Draws on interviews with many of the worlds leading scientists to discuss the possibility that humankind has reached the limits of scientific knowledge.

It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.¹ At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its (...) share of skeptics – philosophers who refuse to accord it any descriptive, let alone normative, distinction. In this paper, we argue that there is at least one _species_ of self-knowledge that is different from, and better than, other knowledge. It is a specific kind of knowledge of one’s concurrent phenomenal experiences. Call knowledge of one’s own phenomenal experiences _phenomenal knowledge_. Our claim is that some (though not all) phenomenal knowledge is different from, and better than, non-phenomenal knowledge. In other. (shrink)

We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.

Combating Hatred provides several practical case studies of teachers, administrators, and school board members who have successfully combated intolerance, prejudice, and hatred in their schools. Furin details innovative ways used in the case studies to create communities that sought the highest social justice values of respect and equality for everyone.

This chapter contains sections titled: Some Examples Principal Features of Whistle‐blowing Ethical Context Issues for Individuals Issues for Organizations Issues for Society Conclusion.

(1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380.

Soon it may be possible to promote the rehabilitation of criminal offenders through _neurointerventions_ (interventions which exert direct physical, chemical or biological effects on the brain). Some jurisdictions already utilise neurointerventions to diminish the risk of sexual or drug-related reoffending. And investigation is underway into several other neurointerventions that might also have rehabilitative applications within criminal justice—for example, pharmacotherapy to reduce aggression or impulsivity. Ethical debate on the use of neurointerventions to facilitate rehabilitation—henceforth ‘neurorehabilitation’—has proceeded on two assumptions: that we (...) have instrumental reasons for employing neurorehabilitation (e.g. because it helps protect the public from crime); and that its permissibility depends upon whether its use unjustifiably infringes offenders’ rights. This paper defends a different, hitherto neglected thought. I argue we have rights-based reasons to offer neurorehabilitation to offenders—in other words, that offenders have a _moral right_ to neurorehabilitation. I identify three considerations which support a moral right to conventional rehabilitative interventions—(1) as a countermeasure to the debilitating side-effects of punishment; (2) as a derivative right of the right to hope for renewed liberty; and (3) as compensation for structural injustice. I argue these considerations extend to support a moral right to neurorehabilitation in the following instance: when neurorehabilitation would be part of the _most effective_ package for facilitating rehabilitation, and can be carried out at reasonable cost. I then defend my argument against potential objections, including the objection that neurorehabilitation is a bad option for offenders to have and the charge of over-medicalisation. (shrink)

This commentary provides a brief overview of the methods and results presented by Jennifer Kuzma, Pouya Najmaie, and Joel Larson in “Evaluating Oversight Systems for Emerging Technologies: A Case Study of Genetically Engineered Organisms.” It offers suggestions regarding how supplemental information might be used to gain additional insights into the authors' results and how future research could further enhance our understanding of the attributes and outcomes of regulatory oversight for genetically engineered organisms.

Although the relations between second formant (F2) onset and F2 vowel are extremely regular and contain important information about place of articulation of the voiced stops, they are not sufficient for its identification. Using quadratic discriminant analysis of a new data set, it is shown that F3 onset and F3 vowel can also contribute substantial additional information to help identify the consonants.

As a proponent of phoneme-like units in speech perception, I am very sympathetic to Merge's use of phoneme-oriented input. However, in the absence of any known way to provide input in exactly the form assumed, further consideration needs to be given to how the variation in the details of the specification of this input might affect Merge's (and Shortlist's) overall behavior.

Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual space for a new kind of metaethical (...) view. In developing our brand of nondescriptivist cognitivism we do the following: (1) articulate a conception of belief (and assertion) that does not require the overall declarative content of beliefs (and assertions) to be descriptive content; (2) make a case for the independent plausibility of this conception of belief and assertion; and (3) argue that our view, formulated in a way that draws upon the proposed conception of belief, has significant comparative advantages over descriptivist forms of cognitivism. (shrink)

David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science. Thus, by focusing on levels of description, one can sharpen foundational differences between classicism (...) and potential non-classical conceptions of mentality that might emerge under the rubric of connectionism. (shrink)

A moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent ought to do each of two actions, Both of which he cannot do. If there are genuine moral dilemmas, The ethical theorist is presented with a problem: he must reject several very plausible principles of standard deontic logic. The main reasons usually given to show that there are moral dilemmas are examined, And it is argued that they are not sufficient. Several positive arguments are then presented, Arguments which try to (...) show that an adequate moral theory must rule out the possibility of genuine dilemmas. (shrink)

