My main aim here is to examine what the significance is of the communitarian critique of liberalism for Hermann Cohen's political philosophy. I will conclude that Cohen's socialist Kantianism can successfully meet this critique. Also, I will argue that his political philosophy can better deal with some of the problems that communitarians detect in our Western democracies than can communitarianism itself. One crucial reason for this is that Cohen completes the original Kantian liberal project by making all agents fully (...) autonomous in the economic sphere. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen (b. 1842, d. 1919), more than any other single figure, is responsible for founding the orthodox neo-Kantianism that dominated academic philosophy in Germany from the 1870s until the end of the First World War. Earlier German philosophers finding inspiration in Kant tended either towards speculative, metaphysical idealism, or sought to address philosophical questions with the resources of the empirical sciences, especially psychology. In contrast, Cohen’s seminal interpretation of Kant offered a vision of philosophy that decisively maintained its (...) independence from empirical psychology, without at the same time simply lapsing back into uncritical metaphysics. Cohen brought these attitudes to bear on a wide range of topics, writing systematically about epistemology, philosophy of science, ethics, law, political theory, and aesthetics. His anti-psychologism became a defining commitment not only of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, founded by Cohen himself, but of orthodox neo-Kantianism more generally. Indeed, that commitment ultimately defined the philosophical context from which, in the early twentieth century, both phenomenology and logical positivism emerged. No less significant than his influence on academic philosophy, Cohen was his generation’s preeminent German-Jewish public intellectual and religious philosopher. His philosophical ethics and political theory provided the foundation for a non-Marxist, Kantian democratic socialism that informed his more popular and topical writings. He argued publicly for universal suffrage and for the rights of workers to organize democratically-constituted collectives. He also saw deep points of connection between ethics and religion, and developed a view of Judaism as a fundamentally ethical system of belief and practice. He argued that monotheism was the historical source of the idea of universal ethical laws, and thus that Judaism offered the world its first model of a universalist morality. This view of Judaism’s ethical significance ultimately informed Cohen’s public defense of the Jews’ place in Germany not only against anti-Semitic attacks, but also against the arguments of early twentieth-century Zionists. However, Cohen’s influence on Jewish thought extends far beyond debates within Imperial Germany: his late religious writings inspired a broad renewal in twentieth-century Jewish ethics and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen famously wrote that Kant “is the true and real originator of German socialism.” This paper seeks to explicate Cohen’s socialist reconstruction of Kant’s ethics and show that this reconstruction overcomes some weaknesses of Kant’s ethics. In conclusion, the paper discusses the contemporary relevance of Cohen’s cooperative socialism.

This paper argues that the ‘scientific dispute’ between Hermann Cohen and Rudolf Stammler is symptomatic of a philosophical movement of left-wing Kant interpretations at the turn of the twentieth century. By outlining influential predecessors that shaped Cohen’s and Stammler’s thinking, I show that their Kantian justifications of socialism differ regarding their conception of law, history, and the political implications that follow from their practical philosophies. Against scholars who suggest that the Marburg School’s view on socialism was a coherent (...) school of thought, I introduce the concept of ‘left-Kantianism’ as an open term that includes a wide variety of novel socialist approaches to Kant at the time. (shrink)

Artykuł jest próbą scharakteryzowania platońskiego idealizmu według wykładni Hermanna Cohena – filozofa w Polsce niemal zapomnianego; założyciela, a zarazem czołowego, obok Paula Natorpa i Władysława Tatarkiewicza, przedstawiciela marburskiej szkoły neokantyzmu. Tok analiz obejmuje cohenowskie tezy postawione przez filozofa w epistemologicznej pracy Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik. Postulaty, do których odwołuje się Cohen wiążą refleksję nad klasycznym idealizmem oraz statusem platońskiej idei z refleksją logiczno-matematyczną i zagadnieniem sichere Hypothesis jako hipotezy pewnej – hipotezy o statusie aksjomatu. W następstwie badań okazuje się, (...) że określenie roli matematyki: arytmetyki i geometrii, staje się nieodzowne w zrozumieniu idealizmu zarówno starożytnego Platona, jak również nowożytnego Kanta. Obaj, Platon i Kant, akcentują znaczenie apriorycznej myśli, logiki czystego myślenia, logicznego rozumowania, poznawczej władzy intelektu, nauki oraz krytycyzmu jako drogi poznawczego, a zarazem kształtującego charakter, postępowania podmiotu poznającego Przeprowadzony w artykule wywód, zakorzeniony w historyczno-filozoficznych analizach problemu, w podsumowaniu jest także próbą określenia znaczenia platońsko-neokantowskiego idealizmu dla współczesnych zagadnień naukowo-filozoficznych. (shrink)

