recent studies reveal that intercellular exchange mediated by EVs runs deeper than expected, and includes molecules causative for cancer progression, such as oncogenes (epidermal growth factor receptor, Ras), and tumour (...) suppressors (PTEN). The uptake of oncogenic EVs (oncosomes) by various cells may profoundly change their biology, signalling patterns and gene expression, and in some cases cause their overt tumorigenic conversion. Moreover, EVs circulating in blood and present in body fluids provide an unprecedented access to the molecular circuitry driving cancer cells, and new technologies are being developed to exploit this property as a source of unique cancer biomarkers. (shrink)

Peter Millican and Branden Thornhill-Miller have recently argued that contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with the host of defeaters based on empirical research concerning alleged sources of evidence for ‘perceived supernatural agency’, render all ‘first-order’, that is actual, religious traditions positively irrational, and a source of discord on a global scale. However, since the authors recognise that the ‘secularisation thesis’ appears to be incorrect, and that empirical research provides evidence that religious belief also has beneficial individual and (...) social effects, they put forward a hypothesis of a ‘second-order religious belief ’, with Universalist overtones and thus free of intergroup conflict, and free of irrationality, since supported (solely) by the Fine-Tuning Argument. While granting most of their arguments based on empirical research and embracing the new paradigm of the atheism/religion debate implicit in their paper, I contend that Millican’s and Thornhill-Miller’s proposal is unlikely to appeal to religious believers, because it misconstrues the nature and grounds of religious belief. I suggest that their hypothesis may be refined by taking into account a view of axiologically grounded religious belief that I refer to as ‘agatheism’, since it identifies God or the Ultimate Reality with the ultimate good (to agathon). (shrink)

We are facing a crisis of trust in expertise today. Fewer and fewer people trust experts, and more and more politicians openly ignore expert consensus. 'Democracy in the Post-Truth Era' asks what might happen to democracy if we reject the fundamental liberal assumption that people are capable of making informed choices. The book explores the potential impact on society if people, including politicians, never appreciate the relevance of expert opinions. What if people cannot choose between supporters and opponents of key (...) issues such as the causes of climate change, effectiveness of vaccines and ways of combating economic and social crises? Applying social epistemology to these questions, the book considers whether democracy can be defended in the post-truth era. (shrink)

There exist different kinds of averaging of the differences of the energy–momentum and angular momentum in normal coordinates NC(P) which give tensorial quantities. The obtained averaged quantities are equivalent mathematically because they differ only by constant scalar dimensional factors. One of these averaging was used in our papers [J. Garecki, Rep. Math. Phys. 33, 57 (1993); Int. J. Theor. Phys. 35, 2195 (1996); Rep. Math. Phys. 40, 485 (1997); J. Math. Phys. 40, 4035 (1999); Rep. Math. Phys. 43, 397 (1999); (...) Rep. Math. Phys. 44, 95 (1999); Ann. Phys. (Leipzig) 11, 441 (2002); M.P. Dabrowski and J. Garecki, Class. Quantum. Grar. 19, 1 (2002)] giving the canonical superenergy and angular supermomentum tensors. In this paper we present another averaging of the differences of the energy–momentum and angular momentum which gives tensorial quantities with proper dimensions of the energy–momentum and angular momentum densities. We have called these tensorial quantities “the averaged relative energy–momentum and angular momentum tensors”. These tensors are very closely related to the canonical superenergy and angular supermomentum tensors and they depend on some fundamental length L > 0. The averaged relative energy–momentum and angular momentum tensors of the gravitational field obtained in the paper can be applied, like the canonical superenergy and angular supermomentum tensors, to coordinate independent analysis (local and in special cases also global) of this field. Up to now we have applied the averaged relative energy–momentum tensors to analyze vacuum gravitational energy and momentum and to analyze energy and momentum of the Friedman (and also more general, only homogeneous) universes. The obtained results are interesting, e.g., the averaged relative energy density is positive definite for the all Friedman and other universes which have been considered in this paper. (shrink)

