This study is about an aspect of the reception of Herbatianism in Austria which has not been thoroughly investigated so far. It pertains to a controversy opposing Robert Zimmermann and Franz Brentano in the context of discussions which took place in the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna. This study looks more specifically at three important episodes involving the Philosophical Society, first, the controversy over Herbartianism, second that over the evaluation of Schelling’s philosophy, and finally the reception of (...) Bolzano in Austria. I will first describe the circumstances that led Zimmermann to get involved in the Philosophical Society and the source of his controversy with Brentano and his followers. I will then comment Zimmermann’s address as chairman of the Philosophical Society and Brentano’s reaction to Zimmermann’s remarks on Schelling and the historical period to which he belongs. I will complete my analysis of Brentano’s reaction with a summary of his evaluation of Herbart’s philosophical program to which Zimmermann adhered. The last part focuses on Zimmermann’s decisive role in the reception of Bolzano in Vienna in connection with the Bolzano Commission established by the Philosophical Society. I will conclude with brief remarks on Zimmermann’s legacy in Vienna. (shrink)

The article analyzes Herbartians pedagogy in the West Ukrainian lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the activities of educational institutions in the light of Herbartianism; retraces the main factors of training teachers of relevant qualifications at higher educational institutions, design and development of curricula and textbooks in pedagogy, publication of research results of pedagogues-Herbartians’ research work in scientific journals; points out the Herbartians’ traditions in the symbiotic training of a teacher run both by the state and by the church.

This article builds on the growing literature on the Kyoto School of Philosophy and its influences on the field of Education. First, I argue that the influence of the Kyoto School of Philosophy is historically significant in Japan, and that the connection between this philosophical school and the philosophy of education is by no means superficial. Second, I suggest that this school contributes a unique view of ‘negative education’ founded in the philosophical idea of ‘nothingness’. I examine how this negative (...) education is manifest both in religious cultivation and in more general views of education, and I develop these ideas through the models of self-negation proposed by Nishitani Keiji and Hisamatsu Shin'ichi. Third, taking up the Herbartian idea of ‘pedagogical tact’, I analyse the characteristics of the I-Thou relationship, in the vector of nothingness, implicit in the above-mentioned view of education. I examine two approaches to this relationship—one of ‘sharing in nothingness’ as found in Nishitani and Hisamatsu, and one that goes beyond the idea of ‘sharing’ and accommodates alterity, as found in Nishida Kitarô and Nishihira Tadashi. By threshing out these three points, I hope to highlight the continued pedagogical relevance of the philosophical ideas of the Kyoto School. (shrink)

FriedrichJulius Stahl (1802-1861), der einst berühmte konservative Staatsphilo­ soph, Kirchenrechtslehrer und Politiker, gilt heute in der Hauptsache als Theoretiker des »monarchischen Prinzips« und als Verfechter eines autoritären Staats- und Kir­ chenbegriffs. Dieses Urteil erfaßt jedoch nur eine Seite der Leistung Stahls; es ver­ leitet dazu, seine politische Theorie als Konstruktion zur Rechtfertigung des monar­ chischen Prinzips und des »Obrigkeitsstaates« anzusehen und daher als überholt ab­ zutun. Die fruchtbaren Ansätze der politischen Wissenschaft, die in Stahls Werk enthalten sind, werden dabei übersehen. (...) In der Literatur ist Stahl bisher relativ wenig Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet wor­ den. Die liberale Staatslehre seiner Zeit sah in Stahl primär den politischen Gegner und bemühte sich kaum um ein tieferes Eindringen in sein Denken 1. Die erste philo­ sophisch gründliche Kritik an Stahl übte 1861 der Herbartianer Thilo 2; sein philo­ sophischer Standpunkt hinderte ihn jedoch daran, die auf Schelling zurückgehende Komponente in Stahls Denken verständnisvoll zu erfassen. So sieht er Widersprüche bei Stahl auch dort, wo keine sind. (shrink)