One of the most interesting developments of Kant’s philosophy was its transformation and expression in the philosophical work of the head of the Marburg School of Kant interpretation: the philosopher Hermann Cohen. We can speak of a transformation because Cohen’s last two works, The Concept of Religion in the System of Philosophy and Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism, attempt to enunciate a philosophy of history rooted in the philosopher’s endeavor to discover in Jewish sources (...) an ethic and a messianic vision that could be comprehended as the consequence and fulfillment of Kant’s moral philosophy. The link that Cohen attempted to establish between Kant and Judaism implied a conviction and belief that a historical religious faith—its history and its peculiar endurance—witnessed a sense of history deeply rooted in values that posited a belief in the ought to be, in the refusal to accept as fate the what is, and was capable of structuring a vision of the future that neither rejected nor devalued the present, but placed before it a teleology that brought to clarity the struggle and confrontation that the ethic of the pure will realizes within the limitation of the historical moral situation. Cohen was a believer, having that faith in reason that has been the philosopher’s from Plato to Hegel, but this faith found embodiment not only in the love of ideas, but in the love of a people’s metahistorical history and in the moral significance which that reality bore for the history of humanity. The ideal of humanity belonged not only to its theoretical expression. Cohen assumed that the respect and admiration that Kant showed to Job was identical to the reality of the suffering and loving Israel, the suffering servanthood of God, which, if understood from an ethical perspective, would yield insights into that cosmic conflict between ignorance and reason. At the end of his essay, “What Is Orientation in Thinking,” an essay that Cohen deeply admired, Kant said. (shrink)

German supporters of the Kantian philosophy in the late 19th century took one of two forks in the road: the fork leading to Baden, and the Southwest School of neo-Kantian philosophy, and the fork leading to Marburg, and the Marburg School, founded by Hermann Cohen. Between 1876, when Cohen came to Marburg, and 1918, the year of Cohen's death, Cohen, with his Marburg School, had a profound influence on German academia.

Sebastian Luft - Hermann Cohen's Critical Idealism - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.4 668-670 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Sebastian Luft Marquette University Reinier Munk, editor. Hermann Cohen's Critical Idealism. Amsterdam Studies in Jewish Thought 10. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005. Pp. v + 434. Cloth, $229.00. This anthology, the first of its kind in English, is devoted to a much-needed reassessment of Hermann Cohen's philosophy. Cohen was (...) one of the founders of the so-called Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism and came to be, with the development of his own philosophical system following his Kant interpretation, one of the most original thinkers in Germany during his lifetime. Moreover, his charismatic personality inspired other philosophers, such as Natorp and Cassirer in Marburg as well as the.. (shrink)

This paper looks at the ways in which Mikhail Bakhtin had appropriated the ideas of Kant and of the Marburg neo-Kantian school. While Bakhtin was greatly indebted to Kantian philosophy, and is known to have referred to himself as a neo-Kantian, he rejects the main tenets of neo-Kantianism. Instead, Bakhtin offers a substantial re-interpretation of Kantian thought. His frequent borrowings from neo-Kantian philosophers (Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and others) also follow a distinctive pattern of appropriation, whereby blocks of (...) interconnected ideas are removed from their original context, and made to serve Bakhtin’s own—substantially different—philosophical purposes in the context of his own thought. Bakhtin’s thought thus remains original even as he is borrowing ideas from others. (shrink)

