La Alianza de Dios con los hombres constituye lo esencial de la Revelación. El primer texto que menciona la Alianza es el relato de la Creación, y el segundo aparece en los Evangelios, cuando Jesús anuncia la Nueva Alianza en su sangre. Pero no son dos Alianzas, la Antigua y la Nueva, sino una y la misma.God´s Covenant with men contitutes the essence of Revelation. The first text to give account of a Covenant is the narration of Creation ant the (...) last one appears in the Gospels, when Jesus announces the New Covenant through his blood. Nevertheless, there are not two covenants, an Old one and a New one. In the Bible, the different narrations of covenants are a renewal of the unique Covenant. It´s man who is summoned to change his attitude in order to answer, always in a more profound way, to God´s call. (shrink)

Nel 1545, dalla tipografia di Damiano de Turlini a Brescia, usciva un volume contenente due operette: la prima intitolata _Un brieve trattato dell’eccellentia delle donne_ composta dal filosofo lombardo Vincenzo Maggi; la seconda, anonima, con il titolo: _Una brieve essortatione a gli huomini_. Vincenzo Maggi, con un trattato –come lui stesso dichiara– breve e semplice, confuta il disprezzo verso il genere femminile imperante nella sua epoca, spinto dalla necessità di ritrovare la verità. Il tutto senza screditare né le tesi avverse (...) né i maschi; anzi, con l’intenzione di convincere costoro ad apprezzare ancor di più le donne e riconoscerne i superiori meriti. L’autore anonimo, invece, pretende smentire le affermazioni del filosofo lombardo esortando gli uomini all’azione, e si dichiara intimorito dall’idea che le donne possano prendere il sopravvento. È nostra intenzione analizzare le due opere presentandone le argomentazioni e i modi in cui esse vengono esposte, nonché offrire una breve biografia di Vincenzo Maggi oltre ad affrontare l’argomento della paternità della seconda opera. (shrink)

À travers une vision gestaltiste, déjà à l’oeuvre dans la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cet article essaie de montrer que toutes les difficultés propres à l’interprétation de la problématique du rapport à autrui, notamment celle concernant le fait de ne pouvoir jamais avoir un accès complet à autrui, peuvent être surmontées ou, du moins, peuvent être mises en discussion. Toute la question est de savoir si ce rapport est basé sur une constitution mutuelle, une constitution réductible à ceux qui le (...) constituent, moi ou autrui, ou si ce rapport va au-delà, étant plus et autre chose que les sujets qui entrent en relation, puisqu’il est lui-même quelque chose d’irréductible. Ni réductibilité à moi, comme chez Husserl, ni réductibilité à autrui, celui totalement autre, comme chez Levinas, mais une irréductibilité conciliante de ce rapport qui, en tant que forme, dépend des éléments qui le constituent et, néanmoins, est autre chose qu’eux et leur demeure irréductible.Through a Gestaltist vision, already present in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, this article attempts to show that all difficulties inherent in the interpretation of the problems concerning the relationship to the Other, especially the fact that we can never have complete access to the Other, can be overcome, or at least, put into discussion. The most important question is to know whether this relationship is based on a mutual constitution, one that is reducible to its terms, self or Other, or if this relationship goes beyond its subjects and is something irreducible in itself. This relationship is not reducible to the self, as in Husserl’s work, nor is it reducible to the Other, as something completely Other, as in Levinas, but is a relationship of reconciliatory irreducibility which, while entirely dependent on its constitutive elements, is nevertheless something else irreducible to both.Attraverso una visione gestaltista, già all’opera nella filosofi a di Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cercheremo qui di mostrare come tutte le difficoltà tipiche della problematica del rapporto all’altro, specie quella relativa al fatto che non possiamo mai avere un accesso completo all’altro, possano essere superate o almeno rimesse in questione. L’intero problema dipende da un’opzione di fondo: se cioè tale rapporto sia basato su una reciproca costituzione, ovvero su una costituzione riducibile a coloro che lo costituiscono, cioè l’io e l’altro; o se tale rapporto vada al di là, sia qualcosa di più, o di diverso, rispetto ai soggetti che entrano in rapporto, essendo il rapporto stesso qualcosa di irriducibile. Né riducibilità a me, dunque, come in Husserl, né riducibilità all’Altro, come in Levinas, ma conciliante irriducibilità del rapporto in quanto forma, che pur dipendendo dagli elementi che la costituiscono è altro dagli elementi stessi. (shrink)