The reputation of Rudolf Hermann Lotze was high in the philosophic world, especially the English-speaking philosophic world, during the period 1880–1920. One encyclopedia of the period says that “in the U. S. his influence is stronger in academic philosophy, perhaps, than that of any other author.” In typical histories of philosophy Lotze is counted among the great successors in the tradition of Kant and Hegel. I have elsewhere sought to explain the reasons for his great influence. Writers contemporary to Lotze (...) wanted first to classify him as an Herbartian, and in spite of his protests, he seemed some sort of Kantian or Hegelian. The character of his philosophy remained enigmatic, and he was sometimes called an “eclectic” since his philosophy contained aspects that reminded readers of some predecessor or other. But clearly he resisted the tendency to make all questions problems of knowledge: “The constant whetting of the knife is tedious, if it is not proposed to cut anything with it.” And clearly he is no Hegelian. He considered the rationalistic search for a single principle and a single method to have failed. German philosophy had failed to respect what is given in experience. Even in aesthetics, where surely one might be expected to attend to what the arts present for sensuous enjoyment, German intellectualism, to Lotze’s disgust, tended to use a deductive method. Santayana accused a priori German philosophers of “egotism”; he might have learned this from Lotze who found this same tradition marked by pretension. Only God could satisfy the program of Fichte. The demand of an all-embracing system is that it “make all particular parts of it pass before [us] in the majestic succession of an unbroken development!” Wrote Lotze, “It seemed to me that only a Spirit who stood in the centre of the universe which he himself had made could, with knowledge of the final aim which he had given his creation…” see the whole. Lotze’s kind of philosophy is professedly modest, nondogmatic, fallibilist. (shrink)

My article aims to revisit the aesthetic thought of the Austrian psychologist and philosopher Joseph Wilhelm Nahlowsky, as expounded in his formerly famous monograph Das Gefühlsleben. I show that although Nahlowsky was a direct heir of Herbart, his ideas were in keeping with both the contemporary debate about form and content and the then-emerging paradigm of psychological aesthetics. I describe his developments on aesthetic feelings and his remarkable attempt to elaborate a general psycho-affective theory on the experience of the aesthetic (...) object. I also discuss the importance of the notion of form, inherited from Herbart, in his psychological aesthetics. Finally, I demonstrate that, in addition to having marked an ‘affective’ turn in Herbartianism, Nahlowsky was a key actor in the evolution of ideas in psychological aesthetics in the second half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Through an exegetic reading of Peirce’s minor texts on higher education, I find that Peirce’s conception of a “Liberal Education” is close to the Herbartian conception of Bildung. Peirce calls for a general education with the ambition of qualifying critical thinkers with the capacity to go beyond the strict rules and narrow borders of the artes liberales, – the different subject matters or sciences taught at a university. Thus, Peirce’s conception of a liberal education is closely linked to his interpretation (...) of common sense – or sensis communis – as a critical commonsensism. To him, it is urgent to educate and nurture “the first rule of reason,” described as a will to learn, a curiosity, a dissatisfaction of what you already incline to think, and an intense desire to find things out. The nurturing of this “first rule of reason” is thus about educating an intellectual community of critical thinkers who are able to question authoritative beliefs, knowing how to debunk them, and how to turn away from obiter dictum. (shrink)

Husserl has undoubtedly considered himself being influenced by Brentano, but his conflicts with the orthodox core of the School of Brentano raise the question whether his adherence to Brentano suffices to adequately grasp the context of his early philosophy. I investigate the biographical details of Husserl’s studies in Vienna to uncover hitherto unknown ties between Husserl and Austrian philosophers outside the School of Brentano. Already during his secondary school studies in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy Husserl was exposed to the philosophy textbooks (...) of Gustav Adolf Lindner; and archival records of the University of Vienna show that he had extensively attended philosophy courses held by other philosophers, especially by Robert Zimmermann. Both Lindner and Zimmermann proposed Herbartian philosophies, and what makes Zimmermann especially interesting is that he had once been a close personal disciple of Bernard Bolzano. I use an unpublished lecture transcript, written by a fellow student of Husserl, to investigate the controversial issue of Zimmermann’s possible transmission of Bolzano’s ideas. While a direct transmission seems improbable, my investigation uncovers a plethora of Herbartian influences, which are interesting on their own terms and have not only furnished Husserl with important parts of his descriptive psychological toolbox but have also helped him navigate the Brentano-School’s debate on intentionality. (shrink)