Music, art, and poetry were profound forces in Hermann Cohen’s thought. If we attempt to comprehend this philosopher, whose name is synonymous with the School of Marburg, that small charming town in Hesse from which Kant’s works and influence spread abroad like the magic of an irresistible melody, then we are forced to appreciate those lovers of music and art that brought him the friendship of the violinist Joseph Joachim, the admiration of painters such as Max Liebermann, Lenid (...) Pasternak, the father of Boris, and others whose names are now distant from us. European culture is alive in philosophy, not merely as illustrative references, but as the achievements of the mind devoted to reason and the power of imagination. This culture was not simply created by a mind that ignored the senses. The body was appreciated as the source of subtle and artistic movement, its power to build and form depended upon the grace and delicacy of the hands, sound awakened in us the inexhaustible dimension and possibilities of communication and relationship, sight the sensitivity to colors, to a variety of architectural forms that evoke a sense of beauty and sublimity by their effect and receptivity, taste and touch cultivate form and allow us to receive and be receptive with a heightened sense of delicacy and appreciation allowing form to be given to us in indescribable and unexpected ways. Through the senses we develop that intimacy with others that the mind can only define and analyze but never feel. Cohen has come forth from his detractors and even from his admirers as the distant and unapproachable “professor” of a forgotten philosophical “system.” He did his service in Kant’s army of interpreters adding volumes of interpretation and appreciation to the old master. Here he paid his dues to his profession and university. Cohen was a cultured man, a deeply sensitive individual, a fine product of artistic sensitivity and generosity. When he turned to the arts, when he moved to music, to religion, to social activity, the humaneness of his personality overcame the professor in him; it showed that tenderness for human relationship, that deep respect for love that Cohen found in his beloved Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, whose operas he believed reflected a sensitivity to moral and aesthetic values. (shrink)

Music, art, and poetry were profound forces in Hermann Cohen’s thought. If we attempt to comprehend this philosopher, whose name is synonymous with the School of Marburg, that small charming town in Hesse from which Kant’s works and influence spread abroad like the magic of an irresistible melody, then we are forced to appreciate those lovers of music and art that brought him the friendship of the violinist Joseph Joachim, the admiration of painters such as Max Liebermann, Lenid (...) Pasternak, the father of Boris, and others whose names are now distant from us. European culture is alive in philosophy, not merely as illustrative references, but as the achievements of the mind devoted to reason and the power of imagination. This culture was not simply created by a mind that ignored the senses. The body was appreciated as the source of subtle and artistic movement, its power to build and form depended upon the grace and delicacy of the hands, sound awakened in us the inexhaustible dimension and possibilities of communication and relationship, sight the sensitivity to colors, to a variety of architectural forms that evoke a sense of beauty and sublimity by their effect and receptivity, taste and touch cultivate form and allow us to receive and be receptive with a heightened sense of delicacy and appreciation allowing form to be given to us in indescribable and unexpected ways. Through the senses we develop that intimacy with others that the mind can only define and analyze but never feel. Cohen has come forth from his detractors and even from his admirers as the distant and unapproachable “professor” of a forgotten philosophical “system.” He did his service in Kant’s army of interpreters adding volumes of interpretation and appreciation to the old master. Here he paid his dues to his profession and university. Cohen was a cultured man, a deeply sensitive individual, a fine product of artistic sensitivity and generosity. When he turned to the arts, when he moved to music, to religion, to social activity, the humaneness of his personality overcame the professor in him; it showed that tenderness for human relationship, that deep respect for love that Cohen found in his beloved Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, whose operas he believed reflected a sensitivity to moral and aesthetic values. (shrink)

This article is a novel assessment of Hermann Cohen’s theoretical philosophy, starting out from his Kant interpretation. Hermann Cohen was the head and founder of the Marburg School of Neo- Kantianism. In the beginning, hence, I will commence with some initial reflections on the makeup and importance of this school, before I move on to Cohen’s revolutionary Kant interpretation and its ramification for the Marburg School in general.

In his 1920 monograph Relativitätstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori the young Reichenbach distinguished between two meanings of the a priori: ‚apodictically valid, true for all time‘ and ‚constituting the concept of object‘. At the end of the 1990s Michael Friedman drew again the attention of philosophers of science to this forgotten distinction. In the spirit of Reichenbach’s early Kantianism Friedman attempted to construct a relativized or temporally variable a priori, which is nevertheless constitutive of the object of knowledge. Friedman rejects an (...) alternative historicized version of the a priori elaborated by the Marburg school and in particular by Cassirer. According to Friedman, Cassirer defended a regulative, but absolute version of the a priori, the existence of a yet-to-be-found set of final principles that are conditions of all scientific experience. This paper suggests that using the constitutive/regulative distinction as a basis for comparison is misleading. In order to understand the Marburg school’s conception of the a priori one should get back to Hermann Cohen’s interpretation of Kant and in particular to his own distinction between two meanings of the a priori. A more suitable comparison is that between Cohen’s opposition metaphysical-vs.-transcendental a priori and Reichenbach’s distinction apodictic-vs.-constitutive a priori. If the comparison is conducted along these lines—as already suggested in the mid-1920 s by the Dutch neo-Kantian Alfred C. Elsbach—it turns out that Cohen and the Marburg school and not Reichenbach provided a good example of a relativized a priori. (shrink)

