For courses in Business Ethics A fresh approach to the assumptions that underlie business practices Two recent events — the 2008 economic meltdown and the ongoing concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of a very small percentage of the population — have led many people to question a number of basic assumptions about business, corporations, and the workings of contemporary free-market capitalism in a global economy. Written as a dialogue between Socrates and a hypothetical contemporary CEO,Socrates Comes to (...) Wall Street leads students to think critically about perspectives and practices that are taken as “givens” in most American business schools and corporations. Employing this original and provocative approach, author Thomas White seeks to encourage the next generation of business leaders to be more astute about the implications of their actions, and to act more prudently and more fairly than we have seen in the recent past. (shrink)

A simple model, illustrating the transition from a population of free swimming, solitary cells to one consisting of small colonies serves as a basis to discuss the evolution of the cooperative group. The transition is the result of a mutation of the dynamics of cell division, delayed cell separation leads to colonies of four cells. With this mutation cooperative features appear, such as synchronised cell divisions within colonies and coordinated flagellar function which enables the colony to swim in definite directions. (...) The selective advantages under given, environmental conditions are defined and the periods necessary for complete allelic replacement in small populations are calculated for asexual and sexual reproduction. The assumption of a steady-state population during allelic substitution is critically considered, particularly under conditions of competition. It is shown that density-dependent population control must operate in the process of selection. Sexual reproduction slows down the rate of selection even though all cells dre haploid. This phenomenon can be explained in general terms of `organizational dominance', where individual units coordinate the function of their neighbours which may be of a different allelotype.Cooperativity is pointed out as an a priori systemic feature which resides in the sub-units of systems, group formation and coordination appears thus as an almost inevitable event. A particular type of system described as ‘closed cycle of positive fitness interaction’ is discussed in more detail. It has the remarkable feature that its members cannot compete with each other; selection takes place between whole cycles .Gonium has a wide spectrum of `somatic plasticity' which enables it to assume various colonial configurations depending on physiological and environmental conditions. This feature can be explained as the result of dynamic flexibilities on the macro-molecular level. The particular relationship between the vast, molecular complexity and the relative simple dynamics of the cell cycle must lead eventually to the genetic fixation of an environmentally induced phenotype. (shrink)

As technology redefines relationships, new assumptions are emerging about the ethics of persuasion. In an increasingly global economy, technology is forcing greater transparency onto businesses and governments as the moral context of their communications is inseparable from the competitive nature of the business world. This article suggests that moral boundaries will be set naturally, that consumers have a moral obligation to excercise "due diligence" in their acceptance of messages, and that no one is in charge of the global economy's conventions (...) and morality. The system ultimately depends on participants to keep their own self-interested boat in the race. (shrink)

This paper considers the question: what becomes of the notion of a logic as a way of codifying valid arguments when the customary assumption is dropped that the premisses and conclusions of these arguments are statements from some single language? An elegant treatment of the notion of a logic, when this assumption is in force, is that provided by Dana Scott's theory of consequence relations; this treatment is appropriately generalized in the present paper to the case where we (...) do not make this assumption of linguistic homogeneity. Several applications of the resulting concept of a heterogeneous logic are suggested, but the main emphasis is on the formal development. One topic touched on is a certain contrast between the boolean and the intensional sentence-connectives in this more general setting. (shrink)

We consider the modal logic of non-contingency in a general setting, without making special assumptions about the accessibility relation. The basic logic in this setting is axiomatized, and some of its extensions are discussed, with special attention to the expressive weakness of the language whose sole modal primitive is non-contingency , by comparison with the usual language based on necessity.

A.N. Prior once showed that on certain apparently reasonable assumptions, a thesis sometimes associated with the name of Hume to the effect that no set of factual statements can ever entail an evaluative statement, is quite untenable. We assume only that there is at least one statement of each kind, and that the negation of a factual statement is factual — a principle we may call ‘N'. Now consider the disjunction F V E of some factual with some evaluative statement. (...) Since the disjunction is entailed by F, a factual statement, it must, if principle H is correct, be classified as factual. But by N, ∽ F is also factual, and this together with F V E entails E, thus violating H since E was exhypothesi an evaluative statement. (shrink)

There is an apparent tension between the open-ended aspect of the ordinal sequence and the assumption that the set-theoretical universe is fully determinate. This tension is already present in Cantor, who stressed the incompletable character of the transfinite number sequence in Grundlagen and avowed the definiteness of the totality of sets and numbers in subsequent philosophical publications and in correspondence. The tension is particularly discernible in his late distinction between sets and inconsistent multiplicities. I discuss Cantor’s contrasting views, and (...) I conclude that his account of that distinction is only tenable if the definiteness of the set-theoretical universe is rejected. (shrink)

