Normal 0 21 false false false ET X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Man könnte sagen, dass Aristoteles so etwas wie eine traditionelle und dominierende Auffassung der Entscheidung in der westlichen Philosophie gründet. Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, diese Auffassung von Aristoteles zu entwerfen, einige ihrer wichtigsten (...) Probleme anzusprechen, und sie damit zu kontrastieren, was ich Jacques Derridas häretische „Konzeptualisierung“ der Entscheidung nennen würde. Es wird gezeigt, dass diese häretische Thematisierung von Derrida nicht nur und einfach mit dem traditionellen aristotelischen Begriff bricht, sondern vielmehr auch zu Recht einige seiner wichtigsten Züge auf solcher Weise schärft, dass von diesem radikalisierten Standpunkt die Behandlung von Aristoteles als die Annullierung der Entscheidung zum Vorschein kommt. Es wird zudem impliziert, wie Derridas häretische Auffassung die Erneuerung der Ethik und Politik mit sich bringt. Normal 0 21 false false false ET X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} It might be said that Aristotle institutes something like a traditional and dominating concept of decision in the philosophical tradition of the West. The aim of this article is to outline that concept of Aristotle, touching on some of its most important problems, and contrast it with what I would call Jacques Derrida’s heretical understanding of decision. It will be shown that this heretical “conceptualization” by Derrida doesn’t simply and merely break with, or depart and differ from, the traditional Aristotelian concept but rather also justifiably sharpens some of its most central features in such a way that from that radicalized point of view the treatment of Aristotle comes to appear as the very annulment of decision. It is moreover implied how Derrida’s heretical understanding of decision entails a renewal of ethics and politics. (shrink)

In my article, I delineate Friedrich Nietzsche’s influence on Estonian intellectual landscape. As it turns out, this influence has been quite remarkable and extends from literature to politics. I start with outlining several orientations of the reception of Nietzsche’s thought in the world and then suggest that with one exception, all those orientations are to some extent also present in Estonian Nietzsche reception. Nietzsche’s reception in Estonia started rather early and one can say that he was somewhat known in Tallinn (...) as well as in Tartu even in his lifetime. The first attempt to translate one of his works into Estonian was made already in 1901. Till the Soviet occupation in 1940, Nietzsche’s thought was rather actively appropriated by Estonian writers, intellectuals and even politicians. In Soviet Union, Nietzsche was prohibited and his works were not freely accessible in public libraries. With the restoration of Estonia’s independence in the beginning of 90s, a new, fresh and active wave of Nietzsche reception also begun. New translations appeared and the reception was generally more faithful and philosophical than in the first period. (shrink)

Nietzsche is known as a great and poignant critic of the Judeo-Christian virtue and morality, but the motivation and aim of his criticisms might sometimes remain unclear. For instance, in _Twilight of the Idols_, he writes: “Are we harming virtue, we immoralists? – Just as little as anarchists _harm_ princes. Princes sit securely on their thrones only after they've been shot at. Moral: _morality must be shot at_.” This saying seems to suggest that Nietzsche criticized and attacked traditional virtue and (...) morality in order to consolidate and strengthen them. In the article, I provide an interpretation of this saying and, in the course of it, approach Nietzsche’s reconceptualization of virtue and morality more generally. (shrink)