An anthology of basic statements by the most influential social and political philosophers of Western civilization. Includes Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Mill, Marx and Engels, Hitler, Gandhi, and others.

When Reid wrote An Inquiry Into The Human Mind, On The Principles Of Common Sense the term ‘common sense’ had long been in use in something like its ordinary sense today. Prompted no doubt by Priestley’s criticism that he had “made an innovation in the received use” of the term he devoted a chapter of his Essays On The Intellectual Powers Of Man to the use of the term: “All that is intended in this chapter is to explain the meaning (...) of common sense, that it may not be treated, as it has been by some, as a new principle, or as a word without any meaning.” He cites what he calls “testimonies” from Berkeley, Hume and others. Pointedly, he even quotes Priestley, concluding “whatever censure is thrown upon those who have spoke of common sense as a principle of knowledge, or who have appealed to it in matters that are self-evident, will fall light, when there are so many to share in it”. Though he himself thought that his use of the term was not new, he developed an account—a theory, if you like—of common sense going clearly beyond ordinary conceptions. Unfortunately, many of his arguments against philosophical scepticism are missed owing to the distraction caused by this theory of common sense. I want to explore how far it is dispensable. (shrink)

Let us invoke philosophic license for a moment to suppose you receive the following letter:“Dear Sir:I am taking the liberty of calling upon you to be the judge in a dispute between me and an acquaintance who is no longer a friend. The question at issue is this: Is my creation, umbrellaology, a science? Allow me to explain this situation. For the past eighteen years, assisted by a few faithful disciples, I have been collecting materials on a subject hitherto almost (...) wholly neglected by scientists, the umbrella. The results of my investigations to date are embodied in the nine volumes which I am sending to you under separate cover. Pending their receipt, let me describe to you briefly the nature of their contents and the method I pursued in compiling them. I began on the Island of Manhattan. Proceeding block by block, house by house, family by family and individual by individual I ascertained 1) the number of umbrellas possessed, 2) their size, 3) their weight, 4) their color. Having covered Manhattan after many years, I eventually extended the survey to the other boroughs of the City of New York, and at length completed the entire city. Thus I was ready to carry forward the work to the rest of the state and indeed the rest of the United States and the whole known world. (shrink)

The argument presented on behalf of ‘the slightest philosophy’ by Hume that ‘The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration’, in contrasting the seen with the real table requires the first relative clause to be defining; but the possibility of identifying tables independently of being seen requires the clause to be non-defining. John P. Wright's objection to Reid's rejoinder is rebutted. A similarly (...) worded argument in Alciphron avoids confusion since Berkeley denies that things like tables can be said in any unqualified sense to be seen. (Published Online February 27 2006). (shrink)

The question, R. M. Hare concedes, “has assumed great importance in the thought of some philosophers, for example Cook Wilson and Collingwood.” A concession, because after a couple of sentences Hare concludes: “we need say no more about questions.” The implication is that in contrast with his two Oxford predecessors the topic has little importance in his philosophy. This isn’t quite so, it will be seen. But it is in line with a tendency among philosophers to relegate the topic, often (...) quite literally, to a footnote. They would be wiser to take questions more seriously; not least because any theory of meaning which connects meaning in some way to the concept of truth—as most do—has to explain how interrogative sentences, which cannot sensibly be said to express what is true or false, can yet have a meaning. Questions also present a challenge to the easy assumption that all thought is either true or false. Even to think of something, it can be argued, is to think that certain descriptions are true of it: to think of a cat is to think of something as having four legs, fur, and so forth. Collingwood’s way of meeting the challenge isn’t immediately apparent. In An Autobiography he does seem to reject the assumption. (shrink)

Critique of idealistic naturalism: methodological pollution in the main stream of American philosophy, by D. Riepe.--Ex nihilo nihil fit: philosophy's "starting point," by D. H. DeGrood.--An historical critique of empiricism, by J. E. Hansen.--Epilogue on Berkeley, by R. W. Sellars.--Mandala thinking, by A. Mackay.--An empirical conception of freedom, by E. D'Angelo.--Heidegger on the essence of truth, by M. Farber.--Minding as a material force, by H. L. Parsons.--The crisis of the 1890's and the shaping of twentieth century America, by R. B. (...) Carson.--Ideology, scientific philosophy, and Marxism, by J. Somerville.--Marx and critical scientific thought, by M. Marković.--Experimentalism extended to politics, by E. Guevara.--The unity of opposites: a dialectical principle, by V. J. McGill and W. T. Parry.--A need definition of "value," by R. Handy.--Alienation and social action, by A. Schaff.--Naturalism in the Tao of Confucius and Lao Tzu, by D. H.-F. Poe.--Bibliography (p. 260-269). (shrink)

ABSTRACT Whether reverse discrimination is justifiable cannot be determined, it is argued, until what is meant by ‘reverse discrimination’ has been. Recent talk of ‘reverse discrimination’ and ‘discrimination in favour of’ suggests that there are some new sorts of discrimination. But the two qualifications ‘reverse’ and ‘in favour of’ seem often to be confused in so far as it is assumed that reverse discrimination is only in favour of. After noting differences between the use of ‘discrimination’ in fiscal contexts—where the (...) phrase ‘discrimination in favour of’ has an established usage—and in political contexts, a sense of the phrase to fit the latter is proposed: to discriminate in favour of a group is to favour it at the expense of some other group so that the other group is discriminated against. The meaning of the qualification ‘reverse’ is then sought. Ambiguities in the terms ‘reverse’ and ‘compensatory’ are noted. In so far as policies described as being reverse discrimination are genuinely discriminatory, for it is not clear from their characterisation that they need constitute discrimination of any sort, it is only within a historical context that they can be distinguished from the old sort of discrimination. It is thus concluded that there are no new sorts of discrimination. (shrink)

In recent years American legislatures and other governing bodies, public and private, have been considering, probably more frequently than ever before, problems associated with the idea of overthrow of government by force and violence. The question usually takes the form of whether Communists believe in and advocate this doctrine; and, if they do, whether they should therefore be penalized in various ways. This issue is and has been central to a series of legal actions which, whatever their ultimate outcome, will (...) constitute a landmark in the history of American jurisprudence. (shrink)

The question, R. M. Hare concedes, “has assumed great importance in the thought of some philosophers, for example Cook Wilson and Collingwood.” A concession, because after a couple of sentences Hare concludes: “we need say no more about questions.” The implication is that in contrast with his two Oxford predecessors the topic has little importance in his philosophy. This isn’t quite so, it will be seen. But it is in line with a tendency among philosophers to relegate the topic, often (...) quite literally, to a footnote. They would be wiser to take questions more seriously; not least because any theory of meaning which connects meaning in some way to the concept of truth—as most do—has to explain how interrogative sentences, which cannot sensibly be said to express what is true or false, can yet have a meaning. Questions also present a challenge to the easy assumption that all thought is either true or false. Even to think of something, it can be argued, is to think that certain descriptions are true of it: to think of a cat is to think of something as having four legs, fur, and so forth. Collingwood’s way of meeting the challenge isn’t immediately apparent. In An Autobiography he does seem to reject the assumption. (shrink)