This chapter begins with a discussion of Herbart's theory of the structures of thought. It then discusses Drobisch's formal philosophy, Hegel's dialectical logic, Trendelenburg's logical investigations, and Herbartian and Hegelian reactions to the criticism.

As recent scholarship has repeatedly shown, the history of Vienna Circle is to some extent rooted in the tradition of Austrian Philosophy which Neurath considered as not involved in the “Kantian interlude”. Nevertheless, it seems that the heritage of Leibniz and, in particular, of his “reform of logic” has been hitherto neglected. Indeed, Leibnizianism (along with Herbartianism) represents a main feature of this tradition stretching from Bolzano to quite forgotten figures as Exner and Zimmermann, and still influent on the (...) Brentano circle. This paper attempt to highlight the role played by Leibniz in framing of the “scientific world conception”, focusing in particular both on Carnap’s and Neurath’s stance towards the characteristica universalis underlying the project of the encyclopedia Leibniz aimed to realize. (shrink)

Review of Harold B. Dunkel, Herbart and Herbartianism: An Educational Ghost Story.

Many historians and philosophers of logic have claimed that during the modern classical era there was a long period of stagnation or even of decline in the field of logic. The aim of this paper is to convince the audience that this standard evaluation of the development of modern logic during the period from Leibniz to Frege is misdirected and needs to be corrected. Even though it is true that the now usual way of understanding logic merely as the doctrine (...) of syntax and semantics of explicit languages would not have appealed even to most 19th century logicians, it is still not the case that there is nothing worth discussing with regard to the development of logic during the modern classical period. The algebraic period culminated with Schroder's contribution and neither Herbartian formal logic nor Trendelenburg's critical epistemology aroused much interest among the 20th century mathematical logicians and analytic philosophers. Nevertheless, the development of symbolic logic can only be understood properly by relating its emergence to the immediately preceding philosophically-oriented discussion about the reform of logic. (shrink)

Many historians and philosophers of logic have claimed that during the modern classical era there was a long period of stagnation or even of decline in the field of logic. The aim of this paper is to convince the audience that this standard evaluation of the development of modern logic during the period from Leibniz to Frege is misdirected and needs to be corrected. Even though it is true that the now usual way of understanding logic merely as the doctrine (...) of syntax and semantics of explicit languages would not have appealed even to most 19th century logicians, it is still not the case that there is nothing worth discussing with regard to the development of logic during the modern classical period. The algebraic period culminated with Schroder's contribution and neither Herbartian formal logic nor Trendelenburg's critical epistemology aroused much interest among the 20th century mathematical logicians and analytic philosophers. Nevertheless, the development of symbolic logic can only be understood properly by relating its emergence to the immediately preceding philosophically-oriented discussion about the reform of logic. (shrink)