A.N. Prior once showed that on certain apparently reasonable assumptions, a thesis sometimes associated with the name of Hume to the effect that no set of factual statements can ever entail an evaluative statement, is quite untenable. We assume only that there is at least one statement of each kind, and that the negation of a factual statement is factual — a principle we may call ‘N'. Now consider the disjunction F V E of some factual with some evaluative statement. (...) Since the disjunction is entailed by F, a factual statement, it must, if principle H is correct, be classified as factual. But by N, ∽ F is also factual, and this together with F V E entails E, thus violating H since E was exhypothesi an evaluative statement. (shrink)

This book is a thought-provoking assessment of assumptions inhibiting progress in comparative biology. The volume is inspired by a list generated years earlier by Donn Rosen, one of the most influential, innovative and productive comparative biologists of the latter 20th century. His list has assumed almost legendary status among comparative evolutionary biologists. Surprisingly many of the obstructing assumptions implicated by Rosen remain relevant today. Any comparative biologist hoping to avoid such assumptions in their own research will benefit from this introspective (...) volume. (shrink)

Back cover: This book develops a philosophical account that reveals the major characteristics that make an explanation in the life sciences reductive and distinguish them from non-reductive explanations. Understanding what reductive explanations are enables one to assess the conditions under which reductive explanations are adequate and thus enhances debates about explanatory reductionism. The account of reductive explanation presented in this book has three major characteristics. First, it emerges from a critical reconstruction of the explanatory practice of the life sciences itself. (...) Second, the account is monistic since it specifies one set of criteria that apply to explanations in the life sciences in general. Finally, the account is ontic in that it traces the reductivity of an explanation back to certain relations that exist between objects in the world (such as part-whole relations and level relations), rather than to the logical relations between sentences. Beginning with a disclosure of the meta-philosophical assumptions that underlie the author’s analysis of reductive explanation, the book leads into the debate about reduction(ism) in the philosophy of biology and continues with a discussion on the two perspectives on explanatory reduction that have been proposed in the philosophy of biology so far. The author scrutinizes how the issue of reduction becomes entangled with explanation and analyzes two concepts, the concept of a biological part and the concept of a level of organization. The results of these five chapters constitute the ground on which the author bases her final chapter, developing her ontic account of reductive explanation. (shrink)

This book provides a timely, compelling, multidisciplinary critique of the largely tacit set of assumptions funding Modernity in the West. A partnership between Michael Polanyi and Charles Taylor's thought promises to cast the errors of the past in a new light, to graciously show how these errors can be amended, and to provide a specific cartography of how we can responsibly and meaningfully explore new possibilities for ethics, political society, and religion in a post-modern modernity.

Birke, a feminist biologist who has written extensively on the connections between feminism and science, seeks to bridge the gap between feminist cultural analysis and science by looking "inside" the body, using ideas in anatomy and physiology to develop the feminist view that the biological body is socially and culturally constructed. She rejects the assumption that the body's functioning is fixed and unchanging, claiming that biological science offers more than just a deterministic narrative of how nature works. Annotation copyrighted (...) by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

This essay discusses a core tenet of pessimism, Afropessimism, in particular. Pessimism claims to be a metatheory analyzing the assumptive logics of the system it critiques. Afropessimists hold that a logical treatment of pessimism is unwarranted because pessimism does not employ a logical treatment of its object. We’ll discuss Afropessimism and, by extension, pessimism, in general, on their own terms as metatheory. We’ll see that a metatheory indirectly follows the logic its object follows directly. From this, a metatheory must hold (...) an assumptive logic of its own, even if superficially disavowed. Consequently, we’ll arrive at a puzzling result when, in this particular case, the metatheory’s claims empty its object of its content, hence the pessimism. (shrink)

Voters satisfy maximin or maximax in their choices between sets of alternatives and secure a Pareto improvement by all voting strategically under simple majority voting for particular sincere preferences. Thus the assumption that strategic voting is a bad thing is challenged and the idea that we should reject voting because of the possibility of misrepresentation dismissed.

Our main result is that the following cardinal arithmetic assumption, which is a slight weakening of GCH, “2κ is a finite successor of κ for every cardinal κ”, implies that in any countably tight compactum X there is a discrete subspace D with . This yields a confirmation of Alan Dow’s Conjecture 2 from [A. Dow, Closures of discrete sets in compact spaces, Studia Math. Sci. Hung. 42 227–234].

