The essays in this collection, many originally presented at a 2008 colloquium on Celtic Cosmology and the Power of Words, aim to examine the worldviews held by the Celtic peoples, particularly the Gaelic (Irish and Scottish) perspectives. Texts and inscriptions, some of them pre-Christian, in Celtic languages and in Celtic Latin provide the sources for the worldviews under study. This area of research is also linked to that of the power of words, which refers to human belief in powerful speech (...) acts. Naming and story-telling processes convey knowledge of the cosmos; this knowledge is connected to the landscape and its roads, rivers, mountains and hills. Cosmology is a description of the order and structure of the world as perceived by human beings, and its study is a study of layers – in the earth, in the language and in the tales. (shrink)

Context: The idea for this article sprang from a desire to revive a conversation with the late Ernst von Glasersfeld on the heuristic function - and epistemological status - of forms of ideations that resist linguistic or empirical scrutiny. A close look into the uses of humor seemed a thread worth pursuing, albeit tenuous, to further explore some of the controversies surrounding the evocative power of the imaginal and other oblique forms of knowing characteristic of creative individuals. Problem: People generally (...) respond to humor, i.e., they are inclined to smile at things they find funny. People like to crack jokes, make puns, and, starting at age two, human infants engage in pretense or fantasy play. Research on creativity, on the other hand, has mostly scorned the trickster within. Cognitivists in particular are quick to relegate wit, whimsy, and even playfulness to the ranks of artful or poetic frivolities. Method: We use the emblems of the craftsman, the trickster, and the poet to highlight some of the oblique ways of knowing by which creative thinkers bring forth new insights. Each epitomizes dimensions intrinsic to the art of “possibilizing.” Taken together, they help us better understand what it means to be playful beyond curious, rigorous beyond reasonable, and why this should matter, even to constructivists! Results: The musings characteristic of creative individuals speak to intelligent beings’ ability to use glitches intentionally or serendipitously as a means to open up possibilities; to hold on to a thought before spelling it out; and to resist treating words or images as conventional and arbitrary signs regardless of their evocative power. To fall into nominalism, Bachelard insisted, is a poet’s nightmare! Implications: Psyche is image, said Jung, and when we feel alive we rely on the imaginal to guide our reason. Note that image is not here to be understood as a picture in the head or a photographic snapshot of the world. The imaginal does not represent, it brings forth what we understand beyond words. It does not lock us into a single mode. Instead, it is a call to be mindful, in Ellen Langer’s sense: in the present, mentally alert, and on the outlook for our psyche’s own surprising wisdom (sagacity. Constructivist content: Debates on the heuristic function and epistemological status of oblique ways of knowing have long occupied constructivist scholars. I can only guess whether my uses of Jung’s imaginal or Bachelard’s anti-nominalism would have amused or exasperated Ernst! I do know that, on occasion, Ernst the connoisseur, bricoleur, and translator allowed the rationalist-within to include the poet’s power to evoke as a legitimate form of rationality. He himself has written about oblique knowing as legit! (shrink)

Philosophers who discuss the emotions have usually treated amusement as a non-emotional mental state. Two prominent philosophers making this claim are Henri Bergson and John Morreall, who maintain that amusement is too abstract and intellectual to qualify as an emotion. Here, the merit of this claim is assessed. Through recent work in neuroanatomy there is reason to doubt the legitimacy of dichotomies that separate emotion and the intellect. Findings suggest that the neuroanatomical structure of amusement is similar (...) to other commonly recognized emotion states. On the basis of these it is argued that amusement should be considered an emotion. (shrink)

I argue that genuine moral flaws never enhance amusement, but they sometimes detract.I argue against comic immoralism--the position that moral flaws can make attempts at humor more amusing.Two common errors have made immoralism look attractive.First, immoralists have confused outrageous content with genuine moral flaws.Second, immoralists have failed to see that it is not sufficient to show that a morally flawed joke is amusing; they need to show that a joke can be more amusing because of the fact that it (...) is morally flawed.I argue that the immoralist lacks a plausible account of how this could be the case.I reject immoralism and argue for comic moralism—the position that moral flaws can make attempts at humor less amusing. (shrink)

