This paper addresses the notion of communicative action on the basis of Alfred Schutz’ writings. In Schutz’ work, communication is of particular significance and its importance is often neglected by phenomenologists. Communication plays a crucial role in his first major work, the Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt from 1932, yet communication is also a major feature in his unfinished works which were later completed posthumously by Thomas Luckmann: The Structures of the Life World (1973, 1989). In these texts, Schutz (...) sometimes refers to “communicative action,” and he comes to ascribe a crucial role to communication within the domain of the life world he calls everyday life. Based on Schutz’ texts, I shall first attempt to critically reconstruct the defining features of his notion of communication and communicative action. As a result, it emerges that Schutz’ notion of communication, particularly in its early incarnation, seems to be, at first glance, characterized by a dichotomy between virtual communication, that is communicative action in a narrow sense, and non-virtual communication. As I want to show with respect to the seemingly established dichotomous distinction between “mediated” and “immediate social action,” Schutz himself started to overcome this dichotomy. Based on this thesis, I will try to sketch a basic outline of a theory of communicative action, a theory less formulated by Schutz’ than built on Schutz’ writings. As the idea of communicative action, and particularly the transgression of the distinction between mediated and immediate action, affects the very structures of the life-world described by Schutz and Luckmann, I will ultimately demonstrate that any mundane phenomenology of the life-world requires a triangulatory method. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reception and impact of Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality. The article will, first, address Berger and Luckmann themselves and their approach to the book. In the next part, we will sketch the diffusion of the basic concept of the book. Then we want to show that the reception exhibits a particular open form, which allowed it to disperse into extremely different disciplines not only of the social sciences and the humanities. It is the (...) disciplinary distance in particular that detaches the diffusion of the concept from reference to the book. In the next part, we can see that this detachment leads to the variation of approaches to social construction. Particularly, it is the misidentification with constructivism that leads to misunderstandings, which will then be clarified in contrast to our reconsideration of the basic thesis of SCR. The conclusion will state that Berger and Luckmann’s concept therefore constitutes the common denominator of social constructivist approaches. (shrink)

In this article, we propose to reconceptualize phenomenology in a relational way. Instead of taking subjective consciousness as the starting point for the constitution of meaning, we consider meaning (as well as subjects and subjectivities) as something that is produced in social relations, or more precisely, in communicative actions. In order to explore how this works we empirically study mutual gaze as a critical case. At first sight, the reciprocity that arises when two subjects look into each other’s eyes and (...) perceive how they look and are being looked at reciprocally seems to be “pure,” i.e. free of any mediation by language, gestures or other objectivations. It turns out, however, that mutual gaze unfolds, albeit highly ambivalently and fluidly, as an “object in time”. In contrast to non‑subjectivist approaches, we argue that we need some sort of subjectivity to understand phenomena such as mutual gaze. However, we also need to understand its embeddedness in cultures as well as in social relations. This is what Relational Phenomenology means. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Paragrana Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 1 Seiten: 49-60.

The notion of life-world is to be understood as a methodological concept which demands the grounding of scientific statements in the first order constructs of everyday experiences and actions. Whereas the methodological principles proposed by Schütz conceive of these experiences mainly from a subjectivistic point of view, the ’communicative turn' asksfor a reconceptualization of these principles. Taken together; the hermeneutics of the everyday life world, ethnomethodology and grounded theory methodology can account for the methodical and communicative production of scientific statements (...) about everyday constructs and the respective degree of "derivatedness. (shrink)