This article attempts to answer the question: what has the current migration crisis revealed in relations between Christianity and Islam, two religions with common Abrahamic roots? What conclusions can be drawn about the state of these relations, particularly with regard to ordinary members of the two religions? How should we assess the reaction of Christians in Europe to the inflow of refugees from Muslim countries in the light of the Gospel, the Second Vatican Council and the teaching of Pope Francis?The (...) article consists of four parts. Part I briefly presents Christian-Muslim relationships over the centuries. Part II focuses on the sense of danger occurring in European societies in connection with the influx of Muslims during the migration crisis. Part III presents the teachings of the Second Vatican Council about Islam and Part IV describes Pope Francis’s attitude towards refugees from Muslim countries. (shrink)

This study investigates performance of portfolios composed of British socially responsible investments (SRI) stocks. Using the ‘Global-100 Most Sustainable Corporations in the World’ list (known also as ‘Global-100’) to select the SRI companies, we found that, in the period 2000–2010, the returns of the SRI portfolios were on average higher compared with the corresponding returns of the market indexes. The annual average difference in returns of the SRI portfolios (with dividends) was 5.26 % and 5.69 % relative to the FTSE100 (...) and FTSE4GOOD indexes (the total return versions), respectively, but the differences in returns in the whole period, in individual years and in other sub-periods were in most cases not statistically significant. Positive performance of SRI stocks in the whole sample is, however, evidenced by risk-adjusted measures such as the modified Sharpe ratio (MSR) and certainty equivalent (CEQ) returns, as well as by incorporating various levels of transaction costs. Furthermore, a simple trading strategy relying on selection of SRI stocks from the Global-100 list would beat the market indexes in the whole period 2000–2010, even after inclusion of various levels of transaction costs. We also estimated the Fama–French and Carhart multi-factor models and found that the returns of the SRI portfolios cannot be consistently explained by conventional factors other than the market factor. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that from the point of view of a theist, inclusivism with respect to the issue whether adherents of different religious traditions can have veridical experience of God (or Ultimate Reality) now, is more plausible than the Alstonian exclusivism. I suggest that mystical inclusivism of the kind I imply in this paper may contribute to the development of cross-cultural philosophy of religion, as well as to the theoretical framework for inter-religious dialogue, because (1) it allows for (...) the possibility of veridical experience of God in a variety of religious traditions, but (2) it avoids the radical revisionist postulates of Hickian pluralism and (3) it leaves open the question whether the creed of any specific tradition is a better approximation to the truth about God than the creeds of other traditions. (edited). (shrink)

Psychological research is based on philosophical assumptions which are not always explicitly formulated. On the other hand, the results of these investigations affect philosophical thinking and the conception of human nature. For a long time it was a ruling conception in psychology that the essence of human nature consists in the existence of driving mechanisms with homeostatic properties drives or needs – which, principally, are inborn mechanisms modified by learning. The analysis of driving mechanisms founded on psychological and neuro-physiological data, (...) brought about a modification of this traditional view. Starting from the concept of need as an objective phenomenon it can be stated that the higher organisms have a special mechanisms securing the satisfaction of needs. They are drives. These mechanisms do not exist in a ready form in man but only potentially, as an ability to organize a functional unit in result of certain experience. The formation of drives includes: making connections between certain internal stimuli and some forms of activity reducing these stimuli; learning how to find things which are necessary to reduce them; and, finally, the acquisition of the ability to give verbal labels to the occurring processes. In consequence, the final form of a drive is determined by biological and social factors as well as by individual experiences. (shrink)