Some evolutionary psychologists claim that humans are good at creating superstimuli, and that many pleasure technologies are detrimental to our reproductive fitness. Most of the evolutionary psychological literature makes use of some version of Lorenz and Tinbergen’s largely embryonic conceptual framework to make sense of supernormal stimulation and bias exploitation in humans. However, the early ethological concept “superstimulus” was intimately connected to other erstwhile core ethological notions, such as the innate releasing mechanism, sign stimuli and the fixed action pattern, notions (...) that nowadays have, for the most part, been discarded by ethologists. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we will reconnect the discussion of superstimuli in humans with more recent theoretical ethological literature on stimulus selection and supernormal stimulation. This will allow for a reconceptualisation of evolutionary psychology’s formulation of (supernormal) stimulus selection in terms of domain-specificity and modularity. Second, we will argue that bias exploitation in a cultural species differs substantially from bias exploitation in non-cultural animals. We will explore several of those differences, and explicate why they put important constraints on the use of the superstimulus concept in the evolutionary social sciences. (shrink)

This volume offers twelve original essays that explore the moral quagmire that is the emotion of amusement. It considers its moral psychology a range of perspectives, going as far back as ancient Chinese and Greek philosophy up to the most current psychological and sociological findings.

With the development of social media, advertising has migrated from traditional media to social media. Marketers are increasingly using social media’s brand pages to actively create humorous dialogue interactions with other brands for brand communication to achieve positive business outcomes. Especially brand-to-brand’s aggressive humor dialogue can also be an effective brand communication strategy. Based on benign violation theory, we have studied the influence mechanism and boundary condition of the brand-to-brand’s aggressive humor styles on consumer engagement behavioral intention in social media (...) context. Through experiments, it is indicated that low-aggressive humor could promote consumer engagement behavioral intention more than high-aggressive humor. Benign appraisal mediates the relationship between low-aggressive humor and consumer engagement behavioral intention. Furthermore, brand personality not only moderates the effect of low-aggressive humor on consumer engagement behavioral intention, but also moderates the mediating role of benign appraisal between low-aggressive humor and consumer engagement behavior intention. (shrink)

In 1823 the first Reader of Geology at Oxford University, William Buckland , unearthed the human skeleton known as the ‘Red Lady’ in Paviland cave, south Wales. While the Red Lady is valued today as a central testimony of early Upper Palaeolithic humans in Britain, Buckland considered the skeleton as of postdiluvian age, meaning from after the biblical Deluge. Rather than viewing Buckland as either obscurantist or as having worked entirely within ordinary scientific practice, the paper focuses on how he (...) managed to create an institutional and conceptual space for his geology at one of the centres for the education of the Anglican clergy, and on the impact the sometimes paradoxical demands had on his interpretation of prehistoric human relics, the Red Lady in particular. Buckland was famous if not notorious for his peculiar humour, the distracting and cathartic qualities of which, it will be argued, served as strategy in the advancement of unorthodox ideas or for glossing over inconsistencies. (shrink)

This article addresses gender differences in laughter and smiling from an evolutionary perspective. Laughter and smiling can be responses to successful display behavior or signals of affiliation amongst conversational partners—differing social and evolutionary agendas mean there are different motivations when interpreting these signals. Two experiments assess perceptions of genuine and simulated male and female laughter and amusement social signals. Results show male simulation can always be distinguished. Female simulation is more complicated as males seem to distinguish cues of simulation (...) yet judge simulated signals to be genuine. Females judge other female’s genuine signals to have higher levels of simulation. Results highlight the importance of laughter and smiling in human interactions, use of dynamic stimuli, and using multiple methodologies to assess perception. (shrink)

