In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Authorship ofthe Abstract Revisited David Raynor In a recent issue ofHume Studies, J. 0¿ Nelson challenges the received view that Hume himself composed the Abstract, and argues instead that we know that Adam Smith wrote it.1 But his main argument is so blatantly fallacious that charity requires that we interpret his intervention as ajeu d'esprit. I have no idea why he wishes to tease Hume scholars so (...) mercilessly. Most probably he wishes to keep the issue of the authorship of the Abstract alive until either someone disproves his belief that Smith wrote the pamphlet, or the scholarly community comes round to accepting Smith as the real author. Whatever his motive, I intend here to squelch his mischievous conjecture once and for all. Nelson first sought to cast doubt on Hume's authorship of the Abstract in an article published in The Philosophical Quarterly for 1976. In the fifteen years since that paper appeared, he has become convinced that Smith wrote the pamphlet. It was not always so. Here is how he judiciously concluded his earlier article: "According to the external evidence it is most improbable that Hume was the author of the Abstract and it is plausible to suppose that Adam Smith was; but according to the internal evidence, it is most improbable that Adam Smith was its author and almost certain that Hume was. How these incompatible conclusions are to be resolved I have no idea." 2 Nelson now has no doubt that any such discomfort should be resolved by allowing the external evidence tooutweigh the internal, becausehehas come to regard the external evidence as showing that it is not simply improbable that Hume wrote the work, but downright impossible. Nelson'sentire case rests on theidentityofthe "Mr Smith"referred to in a letter of 4 March, 1740 from Hume at Ninewells to Professor Francis Hutcheson at Glasgow. The crucial passage reads: My Bookseller has sent toMr Smith aCopy ofmy Book, which I hope he has received, as well as your Letter. I have not yet heard whathe has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but not in the WOrAe ofthe Learned; therehavingbeen an article with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up the Abstract.3 Volume XTX Number 1 213 DAVID RAYNOR Until Keynes and Sraffa argued otherwise in their 1938 edition of the Abstract, some scholars believed that Adam Smith was the "Mr Smith" referred to in H, and that he wrote theAbstract at Hutcheson's suggestion. Keynes and Sraffainstead argued that the "MrSmith"was John Smith, Hutcheson's Dublin pubUsher, and that Hume himself wrote the Abstract (as all the internal evidence suggests). Norman Kemp Smith, in a review ofKeynes and Sraffa's edition, accepted their interpretation.4 Now Nelson seeks to prove all of them wrong. He argues thus: the "Mr Smith" in His eitherJohn Smith or Adam Smith; itcan'tbeJohn Smith;thereforeitmustbeAdamSmith.We canreadily agree with Nelson that the "Mr Smith" was notJohn Smith the Dublin publisher. But it will not follow—as Nelson supposes—that the man referred to must have been Adam Smith who, at the time, was still an undergraduate at Glasgow. "But ifthe Mr Smith ofH was not John Smith... who could he be excepttheAdam Smithofthe traditional theory?" asks Nelson.6 1have elsewhere suggested that the man in question was William Smith, one ofthepublishers oftheAmsterdam periodicalBibliothèqueraisonnée.6 Hutcheson'sInquiry had been pubUshed in Dublin by John Smith andWilliam Smith. The latter subsequently moved to Amsterdam and married into the Wetstein pubhshing family. William Smith was responsible for directing the firm's periodical, the Bibliothèque raisonnée, which employed Pierre Desmaizeaux as its London correspondent. The issue of this periodical for April-June, 1735, published aletterfrom Hutcheson tohis "ancien & intimeAmi"William Smith concerning Robert Simson's book on conic sections. In light ofH, it is probable that copies of the first two books of the Treatise, a manuscript copy oftheAbstract, and aletterfrom Hutcheson were sent to WilUam Smith in early 1740. The April-May-June issue of the Bibliothèqueraisonnée for 1740 published a largely favourable review of the first... (shrink)

David R. Raynor - On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations : A Philosophical Companion - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 365-366 Samuel Fleischacker. On Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. xvii + 329. Cloth, $39.50. Adam Smith's fame now rests primarily upon his Wealth of Nations of 1776, which did not receive much attention until Prime Minister Pitt praised it in Parliament (...) in 1791. Before then Smith's reputation was almost entirely based upon his Theory of Moral Sentiments of 1759. Fleischacker begins this "philosophical companion" to WN with the observation that "Adam Smith was a philosopher before he was a social scientist, yet it remains unclear to this day what.. (shrink)