The paper discusses the Christological bearing of certain Byzantine festal hymns, whose roots stretch back to the early Christian tradition, but which are still used in the services of the Orthodox Church. These hymns avoid the vocabulary of their contemporary dogmatic debates, and offer an alternative poetic theology deeplyrooted in Biblical imagery, yet surprisingly precise and effective in conveying the very same message about Christ. This finding opens up the discussion of theological method, namely the question of how these hymns (...) could be taken into account as direct sources for theology, on a par with the data provided by the ecumenical councils, and the subsequent patristic and medieval theology. (shrink)

This dissertation discusses friendship in relation to self-identity in the thought of Paul Ricoeur. Its main claim is that Ricoeur's notion of self-identity designates a hermeneutically mediated experience, and that this complex experience can only be illumined by a phenomenology that is sensitive to ethical aspects. Another finding is that, according to Ricoeur, whatever we do, say, or write, takes on the form of narrative experience. Finally, the dissertation shows that what looks like the force of the discourse, driving author (...) to reader, and readers to one another, is in fact the force of philia, and that the latter is a source that nourishes practical wisdom exercised in relations with others. The call to friendship is a call to esteem for the being-like-me, a call to recognize a likeness beyond question and doubt, which relates selfhood and alterity, sameness and difference. (shrink)

L'éthique bachelardienne est une éthique simple, mais pas du tout simpliste : l'homme du théorème est complété par l'homme du poème. Mais si l'éthique est une direction de la pensée qui doit maîtriser notre avenir, la poétique est la source ontologique de cette pensée. C'est-à-dire, la liberté de rêver doit être à l'origine de la liberté créatrice de la pensée ou de l'homme des théorèmes. En fait, il ne s'agit pas d'une éthique fermée dans les modèles artificiels d'une pensée techniciste, (...) mais toujours d'une éthique soutenue, à l'origine, par une poétique de la pensée ouverte. (shrink)

The research on stem cell-based therapies has greatly expanded in recent years. Our text attempts to seek those religious and ethical challenges that stem cell therapy and research bring into debate. Our thesis is that bioethics can defend its principle without a religious background. We will develop our argumentation on three major points: firstly, a comparison between secular ethics and religious views will clarify why stem cell therapy and research are important from a scientific point of view, addressing the very (...) center of the human being; in our view, being based on secular society, bioethics can answer the challenges of stem cell therapy and research; secondly, following Hans Jonas' perspective on experimenting on humans, we seek to understand the philosophical guidance that sciences dealing with stem cell need; thirdly, we will map the ethical guidelines for clinical translational research that have been adopted by the International Society for Stem Cell Research. . (shrink)

L’un des chercheurs roumains ayant Je plus travaillé sur l’œuvre de Bachelard en Roumanie fut le professeur Vasile Tonoiu de l’université de Bucarest. Dans cet article, nous analysons quelques-unes de ses réflexions au sujet de l’épistémologie du philosophe français. Même si la compréhension historique des travaux de Bachelard lui faisait défaut, cet auteur roumain a très bien saisi l’esprit du néorationalisme français, qu’il a mis en regard des recherches de l’épistémologie anglo-saxonne.