Once we establish that the fundamental subject matter of the study of humour is a mental state – which I will call finding funny – then it immediately follows that we need to find the content and function of this mental state. The main contender for the content of finding funny is the incongruous (the incongruity thesis ); the main contenders for the function of finding funny are grounded either in its generally being an enjoyable state (the gratification thesis ) (...) or its tendency to lead to biased social attitudes (the favouritism thesis ). While all three of these families of claims are well-supported and individually plausible, the situation looks different once we attempt to unify our accounts of the content and function of finding funny . While functions based in the gratification thesis readily combine with the incongruity thesis, it is not at all clear how the phenomenon described by the favouritism thesis arises from a state with this content. The upshot is that we may have to sideline the favouritism thesis in our theory of humour. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25(2) 2006: 126-137. (shrink)

Consider Bob, whom people attest a lack of sense of humor because he is not easily amused. He may ask himself, "Can I train to be amused more often?" or, in a more sophisticated manner, "Can I somehow improve the mechanism that is responsible for amusement in a way so that I enhance my ability to be amused?" Given that a sense of humor is something that we value in other people, the wish to improve this ability may not (...) be as far-fetched as it might seem. Some authors have hinted that our sense of humor is subject to cultivation and training.1 Aaron Smuts, for example, claims that our sense of humor can be trained and blocked.2 In the light of these remarks, I want to investigate the idea that our ability of... (shrink)

In this chapter I address the concern that UNESCO World Heritage designation leads to unregulated tourism. I argue that heritage tourism not only has a negative impact on the site but may adversely impact local populations and descendant communities. I detail two related worries, UNESCO-cide and the Disneyfication of cultural heritage. The term ‘UNESCO-cide’ was coined by Marco d’Eramo to describe the role overtourism has played in the death of cities listed on UNESCO’s World Heritage list. Disneyfication is the process (...) of sanitizing potentially controversial or seemingly negative narratives from the tourist site to make the experience more palatable. I focus my analysis on two UNESCO World Heritage sites: Angkor Archaeological Complex in Cambodia and George Town in Malaysia. After a discussion about the negative impacts World Heritage designation has had on these sites, I suggest some mitigating strategies for tourism. (shrink)

This is a review of the Japanese film, Like Father, Like Son. The movie tells the story of two families attempting to resolve the dilemma of learning that their 6-year old sons are actually not their biological children, but rather children swapped at birth by a nurse with malicious intent.

In this chapter I address the concern that UNESCO World Heritage designation leads to unregulated tourism. I argue that heritage tourism not only has a negative impact on the site but may adversely impact local populations and descendant communities. I detail two related worries, UNESCO-cide and the Disneyfication of cultural heritage. The term ‘UNESCO-cide’ was coined by Marco d’Eramo to describe the role overtourism has played in the death of cities listed on UNESCO’s World Heritage list. Disneyfication is the process (...) of sanitizing potentially controversial or seemingly negative narratives from the tourist site to make the experience more palatable. I focus my analysis on two UNESCO World Heritage sites: Angkor Archaeological Complex in Cambodia and George Town in Malaysia. After a discussion about the negative impacts World Heritage designation has had on these sites, I suggest some mitigating strategies for tourism. (shrink)

Can scientific evidence prompt us to revise philosophical theories or folk theoretical accounts of phenomena of the mind? We will argue that it can—but only under the condition that they make a so-called ‘ontological commitment’ to something that is actually subject to empirical inquiry. In other words, scientific evidence pertaining to neuroanatomical structure or causal processes only has a refuting effect if philosophical theories and folk notions subscribe to either account. We will illustrate the importance of ‘ontological commitment’ with the (...) ‘neuroanatomical approach’ to amusement as proposed in a recent paper by Palencik :419–434, 2007). We will show that the scientific evidence presented in said neuroanatomical approach has no bearing on the conceptual issues, in that the philosophical theories and folk distinction that are criticized do not subscribe to any account of the underlying neuroanatomical structure or causal processes. Our suggestions in this paper are not limited to philosophical accounts of humor but apply to the relationship of philosophy, common sense and science in general. (shrink)