The modern state of the Pauli exclusion principle studies is discussed. The Pauli exclusion principle can be considered from two viewpoints. On the one hand, it asserts that particles with half-integer spin (fermions) are described by antisymmetric wave functions, and particles with integer spin (bosons) are described by symmetric wave functions. This is a so-called spin-statistics connection. The reasons why the spin-statistics connection exists are still unknown, see discussion in text. On the other hand, according to the Pauli exclusion principle, (...) the permutation symmetry of the total wave functions can be only of two types: symmetric or antisymmetric, all other types of permutation symmetry are forbidden; although the solutions of the Schrödinger equation may belong to any representation of the permutation group, including the multi-dimensional ones. It is demonstrated that the proofs of the Pauli exclusion principle in some textbooks on quantum mechanics are incorrect and, in general, the indistinguishability principle is insensitive to the permutation symmetry of the wave function and cannot be used as a criterion for the verification of the Pauli exclusion principle. Heuristic arguments are given in favor that the existence in nature only the one-dimensional permutation representations (symmetric and antisymmetric) are not accidental. As follows from the analysis of possible scenarios, the permission of multi-dimensional representations of the permutation group leads to contradictions with the concept of particle identity and their independence. Thus, the prohibition of the degenerate permutation states by the Pauli exclusion principle follows from the general physical assumptions underlying quantum theory. (shrink)

Introduction. A radical tendency in modern approaches to understanding the mechanisms of the brain is the tendency of some scientists to believe that the brain is a receptor capable of capturing thoughts; the nature of the occurrence of the thoughts themselves, however, is not to be clarified. However, speech expressing thoughts is undoubtedly the result of the work of the brain, so studies of the frequency structure of speech can be the basis for considering the material structure of the brain (...) as a kind of “antenna”. In this approach, the problem of noise protection against the background of the undeniable frequency similarity of speech and music appears to us from somewhat different positions. This study raises the question of how essential the overall height of the musical system is to the perception of music (are there musical systems that are harmful or useful, in terms of their effects on the psyche). This question is also relevant to speech perception.Methodology and sources. The main sources in which the work of the brain and the essence of consciousness are considered from the positions indicated above were for us the work of American and British neurophysiologists and psychiatrists (Sam Parnia, Peter Fenwick). These scientists are studying the phenomena that accompany clinical death, and argue that at these moments the brain functions to the greatest extent as a receiving “antenna”. Assuming that any antenna is to be tuned, we are trying to identify possible ways to “tune” the brain. To do this, we propose to study the frequency characteristics of speech (in the simplest case, when singing vowels in a calm state) for their belonging to a particular musical system, as well as the peculiarities of music perception depending on the musical system (on the height of the note “la”). Varying the frequency characteristics of speech in a particular musical system can be considered, in our opinion, the main way to “tune” the brain. The methodology of the method is based on the use of frequency analysis of sound and the basic provisions of the elementary theory of music.Results and discussion. The main conclusion made by Western psychiatrists is the brain is not an organ of thought, consciousness exists independently from outside, the work of consciousness cannot be explained by the functioning of the brain – it requires a hardware check. If the neural network is an “antenna” that captures thoughts, and its “adjustment” at the physical level can be carried out (and is carried out) through sensory systems (including the hearing organ), the study of the frequency structure of speech will answer a number of important questions, including including related and higher brain functions (insight, creativity). Our experiments (Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University, FIBS, department of EUT) showed that the influence of the “increased” or “lowered” musical-speech system on brain activity is insignificant. The study revealed the equiprobability of the frequency structure of speech. Since our brain lacks some characteristic set of frequencies – elements of a uniformly temperamental system, it is not necessary to talk about the harmful (or any other noise) effect of the “raised” and “lowered” systems due to deviation from the “internal standard”.Conclusion. In response to the assumptions made by Western experts, we proposed a frequency interpretation of the processes occurring in the brain, which, perhaps, will explain in more detail such phenomena as inspiration, discovery, etc., which occur with minimal activity of consciousness. Despite the limited methods of hardware study of factors that influence the activity of the brain and largely determine its higher functions (for example, creativity), the results of the brain's work in relation to music (both in terms of its creation and in terms of our reaction to it) are quite analyzable, which was shown in this study. The “musicality” of speech is extremely vividly represented in its frequency structure and allows one to reveal, to one degree or another, the features of the brain. (shrink)

We develop the theory of Kim-independence in the context of NSOP $_{1}$ theories satisfying the existence axiom. We show that, in such theories, Kim-independence is transitive and that -Morley sequences witness Kim-dividing. As applications, we show that, under the assumption of existence, in a low NSOP $_{1}$ theory, Shelah strong types and Lascar strong types coincide and, additionally, we introduce a notion of rank for NSOP $_{1}$ theories.

