The goal of discourse-based decision-making is to free negotiations from self-interested, strategic interactions. In this paper it is argued that the absence of interests may lead to both efficiency losses and redistribution between participants of the discourse and outsiders. The latter effect is the stronger, the more personal relationships between discourse participants become. Therefore, it is essential to validate the recommendations arrived at in discourses in democratic decision-making processes that are driven by competition between different points of views and interests.

This book is an inquiry into the nature of protest, legislative efforts at its criminalization, and the common good. Using the method of montage, the text juxtaposes different voices, disciplines, and media to illuminate rather than obscure the contradictions in our contemporary understanding of dissent and state power.

In this article we consider certain elements of the normative theory of Jürgen Habermas in the light of the proposals of Bruce Ackerman, with a view to strengthening a concept of deliberative democracy applied to the legitimation of juridical rules. We do not construct a hierarchy of the two positions, but seek to bring together certain elements to achieve a common project. As the starting point for examining the work of the two authors, we take the scheme proposed by Habermas (...) in Faktizität und Geltung. In this connection, through the work of Ackerman, we intend to fill in some of the gaps that Habermas appears to have left in the theory of radical democracy applied to the law. The work of Ackerman can make a significant contribution to deliberative democracy, to the discourse principle that Habermas defines, and to the contractualist theories from a liberal perspective. The study of these contributions makes possible a critical judgment that enables the legitimation of juridical rules carried out by Habermas to acquire greater practicity. In examining the epistemological status of juridical science and law, we attempt to determine the weight and the performance of normative democracy. In Tarr's view, it is a matter for philosophers to examine direct democracy and its desirability. (shrink)

James I. The Political Works of James I. Reprinted from the Edition of 1616. With an Introduction by Charles Howard McIlwain. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. cxi, 354 pp. Reprinted 2002 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.