In this thesis, I address the metaphysical question `What is humour?' and the ethical question `When is humour immoral?' Consulting a dictionary reveals a circle of definitions between `amusement', `funniness', and `humour'. So I split the metaphysical question `What is humour?' into three questions: `What is amusement?', `What is funniness?' and `What is humour?' By critically analysing then synthesising recent research in philosophy, psychology and linguistics, I give the following answers: x amuses y if and only if: y (...) is in a non-serious, non-threatened, non-goal-directed state. y simultaneously activates two incompatible interpretations of x via unsound logic. sufficiently increases the psychological arousal of y. x is funny if and only if x merits amusement. x is humour if and only if the function of x is to merit or elicit amusement. Similarly, I split the ethical question `When is humour immoral?' into three questions: `When is amusement immoral?', `How does immorality affect funniness?' and `When is humour immoral?' By using, and, I give the following answers: Amusement is immoral when the correct theory of normative ethics defines, or to be immoral. Immorality negatively affects funniness. Humour-types are not subject to moral evaluation. Humour-tokens are immoral when the correct theory of normative ethics defines them to be immoral. This thesis contributes to the knowledge of the subject in two ways. First, by critically analysing and synthesising recent inter-disciplinary research, provides a more precisely specified definition of amusement than that in the philosophical literature. Second, research on humour, across all disciplines, conflates the three closely related but distinct concepts of humour, amusement and funniness. By providing a linear sequence of definitions,, and avoid the conceptual confusions that commonly occur. (shrink)

Bill Cosby’s immorality has raised intriguing aesthetic and ethical issues. Do the crimes that he has been convicted of lessen the aesthetic value of his stand-up and, even if we can enjoy it, should we? This article first discusses the intimate relationship between the comedian and audience. The art form itself is structurally intimate, and at the same time the comedian claims to express an authentic self on stage. After drawing an analogy between the question of the moral character of (...) comedians and the aesthetic value of their stand-up and the debate over the ethical criticism of art, this article argues that it is reasonable to find a comedian’s performance less funny, because stand-up’s artistic success relies on this intimacy. It contrasts the comedy of Bill Cosby with that of Louis C.K. C.K.’s moral flaws are much more present in his comedy, and it is therefore more difficult to find him funny. Last, it is ethically permissible to enjoy their comedy, if no harm to others results, both because it does not corrupt the audience’s character and because amusement is valuable. (shrink)

In two very influential papers from 2008, Tamar Gendler introduced the concept of “alief” to describe the mental state one is in when acting in ways contrary to their consciously professed beliefs. For example, if asked to eat what they know is fudge, but shaped into the form of dog feces, they will hesitate, and behave in a manner that would be consistent with the belief that the fudge is really poop. They alieve that it is disgusting, while they believe (...) it is not. This paper investigates laughter from self-proclaimed egalitarian, tolerant folk, in response to oppressive jokes that might fit the alief-model. If I merely alieve the content of a joke at which I laugh, will that constitute morally exculpating reasons for such laughter? And what else might it imply? This paper will provide insights at the intersections of humor studies, ethics, epistemology, phenomenology, and the philosophy of mind, all while being moderately and appropriately amusing. (shrink)

This paper considers the question of how immoral elements in instances of humour affect funniness. Comic ethicism is the position that each immoral element negatively affects funniness and if their cumulative effect is sufficient, then funniness is eliminated. I focus on Berys Gaut’s central argument in favour of comic ethicism; the merited response argument. In this journal, Noël Carroll has criticized the merited response argument as illegitimately conflating comic merit with moral merit. I argue that the merited response argument, and (...) hence comic ethicism more generally, is vulnerable to Carroll’s criticism only if the comic ethicist fails to distinguish between three closely-related but distinct concepts; humour, amusement and funniness. By providing separate accounts of these three concepts, I explain how Carroll’s criticism is unsuccessful. In summary, accepting my distinctions between humour, amusement and funniness makes it clear that comic ethicism is the right position. (shrink)

