This work, the most comprehensive treatment of alienation ever published, deals with the philosophical, sociological, psychological, religious, political, and literary aspects of the problem. Among the topics discussed are the lost self, the fragmented self, alienated leisure, measurements of social alienation, counterculture, anti-intellectualism, and cures for alienation.

Cet article propose un modèle additionnel pour l’interprétation des changements qui, dans les sciences, ne résultent pas d’une rupture irréversible avec le passé, mais du recyclage opportuniste de vieilles théories, destiné soit à en enrichir les théories émergentes, soit à provoquer le retour contre-révolutionnaire des théories défaites. Il soutient que, quand la science crée ainsi du neuf à partir du vieux, elle procède suivant un modèle proche du « bricolage évolutif », par lequel François Jacob explique l’évolution par le jeu (...) des réaménagements opportunistes qui surviennent dans la structure du noyau cellulaire. (shrink)

Our paper contributes to Science, Technology and Society scholarship on the practices and technologies of containment. We build on existing work in STS that has analyzed containment as a performative sociotechnical system that generates and sustains new realities, new systems, and new relationships. Our contribution draws from the problem of containment in salmon aquaculture. The stakes for containing salmon are very high. Farmed salmon escapes are environmentally damaging to ecosystems and wild salmon populations, and they put additional pressure on an (...) industry that has a very poor environmental record. We consider in detail Newfoundland and Labrador’s “Code of Containment” that works to keep farmed salmon in cages and prevent them from escaping into the wild. Through our analysis of the Code, we argue that containment is not only about holding inside. It is also about holding together, an obsolete meaning of the term “to contain.” We add to STS scholarship by arguing that containment and its associated Code in Newfoundland holds together a large scale, industrial aquaculture sector that tolerates persistent farmed salmon escapes into the wild from ocean-based cages. We conclude by examining the broader implications of our analysis for STS scholarship on the practices and technologies of containment. (shrink)

This publication articulated in three parts, and twelve chapters endeavours to engage with the complex negative emotions and consequent phenomenon of self-deceit, radicalisation and extremism. First part: Emotions as Lines of Demarcation or Guidelines to Our Self. The Psychodynamic Surrounding of our Intentional Self; second part: Case Studies of Some Concrete Societal Encapsulations of the Negative Passions; and third part: Resisting the Colonisation of Tyrannical Affections. Possible Paths of Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism. What kind of educational responses can be given (...) to extremist claims of territory, identity, resources, power, and interpretations? How can a dialogue on unifying ethical principles and values aid in developing common grounds for preventing radical and extremist excesses? With authors from three continents, this publication endeavours to not only ask the uncomfortable questions with regard to the exteriorisation of human emotive predispositions and inclinations to ostracize, stigmatise and discriminate. The exit door from the extreme is also clearly presented, through four contributions, notably the interplay of Charvaka philosophy, Sikh wisdom on balanced forms of engagement with strong emotions. (shrink)

In the commentaries on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, due attention has always been paid to the philosophy of logic contained in this work. In particular the statement that a picture and reality must have their form in common has attracted the attention of the commentators. This statement has been explained now in an extreme realistic way, now in the sense of a linguistic kantianism. Both of the interpretations have this in common that they tend to give a kind of metaphysical status to (...) this 'logical form', considered either as THE form of reality on its own or as THE objective form of language as such. In our article, we try to show that there is no place for this kind of 'hypostases' or reifications in the philosophy of the Tractatus. We point out some important arguments available in the text, to show that Wittgenstein didn't found logic on what can be termed as the objective and given structural form either of language or of reality. The point of his philosophy of logic, we argue, was not a metaphysical, but rather a pragmatical and operational one. Our argumentation is built upon what we consider to be the two basic texts of Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, namely that we can „postulate” the truths of logic in so far as we can postulate an „adequate notation”(6.1233), and that the so called „logical constants” are not representatives : that there can be no „representatives” (in German : „vertreten”) of the logic of facts (4.0312). We first try to show that logic is not really distinct from the grammar (syntax, form) of a language which is capable to express reality in a complete and determinate way (4.123; 3.14; 3.251; 4.023; 4A66 ; 6.124; 4.002a). And to the extent that there is no meaningfull language without a signified reality related with it, there is no logic either which is not apriori and at the same time a logic applied to reality, i.e. the logic of the world. Consequently, we try to develop an interpretation of 2.16-2.18 of the Tractatus which can account for its a-metaphysical, operational conception of logic. Finally, we attempt a clarification of 5.552, a text which we consider as basic for Wittgenstein's philosophy of the „mystical”. (shrink)