Widmer sheds light on a neglected aspect of the Western philosophical tradition. Following an era of Hegelianism, the members of the neo-Kantian "Marburg School," such as Friedrich Albert Lange, Hermann Cohen, Rudolf Stammler, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer defended socialism or left-wing ideals on Kantian principles. In doing so, Widmer breaks with two mistaken assumptions. First, Widmer demonstrates that the left-Hegelian and Marxist traditions were not the only significant philosophical sources of socialist critique in nineteenth-century Germany, as the (...) left-Kantians identified problems of normativity that the left-Hegelians could not adequately address. Second, Widmer challenges the prevailing assumption that the political philosophies developed in the Marburg School can be comprehensively characterized as a unified school of "ethical socialism." By showing that they varied fundamentally regarding their political views and their philosophical foundations of socialism, Widmer fills a gap in the studies of neo-Kantianism that is long overdue. (shrink)

In 1912, Ernst Cassirer contributed to the special issue of the Kant-Studien that honored Hermann Cohen's retirement—his mentor and teacher, and the recognized founding father of the so-called 'Marburg school' of Neo-Kantianism. In the context of an otherwise rather conventional presentation of Cohen's interpretation of Kant, Cassirer made a remark that is initially surprising. It is “anything but accurate,” he wrote, to regard Cohen's philosophy as focused “exclusively on the mathematical theory of nature,” as is usually done. A (...) reconstruction of the genesis of Cohen's thought, Cassirer continued, would already refute this interpretation. Actually, “[t]he... (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), Kant sought to explain the objectivity of cognition by describing the operation of certain human cognitive activities. That is, in some sense Kant explained cognition's objectivity by appealing to features of the mind. A century later, the Marburg School Neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp would insist that philosophers must explain cognition's objectivity without appeal to the subject's mind. Once at the center of the Kantian account of objectivity, the mind had (...) been expunged from it. This shift was the emergence of anti-psychologism, the view that the mind has no place in philosophical accounts of cognition's objectivity. This dissertation offers an account of how that shift happened. Chapter 1 argues that a central section of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Deduction, is a description of a cognitive operation—namely, the apperception's synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition. Because this operation is necessary, it determines the structures that a subject's cognition must conform to, and thus explains cognition's objectivity for Kant. But Kant's view that the mind is characterized by necessary cognitive operations was abandoned in the nineteenth century in favour of purely empirical conceptions of the mind. Chapter 2 argues that, in response to this change and in particular to the psychologism of the Back to Kant movement, Cohen developed an anti-psychologistic account of cognition's objectivity: for him, objectivity must be explained by appeal to the principles and laws of mathematics and pure natural science. But his account fails, since he does rot explain why those laws explain cognition's intersubjectivity. Chapter 3 examines Wilhelm Wundt's and Ernst Mach's attempts to articulate purely empirical conceptions of the mind, and to explain cognition's objectivity by appeal to the mind so conceived, as well as Hermann Lotze's anti-psychologism. Chapter 4 argues that, for Natorp, fundamental physical laws constitute the intersubjective content of cognition because they are invariant across space and time, and so different subjects can share representations of them despite having different points of view on the world. Natorp thus finally articulates a successful anti-psychologistic alternative to Kant's account of objectivity. (shrink)

Recent work on the philosophy of Hermann Cohen (1848-1914), founder of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, has appeared in three distinct circles in the English-speaking philosophical context. Cohen re-interpreted Kant's a priori to take scientific developments into account. Michael Friedman acknowledges that the later development of this view by Cohen's intellectual heir Ernst Cassirer influenced Friedman's work on the dynamic a priori, especially in the history and philosophy of science. Owing to Cohen's links to Franz Rosenzweig, scholars have (...) begun to investigate Cohen's philosophy with reference to Derrida, Benjamin, Habermas, and Levinas and the philosophy of responsibility. And there is increasing interest in analyzing Cohen's influence on Deleuze and Badiou, particularly in the areas of ethics and aesthetics. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. ++++ The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to ensure edition identification: ++++ Kants BegrUndung Der Aesthetik Hermann Cohen F. DUmmler, 1889 Aesthetics. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen. Hermann Cohen Band 113. Kommentar' zu Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Kommentar Zu Immanuel Kants Kritik Der Reinen Vernunft (Job an, Kommentar z. Kants Kritik d. rein. Vernunft. 1. Front Cover.