I argue that the unthought philosophical bias in favor of seriousness and sense rather than nonsense and joking blocks the path to reality. Because of this bias we obsess over significant signs and forget to consider what signs are signs of; we lose sight of the forest because there are so many interesting trees. Through a thoroughgoing interrogation of signs or appearances, we can reveal what it is that all signs present or represent: the underlying real joke. Once the “sensible (...) bias” of philosophy is overcome and the sense of nonsense restored, we can reveal the object of ontology—the Kantian noumenon—and, therefore, understand the necessary order of signification or representation. In this way, I argue, we can come to be equally amused by all appearances, recognizing that their deceptive character is necessitated by the playful nature of the real thing which, qua joke, provokes amusement. (shrink)

This essay discusses the question of whether hunting is a competitive sport. The discussion approaches this issue from several angles. The author asserts that there is an anthropomorphic fallacy that the “superiority” of human beings justifies the “right” to exploit animals. The discussion turns to an historical analysis of how hunting emerged as a “sport.” The author discusses evolving standards of what constitutes acceptable forms of amusement, and the basis of moral criticisms of hunting. The author then claims that (...) the techniques commonly employed in hunting constitute animal cruelty. As a further analysis, the author points out a series of asymmetries between competitive sports and hunting, including the claim that sports are structured around and indeed constituted by a set of rules, in contrast to hunting. The essay then discusses wildlife management and distinguishes that from hunting. (shrink)

Amusement, diversion, fun. This was the definition of sport offered by the first dictionary I consulted in preparation for this lecture, and if we accept it then there is at least a sporting chance that we will all be able to agree: mountaineering is a sport. But it is not a definition that sits easily with much of what sport is currently thought to be. This talk is part of a series on Philosophy and Sport timed to mark the (...) London Olympics, and amusement and fun are probably not the first words to spring to mind there, certainly not for the competitors. They may be a part of it, but I don't think it unreasonable to think more immediately of commerce, competition, achievement. So this evening I need to consider mountaineering within that context. I also want to make clear at the outset that I shall take mountaineering to mean not just the climbing of high snow-covered peaks, but mountain travel and exploration, and simply recreational mountain walking. There doesn't need to be anything technical involved. At the same time, I must include rock-climbing within my brief, and for at least two reasons. One is that rock-climbing and mountaineering are closely connected historically. In it's early years, alpine climbing often led to rock climbing, the latter being seen as geographically convenient training for ‘the real thing’ – namely, the annual alpine holiday. When I was a teenager in the 1970s the influence went the other way: I began with rock-climbing in the Lake District, and proceeded to alpine climbing. And secondly, rock-climbing and mountaineering are administratively and politically connected. I suspect that the former, which in Britain as often as not doesn't take place in mountains at all, now absorbs the major part of the public funds devoted to these matters. And it is predominantly on the British experience that I want to draw. (shrink)

Understanding positive emotions' shared and differentiating features can yield valuable insight into the structure of positive emotion space and identify emotion states, or aspects of emotion states, that are most relevant for particular psychological processes and outcomes. We report two studies that examined core relational themes (Study 1) and expressive displays (Study 2) for eight positive emotion constructs—amusement, awe, contentment, gratitude, interest, joy, love, and pride. Across studies, all eight emotions shared one quality: high positive valence. Distinctive core relational (...) theme and expressive display patterns were found for four emotions—amusement, awe, interest, and pride. Gratitude was associated with a distinct core relational theme but not an expressive display. Joy and love were each associated with a distinct expressive display but their core relational themes also characterised pride and gratitude, respectively. Contentment was associated with a distinct expressive display but not a core relational theme. The implications of this work for the study of positive emotion are discussed. (shrink)