The title The Imprisoned Splendour derives from the author's conviction that there is a world of unfolding "spiritual" potentiality interpenetrating the world of matter, and that to understand ourselves, and our relationship to nature and the creatures of the physical world we inhabit, this interpenetration must be philosophically considered. In this book, physicist, Raynor Johnson explores natural science, psychical research and mystical experience. The book is valuable for the serious and casual reader alike or anyone wishing to explore the (...) mystical world of paranormal phenomena. Telepathy, clairvoyance, clairaudience, telekinesis, poltergeist phenomena, phantoms of the living and the dead, trance phenomena, automatic writing, and the evidence for the "etheric body" are all discussed, Johnson the Scientist is clearly a mystic at heart, and this makes for fascinating reading; No stone is left unturned and theological dogma is cast aside. Pre-existence is discussed in depth. Johnson explains, "If the general conception of evolution be regarded as applicable to the soul as well as to the physical world, it is not either improbable or unreasonable that the soul should adventure forth into the physical world in a newly-built body to acquire further experience of the kind which this world can provide. The fact that the soul has done so once was presumably for adequate and compelling reasons, and whatever these are, it is apparent that more might be gained by a series of such incarnations." The imprisoned Splendour is deeply impressive and now considered a classic in psychical research literature. (shrink)

Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.

This, the last of Raynor Johnson's book, is based on a series of lectures delivered in America and London. In his gentle style he draws upon more than eighty years of life experience, during half of which his thinking bridged both science and philosophy.

Aristotle is widely regarded as the greatest of all philosophers; indeed, he is traditionally referred to simply as `the philosopher'. Today, after more than two millennia, his arguments and ideas continue to stimulate philosophers and provoke them to controversy. In this book J.L. Ackrill conveys the force and excitement of Aristotle's philosophical investigations, thereby showing why contemporary philosophers still draw from him and return to him. He quotes extensively from Aristotle's works in his own notably clear English translation, and a (...) picture emerges of a lucid, lively, subtle and tough-minded thinker of astonishing range and penetration. Professor Ackrill identifies many striking connections between Aristotle's ideas and ideas in recent philosophy; he also raises philosophical questions of his own, and exemplifies the way in which Aristotle can still be argued with and learned from. (shrink)

This article reprints the text of a review of adam smith's "theory of moral sentiments", And presents arguments for ascribing it to david hume. Hume's subsequent criticism of what he called "the hinge" of adam smith's moral system ("viz." that "all kinds of sympathy are necessarily agreeable") is also examined, And it is argued that smith failed to appreciate the nature and extent of this criticism. It is concluded that "the hinge" of smith's novel theory is a false assumption; yet (...) without it smith cannot present a viable alternative to hume's explanation of the origin of our moral sentiments. (shrink)

A historical investigation of the exclusion of Africa and Asia from modern histories of philosophy.