Problem: What alternative strategies from our experiences using a Piaget-based radical constructivist pedagogy might have more and better results than the current practice of responding in debate form, each side trying to prove the other wrong? Method: Use of Slezak’s paper to illuminate the point that the central problem with the interpretation of RC generally used in such writing is that the authors seem not to be able to operate from the central tenet of RC, which is the opposite of (...) that used in realism. Description of how this failure to use the central tenet of RC results in claims that RC is irrelevant to education and to definitions of good teaching. Results: A specific approach shown to be useful in facilitating the construction of new understanding in science is adapted in order to guide interaction between an RC and a realist, which can result in the realist understanding the RC point of view. Implications: Instead of debating with critics of RC, where each side is trying to prove the other side wrong, we need to change the interaction to one in which members of opposing sides attempt to understand the other’s position. In this situation we are in a position to use a pedagogical strategy in which the realist examines her own fundamental assumption that we can know a mind-independent world, and considers the implications of a starting assumption that is exactly the opposite. (shrink)

Evaluative studies of inductive inferences have been pursued extensively with mathematical rigor in many disciplines, such as statistics, econometrics, computer science, and formal epistemology. Attempts have been made in those disciplines to justify many different kinds of inductive inferences, to varying extents. But somehow those disciplines have said almost nothing to justify a most familiar kind of induction, an example of which is this: “We’ve seen this many ravens and they all are black, so all ravens are black.” This is (...) enumerative induction in itsfullstrength. For it does not settle with a weaker conclusion (such as “the ravens observed in the future will all be black”); nor does it proceed with any additional premise (such as the statistical IID assumption). The goal of this paper is to take some initial steps toward a justification for the full version of enumerative induction, against counterinduction, and against the skeptical policy. The idea is to explore various epistemic ideals, mathematically defined as different modes of convergence to the truth, and look for one that is weak enough to be achievable and strong enough to justify a norm that governs both the long run and the short run. So the proposal is learning-theoretic in essence, but a Bayesian version is developed as well. (shrink)

Graham Priest argued that all the paradoxes of set theory and logic fall under one schema; and hence they should be solved by one kind of solution. This reply addresses both claims, and counters that in fact at least one paradox escapes the schema, and also some apparently "safe" theorems fall within it; and even for the range of paradoxes so captured by the schema, the assumption of a common solution is not obvious; each paradox surely depends upon the (...) theory and context in which it arises. Details of Priest's proposed solution are also sought. (shrink)

The practice of a priori conceptual analysis requires that the concept being analyzed be available in the analyst's mind. The difficulties of analysis and the existence of disagreements among analysts are explained by distinguishing the implicit knowledge we have of these concepts from the explicit knowledge we seek. This view of disagreement assumes that those who disagree are typically attempting to analyze a single shared concept. In this paper, reasons are developed for replacing this guiding assumption with the alternative (...) assumption that members of a conceptual community often have similar, but not identical, concepts. Adopting this alternative requires that we rethink the nature and aims of conceptual analysis. (shrink)

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. (...) Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative. (shrink)

This paper examines the adequacy of causal graph theory as a tool for modeling biological phenomena and formalizing biological explanations. I point out that the causal graph approach reaches it limits when it comes to modeling biological phenomena that involve complex spatial and structural relations. Using a case study from molecular biology, DNA-binding and -recognition of proteins, I argue that causal graph models fail to adequately represent and explain causal phenomena in this field. The inadequacy of these models is due (...) to their failure to include relevant spatial and structural information in a way that does not render the model non-explanatory, unmanageable, or inconsistent with basic assumptions of causal graph theory. (shrink)

The study of church growth has historically been divided into two strands of research: the Church Growth Movement and the Social Science approach. This article argues that Dunbar’s Social Brain Hypothesis represents a legitimate and fruitful third strand in the study of church growth, sharing features of both previous strands but identical with neither. We argue that five predictions derived from the Social Brain Hypothesis are accurately borne out in the empirical and practical church growth literature: that larger congregations lead (...) to lower active engagement from members; that single-leader congregations are limited to around 150 members; that congregations of 150 are further stratified into smaller functioning groups; that congregations expanding beyond 150 members undergo internal tensions and are forced to reorganise; and that congregations larger than 150 will require structural sub-divisions to retain active member involvement. While these assertions are reflected in the church growth literature and articulate the common sense assumptions of church growth experts, the Social Brain Hypothesis offers a coherent theoretical framework which unifies these observations and thereby represents a distinctive contribution to church growth studies. (shrink)

The problem of induction has long been one of the central problems of empiricist epistemology. There are two main versions of this problem: to justify a strictly universal statement on the basis of a finite set of singular statements and to justify a new singular statement on the basis of some finite set of accepted singular statements. In both cases it is assumed that we have a set of singular statements with which to begin and that these singular statements are, (...) somehow, provided by observation; neither of these assumptions will be disputed in this paper. But there is another assumption without which there might well be no problem of induction:A. Any synthetic statement which is to be accepted as known must be justified on the basis of observation.It is only because philosophers assume A that they are faced with the problem of showing how we can infer from statements which have been justified by observation to others which have not. It is this assumption which will concern us here, for if there are no adequate grounds for accepting A, the problem of induction may not arise at all. (shrink)