Bd. 1. Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (3 v.) -- Bd. 2. Kants Begründung der Ethik -- Bd. 3. Kants Begründung der Ästhetik -- Bd. 4. Kommentar zu Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft -- [Bd.] 5. Das Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte -- Bd. 6. System der Philosophie, 1. Teil -- Bd. 7. System der Philosophie, 2. Teil -- Bd. 8. System der Philosophie, 3. Teil, 1. Bd. -- Bd. 9. System der Philosophie, 3. Teil, 2. Bd. -- Bd. (...) 12. Kleinere Schriften I, 1865-1869 -- Bd. 15. Kleinere Schriften IV, 1907-1912. (shrink)

Excerpt from Die Systematischen Begriffe in Kants Vorkritischen Schriften: Nach Ihrem Verhaltniss zum Kritischen Idealismus Schriften aufgenommen hatte, heranzieht und in Rucksicht auf die Schrift vom Jahre 1763 der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes beleuchtet. Ueber haupt hat er die Frage von der Beweisbarkeit Gottes durch Anfuhrung der vielen Beweis und Widerlegungsversuche ein gehend erortert. Zu einer literarischen Wichtigkeit hat aber erst Kuno Fischer die Frage uber den Werth der vorkritischen Schriften erhoben. Seine Untersuchungen werden uns (...) in der Folge viel fach beschaftigen. Doch erscheint es zur Orientirung uber die Methode, nach welcher wir selbst die Frage behandeln, zweck massig, uber das von K. Fischer geubte Verfahren, das spaterhin sehr im Einzelnen gepruft werden soll, vorlaufig nur, soweit es die Methode angeht, ein Urtheil zu fassen. Kuno Fischer sucht und macht Unterschiede. Dies muss vor Allem anerkannt werden. Auch gluckt es ihm, die Gedanken, welche er aus den Schriften vor dem Jahre 1770 heraushebt, in eine die spatere Entdeckung praedestinirende Beziehung zu einander zu setzen. Diese uberraschenden Zusammenhange werden oftmals und immer in neu erscheinenden Wendungen vorgefuhrt, so dass ein Bild von dem Entwickelurigsgange des Denkers entworfen wird. Ob dieses Bild treu ist, ob die Gedanken, aus denen es zusammengesetzt wird, genau aufgenommen und richtig geordnet sind, das wird an seinem Orte gepruft werden mussen. Hier fragen wir nur: Kann es den Lernenden, ge schweige den Nachforschenden fordern, wenn Einzelnes aus dem Systeme, wie der Ausdruck wiederholentlich gebraucht wird. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The article presents a sketch of the biography and work of Hermann Cohen, head of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. It shows how wrong it is to think that Cohen reduced all philosophy to a theory of knowledge. At the same time, the theory of knowledge really occupied an important place in Cohen's system, and by knowledge he meant first of all mathematized natural science, although he paid attention to the notion of goal and its importance both for (...) biology and philosophical system, contributing to unification of the doctrine of knowledge and ethics. A peculiarity of Cohen's understanding of idealism is shown: the latter becomes fruitful only when it does not lose sight of that which is distinct from reason, constitutes a difficulty for it, and thus sets a task for it, namely sensual data. It is analyzed how Cohen saw such idealism in Plato and Kant, as well as in the scientific revolution of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in particular in the crisis of mechanistic understanding of matter and in A. Einstein's theory of relativity. The origins of Cohen's understanding of continuity, reality and their connection, as well as his understanding of the thing-in- itself are considered. Attention is drawn to the connection between Cohen's understanding of the infinite task of knowledge (approximation to the thing-in-itself) and his idea of humanity. The development of this idea in Cohen's ethics and aesthetics is presented. Transcendental freedom (as a thing-in-itself in general), from his point of view, cannot be a given distinctive feature of the subject, but remains an infinite task facing humanity as a whole. More details is given on Cohen's philosophy of religion, which became the final part of his system. Cohen defines his own notion of the religion of reason and explains its distinction from ethics. Religion of reason recognizes the irreducible self of the Other, repentance, redemption, and renewal. Although the religion of reason belongs to all humanity, it first begins to form and develop in Judaism. The Cohenian understanding of God, the religion of reason as ethical monotheism and the idea of the correlation between God and man are analyzed. It is shown that ethical monotheism in Cohen's understanding culminates in the idea of messianism. (shrink)