Interactive Video (IV) is now firmly established as a training tool in commerce and industry; the electronic maintenance manual is gaining ground; IV is making inroads into marketing strategies, as a point of sales device; any respectable amusement arcade will have at least one interactive video game; and of course the allied technologies of compact sound disc and CD ROM are both beginning to revolutionise their respective fields of information storage and dissemination.This paper concentrates on the specific problem of (...) Interactive Video and its associated computing requirements in the fields of education and training, suggesting ways in which the introduction of ‘intelligence’ both artificial and human into such systems will be essential to their long-term educational and also commercial success. (shrink)

The traditional concern of the academic literature on the ethics of humor is to determine whether ethical considerations influence comic amusement or, in other words, judge the impact of ethics over aesthetics. For some, ethically questionable dimensions bear no implication for the effectiveness of jokes; for others, they do, but this group disagrees on whether ethical problems make jokes less or more funny. This article attempts an alternative approach and explores the occurrences in which the aesthetic reaction to humor (...) reveals a more profound ethical commitment. It asks: What are the conditions under which laughter resulting from comic amusement reflects the moral stance of an individual? Or, more simply: Can one judge a person's character based on what this person is laughing at? The article starts by showing how humor can legitimately be taken as representative of the individual spirit, continues by identifying the subsection of humor that can offer an affirmative answer to the posed questions, highlights the power dynamics at play within this subsection of humor to justify its characterization as “fascist,” and concludes by offering guidance on identifying fascist laughter. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Life is GoodAnnette ChacosI live in Hervey Bay. I’m a member of several social groups. I have adult children and grandchildren, and many lovely friends. I love to write. Most importantly I love The Lord Jesus Who has been my strength, bringing me through the good times, the not so good times, and the, ‘I’m throwing in the towel’ times.I was first diagnosed with a brain tumour in 1997. (...) Prior to knowing about the tumour and for some time after its removal I had little or no memory of events. The tumour was a left Frontal Meningioma (benign). For some time afterward I was partially [End Page 189] paralyzed. Now there is only some weakness on the right side of my body. Epilepsy too became part of my life. There are different types of seizures, which are rarely, if ever, amusing.Humour is very important. If you can’t laugh at the things that happen life would be a constant tale of woe. I’m very blessed. There are so many people who are much worse off than myself.My storyIn July 1997 my husband went to see if everything was okay because I wasn’t up out of bed yet. I was lying across the bed in a disheveled state. After being cleaned up I was taken to the local hospital. The duty doctor, who hadn’t even seen me, told my son that he didn’t think there was much wrong and to take me home. My sons refused and insisted that the doctor admit me. He did.I was diagnosed with a urinary tract infection. My memories of this are scattered. I learned some time later that I had had a Tonic Clonic seizure (formerly known as “grand mal” seizures which are commonly associated with epilepsy). After I came out of hospital I saw my general practitioner (GP). She sent me for an x–ray, and then to see a Neurosurgeon. An MRI was taken and there was a large tumour in my brain.My memory of this time is poor. I do recall a friend phoning and I told her I was going into hospital to have a brain tumour removed. After fifteen years she is still saying I was so matter of fact about it. I now know that my emotions, like my memory, was at a very low ebb due to the tumour. There was no caring or worrying. If there was, in the next minute, probably second, it was forgotten.Before going into hospital my late husband said to the kids “better take a photograph of your mother in case she dies.” I was told about that comment some time later. What a comfort! Then one day the photo turned up. It was so ugly I tore it up. You’ll note I said the photo was ugly!The operation took place in Canberra hospital, at the end of August. It was to be earlier but they deferred it because an emergency came in. They were going to defer it again, by which time I was mute and non–responsive. My daughter Maria arrived from Melbourne and my daughter Katrina and her husband Kevin came from America with their 3–month–old baby. My son Libe arrived from Sydney. Marcus, my youngest, lived locally, as did my daughter Tania. On hearing the operation was to be deferred again they took action informing hospital staff they were going to the local MP and the A Current Affair television show. So l had the operation—it was much easier to put me under the scalpel than battle the bureaucracy!I have only one film from that MRI. Where the others are I don’t know. According to Dr C, the tumour was very large. But to me, what does size matter—it was no longer there. Most importantly, I survived. The ten days I was in hospital are mostly forgotten. The few people I remember are like snapshots. No one moved, or so it seemed to me.In 2006, the second tumour was removed. It was discovered by the same lovely GP, who found the first one. I was... (shrink)