Hick professes now to be a “poly-something” and a “mono-something.” Most of my response is directed to these claims. I suggest that (contrary to my earlier assumption) Hick does not take any of the gods of the actual religions to be real. They are much more like fictional characters than like Kantian phenomena. He is “poly” about these insubstantia.I argue that Hick is not “mono” about anything at all of religious significance. In particular, he is not a mono-Realist.I conclude (...) by arguing that Hick has no satisfactory support for the sort of ineffability which he attributes to the Real. (shrink)

The article argues for the possibility of translation manuals having an implicit internal structure. This structure is composed of specific methodological assumptions and techniques. Using the (N)-type and (G)-type distinction developed by Fuller for the study of scientific behavior, it is shown that these are incomplete characterizations of translation manuals. A more complete characterization must involve an analysis of how the presence or absence of methodological rules influences the interpretation of specific research questions. It is further argued that while Quine's (...) original indeterminacy thesis cannot be completely rejected, in some cases it can be modified to reflect the importance of the methodological constraints. Finally, it is suggested that the more critical analysis of translation manuals will benefit the on-going debates in the study of scientific behavior. (shrink)

In this paper I examine various aspects of the proposal that scarce lifesaving medical resources should (morally) be allocated by some random procedure. I argue that a fundamental assumption of this approach is that there are no morally relevant differences among the candidates for such services, and I challenge this general claim. I also argue that there are a great many lotteries among which we must choose if we are to use a lottery at all, and that we should (...) choose among them on valuational grounds. (shrink)

Context: Distributed language and interactivity are central members of a set of concepts that are rapidly developing into rigorous, exciting additions to 4E cognitive science. Because they share certain assumptions and methodological commitments with enactivism, the two have sometimes been confused; additionally, while enactivism is a well-developed paradigm, interactivity has relied more on methodological development and on a set of focal examples. Problem: The goal of this article is to clarify the core conceptual commitments of both interactivity-based and enactive approaches (...) to cognitive science by contrasting the two and highlighting their differences in assumptions, focus, and explanatory strategies. Method: We begin with the shared commitments of interactivity and enactivism - e.g., antirepresentationalism, naturalism, interdisciplinarity, the importance of biology, etc. We then give an overview of several important varieties of enactivism, including sensorimotor and anti-representationalist enactivism, and then walk through the history of the “core” varieties, taking care to contrast Maturana’s approach with that of Varela and the current researchers following in Varela’s footsteps. We then describe the differences between this latter group and interactivity-based approaches to cognitive science. Results: We argue that enactivism’s core concepts are explanatorily inadequate in two ways. First, they mis-portray the organization of many living systems, which are not operationally closed. Second, they fail to realize that most epistemic activity depends on engagement with non-local resources. Both problems can be dealt with by adopting an interactivity-based perspective, in which agency and cognition are fundamentally distributed and involve integration of non-local resources into the local coupling of organism and environment. Implications: The article’s primary goal is theoretical clarification and exposition; its primary implication is that enactive concepts need to be modified or extended in some way in order to explain fully many aspects of cognition and directed biological activity. Or, read another way, the article’s primary implication is that interactivity already provides a rich set of concepts for doing just that, which, while closely allied with enactivism in several ways, are not enactivist concepts. Constructivist content: The article consists entirely of a comparison between two constructivist fields of theory. Key Words: Interactivity, enactivism, distributed language, radical embodied cognitive science, ecological psychology, autonomy. (shrink)

When people communicate, they coordinate a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviors. This process of coordination is called alignment, and it is assumed to be fundamental to successful communication. In this paper, we question this assumption and investigate whether disalignment is a more successful strategy in some cases. More specifically, we hypothesize that alignment correlates with task success only when communication is interactive. We present results from a spot-the-difference task in which dyads of interlocutors have to decide whether (...) they are viewing the same scene or not. Interactivity was manipulated in three conditions by increasing the amount of information shared between interlocutors. We use recurrence quantification analysis to measure the alignment between the scan-patterns of the interlocutors. We found that interlocutors who could not exchange feedback aligned their gaze more, and that increased gaze alignment correlated with decreased task success in this case. When feedback was possible, in contrast, interlocutors utilized it to better organize their joint search strategy by diversifying visual attention. This is evidenced by reduced overall alignment in the minimal feedback and full dialogue conditions. However, only the dyads engaged in a full dialogue increased their gaze alignment over time to achieve successful performances. These results suggest that alignment per se does not imply communicative success, as most models of dialogue assume. Rather, the effect of alignment depends on the type of alignment, on the goals of the task, and on the presence of feedback. (shrink)

This paper provides a partial solution to the completeness problem for Joyal's axiomatization of open and etale maps, under the additional assumption that a collection axiom holds.