Willey emphasizes the social-political context as the source of problems which neo-Kantian thought had to—and largely failed to—cope with. "I believe the neo-Kantians expressed the tentative and unsuccessful efforts of a segment of the upper bourgeoisie to make peace with the proletariat and to retain an attitude of cultural community with the West". The first of these two themes refers to the rapprochement of academic philosophy and socialism which is mainly associated with "the Marburg School," above all, F. A. (...) Lange and Hermann Cohen, which led to diverse practical extensions in Karl Vorländer, Kurt Eisner, and Eduard Bernstein. (shrink)

Zeugnisse eines engagierten und um Freundschaft werbenden Philosophen Der Philosoph und judische Denker Hermann Cohen (1842-1918) zeigt sich in den Briefen an seinen schweizerischen Schuler und spateren Professor am Zurcher Polytechnikum, August Stadler (1850-1910), als impulsiver, mitteilsamer, Vertrauen schenkender und um Freundschaft werbender Philosoph. Seine zahlreichen Bemerkungen zu systematischen Problemen, zur damaligen Wissenschaftslandschaft und zur allgemeinen politischen Lage sind eine unschatzbare Quelle fur das intellektuelle Profil jener Zeit und besonders fur die Begegnung mit den Personlichkeiten Cohens und Stadlers. Der (...) Schwerpunkt der Ausgabe liegt auf den in Zurich aufbewahrten Schriftstucken von 1872 bis 1881. Kurz vor Beginn der Korrespondenz hatte Cohen in Berlin einen Kreis von Studenten um sich versammelt, dem sich auch August Stadler anschloss. Die personliche Nahe zwischen beiden war sofort gross und blieb trotz mancher Meinungsverschiedenheiten ungetrubt. Neuneinhalb Jahre spater, im letzten Brief dieser Reihe, erscheint erstmals der Name des neuen Marburger Privatdozenten Paul Natorp. Damit beginnt die Geschichte der sogenannten Marburger Schule. Der vorliegende Band beinhaltet somit den Ruckblick auf die Vorgeschichte dieser einflussreichen, stilbildenden Denkrichtung im wilhelminischen Deutschland. Inhaltlich nicht weniger interessant sind die spateren, nicht dem Zurcher Corpus angehorigen Briefe aus den Jahren zwischen 1886 und 1905. In ihnen aussert sich Cohen zu seinen Begegnungen mit Gottfried Keller in Zurich, zu dessen Tod und zuletzt zur Sorge um Stadlers Gesundheit. Im Anhang findet sich eine Liste samtlicher Lehrveranstaltungen Cohens in Marburg und an der Berliner Hochschule fur die Wissenschaft des Judentums. Ein detailliertes Namen- und Sachregister bildet den Abschluss. (shrink)

A translation of one section of Hermann Cohen's introduction to Friedrich Albert Lange's History of Materialism.

Neokantismes: la marque du pluriel indique d'emblee que le mot d'ordre des annees 1865 Retour a Kant! regroupe differentes ecoles. Les auteurs dont les textes inedits en francais se trouvent ici rassembles et traduits, appartiennent en effet soit a l'ecole de Marbourg (H. Cohen, P. Natorp et E. Cassirer) soit a l'ecole de Bade (W. Windelband, H. Rickert, E. Lask, J. Cohn). Le point commun du neokantisme logique des premiers et du neokantisme axiologique des seconds consiste en une volonte d'asseoir (...) le positivisme sur un fondement philosophique respectueux de l'attitude phenomenologique. Kant apparut donc a tous ces penseurs comme science rigoureuse a condition toutefois de ne considerer le sujet transcendantal que comme une fonction logique de la pensee qui elabore la forme et le contenu de la connaissance. A condition egalement de ne pas limiter l'entreprise critique a la physique, mais de l'etendre au fondement de toutes les sciences de l'esprit. (shrink)

