This commentary focuses on Dixon et al.'s discussion on the dangers of employing prejudice-reduction interventions that seek to promote intergroup harmony in historically unequal societies. Specifically, it illustrates these dangers by discussing my work in Israel on the processes and practices through which reconciliation-aimed encounters between Jews and Arabs mitigate sociopolitical change.

Confucius’ religious thought summarized and utilized existing historical and cultural achievements. He strove to bring problems concerning traditional religious ideas such as destiny, the spirits, ritual propriety and faith into the realm of the rational. He sought to unearth the elements of human reason contained within these and to highlight the sublime and sacred in actual human society. He established a system of religious humanism that incorporated views on edification, faith, destiny, the ghosts and spirits and self-cultivation. Using a dialectic (...) based on the mean, he established a spiritual mindset comprising rational faith, a this-worldly transcendence and a sacredness grounded in the human that led ancient Chinese religious thinking in a unique direction. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Capitalism on Edge aims to redraw the terms of analysis of the so-called democratic capitalism and sketches a political agenda for emancipating society of its grip. This symposium reflects critically on Azmanova’s book and challenges her arguments on methodological, thematic, and substantive grounds. Azar Dakwar introduces the book’s claims and wonders about the nature of the anti-capitalistic agency Azmanova’s ascribes to the precariat. David Ingram worries about Azmanova’s deposing of “economic democracy” and the impact of which on the prospect (...) of radical change she advocates. William Callison casts doubt over the empirical plausibility of Azmanova’s vision of crisis-free transition out of democratic capitalism. Eilat Maoz interrogates Azmanova’s emancipatory project from the historical standpoint of (de)colonization and global imperialism. In her reply to these criticisms, Azmanova accepts some and parries others, while bringing their points closer to her anti-capitalist vision. (shrink)

What is free will? Can it exist in a determined universe? How can we determine who, if anyone, possesses it? Philosophers have been debating these questions for millennia. In recent decades neuroscientists have joined the fray with questions of their own. Which neural mechanisms could enable conscious control of action? What are intentional actions? Do contemporary developments in neuroscience rule out free will or, instead, illuminate how it works? Over the past few years, neuroscientists and philosophers have increasingly come to (...) understand that both fields can make substantive contributions to the free-will debate, so working together is the best path forward to understanding whether, when, and how our choices might be free. We therefore asked leading philosophers and neuroscientists which questions related to free will they would most like the other field to answer. Those experts then voted on the 15 most important questions for each field to answer. This book is a collection of the answers to those questions along with follow-up questions from world experts in the neuroscience and philosophy of free will. These varied perspectives will fascinate, illuminate, and stimulate students from both fields along with anyone who wants to be brought up to date on these profound issues. (shrink)

This study explored attention and interpretation biases in processing facial expressions as correlates of theoretically distinct self-reported anger experience, expression, and control. Non-selected undergraduate students completed cognitive tasks measuring attention bias, interpretation bias, and Spielberger’s State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory. Attention bias toward angry faces was associated with higher trait anger and anger expression and with lower anger control-in and anger control-out. The propensity to quickly interpret ambiguous faces as angry was associated with greater anger expression and its subcomponent of anger (...) expression-out and with lower anger control-out. Interactions between attention and interpretation biases did not contribute to the prediction of any anger component suggesting that attention and interpretation biases may function as distinct mechanisms. Theoretical and possible clinical implications are discussed. (shrink)

This book fills that void and is a welcome addition on that count."--Ronald F. Webbink, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

The continuous increase of carbon emissions is a serious challenge all over the world, and many countries are striving to solve this problem. Since 2020, a widespread lockdown in the country to prevent the spread of COVID-19 escalated, severely restricting the movement of people and unnecessary economic activities, which unexpectedly reduced carbon emissions. This paper aims to analyze the carbon emissions data of 30 provinces in the 2020 and provide references for reducing emissions with epidemic lockdown measures. Based on the (...) method of time series visualization, we transform the time series data into complex networks to find out the hidden information in these data. We found that the lockdown would bring about a short-term decrease in carbon emissions, and most provinces have a short time point of impact, which is closely related to the level of economic development and industrial structure. The current results provide some insights into the evolution of carbon emissions under COVID-19 blockade measures and valuable insights into energy conservation and response to the energy crisis in the post-epidemic era. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on the Idea of Existence1 Phillip D. Cummins One, the primary, aim of this paper is to understand an argument Hume employed to defend his contention that there is no special or distinctidea ofexistence. This contention he expressedvariouslyin the following passage: The idea ofexistence, then, is the very same with the idea of what we conceive tobe existent. To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on (...) it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoin'd with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we please to form is the idea ofa being; and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form.2 My secondary aim is to understand what the quoted claim amounts to as a characterization of the idea of existence. I am among those who have serious difficulty understanding what precisely Hume is here claiming. Specifically, I am not sure how, if at all, his position on the idea ofexistence fits with other elements ofhis theory ofthought.3 For example, earlier in the Treatise, in "OfAbstract Ideas," Hume argued that under suitable conditions of habituation and linguistic competence, a single simple4 idea could be the idea ofboth a particular object, a line drawn on a particular sheet ofpaper, and a type ofobject, line in general (T 20-24). Further, on the basis of appropriate comparisons, a single simple idea can also be the idea oftwo different quaUties, purple and extended, for example (T 24-25, 34). The former claim is the positive component ofHume's account ofabstract thinking; the latter is the positive component of his position on distinctions of reason. Hume goes out ofhis way to distinguish his position on the idea of existence from his position on distinctions of reason (T 67). As for how it differs, ifat all, from his position on abstract ideas, a matter by no means obvious, Hume says nothing at all. His silence does not preclude speculation on the subject—on the contrary, it makes such speculation unavoidable—but it does give special importance to his brief and puzzhng proof that there is no special or distinct idea of existence. Volume XVII Number 1 61 PHILLIP D. CUMMINS I. Hume's Argument In making his case that we have no distinct idea of existence Hume first insists that we have an idea of existence, appealing to what he regards as an undeniable matter of psychological fact. He writes, There is no impression nor idea ofany kind, ofwhich we have anyconsciousness or memory, thatis not conceiVd as existent; and 'tis evident, that from this consciousness the most perfect idea and assurance ofbeing is deriv'd. (T 66) The argument seems to comprise the following propositions: attending to consciousness and memory reveals that all the perceptions we experience or remember are believed to exist; one cannot beUeve in the existence of something unless one has an idea of existence; therefore, there is an idea ofexistence (being) which in some way is derived from consciousness and memory. Hume next formulates what he calls a dilemma. From hence we may form a dilemma, the most clear and conclusive that can be imagin'd, viz. that since we never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence toit, the idea ofexistence must eitherbe deriv'd from a distinct impression, conjoin'd with every perception or object ofour thought, or must be the very same with the idea of the perception or object. (T 66) The alternatives seem clear: either, in believing in the past existence of, say, a blue spot once seen, one has two ideas, one of the blue spot and a different one of existence, or one has only one idea, which somehow is both the idea of the spot and the idea ofexistence. What is not immediately obvious is why Hume speaks ofa dilemma. From the supposed psychological fact (we never remember any idea or impression without attributing existence to it) and its corollary (we have an idea ofexistence) Hume develops a disjunction (either the idea ofexistence is derived from a distinct impression conjoined with every perception, or... (shrink)