This essay reads Sylvia Wynter’s only novel The Hills of Hebron as a modern tragedy, one that both challenges and builds upon Raymond Williams’s concept of modern tragedy. The essay’s main argument is that tragedy, as a literary form, and the tragic, as a philosophical concept, are fundamental to Wynter’s project of creating forms of counterpoieses. Engaging Wynter’s interlocution with tragedy is crucial for comprehending how she is able to transform loss into a condition of possibility, primarily for the writing (...) of what she calls “traumatic time.” Instead of only blocking mental representation, traumatic loss in Wynter becomes the first gesture of a philosophical activity that makes presentable that which has been lost or abandoned to a state of ruin, an argument that Walter Benjamin, another writer in dark times, had earlier made in The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Occupying the temporality of the tragic, Wynter has always made the re-assumption of the past—“slave, slave masters and all,” as she says—central to her project of critiquing and dismantling the “descriptive statement” of Man as the only permissible version of the Human. In my reading of The Hills of Hebron, I show how the novel utilizes the aesthetic, particularly the medium of theatricality, as the grounds for a theoretical framework that makes, in a manner redolent of Antigone, “the wretched of the earth” presentable not as “symbolic death” but rather as allegories of resistance. (shrink)

We begin by presenting William of Ockham's various formulations of his principle of parsimony, Ockham's Razor. We then define a reaction mechanism and tell a personal story of how Ockham's Razor entered the study of one such mechanism. A small history of methodologies related to Ockham's Razor, least action and least motion, follows. This is all done in the context of the chemical (and scientific) community's almost unthinking acceptance of the principle as heuristically valuable. Which is not matched, to put (...) it mildly, by current philosophical attitudes toward Ockham's Razor. What ensues is a dialogue, pro and con. We first present a context for questioning, within chemistry, the fundamental assumption that underlies Ockham's Razor, namely that the world is simple. Then we argue that in more than one pragmatic way the Razor proves useful, without at all assuming a simple world. Ockham's Razor is an instruction in an operating manual, not a world view. Continuing the argument, we look at the multiplicity and continuity of concerted reaction mechanisms, and at principal component and Bayesian analysis (two ways in which Ockham's Razor is embedded into modern statistics). The dangers to the chemical imagination from a rigid adherence to an Ockham's Razor perspective, and the benefits of the use of this venerable and practical principle are given, we hope, their due. (shrink)

This book presents stipulated definitions, essays, ontological arguments and logic used to determine necessary basic assumptions of right and wrong, culminating in a practical procedure based upon the Universal Law that can permit everyone to eliminate misconceptions, avoid destructive interpretations, and develop an ethical conscience.

Kristeller's article ‘The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics’ is a classic statement of the view, now widely adopted but rarely examined, that aesthetics became possible only in the eighteenth-century with the emergence of the fine arts. I wish to contest this view, for three reasons. Firstly, Kristeller's historical account can be questioned; alternative and equally plausible accounts are available. Secondly, ‘the modern system of the arts’ appears to have been neither a system nor (...) an agreed upon entity, but only a historical construct of Kristeller's own making that matches up with no known historical reality. Thirdly, while the concept of the fine arts existed in the eighteenth century, the assumption that it had an impact on the rise of aesthetic theory remains unproven and unnecessary. A more satisfactory account of aesthetic thought in antiquity can be given, once the ‘fine-arts’ objection has been cleared away. (shrink)

In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assumptions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inadequacy of this notion (...) in solving the problem of the “emergence” of thought. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of such an “emergence,” looking for continuities between pre-linguistic and linguistic thoughts. (shrink)

The movement to assess teacher competency is becoming a central concern for professional educators, state departments of education, and the public. The major underlying assumption of this concern is that primary and secondary school-aged children are falling far behind in basic skills as compared with their counterparts in other countries. A further concern is that, within this country, variability in teacher competency may exacerbate differences among children of various socioeconomic, racial and ethnic backgrounds and thus perpetuate long-term educational and (...) economic inequalities. To support these assumptions, critics of teacher preparation institutions cite declining SAT and ACT test scores of those entering teacher training, and also this constitutes sufficient grounds for assuming that becoming a teacher is less intellectually demanding than preparing for other fields. (shrink)