Although it became customary to warn against confusing postmodernism with deconstructionism, it seems plausible to suggest that their central agendas are not dissimilar. Moreover, from the philosophical point of view, it is the idea of the 'deconstruction of meaning' that can be said to constitute the foundation of postmodernism understood here as an intellectual movement. It is true that grounded in the poststructuralist language analysis, deconstructionism seeks primarily to challenge the attempts inherent in the Western philosophical tradition to establish ultimate (...) meaning in a text. However, as one might have anticipated, the deconstruction of meaning of texts provided a basis for a large scale project leading to deconstruction of all 'truths', as conceived in the mainstream philosophical tradition. And it did it by questioning the coherence of the very concept of 'truth'. Eclectic as postmodernism is, it can be recognized by the fundamental assumption that there is no common denominator that guarantees the one-ness of the world, or the possibility of objective or neutral thought. This assumption would suffice to make one expect that postmodernism will challenge the very foundations of any metaphysical or religious system of beliefs. And so it does. In this paper I would like to ellucidate just one way this challange may be construed, poiting to the example of Don Cupitt, the leading exponent of the 'antirealist' critique of the discourse of theism. (shrink)

Although it became customary to warn against confusing postmodernism with deconstructionism, it seems plausible to suggest that their central agendas are not dissimilar. Moreover, from the philosophical point of view, it is the idea of the 'deconstruction of meaning' that can be said to constitute the foundation of postmodernism understood here as an intellectual movement. It is true that grounded in the poststructuralist language analysis, deconstructionism seeks primarily to challenge the attempts inherent in the Western philosophical tradition to establish ultimate (...) meaning in a text. However, as one might have anticipated, the deconstruction of meaning of texts provided a basis for a large scale project leading to deconstruction of all 'truths', as conceived in the mainstream philosophical tradition. And it did it by questioning the coherence of the very concept of 'truth'. Eclectic as postmodernism is, it can be recognized by the fundamental assumption that there is no common denominator that guarantees the one-ness of the world, or the possibility of objective or neutral thought. This assumption would suffice to make one expect that postmodernism will challenge the very foundations of any metaphysical or religious system of beliefs. And so it does. In this paper I would like to ellucidate just one way this challange may be construed, poiting to the example of Don Cupitt, the leading exponent of the 'antirealist' critique of the discourse of theism. (shrink)

The article discusses the philosophical problems associated with the dualistic conception of the person dominant in traditions influenced by Platonism. The key suggestion made in the article is that opting for an embodied rather than a disembodied posthumous existence for the human person will in no way hinder the theistic philosopher when it comes to arguing that God exists in a disembodied form.

W maju 1998 roku odbyła się w Monachium międzynarodowa konferencja poświęcona zagadnieniu racjonalności teizmu. Temat to szeroko dyskutowany w ostatnich czasach, stąd wydawać by się mogło, że zorganizowanie jeszcze jednej sesji, która przyciągnęłaby uwagę środowiska filozofów religii, będzie przedsięwzięciem wyjątkowo trudnym. Tymczasem monachijska debata zasłużyła sobie na miano wydarzenia. O jej atrakcyjności zadecydował fakt, że została pomyślana jako próba ożywienia dialogu pomiędzy filozofami nawiązującymi do tradycji kontynentalnej z przedstawicielami filozofii analitycznej. Tego rodzaju ekumeniczne inicjatywy nalezą w tej dziedzinie do rzadkości. (...) Ten swoisty izolacjonizm ma wiele przyczyn, a kością niezgody jest między innymi stosunek do Kanta. Postkantowska kontynentalna filozofia religii, kładąca nacisk na epistemologię i fenomenologię doświadczenia religijnego, postrzega anglosaski renesans badań nad klasycznymi problemami teodycealnymi jako nawrót do przedkrytycznego dogmatyzmu. Z kolei niektórzy analityczni filozofowie religii zdają się uprawiać swą dyscyplinę w taki sposób, jak gdyby kopernikański przewrót Kanta uważali za niebyły, a czasem nazywają expressis verbis epoką nowożytną okresem błędów i wypaczeń. Epistemologiczne zagadnienie racjonalności religii należy do kręgu zainteresowań obydwu wymienionych tradycji, stad możliwe jest tu połączenie wysiłków w celu uporządkowania tematyki i oceny aktualnego stanu refleksji. (shrink)