Habits of Whiteness offers a new way to talk about race and racism by focusing on racial habits and how to change them. According to Terrance MacMullan, the concept of racial whiteness has undermined attempts to create a truly democratic society in the United States. By getting to the core of the racism that lives on in unrecognized habits, MacMullan argues clearly and charitably for white folk to recognize the distance between their color-blind ideals and their actual behavior. Revitalizing (...) the work of W. E. B. Du Bois and John Dewey, MacMullan shows how it is possible to reconstruct racial habits and close the gap between people. This forthright and persuasive analysis of the impulses of whiteness ultimately reorganizes them into something more compatible with our country's increasingly multicultural heritage. (shrink)

The philosophy of language pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein, far from being inimical to the metaphysical concerns of philosophy, can be understood as complementing and perhaps even deepening the approach to metaphysics first employed by the Belgian Jesuit philosopher Joseph Marèchal: a ‘metaphysics of knowledge’ illuminating the deeper‐than‐conceptualist movement in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The relationship of words and reality was radically reconfigured in the linguistic turn inaugurated in the work of Wittgenstein, but that work itself still presupposes what might (...) be called the existential act of judgement, which was the foundation of Marèchal's Thomistic retrieval. (shrink)

This article offers an overview on current trends and future research possibilities within the philosophy of whiteness. It examines the sub-field of the philosophy of whiteness within the context of the larger field of the philosophy of race in order to assess the viability and relevance of this field of study. Some of the topics on whiteness examined in the article include the problems of white ignorance and privilege, the invisibility of white supremacist racism to white people, and how all (...) these problems can be understood either as examples of epistemologies of ignorance or as unexamined habits in the sense used by pragmatist philosophy. The article argues that the current state of this field calls for a greater emphasis on public intellectualism on whiteness that would incorporate many ideas that are widely accepted by critical race scholars into the under-informed public discourse on race and whiteness. It also argues that the increasing prevalence of negative liberty movements in the United States should be examined in light of established research on the philosophy of whiteness. (shrink)

Rogue One is a complex film that invites a wide range of philosophical questioning. This chapter focuses on the film's political aspect. Rogue One powerfully illustrates an essential and timely claim made about the nature of democracy by John Dewey. Rogue One is significantly different from earlier Star Wars films. It does not offer a simple, mythic morality tale, where the difference between right and wrong is as stark as the contrast between Leia's white gown and Vader's black mask. Rogue (...) One takes place in a messy and unfair world in which traditional moral frameworks appear naive and ill‐suited. The rest of Rogue One is exceptionally powerful not only because of amazing acting, sound design, and cinematography, but because it uses the tropes and setting of gritty war cinema to tell a universal story about the power of hope and faith in others. (shrink)

As a Sith, Darth Plagueis was a devotee of the Dark Side of the Force, which grants enormous powers to those brave enough to become living conduits for passions like hatred and anger. Such a person would be the exact opposite of what Plato would call “wise.” For Plato, wisdom is a virtue that is inextricably bound to humility and justice. The paradox presented in this chapter opens horizons for reflection on the themes of ethics, wisdom, and freedom. It also (...) raises the possibility that Plato's ideal of wisdom is too narrow, and that a different philosophy of life might better explain the existence of a wise Dark Lord of the Sith. Plagueis focused on the instinct of life by seeking to unlock the secret of an eternal existence. Friedrich Nietzsche offers a liberating wisdom in a verse worthy of preservation within even the rarest of Sith holocrons. (shrink)

Bernard Lonergan identified the need and possibility of what he called "generalized empirical method" in science and philosophy. Implementation will be a future community achievement. The book enters into details of a selection of examples in the sciences and philosophy of science. These are provided not to engage in, or blend the present aim with traditional philosophical debate, but as points of entry to help reveal the possibility and need of balanced empirical method. Taking words of Lonergan: "(Q)uestions of method (...) are practical. So my purpose in these (chapters) is not to demonstrate what is necessary. It is not to forecast what is probable. It is... to invite you to share in the exploration of a proposal" (Bernard Lonergan, A Third Collection (1985), 114). The main examples are drawn from biochemistry and biology, although heuristics envisioned will include all sciences. (shrink)

The vitality of mathematics, however, “is conditioned upon the connection of its parts.” What, however, are the “parts” and “connections”? Is there, perhaps, some general pattern to this ongoing enterprise? In other words, is there some recognisable order to the mathematical project, not as in something to be imposed, but an order that can be verified in actual works and collaborations? A main purpose of this paper is to offer an answer to this question in the affirmative. For there is (...) accumulating evidence for the existence of an eight-fold periodic sequence of functionally related zones of enquiry H1, … , H8 – where for the rest of this paper these zones will be called functional specialties. In particular, each functional specialty would seem to have its own main objective and to involve its own differentiated type of enquiry. (shrink)