En su gran texto dedicado al amor — el capítulo 178 de _Las Iluminaciones de La Meca_—, Ibn ʿArabī comenta siete cualidades (_ṣ__ifāt_) que, según el Corán, suscitan el amor de Dios hacia los seres humanos. A lo largo de nuestro trabajo analizaremos el comentario akbarí y mostraremos cómo la clave para actualizar dichas cualidades consiste en_ hacer del propio ser un regalo de __amor_. O lo que es lo mismo: realizar un movimiento análogo al de Dios en cuanto que (...) El Omni-Compasivo (_al-Ra__ḥ__mān_), Quien a cada instante, de modo incondicional y sin esperar nada a cambio, asiste amorosamente a todas y cada una de Sus criaturas. (shrink)

This paper examines the thought of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) regarding takfīr (declaring another a non-believer), a practice which would become popularized in the generation after the death of the Prophet Muhammad by a sect known as the Kharajites. The Kharajites were a religio-political sect that would use takfīr as a kalāmic tool of excommunication, as well as a justification for violence against other Muslims. The group originates in the first century of hijrah following their excommunication of the Caliph (...) ‘Alī for mediating with his political challenger Mu‘āwiya. In the centuries following the emergence of this sect, scholars of kalām such as al-Āmidī would begin to discuss and debate takfīr in the context of the greater Muslim community. In contrast to the Kharajites, a number of other sects al-Āmidī would recognize as deviant would hold contrasting beliefs, including the Murji’ites who vehemently opposed the excommunication of anyone so long as they outwardly maintained belief in God and His prophet. While some of these scholarly debates over takfīr would become so heated as to result in excommunication between kalāmic schools, it would later be accepted that excessive takfīr was not necessarily a characteristic of any single Sunni sect, but rather a mentality that could manifest in any given kalāmic school. Many of these scholars would adopt a kalāmic formula designed to prevent excessive takfīr, the principle that the “those belonging to the qibla” (ahl al-qibla) ought not be excommunicated. In his formulation, Al-Āmidī addresses a number of issues debated as potential reasons for takfīr, including the committing of major sins (murder, adultery, theft, etc.), abandonment of central Islamic obligations, opposing scholarly consensus, belief in the createdness of the Qur’ān, denying the beatific vision (ru’yā), misinterpreting the divine attributes (ṣifāt), and the excommunication of prophetic companions or other Muslims. This principle, as shown in this study, would be considered flexible by many of these scholars, who were willing to excommunicate followers of heretical movements. Al-Āmidī, a prominent scholar living in the context of these debates surrounding excommunication, spent considerable energy on the question of takfīr and proposed a number of original insights. In attempting to minimize the application of takfīr, al-Āmidī analyzed many of the specific issues discussed by previous scholars on the issue, arguing that many acts previously considered excommunicable in fact did not constitute disbelief. These groups include such sects as the Kharajites, Murji’ites, Mu’tazilites, Shi’ites and anthropomorphists, whom al-Āmidī argues must not be excommunicated from the fold of Islam, drawing from both logical (‘aqlī) and scriptural (naqlī) arguments. One of the central scriptural sources al-Āmidī deploys is an oft-quoted prophetic tradition concerning the prediction of the Muslim nation splitting into 73 sects, only one of which will be saved from the hellfire – implying that these groups should still be recognized as Muslims. Conversely, questions regarding which al-Āmidī would affirm the obligation for takfīr include denying prophecy, any aspect of divine revelation, belief in the divinity of objects or beings, denial of God and divine miracles, and insulting God, the prophets, or any aspect of the religion. This study further analyzes Al-Āmidī’s definitions of īmān (belief) and kufr (disbelief), the relationship between them, and his views on specific heretical sects as debated in the Sunni tradition. (shrink)