This comprehensive and important volume includes contributions by activists, journalists, lawyers and scholars from twenty-one countries. The essays map the directions the movement for women's rights is taking--and will take in the coming decades--and the concomittant transformation of prevailing notions of rights and issues. They address topics such as the rapes in former Yugoslavia and efforts to see that a War Crimes Tribunal responds; domestic violence; trafficking of women into the sex trade; the persecution of lesbians; female genital mutilation; and (...) reproductive rights. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:164. HUME'S MISTAKE — ANOTHER GUESS Richard Price's first biographer reports that David Hume once "candidly acknowledged that on one point Mr. Price had succeeded in convincing him that his arguments were inconclusive; but it does not appear that Mr. Hume, in consequence of this conviction, made any alteration in the subsequent edition of his Essays." It has 2 been suggested that Hume's avowed mistake is to be found (...) in his 'Of Miracles', a section of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding which is severely criticized in the 3 fourth of Price's Four Dissertations. This suggestion receives some support from Hume's generous response to Price's criticism: I own to you, that the Light in which you have put this Controversy, is new and plausible and ingenious, and perhaps solid. But I must have some more time to weigh it, before I can pronounce this Judgment with Satisfaction to myself. My present Occupations shall not deprive me of the Leizure requisite for that Purpose; as no Object can possibly have equal Importance. However, there is no evidence that after studying Price's arguments Hume came to regard them as "solid" and his own as inconclusive or mistaken. The fact that Hume never revised his essay on miracles in order to accommodate Price's criticisms seems good evidence that that work does not contain Hume's mistake. Most fortunately there is another plausible candidate. In A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals Price criticized several of Hume's philosophical conclusions and arguments, including the central argument of A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I Part IV Section I ('Of scepticism with regard to reason'). This very complicated argument is a novel application of John Craig's "celebrated argument against the Christian Religion." Price summarizes and then criticizes Hume's argument as follows: 165. In every judgment we can form, besides the uncertainty attending the original consideration of the subject itself; there is another derived from the consideration of the fallibility of our faculties, and the past instances in which we have been mistaken; to which must be added a third uncertainty, derived from the possibility of error in this estimation we make of the fidelity of our faculties; and to this a fourth of the same kind, and so on in infinitum; till at last the first evidence, by a constant diminution of it, must be reduced to nothing. See Mr. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Vol. I. p. 315, & c. As much of this strange reasoning as is not above my comprehension, proves just the reverse of what was intended by it. For let it be acknowledged, that the consideration of the fallibility of our understandings, and the instances in which they have deceived us, necessarily diminishes our assurance of the rectitude of our sentiments ; the subsequent reflection on the uncertainty attending this judgment which we make of our faculties, diminishes not, but contributes to restore to its first strength, our original assurance; because the more precarious a judgment or probability unfavourable to another appears, the less must be its effect in weakening it. Hume's argument has been described as "one of the worst arguments ever to impose itself on a man of genius." Moreover, Hume himself may have become dissatisfied with it, 166. for it appears to be the only major argument of Treatise I_ which he did not recast in some form in his post-Treatise 0 writings. If Price's criticism is telling, then Hume probably would have readily acknowledged that his juvenile argument in 'Of scepticism with regard to reason' was mistaken. David Raynor Mount Allison University 1.William Morgan, Memoirs of the Life of The Rev. Richard Price, D.D., F. R. S. (London, 1815) 16f. 2.Bernard Peach, "Hume's Mistake", Journal of the History of Ideas XLI (1980), 331-334. See also Price-Priestly Newsletter, No. 2 (1978), 76-81. 3.Four Dissertations. (London, 1767). For a brief account of Price's Bayesian critique of Hume's views on miracles see Bernard Peach, "Miracles, Methodology, and Metaphysical Rationalism", International Journal for Philosophy of Religion IX (1978), 69-74. 4.Hume to Price, 18 March 1767: New Letters of David... (shrink)

It has commonly been assumed that the work of four books by Moeragenes on Apollonius of Tyana, to which Philostratus refers disparagingly when discussing the source material for his own work, represented a viewpoint hostile to the sage, and was for this reason discarded by Philostratus. Hand in hand with this assumption has gone the view that Moeragenes presented Apollonius as an undesirable μγος, a wizard and sorcerer, or even a charlatan pretending to be a μγος. These views have recently (...) been challenged by E. L. Bowie, who rejects both, arguing not only that Moeragenes was favourable to Apollnius, but also that he presented him as an intellectual philosopher, a figure instantly recognisable from Philostratus' account. This leaves Bowie in some difficulty when he attempts to explain Philostratus' strong disapproval of Moeragenes' work. His only suggestion is that ‘the main reason for Philostratus’ hostile attitude is clearly the usual ground for ancient polemic: Moeragenes' was the standard work when he wrote'. In this paper I propose to argue, on the basis of a re-examination of the available evidence, that there was a considerable divergence between Philostratus' and Moeragenes' views of Apollonius, and that this offers a more substantial and satisfactory explanation of the later author's disapproval of his predecessor. (shrink)

Philosophers no longer argue whether Hume ever read Berkeley, yet some remain puzzled as to why so little of Berkeley appears in Hume's works. Professor Popkin has remarked that even “where Hume and Berkeley come closest to discussing the same subject or holding the same view, Hume neither uses Berkeley's terms nor refers to him.” An apparent exception to this generalization is Berkeley's doctrine ofminima sensibilia, for both philosophers use this term to denote indivisible sensible points, and both invoke such (...) points in order to show that sensible extension is not infinitely divisible. Yet it has been suggested that, although Berkeley and Hume employ the same terms, they nevertheless maintain different doctrines: Hume'sminimaare unextended, whereas Berkeley's are extended. (shrink)