After the completion of I. Kant’s “Copernican” turn in metaphysics, all subsequent European philosophy to one degree or another was under his influence. The purpose of the article is to consider the reception and transformation of the Kantian theoretical philosophy by the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism. It is necessary to analyze the reasons for H. Cohen's and P. Natorp’s interpretation of Kant's criticism. To do this, one should consider (i) internalist and (ii) externalist factors in the formation of the (...) Marburg School. Neo-Kantianism, on the one hand, emerged as a response to materialism, naturalism, and post-Kantian German idealism. In addition, the Marburg School was strongly influenced by the change in the scientific paradigm in mathematical natural science at the end of the 19th century. The justification by the Marburgers of Kant’s a priori doctrine presupposed thematization, first of all, of: a) purity of thought; b) systematic unity of thought and experience; c) the orientation of philosophy to the “fact of science”; d) transcendental method. As a result, the Marburg School interpreted the Kantian concept of the unity of consciousness; abandoned the principle of synthetic (real) unity of consciousness in favor of systematic (logical) unity; substantiated the purity of scientific thinking; put forward the requirement of orientation of philosophy to the “fact of science”; developed the concept of the origin of thinking (Ursprung); abandoned the idea of “givenness” of the subject of knowledge and proved its “assignment”; changed the understanding of the essence and functions of the transcendental method; put forward the concept of thinking as “generation” (“production”); formulated a new understanding a priori. The changes that took place in the 19th century in philosophy, mathematical natural science and mathematical sciences led to a sharp activation of constructivism. It can be concluded that Kant’s epistemological paradigm was realistic constructivism. Pure constructivism became the paradigm of the Marburg School. (shrink)

This paper offers an introduction to Hermann Cohen’s Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode, and recounts the history of its controversial reception by Cohen’s early sympathizers, who would become the so-called ‘Marburg school’ of Neo-Kantianism, as well as the reactions it provoked outside this group. By dissecting the ambiguous attitudes of the best-known representatives of the school, as well as those of several minor figures, this paper shows that Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode is a unicum in the history of philosophy: (...) it represents a strange case of an unsuccessful book’s enduring influence. The “puzzle of Cohen’s Infinitesimalmethode,” as we will call it, can be solved by looking beyond the scholarly results of the book, and instead focusing on the style of philosophy it exemplified. Moreover, the paper shows that Cohen never supported, but instead explicitly opposed, the doctrine of the centrality of the ‘concept of function’, with which Marburg Neo-Kantianism is usually associated. (shrink)

This paper offers an introduction to Hermann Cohen’s Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode, and recounts the history of its controversial reception by Cohen’s early sympathizers, who would become the so-called ‘Marburg school’ of Neo-Kantianism, as well as the reactions it provoked outside this group. By dissecting the ambiguous attitudes of the best-known representatives of the school, as well as those of several minor figures, this paper shows that Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode is a unicum in the history of philosophy: (...) it represents a strange case of an unsuccessful book’s enduring influence. The “puzzle of Cohen’s Infinitesimalmethode,” as we will call it, can be solved by looking beyond the scholarly results of the book, and instead focusing on the style of philosophy it exemplified. Moreover, the paper shows that Cohen never supported, but instead explicitly opposed, the doctrine of the centrality of the ‘concept of function’, with which Marburg Neo-Kantianism is usually associated. (shrink)

This article provides the first English translation of Tanabe’s early essay, “The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology: A Critique of the Marburg and Freiburg Schools”. The key notion that the young Tanabe seeks to define in relation to his detailed analyses of contemporary Neo-Kantian epistemology is the notion of “pure experience” presented in Nishida’s philosophy. The general theory of epistemology shared among the thinkers from these two prominent schools of philosophy in early 20 th century Germany aimed to eliminate (...) the empirical residues in Kant’s theory of knowledge while opposing naïve empiricism and the uncritical methodology of positive science. Their “logicistic” approach, according to Tanabe, seems to contradict Nishida’s notion of pure experience, for it cannot allow any vestige of empiricism in its systematic framework, which is specifically designed to ground scientific knowledge. Yet given that the Neo-Kantian configuration of epistemology does not create the object of knowledge, it must face sensation or representational content as its limiting instance. Thus, to ground a Neo-Kantian theory of knowledge while taking account of this limit of logicism involves explaining their understanding of the unity of subject and object in human knowing. For this, Tanabe argues, recourse to Nishida’s notion of pure experience is indispensable. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer in the Master–Disciple Relationship of AuthorityThe aim of the paper is to analyze the relationship between the authority of the master and the disciple occurring between the two main representatives of the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School, Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer. The analysis is based on the pragmatic-logical model of authority developed by Jozef M. Bocheński within the framework of his logic of authority in application to research on the basic relations (...) taking place in the history of philosophy. The purpose of the analysis is to verify the hypothesis of the existence of the master– disciple authority relationship between the mentioned representatives of the school and to explain its logical consequences of the basis of historical-philosophical research of this particular philosophical formation. (shrink)