Does the alleged religious experience of a mystic constitute a reliable source of knowledge about the object of his or her experience? Or does it rationally justify a move from such experience to meaningful beliefs about God or the Absolute which is supposed to be the object of that experience? And are religious beliefs in need of being grounded in religious experience in order to be rationally justified? Although it seems pretty obvious that a great many adherents of all religions (...) find reasons for their beliefs in their religious traditions rather than in their personal religious experiences, one could note that usually these traditions present religious experiences of their founder figures as constituting evidence for their authenticity and truthfulness ; the supposed mystical experiences of some adherents of a given religious tradition are often treated by their co-believers as an important evidence which increases credibility of their own religious convictions. (shrink)

Rezultaty badan filozofów religii związanych z nurtem analitycznym są w naszym kraju mało znane, w każdym razie znacznie mniej, niż na to zasługują. Tłumaczenia prac zaliczanych już do klasyki w tej dziedzinie badan filozoficznych można policzyć na palcach jednej ręki. Są to następujące pozycje: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Uwagi o religii i etyce; John L. Mackie, Cud teizmu; John Hick, Argumenty za istnieniem Boga; Alvin C. Plantinga, Bóg, wolność, zło; Richard Swinburne, Spójność teizmu, oraz cenna antologia ważniejszych esejów wydana w serii: Fragmenty (...) filozofii analitycznej pod zbiorczym tytułem: Filozofia religii. Niedawno nakładem PWN, w cyklu publikacji z szeroko pojętego religioznawstwa, ukazał się przekład pierwszej pracy, którą można traktować jako elementarne wprowadzenie do zagadnień podejmowanych przez analityczną filozofię religii. (shrink)

Research on natural and artificial brains is proceeding at a rapid pace. However, the understanding of the essence of consciousness has changed slightly over the millennia, and only the last decade has brought some progress to the area. Scientific ideas emerged that the soul could be a product of the material body and that calculating machines could imitate brain processes. However, the authors of this book reject the previously common dualism—the view that the material and spiritual-psychic processes are separate and (...) require a completely different substance as their foundation. -/- Reductive Model of the Conscious Mind is a forward-thinking book wherein the authors identify processes that are the essence of conscious thinking and place them in the imagined, simplified structure of cells able to memorize and transmit information in the form of impulses, which they call neurons. The purpose of the study is to explain the essence of consciousness to the degree of development of natural sciences, because only the latter can find a way to embed the concept of the conscious mind in material brains. The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 works to convince readers that the emergence of consciousness does not require detailed knowledge of the structure and morphology of the brain, with the exception of some specific properties of the neural network structure that the authors attempt to point out. Part 2 proves that the biological structure of many natural brains fulfills the necessary conditions for consciousness and intelligent thinking. Similarly, Part 3 shows the ways in which artificial creatures imitating natural brains can meet these conditions, which gives great hopes for building artificially intelligent beings endowed with consciousness. Covering topics that include cognitive architecture, the embodied mind, and machine learning, this book is ideal for cognitive scientists, philosophers of mind, neuroscientists, psychologists, researchers, academicians, and advanced-level students. The book can also help to focus the research of linguists, neurologists, and biophysicists on the biophysical basis of postulated information processing into knowledge structures. (shrink)

In the late forties, Stanisław Jaśkowski published two papers onthe discursive sentential calculus, D2. He provided a definition of it by an interpretation in the language of S5 of Lewis. The knownaxiomatization of D2 with discursive connectives as primitives was introduced by da Costa, Dubikajtis and Kotas in 1977. It turns out, however,that one of the axioms they used is not a thesis of the real Jaśkowski’s calculus. In fact, they built a new system, D∗2 for short, that differs from (...) D2 inmany respects. The aim of this paper is to introduce a direct Kripke-type semantics for the system, axiomatize it in a new way and prove soundness andcompleteness theorems. Additionally, we present labelled tableaux for D∗2.1. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a calculus of paraconsistent logic. We propose an axiomatisation and a semantics for the calculus, and prove several important meta-theorems. The calculus, denoted as CB1, is an extension of systems PI, C min and B1, and a proper subsystem of Sette’s calculus P1. We also investigate the generalization of CB1 to the hierarchy of related calculi.

This book is both suitable for logically and algebraically minded graduate and advanced graduate students of mathematics, computer science and philosophy, and ...