Convincing disputes about explanatory reductionism in the philosophy of biology require a clear and precise understanding of what a reductive explanation in biology is. The central aim of this book is to provide such an account by revealing the features that determine the reductive character of a biological explanation. Chapters I-IV provide the ground, on which I can then, in Chapter V, develop my own account of explanatory reduction in biology: Chapter I reveals the meta-philosophical assumptions that underlie my analysis (...) of reduction, Chapter II introduces the previous debate about reduction in the philosophy of biology by pointing out the most crucial lessons one should learn from this debate, Chapter III critically discusses the two perspectives on explanatory reduction that have been proposed in the philosophy of biology so far, and Chapter IV clarifies in what ways the issue of reduction is entangled with the issue of explanation. In Chapter V I present my own account of explanatory reduction. My main claim is that reductive explanations in the biological sciences possess three main characteristics: they explain the behavior of a biological system S, first, exclusively in terms of factors that are located on a lower level of organization than S, second, by focusing on factors that are internal to S , and third, by describing the genuine parts of S only as “parts in isolation”. This account is ontic because it traces the reductivity of an explanation back to certain relations that exist in the world. (shrink)

This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law (...) and practical ethical reflection. (shrink)

(Axiological Systems in the XXI century: A Collage. The downfall of axiological systems based on beliefs and the co-existence of varied beliefs in the spiritual market) - DOI – 10.5752/P.2175-5841.2012v10n28p1295 Resumen Pretendemos mostrar como los sistemas axiológicos de creencias provenientes de las religiones no están vigentes en la actualidad. Para ello mostramos algunos datos del Banco Mundial que muestran como los sistemas heterónomos de creencias no funcionan como orientadores de la vida personal y social del individuo. También facilitamos información sobre (...) la disminución de los que se autoadscriben como pertenecientes a un sistema de creencias y además demostramos mediante las estadísticas que no existe relación entre autoadscribirse como miembro de un sistema de creencias y mantener unas determinadas creencias. Clarificamos la noción de creencia comúnmente utilizada como supuesto acrítico y otros usos del lenguaje corriente y del lenguaje científico. Utilizamos estadísticas de Catalunya, España, y de algunos países de Europa y América. Concluimos que si los sistemas axiológicos de los individuos no vienen determinados por las religiones, entonces ¿qué sistemas axiológicos tenemos que sean capaces de cohesionar y motivar los individuos hacia fines valiosos comunes? Palabras clave : Sistemas Axiológicos. Creencias. Religión. Cualidad humana. Estadísticas. España católicaWe aim at showing why axiological systems coming from religion are not operative currently. To do this we show World Bank data where it is manifested that heteronomous systems of beliefs are not in force to orient the personal and social life of the individuals. We also communicate the declining numbers of those that register themselves as believers and we also reveal that there is no relationship between registering oneself as a believer in an axiological system and effectively holding and “believing” the beliefs of that axiological system. We clarify the common use of the term belief as a non-critical assumption, and other uses of the term in natural language and scientific language. We use statistical data for Catalonia, Spain and some countries of Europe and America. We conclude by asking if individuals’ axiological systems are not determined by religions, then What axiological systems do we have able to cohere and motivate individuals towards valuable common futures? Keywords: Axiological systems. Beliefs, Religion. Human Quality. Statistics. Spain Catholic. (shrink)

Social grooming is an important element of social life in terrestrial primates, inducing the putative benefits of β-endorphin stimulation and group harmony and cohesion. Implicit in many analyses of grooming (e.g. biological markets) are the assumptions of costs and benefits to grooming behaviour. Here, in a review of literature, we investigate the proximate costs and benefits of grooming, as a potentially useful explanatory substrate to the well-documented ultimate (functional) explanations. We find that the hedonic benefits of grooming are well documented. (...) However, we did not find convincing evidence for costs. If proximate costs do exist, they might consist of energetic, cognitive, opportunity costs, or some combination of all of these. Nonetheless, there remains the possibility that grooming costs are negligible, or even that the provision of allogrooming is rewarding in itself. We suggest empirical research to resolve this issue. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:45. HUME'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SELF One of the more baffling and apparently inconclusive parts of the Treatise is the section on personal identity. Hume himself, when he takes a backward glance at it in those notorious passages in the Appendix, singles it out as representing an unresolved problem in his philosophy. It is a matter of fairly general agreement among recent writers on the subject that one of (...) Hume's chief difficulties -- though not one he recognizes — is his assigning to the mind (or, sometimes, the "imagination") certain activities, which he claims are instrumental in generating belief in, and awareness of, the very mind or self whose activities they are said to be. Hume talks about customs and habits of the mind and the expectations arising out of these, of the acts of observing, noticing and associating, of believing, of feigning, and so on, acts which the mind is required to perform in order for us to be able to explain along acceptable empiricist lines how the idea of an abiding self arises. Such talk, it seems, already presupposes the existence of a self and our possession of the idea thereof. So does, of course, the talk involved in Hume's accounts of the external world and of causality. Insofar as these involve his theory of belief, they, too, seem to presuppose a self which is more than a fiction, more than a product of the imagination. Yet the account he gives of the self seems to yield precisely a fiction in just the sense in which our ideas of the external world and of its causal connections are ideas of fictions. Quite generally, then, if Hume's theory of belief presupposes a continually existing self, what sense can be made of his arguments to show that our belief in such a self is the belief in a fiction? I want to argue that Hume can be defended against such criticisms and that the appearance of circularity here is just that: an appearance. It results largely from 46. two features of the Treatise. The first is that since at different points in the Treatise Hume is obviously concerned with different problems, his language reflects this. It is for this reason only that at times he talks in ways which make it seem that a continually existing self is being presupposed. The second feature responsible for the appearance of circularity is that while Hume draws a distinction between "perfect" and 'imperfect" identity, he fails to make that distinction explicit enough, so that one may easily miss the all-important point that it is only the former sort of identity which is being denied of the self, and the latter sort which is being explained and accounted for along Humean empiricist lines. If we keep this in mind, we shall see that the references in his account of the identity of the self to the activities of the self are not questionbegging, and that the attribution of these activities to the very same "fiction" whose existence is being accounted for carries no absurdity. II One way to bring out the differences between the kind of self which is alleged to be presupposed by Hume's account and that which, as I shall argue, is really involved in that account, is to put pressure on Hume's doctrine of 2 association. It is frequently urged by commentators that the notion of association which is so fundamental for much of Hume's philosophy is ambiguous, showing as it does the influence of two very different models, deriving from Hutcheson and Newton respectively. On the first model, a continuing self is presupposed as the agent of the various sorts of associative acts he invokes; on the second it is the items associated (perceptions) which are themselves the entities doing the associating. Clearly, the question whether Hume's theory of belief involves the assumption that a continuing self exists (harmless in the uses of that 47. theory in other contexts, but possibly fatal in its use in a theory of personal identity) may be seen to resolve into the question, which model of association is fundamental for Hume? It is, of course, an undeniable... (shrink)