In his literary autobiography, Le vent Paraclet , Michel Tournier records how during his time at the Lycée Pasteur in Neuilly he and his fellow classmates found a source of great hilarity in their favourite bêtisier , a volume called Pensées de Pascal , in which one learns that painting is a frivolous exercise that consists in imperfectly reproducing objects that are themselves quite worthless. Fairness to Pascal – far from Tournier's mind in those early days – demands that that (...) offending pensée , which belongs in the sheaf of Vanités , be seen more as a summary of Saint Augustine's views than as a record of Pascal's own, and one that was rooted in a tradition stemming from Plato that deprecated all varieties of mimesis. Setting historical adjustment aside and reining back on the boys' sophisticated amusement, one may well wonder whether the view Pascal records does not contain a grain of truth. Are there not indeed kinds of painting that we prize, yet which are well chosen butts of this criticism? In particular, still life painting concerned to record the trivia of domestic life, pots and pans, fruits and meats, glasses and all sorts of everyday tableware looks to be sharply exposed to Pascalian scorn. If this Platonic or in Augustine's case, neo-Platonic, attack on painting is to be warded off in general then it had best be done here where it appears at its most pressing. And if it cannot be warded off here, then still life painting at least is moribund, probably lifeless, nature morte mort indeed. (shrink)

I take friendship to be a practical and emotional relationship marked by mutual and (more-or-less) equal goodwill, liking, and pleasure. Friendship can exist between siblings, lovers, parent and adult child, as well as between otherwise unrelated people. Some friendships are valued chiefly for their usefulness. Such friendships are instrumental or means friendships. Other friendships are valued chiefly for their own sakes. Such friendships are noninstrumental or end friendships. In this paper I am concerned only with end friendships, and the challenge (...) they pose to consequentialism. In an end friendship, one loves the friend as an essential part of one's system of ends, and not solely, or even primarily, as a means to an independent end - career advancement, amusement, philosophical illumination, or greater happiness in the universe. In such love, one loves the friend for the person she is, i.e., for her essential rather than incidental features. These include both her character traits - the fundamental intellectual, psychological, moral, and aesthetic qualities that constitute an individual's personality - and her unique perspective on herself and others: her view of the important and unimportant, her interest in herself and others. Thus in end friendship the friend cannot be replaced by another, for no other can have her essential features. Nor can she be replaced by a more efficient means to one's ends, or abandoned on their achievement, for it is not as a means that one 2 loves her. It is this necessary irreplaceability that most obviously marks off end friendship from means or instrumental friendship, in which the friend is replaceable.i Hence to love a friend as an end is to place a special value on her - to believe that her value is not outweighed, say, simply by the greater needs of others - or the needs of a greater number of others ("Sorry dear, there are more drowning on this end").ii End friendship (hereafter simply "friendship") is a cardinal human value.. (shrink)