After the 'death of God', it would be a mistake to continue to think of eros in terms of a longing for possession ofthat which one is lacking, especially in matters of religion. Alongside Plato's Diotima, Kierkegaard, Levinas and even Heidegger, an alternative view of eros is proposed in which eros is gradually letting go of its possessive cravings in order to open itself for the other. In this way, eros is bent in the directionof the unselfish service of the (...) other. The question is then asked which kind of understanding of being is implied by this redirection of eros. The answer is taken from a thinking of the meaning of being in terms of self-givenness and self-outpooring in beings, for beings to be 'there'. Our being at the service of the other can therefore be seen as a following of the call of being in us to become adequate to the meaning of being itself. (shrink)

The issue of philosophy’s contribution to theology is an old and much disputed one. This article posits philosophy as the 'conscience' of theology. It takes 'conscience' in the heideggerian sense of existential 'being-aware-of' and applies this to our finitude and the ultimate meaning of being. A living theology has therefore to be based on a successful encounter between our understanding of the issue of our existence and the Word of 'revelation' — as Western tradition calls it —, spoken to us (...) 'from elsewhere'. This position is considered with reference to the theological thinking of Thomas Aquinas, and more specifically to his doctrine of human happiness and bliss, and the natural desire to see God. Attention is drawn to the fact that Thomas’ view on the supernatural is based on both a philosophical and a theological component. To further illustrate the point, three statements are developed. The first concerns a possible abuse of Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics in order to support a 'pluralistic' approach of religious truth. Here the objection is raised that this conception disowns the proper nature of religious and theological truth as distinguished from metaphysical truth. The second statement is about any possible coalescence of philosophyand theology: whereas metaphysical truths show a 'representative' character, the properof religious and biblical truth appears to be 'a way of liberation'. Between both a 'mediation' needs to be found. The author claims that such may surface in man's inner belonging to 'another dimension', i.e., in an 'immanent transcendence'. The third statementproposes to update the synthesis of philosophy and theology as presented by Aquinas. A dialectical elucidation of man's craving for infinity still points to a possible way byrevealing an essential aspect of human 'conscienceawareness'. (shrink)

Today, we can notice a renewed interest in spirituality, often as an alternative for established religions. Does this also mean that after centuries of growing apart and mutual diffidence, our time would offer a new opportunity for a meeting between spirituality and philosophy? At first glance this seems rather improbable. The origin of the term 'spirituality' is not philosophical, but Christian. There, it means a life under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Today, the content of a spirituality can be (...) religious as well as atheist, as some contemporary examples show. Thus it mostly expresses a craving for inner unity and universal reconciliation for human beings and for the universe. Such a spirituality testifies to a transcendency in the human and promotes a practical wisdom based on a corresponding metaphysical worldview. But it is not immediately clear what such a worldview could afford to the self-understanding of rational philosophy. Yet, the idea of human transcendency is not unknown to contemporary philosophy. In Heidegger's Being and Time, it bears the name of 'existence'. Moreover, Heidegger agrees that his philosophy of authentic existence as finite being-until-death is inspired by a 'factical ideal'. He presents his philosophy as being that lifeview in its reflexively understood meaning. Building on such a hermeneutic idea of philosophy, this article defends the view that spiritualities in general can be seen as carriers of valuable elements for an ontological understanding of the meaning of being. The article develops an understanding of being in which being is seen as a commonly shared perfection in the context of a general ontology of finite participation in being in which the world appears as the place of a lacking. This perfection comes toward us as an appeal to our freedom. That ontological awareness gives way to a reflexive assumption of spiritual attitudes such like generosity and fidelity in the context of an ontological philosophy of the meaning of human existence. (shrink)