John Maynard Smith was the founder of evolutionary game theory. He has also been the major influence on the direction of this field, which now pervades behavioural ecology and evolutionary biology. In its original formulation the theory had three components: a set of strategies, a payoff structure, and a concept of evolutionary stability. These three key components are still the basis of the theory, but what is assumed about each component is often different to the original assumptions. We review modern (...) approaches to these components. We emphasis that if a game is considered in isolation, and arbitrary payoffs are assumed, then the payoffs may not be consistent with other components of the system which are not modelled. Modelling the whole system, including not only the focal game, but also the future behaviour of the players and the behaviour of other population members, allows a consistent model to be constructed. We illustrate this in the case of two models of parental care, showing how linking a focal game to other aspects of the system alters what is predicted. (shrink)

In the theory outlined in the target article, an animal forages continuously, making sequential decisions in a world where the amount of food and its uncertainty are fixed, but delays are variable. These assumptions contrast with the risk-sensitive foraging theory and create a problem for comparing the predictions of this model with many laboratory experiments that do not make these assumptions.

In the 1930s, socialist economists used the assumptions of equilibrium theory to argue that a central planner could coordinate supply and demand from above. This argument led Hayek, over the years, to try to explain the limitations of equilibrium theory and, conversely, to explain how capitalism functioned without the assumptions of equilibrium being met. In a changing world of agents who are ignorant of the future, how is a functioning market “order” possible? One answer can be found in Hayek's argument (...) that evolved rules make people's future behavior more predictable and, more to the point, that they contain previously accumulated knowledge that provides the building blocks for future economic growth. Hayek's evolutionary theory was flawed, however, in failing to explain how people can know which rules are responsible for their success or failure so that they persist in using those rules and pass them forward in time. However, markets provide immediate feedback about success and failure through profits and losses. An evolutionary explanation of the economy would have permitted Hayek to dispense with the metaphor of general equilibrium, which was increasingly irrelevant to his understanding of economic order. (shrink)

Economics is privileged in contemporary government policy such that all human transactions are seen as economic forms of exchange. Education has been discursively restructured according to the logic of the market, with education policy being increasingly colonised by economic policy imperatives. This paper explores some of the consequences of this reframing which draws upon metaphors from industrial and business domains. This paper examines a significant dimension of teaching that currently has marginal presence in official discourse: social contingency. We argue that (...) social contingency is characterised by a variety of distinctive features that include unpredictability, relationality and ethical demands. The significance of social contingency is highlighted by a comparison with industrial production, which is organisationally contingent, and craft production, which is characterised as materially contingent. We argue that the different nature of contingency in these domains makes them inappropriate as metaphors for teaching. We explore the nature of social contingency and some of the practical and ethical consequences of the failure to articulate this in official discourse. Its absence in such discourse is illustrated by consideration of competence statements in the Initial Teacher Education context. We argue that the neglect of social contingency is founded on assumptions of teacher sovereignty that are both philosophically and ethically unsustainable. (shrink)