Die Forschung zu Eduard Hanslicks Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (1854) ist in der deutschsprachigen Diskussion auf die historischen Hintergründe von Hanslicks Argument fokussiert. Während die frühesten Deutungen von Hanslicks Standpunkt seine systematischen Berührungspunkte mit dem ahistorischen Formalismus von Johann Friedrich Herbart konstatierten, akzentuierte die deutsche Forschung der 1970er und 1980er seinen starken Konnex mit Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Dahlhaus betonte speziell, dass Hanslicks Argument eine Bekanntschaft mit dem Hegelianismus als der »herrschenden Philosophie der 1830er und 1840er« nötig mache. Dahlhaus’ Hypothese wird bei (...) der gewissenhaften Rekonstruktion der österreichischen Hegelrezeption jedoch schwierig. Habsburgische Bildungsplaner befanden dagegen den Deutschen Idealismus für politisch untragbar, was die Entlassung von mehreren Professoren nach sich zog, die den ›gefährlichen‹ Hegelianismus propagierten. Diese Lage wird von uns als geeigneter Ansatzpunkt für die detailgetreue Untersuchung der hegelianischen Theorieelemente von Hanslicks Abhandlung benutzt, welche vor dem Hintergrund der ablehnenden Grundhaltung ›Österreichs‹ zum Deutschen Idealismus sorgsam erfolgen muss. Hanslicks VMSTraktat umfasst dennoch mehrere wichtige Elemente der hegelianischen Ästhetik-diskussion, die nicht einzig Hegels System, sondern ebenso hegelianische Kunsttheoretiker (Kahlert, Krüger, Vischer etc.) umfänglich einbeziehen muss. Hanslicks Standpunkt, der die ahistorische Ausrichtung des Herbart’schen Formalismus niemals aufgriff, ist vor allem durch Vischers Annahme zur historischen Entwicklung des musikalischen Grundmaterials geprägt worden. Wir sehen somit Hanslicks VMS-Traktat als die ›eklektische‹ Verschmelzung von heterogenen theoretischen Diskursfeldern, womit dieser Herbartianismus und Hegelianismus als ästhetische Gegenpole des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts miteinander ausgleichen konnte. German-speaking scholarship on Eduard Hanslick’s aesthetic treatise »On the Musically- Beautiful« (1854) is primarily concerned with the historical background of Hanslick’s argument. Whereas contemporary investigations into Hanslick’s aesthetics emphasised theoretical overlaps with Johann Friedrich Herbart’s ahistorical formalism, German scholars of the 1970s and 1980s highlighted similarities to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In this respect, Dahlhaus specifically accentuated that Hanslick’s doctrine implies an exposure to Hegelianism as the »reigning philosophy of the 1830s and 1840s«. By reconstructing the historical reception of Hegel’s system in Austria, however, Dahlhaus’s premise becomes thoroughly problematic. Habsburg authorities considered German Idealism to be politically intolerable, thereby prompting numerous sackings of Austrian university lecturers on account of ›dangerous‹ Hegelianism. We take this historical framework as a suitable starting point for a comprehensive investigation of Hanslick’s Hegelian leanings that have to be carefully explored in the light of ›Austria’s‹ critical attitude towards speculative philosophy. »On the Musically-Beautiful«, however, comprises important elements of Hegelian aesthetics that are not limited to Hegel’s system but rather extend to Hegelian aesthetics in general (Kahlert, Krüger, Vischer etc.). Vischer’s hypothesis regarding the historical development of musical material particularly influenced Hanslick’s aesthetic outlook, who did not share the ahistorical conception of Herbartian formalism. Thus, we interpret Hanslick’s aesthetic treatise as an ›eclectic‹ fusion of diverse theoretical frameworks, ultimately reconciling Herbart and Vischer as the opposing extremes of mid-19th century aesthetics. (shrink)

Situating Lotze in the School of Speculative Theology, I use debates about Schelling’s critique of Hegel—then and now—to understand Lotze’s critique of Hegel. Lotze’s early metaphysics seems to employ a version of Hegel’s dialectical analysis of being, phenomena, and mind emphasizing “the interconnection of things.” One can equally argue that he proceeds in an analytic style of reviewing and testing alternative theories. My tentative conclusion is that he assumes the existence of reality (the Absolute) like Schelling, and makes cognition a (...) process subordinate to that reality. In this respect, he goes beyond his Kantian mentors J. F. Fries and E. F. Apelt. From all these sources came a radically original Gestalt metaphysics. For example, he reverses Kant’s forms of intuition (Anschauung) into “forms of intuitability”(Anschaulichkeit), including the relational categories of space, time, motion, mechanism, organism, law, and event. He then makes the categories into ethical levels of a “teleological idealism.” In this way he overcomes his Herbartian teachers’ separation of metaphysics from ethics, evincing his center Hegelian roots. (shrink)