In philosophical literature, the complex emotional state of ressentiment gained popularity through the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. According to Nietzsche, ressentiment was a bad feeling that reflected the suppressed anger, the pain of impotence, and the general misery of the weak when they compared themselves to the strong and talented members of society. Max Scheler took up Nietzsche’s thesis and described ressentiment as a complex condition characterised by a thirst for revenge. Moreover, ressentiment has the annoying property of presenting itself (...) as having some merit: the modern social and political context offers more than enough examples. First, the aim of this article is to take a closer look at Nietzsche’s ‘man of ressentiment,’ an odious personality characterised by weakness, deep frustrations, and hypocrisy. It will turn out that ressentiment has many different shades that paint a somewhat different picture and raise philosophical questions about positive valuation, vulnerability, and the sense of injustice. Second, we shall be working on the link between the psychology of ressentiment and the temptation to lack integrity in writing, art, or science. The well-described and well-known fact that academic fraudsters evolve in disguise, that they first reactively endorse values very different from their own values, and that these plagiarist authors, second, embark on long-term projects repeating their misdeeds and errors, as if it were normal, are two facts worthy of our attention. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Warum muss Strafe sein? Die Beiträge betreffen zunächst aktuelle Strafbegründungstheorien, insbesondere solche, die in der Strafe einen Tadel sehen. Eine klare Unterscheidbarkeit zwischen absoluten und relativen Straftheorien wird heute nicht selten bezweifelt.

Filosofische speurtocht naar een verantwoorde wijze om over God te spreken, tegen de achtergrond van de huidige religieuze crisis in de westerse cultuur.

A popular goal in psychological science is to understand human cognition and behavior in the ‘real world’. In contrast, researchers have typically conducted their research in experimental research settings, a.k.a. the ‘psychologist’s laboratory’. Critics have often questioned whether psychology’s laboratory experiments permit generalizable results. This is known as the ‘real-world or the lab’-dilemma. To bridge the gap between lab and life, the concept of ecological validity has been widely used to evaluate whether laboratory experiments resemble and generalize to the ‘real (...) world’. However, researchers seldom define what they mean with this concept, nor are there any guidelines or criteria available for evaluating a study’s ecological validity. In our view, the popular concept of ecological validity is ill-formed, lacks specificity, and falls short of adequately addressing the fundamental problem of generalizability. In order to move beyond this ‘real-world or the lab’-dilemma, we believe that researchers should be more specific about the contexts of behaviors they are interested in, instead of aiming to understand human cognition and behavior in the ‘real world’. We argue that this is a more constructive way of uncovering the context-specific and context-generic principles of human cognition and behavior. (shrink)

Description logics and other formal devices are frequently used as means for preventing or detecting mistakes in ontologies. Some of these devices are also capable of inferring the existence of inter-concept relationships that have not been explicitly entered into an ontology. A prerequisite, however, is that this information can be derived from those formal definitions of concepts and relationships which are included within the ontology. In this paper, we present a novel algorithm that is able to suggest relationships among existing (...) concepts in a formal ontology that are not derivable from such formal definitions. The algorithm exploits cross-lingual information that is implicitly present in the collection of terms used in various languages to denote the concepts and relationships at issue. By using a specific experimental design, we are able to quantify the impact of cross-lingual information in coping with underspecification in formal ontologies. (shrink)

Solidarity could be defined in the broad sense either as a means or as an end. Considered as an end, solidarity is the motive of any virtuous action based on altruistic reasons, such as helping others to rescue someone in order to prevent a harmful situation. E. g. contributing to lift and rescue a heavy person, lying unconscious in the street on the floor, who is being handled by rescuers, but who might be needing an additional person, could express the (...) value of solidarity as an end, since an answer to others request for help is given in the situation of emergency and risk, without having a particular obligation to help. Solidarity as a means (to an end, not an end), could be understood as a property of dependency of a set of parts to a whole (in solidum), as when in a family or a professional group, individual and collective roles and responsibilities are melt together to some extent.This idea of benefiting others could be understood either as a way of sharing together moral sentiments as love, social virtues as friendship and shared commitments and common economic and educational interests, in a limited community circle, that of the family. Even if the division of labour is not simply based on patriarchal authority, mutual consent of family members to rules and to a common circle of interests, those of the family, resemble to a egoism of the group, and not yet to truly social and altruistic values. Solidarity as cohesion of human beings, by the means of "interchangeability of ideas, services, goods, of workforce, virtues and vices", is solidarity limited to the constitution of a process of exchange that is a means that could be used to different ends. (shrink)