One of the most fascinating entries in Samuel Pepys diaries, from the 13th May 1665, recounts his experience of having been gifted a new pocket watch:To the ‘Change after office, and received my watch from the watchmaker, and a very fine [one] it is, given me by Briggs, the Scrivener… But, Lord! to see how much of my old folly and childishnesse hangs upon me still that I cannot forbear carrying my watch in my hand in the coach all this (...) afternoon, and seeing what o’clock it is one hundred times; and am apt to think with myself, how could I be so long without one; though I remember since, I had one, and found it a trouble, and resolved to carry one no more about me while I lived.Pepys’ excitement at being able to ‘see what o’clock it is’ might strike us as a very antiquated kind of thrill, but his account of the ‘trouble’ that follows from the distraction of being able to do so will most likely resonate with anyone with a smart phone. Like Pepys, many of us are familiar with the experience of carrying a small object around in our pocket with the capacity to distract and amuse. Many smart phone owners (myself included) may well have, like Pepys, ‘resolved to carry it no more about’ us—although (at least in my experience) such resolve inevitably breaks. (shrink)

Any analysis of "In the Company of Men" is forced to answer three questions of central importance to the ethics of humor: What does it mean to find sexist humor funny? What are the various sources of humor? And, can moral flaws with attempts at humor increase their humorousness? I argued that although merely finding a joke funny in a neutral context cannot tell you anything reliable about a person's beliefs, in context, a joke may reveal a great deal about (...) one’s social attitudes, or feelings of insecurity. Especially in its portrayal of Howard, the film exposes the role of insecurity as a source of humor. Not only can insecurity make one more prone to laugh, but it can also make someone seem funnier in some contexts. I contended that this shows that a strong version of the superiority theory of humor is clearly wrong. Furthermore, the disparate audience reactions to Chad's jokes showed that the morally sensitive who were aware of the purpose of his jokes would see them as ethically flawed. Rather than making the jokes more amusing, the fact that the jokes were considered to be ethically flawed made them less funny. Hence, immoralism is most likely false. (shrink)

''In a democracy, should everyone - absolutely everyone - get a vote? Does it really matter if tigers become extinct? Why does murder carry a heavier penalty than attempted murder? If you don't like the socks your grandma gives you for Christmas, should you tell her so? This entertaining introduction to ethics will bring you face to face with some tough moral choices. It presents you with 101 imaginative scenarios - sometimes amusing, sometimes tragic and sometimes uncomfortably realistic - which (...) will force you to re-examine your most cherished assumptions about right and wrong. Including: the torturer with a conscience; the lady who can prevent enormous suffering for the price of a latte; and the man who is handy with his fists but not a killer, surely." -- Back cover. (shrink)

While reflecting one day on the enormous difficulties that men have in knowing that there is a God, a completely unexpected and unfamiliar question drifted into my purview – perhaps as a kind of ultimate expression of my philosophical frustration. ‘Indeed’, the question asked, ‘can even God know that he is God?’ At first I thought this query merely amusing. ‘Wouldn't it be funny if God cannot know that he is God! But of course he can.’ So my mind wandered (...) on to other things. The question did not leave me alone, though. It insisted that I take it seriously, and the more I did, the more legitimate, complex, and significant it came to seem - and still does. (shrink)

Falsafat wa-ḥayāt Abī Hāshim al-Jubbāʼī wa-madrasatuh -- al-Tawallud ʻinda al-Muʻtazilah.

Pyrrhonism, named after the scepticism of Pyrrho of Elis, as one of the significant philosophical doctrines in the history of philosophy, was revived by Aenesidemus and Agrippa, and defended by Sextus Empiricus, its last follower, against criticisms in the theoretical and practical contexts. Pyrrhonian scepticism, based on three tenets as the state of equipollence, suspension of judgment and ataraxia, accepts adherence to appearances as a practical guide for life. The aim of this study is to discuss Sextus’ objections regarding two (...) main problems, the nature of good and evil and the art of living, elaborated in Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Ethicists and contemporary remarks on the subject. Thus, it will be addressed whether the sceptic way of life prescribed by Sextus is compatible with his theoretical framework and therefore, whether it can be applied in practice. (shrink)

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock (...) of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)