This paper is in four parts. The first sets out the debate between those who wished England to have only a professional army, and those who sought to supplement it with a citizen militia. This debate is crucial for understanding The History of the Proceedings in the Case of Margaret, Commonly Called Peg, Only Lawful Sister to John Bull, Esq. This political satire (commonly known as Sister Peg) is about the successful struggle to re-establish the militia in England in 1757, (...) and the unsuccessful attempt to extend the measure to Scotland. Adam Ferguson was in favour of Scotland having a militia, whereas some have claimed that Hume was against it. It is argued that Hume supported the measure. In the second part Sister Peg is briefly compared to Dr John Arbuthnot’s The History of John Bull, of which it is an imitation and sequel. In the third part the issue of the disputed authorship of Sister Peg is considered at length and Hume’s claim to have written it is compared to the Rev. Alexander Carlyle’s account that Ferguson alone wrote the work. Which of the two accounts is reliable? Richard B. Sher, in an article in this journal, assumes that Carlyle’s account is reliable, and takes issue with my arguments for reattributing the satire to Hume. It is argued that none of his arguments is successful, and that simply assuming the reliability of Carlyle’s account begs the question. In the fourth part some emendations made by Ferguson in his copy of Sister Peg are set out so that readers may see for themselves that they are almost certainly non-authorial. (shrink)

In 1974 R W Connon discovered a copy of "Treatise" III bearing Hume's autograph alterations. I argue ("contra" connon and nidditch) that Hume's corrections are of no philosophical significance. I also comment on Hume's relationship with Hutcheson.

Presents general information about meteorology, weather, and climate and includes more than thirty activities to help study these topics, including making a ...

This paper argues that for the purposes of any sort of serious discussion about immoral conduct in sport very little is illuminated by claiming that the conduct in question is cheating. In fact, describing some behavior as cheating is typically little more than expressing strong, but thoroughly vague and imprecise, moral disapproval or condemnation of another person or institution about a wide and ill-defined range of improper advantage-seeking behavior. Such expressions of disapproval fail to distinguish cheating from many other types (...) of immoral conduct. The discussion shows that we should set the concept aside and assess the moral disapproval implied by claims of cheating by reference to the moral and other principles that underlie the practice of sport. This allows us to consider carefully the complexity of the issues that are raised when allegations of cheating are made and not be distracted by the emotionally loaded, conversation-stopping tendency of the concept. This means that some types of disputes in sport will be messy and demand more effort to resolve, but the payoff will be better informed and more thoughtful discussions and greater awareness of the moral complexity of sport and of its principled underpinnings. (shrink)

Isaac Newton wrote the manuscript Questiones quaedam philosophicae at the very beginning of his scientific career. This small notebook thus affords rare insight into the beginnings of Newton's thought and the foundations of his subsequent intellectual development. The Questiones contains a series of entries in Newton's hand that range over many topics in science, philosophy, psychology, theology, and the foundations of mathematics. These notes, written in English, provide a very detailed picture of Newton's early interests, and record his critical appraisal (...) of contemporary issues in natural philosophy. Written predominantly in 1664-5, they give a significant perspective on Newton's thought just prior to his annus mirabilis, 1666. This volume provides a complete transcription of the Questiones, together with an 'expansion' into modern English, and a full editorial commentary on the content and significance of the notebook in the development of Newton's thought. It will be essential reading for all those interested in Newton and the intellectual foundations of science. (shrink)

The first English translation of Fichte’s second set of 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre.

v. 1. Nicomachean ethics. Politics. The Athenian Constitution. Rhetoric. On Poetics.--v. 2. Logic.--v. 3. Physics. Metaphysics. On the soul. Short physical treaties.--v. 4. On the heavens. On generation and corruption. Meteorology. Biological treatises.

The posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is the most likely site where egocentric spatial relationships are represented in the brain. PPC cells receive visual, auditory, somaesthetic, and vestibular sensory inputs; oculomotor, head, limb, and body motor signals; and strong motivational projections from the limbic system. Their discharge increases not only when an animal moves towards a sensory target, but also when it directs its attention to it. PPC lesions have the opposite effect: sensory inattention and neglect. The PPC does not seem (...) to contain a “map” of the location of objects in space but a distributed neural network for transforming one set of sensory vectors into other sensory reference frames or into various motor coordinate systems. Which set of transformation rules is used probably depends on attention, which selectively enhances the synapses needed for making a particular sensory comparison or aiming a particular movement. (shrink)