After Kant, the school which further developed Kant's philosophy is the neo-kantianism. This neo-kantianism scholarship is characterized by the simultaneous development of Kant's epistemological and ontological problems. The ontological problem developed around Hartmann, and the epistemological problem developed around Cohen. Here we can see Cohen's achievements. Cohen completes epistemology in Logic of pure awareness(Logik der reinen Erkenntnis). In order to establish his own epistemology, Cohen first completes the problem of aspect category. And Cohen brings the problem of this aspect category (...) in the form of Plato and Aristotle. He connects these aspect categories and Kant's aspect categories. Like this, Cohen completes his perception logic in this aspect category. Plato, Aristotle, and Kant have different categories. Cohen first deals with the problem of the aspect based on the epistemology based on Plato's a priori. Next, he accepts metaphysical aspects of Aristotle's ten categories. Kant's aspect category is different from the other two philosophers. It is, soon, the basis of judgment. Cohen accepts Kant's aspect category of the very basis of his judgment for his epistemology. In this article, we first look at how Cohen embraced Plato, Aristotle, and Kant's view categories for his cognitive logic, and then see how he completed his aspect category. Whether epistemological or ontological, the construction of aspect category is for category theory, which is ultimately related to the laws of nature. Cohen also completes his categorization system in 12 categories, like Kant, centering on three aspect categories. Aristotle's ten categories, Kant's twelve categories, and Cohen's twelve categories eventually start with judgment. And so far, the number of these categories has been limited to twelve. Cohen argues that the number of these categories is likely to increase sufficiently. As science develops and societies become more complex, the number of categories is not as limited as Aristotle and Kant's view, but has the idea that there can be as many. Cohen explains his thoughts as Judgment of Methodology(Ureile der Methodik). We find here the merits of Cohen's cognitive logic. However, Cohen did not leave his view of the increasing number of categories or numbers. This is his disadvantage. The conclusion of this paper is to point out a problem with Cohen's aspect category by discussing the possibility of expanding or increasing the number of categories claimed by Cohen. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen on the Way to „Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism” Breslau Stop On the way leading Hermann Cohen from his family Coswig to Marburg and — later — to Berlin, from a Jewish province to a multicultural metropolis, Breslau is a special point. The future philosopher came here in 1857, hoping for the future of fice of the rabbi, to begin studies at the newly established Jewish Theological Seminary. Here too, four years (...) later, he enrolled at the university, opening up the prospect of an academic career. A special point, which allowed him to create in the next years an “impressive system” which is a bold attempt to present German and Judaism as identical or connected. Jewish and religious content was a permanent and constant component of Cohen’s works, and Religion of Reason and System of Philosophy form a whole. Already before the creation of works devoted to Kant, some features of Cohen’s philosophy of religion are revealed, which originated in his studies at Breslau, one of the most important Haskalah centers in the middle of the 19th century. Cohen found there an atmosphere conduciveto the later shaping of the science of the universal religion of reason. After many years, Cohen assessed the Jewish Theological Seminary as “the most important educational institution [of his] youth.”. (shrink)

Few texts summarize and at the same time compound the challenges of their author's philosophy so sharply as Hermann Cohen's Das Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode und seine Geschichte . The book's meaning and style are greatly illuminated by placing it in the scientific, political, and academic context of late-nineteenth century Germany. As this context changed, so did both the reception of the philosophy of the infinitesimal and of the Marburg school more generally. A study of this transformation casts significant (...) light on the political relevance of the philosophy of science in theWilhelmine era. As a means of following this development across time, Cohen's text is read through its changing reception in the philosophy of his closest disciple, Ernst Cassirer. (shrink)

: Few texts summarize and at the same time compound the challenges of their author's philosophy so sharply as Hermann Cohen's Das Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode und seine Geschichte (1883). The book's meaning and style are greatly illuminated by placing it in the scientific, political, and academic context of late-nineteenth century Germany. As this context changed, so did both the reception of the philosophy of the infinitesimal and of the Marburg school more generally. A study of this transformation casts (...) significant light on the political relevance of the philosophy of science in theWilhelmine era. As a means of following this development across time, Cohen's text is read through its changing reception in the philosophy of his closest disciple, Ernst Cassirer. (shrink)