In the last decades, there has been a far-reaching debate about whether reason is a natural power of the human animal or a socio-historical achievement. This paper brings out and criticizes two paradigmatic views of reason entangled in that dilemma: the substantive view which construes reason as a primitive power possessing the basic forms of intelligibility; and the derivative view which traces back reason to non-rational, natural-historic processes. I approach the issue by discussing how Aristotle addresses the underlying predicament in (...) Metaphysics Theta. The predicament persuades us to overdetermine or underdetermine our natural potentiality for reason because it ignores what I call Aristotle's main insight: the understanding from which rational capacities are exercised is acquired by undertaking appropriate activities. The measure of rational capacities is neither merely naturally determined nor merely socio-historically inherited but relies on the engagement with the things falling under the purview of the pertaining activities. We must recover this Aristotelian insight, I argue, to avoid succumbing to either the substantive or the derivative view of reason. (shrink)

Wittgenstein accepts the linguistic hypothesis about science according which science is the corpus of significant propositions. The epistemological problem can be divided into the problem of demarcation and the problem of justification. The answer to the demarcation problem consists in a criterion for significant propositions. Wittgenstein proposes a syntactical criterion. A proposition has sense if it is composed of elementary propositions and logical operators. The domains that contain senseless propo- sitions must be excluded from the scientific field. Wittgenstein’s solution to (...) the justification problem consists in the hypothesis of identity between tautology and necessary truth. In this way, the logical decision methods may be extended to the epistemo- logical decision. Wittgenstein’s epistemological conclu- sion is that only mathematics and logic (but not physics) are justified, because their propositions are tautologies. (shrink)

Any religion has an ethical component. Thus, the examination of ethical problems is very important for religious studies. Consequentialism is an ethical doctrine according to which a fact is good only if it has good consequences. In order to avoid infinite regression, there is the need for a moral foundation in conformity with the criterion of goodness. The consequentialists proposed various criteria for goodness, such as pleasure, happiness or utility. Any fact will be judged as good only if its consequences (...) belong to the moral basis. The correctness of ethical judgments depends on the analysis of consequence relations. This study takes into account material and strict implication as representations of consequence. Both of them generate ethical paradoxes. If consequence is represented by material implication, according to the Manichean ethics, a fact is either good or bad; there are no neutral ethical facts. If consequence is analyzed by strict implication, the necessary facts will not have a moral value. The present study is to suggest an original solution to these paradoxes. (shrink)

In his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel treats human sensibility differently in the sections on anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. With the recent revival of Hegel’s work, there has been a lively debate about how to understand the progression from more primitive to more sophisticated human capacities. This paper differentiates three influential readings to that effect – the animals-first, the emancipatory, and the rational-first reading – and argues that they risk misconstruing mental development as a transition from one category of capacities to (...) the other. The transition is rendered in terms of either accumulation, emancipation, or maturation. But this basic picture confuses the capacities characterizing us as a kind of animal, a kind of consciousness, and a conceptually self-conscious being. This paper explains how anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology articulate complementary, but irreducible categories of human capacities. The apparently more basic capacities are abstractable aspects of those that come later in the order of presentation. The distinct kinds of capacities do not stand separately on a three-step ladder of mental development but are aspects of one singular and synchronous development of the human mind. Their particular development is mutually dependent on each other but can be properly accounted for only in distinctive categorial terms. (shrink)

Considering the dialectical structure of tragic thought in classical philosophy, one can read Nietzsche’s conception of the tragic in a dialectical way. Reading Nietzsche\'s The Birth of Tragedy in this way is justified, as long as the Apollonian and Dionysian are understood as contrasting impulses who work together in their “reciprocal necessity”. Beginning of the fifth chapter of this book, however, there is a second design of the tragic experience; here Nietzsche emphasizes that Dionysian is the affirmative dimension of the (...) tragic. This non dialectical conception of tragic, as Nietzsche builds it along his work, stresses the non necessity to justify life, the affirmation of life as it is, without deploring and rebuilding it, and without giving it an alien meaning. This conception cancels the negativity which founds the dialectical conception of the tragic, in so far as suffering, vain, and finiteness are no longer seen as opposed to life and in need of an appoint justification: they belong to it. The philosophical task is to ask: of what does the tragic of an absolute affirmation of life consist of, if the dialectic contradiction is repealed. (shrink)

Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences is possible only due (...) to its belonging to a comprehensive theoretical horizon. For that purpose, I first analyze Heidegger’s influential account on moods in Being and Time, in order to clarify his claim that moods have their own understanding. Although Heidegger asserts that attuned understanding becomes itself when it is interpreted, he nevertheless rejects conceptual unfolding as a legitimate disclosure of the intelligible content of moods. I amend Heidegger’s account by engaging Hegel’s approach to this topic in his Philosophy of Mind. In this text, Hegel argues that feelings cannot give an account of their purport by feeling alone. Affective states not only manifest the need and urge to express themselves, but they reach their full extent when their meaning is disclosed within the entirety of the mind. It may be the case that affective states cannot always be fully clarified, but, even within a non-cognitivist account of moods, their intelligibility requires our acquaintance with articulated understanding. (shrink)

This paper discusses Hegel's conception of self-consciousness in the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. It argues that Hegel articulates self-consciousness as a living being's capacity to conceive of itself in light of the life-form it instantiates. I start by critically reassessing the prevalent readings of the Self-Consciousness chapter, each of which focuses on one of three constitutive aspects of self-consciousness: sociality, corporeality or practicality. Second, I reconstruct how the opening of the chapter aims to reveal that the initial (...) rift between the sensory and the conceptual capacities of consciousness is resolved by the unity of consciousness as a life-form. Third, I discuss the specification of this life-form as Geist and argue that, by introducing the notion of Geist, Hegel indicates that the generic capacity of the human being to conceive of itself in light of its life-form always particularizes itself in a conception of human life that determines a historic and social form of life. Fourth, I outline how the master-slave dialectic illustrates the interdependency between sensory and conceptual capacities. Hegel's tale undermines the assumption of a self-contained capacity for reason by displaying how conceptual capacities, actualized by a living being, rely from the outset on objective constraints. I conclude by contending that the Self-Consciousness chapter paves the way for the central role that the idea of life plays in the Logic in exemplifying the objectivity of the concept. (shrink)

Hegel und Heidegger teilen die Ansicht, dass das, was den Bedeutungsgehalt von Begriffen konstituiert, in ihrer unmittelbaren Verständlichkeit verborgen liegt. Dieser Gedanke bildet den Kern einer Konzeption der Negativität im Sinne einer Auffassung der Art und Weise, in der Sinn von Latenz geprägt ist. Hegel und Heidegger verstehen aber die Natur jener Latenz und das Verhältnis von Sinn und Begriff verschieden. Denn mit einer solchen Konzeption der Negativität ist die Frage verbunden, ob die Konstitution von Sinn begrifflich artikulierbar ist und (...) ob Sinn überhaupt begrifflich verfasst ist. Dieser Frage geht das Buch nach, indem es Hegel und Heidegger in ein Gespräch bringt, um den Stellenwert des begrifflichen Vermögens in der Konstitution und Artikulation von Sinn zu klären. Dabei wird eine Kritik an der Auffassung formuliert, dass die Quelle von Sinn nichtbegrifflich und unbegreiflich ist, und argumentiert, dass nur die begriffliche Artikulation von Bedeutungen die semantische Fülle der Welt verbürgt. (shrink)

If we want to define today's society in one word, trying to capture its meaning, it would be polarization. The interdependence between all social segments, articulated by globalization, has a double function: unpacking the identitary elements that enter in the structure of society and framing them in a relational dynamic. In this situation are Theology and Science, which, of course, maintain a number of components under their general names. Can we talk about a congruence between these two dimensions of human (...) knowledge? Or they are developing completely separately and antagonistic in social progress? According to Ian G. Barbour there are four types of relation between Science and Religion: conflict, independence, dialogue, integration. This article intends to highlight the congruence between Theology and Science in the paradigm of neo-patristic synthesis, which explores in a phenomenological, theological and philosophical way the relationship between these two. Neo-patristic synthesis is a theological movement from the 20th century, generated by the initiative of the orthodox theologian G. Florovsky. (shrink)

God's Covenant with men contitutes the essence of Revelation. The first text to give account of a Covenant is the narration of Creation and the last one appears in the Gospels, when Jesus announces the New Covenant through his blood. Nevertheless, there are not two covenants, an Old one and a New one. In the Bible, the different narrations of covenants are a renewal of the unique Covenant. It's man who is summoned to change his attitude in order to answer, (...) always in a more profound way, to God's call. (shrink)