Ignace Ndongala Maduku | : Cet article entend vérifier la plausibilité sociale et politique de la parole épiscopale. Il a pour objet un Message de l’épiscopat congolais qu’il approche à partir de l’analyse du discours tel que systématisé par Ruth Amossy et Patrick Charaudeau. Il examine la visée persuasive, les modes d’argumentation et de légitimation de la parole épiscopale. Il rend compte de la manière dont les évêques congolais construisent leur identité et celle de leur auditoire ainsi que de la (...) façon dont ils incitent ce dernier à l’action. | : This article intends to investigate the social and political plausibility of the Episcopal speech. It provides a message that the Congolese bishops approach from discourse analysis as systematized by Ruth Amossy and Patrick Charaudeau. It examines the persuasive aim, modes of argumentation and legitimation of the Episcopal speech. It reports how the Congolese bishops construct their identity and that of their audience and how they encourage it to action. (shrink)

Poetry and Ethics: Inventing Possibilities in Which We Are Moved to Action and How We Live Together, Obiora Ike / Andrea Grieder / Ignace Haaz (Eds.), Global Series No. 16, Geneva: Globethics Publications, 2018, pp. 247-262.

Part of education as interactive exercise is related to a community of practitioners, a dialogue based philosophy of morals which supposes ethical normative characteristics of the discourse. This normative layer can be interpreted either in relation to the lifeworld, i. e. to the understanding of the good life. Alternatively, it can be realized in relation to some cultural rights, since a mutual recognition based ethics, aiming at highlighting culture as necessary feature of human dignity, can explain an ultimate goal of (...) higher education as global and universal education. Since the whole set of human rights should be seen as an indivisible system of basic limits to individual and collective freedom, a right based approach would be the other main perspective, certainly relevant in the context of the African continent, as it is worldwide. Furthermore a right based understanding is a much ignored aspect of human rights, although intimately related to basic interests of the higher education system from either the point of view of the national education systems, or as private universities and it is also related to non-governmental organisations understanding of the general aim of higher education development, where international organizations could help in the implementation of these cultural rights based good practices. In the first section we first develop briefly a normative ethical model of education based on the transformative model of the ethics of discourse compared to other possible classical models based on merit, then we will present cultural rights, reminding us some aspects of cultural rights related to higher education, and address the relevance for the African context of a contextual reflection on these rights. (shrink)

The claim of this paper is to present Spinoza’s view on self-esteem and positive reciprocity, which replaces the human being in a monistic psycho-dynamical affective framework, instead of a dualistic pedestal above nature. Without naturalising the human being in an eliminative materialistic view as many recent neuro-scientific conceptions of the mind do, Spinoza finds an important entry point in a panpsychist and holistic perspective, presenting the complexity of the human being, which is not reducible to the psycho-physiological conditions of life. (...) From a panpsychist point of view, qualities and values emerge from the world, in a situation similar to what could be seen in animism, or early childhood psychology, where the original distance between the mind and the exterior thing is reduced ad minima, and both can even interrelate in a confusing manner. Human reality is nevertheless a social reality, it supposes a basis for shared competencies, that we will present as grounded on the one hand of the sustaining character of the essence of the animal-man as will-to-power. Negatively speaking we all share same asocial tendencies and affects. This aspect is not only negative but it is also a will to develop and master the environment, because values have an onto-metaphysical immanent dimension in nature, not because there is an individual bottom-up will to survive, but rather a will to live in harmony with the surrounding world. On the other hand, we shall see that Spinoza understood and described perfectly the power of the mind over the power of the affects, as a co-constituting dimension, which is alienating natural dependencies, leaving an inner space for the objectification of ethical values, not related to mere compensation mechanisms. (shrink)