ABSTRACT There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: free agency is grounded in an agent’s possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, only actual sequence features can ground free agency. This paper argues that and can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict between two approaches to the notion of non-accidentality. According to modalism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff p modally tracks q. (...) According to explanationism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff q explains p in the right way. The conflict between these two approaches becomes manifest in Frankfurt-like cases for many notions, in which p and q are intuitively non-accidentally connected even though there is no modal tracking between them. Thus, and can’t be combined because the Frankfurt-cases upon which rests track explanationist intuitions, while the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness in is usually spelled out in modalist terms. Hence, the possibility of an actual sequence reasons-responsiveness account depends on finding an explanationist approach to the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness. (shrink)

Many think it is plausible that agents enjoy freedom and responsibility with respect to their actions in virtue of being reasons-responsive. Extant accounts spell out reasons-responsiveness (RR) as a general modal property. The agent is responsive to reasons for and against ϕ-ing, according to this idea, if they ϕ in accordance with the balance of reasons in a suitable proportion of possible situations. This paper argues that freedom and responsibility are not grounded in such modal properties on the basis of (...) a phenomenon I call ‘rational blind spots’. Agents have highly specific local blockages (or openings) that prevent them from seeing or reacting for a particular type of reason. When these blind spots are triggered, agents fail to be responsive to reasons in the sense relevant to freedom and responsibility. Thus, we judge that they are not free and responsible. But bind spots don’t remove the agent’s possession of general modal RR properties. Thus, extant accounts of reasons-responsiveness render the incorrect result that the agents in these cases remain responsible because they remain responsive to reasons in a general sense. (shrink)

This essay offers a fresh interpretation of Bhartr̥hari’s concept of “insight”, and of its identification as the object of a sentence in the second kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya. Earlier scholars dealing with this topic disagreed on three main points: whether an epistemologically rigorous concept of insight can be found in Bhartr̥hari’s work, or if the notion remains irrevocably vague and equivocal; whether the concept of pratibhā primarily belongs to linguistics, or to action theory; whether Bhartr̥hari’s identification of insight as the (...) object of a sentence should be taken literally or figuratively. Starting from a close analysis of all passages in Bhartr̥hari’s work mentioning pratibhā, I identify, first of all, a univocal understanding of insight, valid throughout the Vākyapadīya, as immediate cognition informed by verbal transmission, in other words as a form of practical knowledge, non-representational yet essentially productive and dynamic. Showing, on this basis, how Bhartr̥hari’s understanding of language at the level of sentences is pragmatic rather than referential, I demonstrate, against the view prevalent in the late grammatical tradition, that a literal interpretation of his provocative statement on pratibhā as vākyārtha remains perfectly plausible. This thesis is further corroborated by the consideration of post-Bhartr̥hari philosophical sources elaborating on his ideas, which allow us better to understand in what sense pratibhā can legitimately be thought of as cognition “without an object”. (shrink)

This article is an attempt at understanding the use that Abhinavagupta, the Kashmiri Śaiva philosopher and scholar of poetics, makes of a few concepts and theories stemming from the tradition of Vedic ritual exegesis. Its starting point is the detailed analysis of a key passage in Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the “aphorism on rasa” of the Nāṭyaśāstra, where the learned commentator draws an analogy between the operation of the non-prescriptive portions of the Veda in the ritual and the “generalisation” taking place, (...) according to him, in the appreciation of a work of art. Arguing against the tendency of modern historiography to explain this analogy exclusively in terms of Kumārila’s theory of effectuation in its two modalities, the article endeavours to show how Abhinavagupta relies on a variety of other textual sources he knew extensively and presumably first-hand. Some of them belong to the great Mīmāṃsaka tradition ; others, to different trends of medieval Brahmanism claiming exegetical heritage, as in the case of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī The nature of Abhinavagupta’s debt to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and his concept of bhāvanā is also reconsidered in light of these new findings. This investigation finally leads to identify, in the Abhinavabhāratī, an original theory of scriptural narratives and their efficacy, irreducible to any of its exegetical sources. According to this theory, mythological passages of the Veda directly prompt action, through the same capacity of abstraction or “de-temporalisation” that is at work in our appraisal of literature and theatre. (shrink)

This essay argues that it is a matter of vital concern to develop a theoretical apparatus that is adequate to the inherent spatiotemporal dynamics of capital accumulation and the changing practices developed to manage the crisis tendencies of those dynamics. This requires integrating the a-spatial theory of capital accumulation and its internal contradictions with the spatial/geographical theory of imperialism that invokes geopolitical and geo-economic struggles between nation-states. I argue that the two are linked by the way capital deals with the (...) problem of absorbing capital surpluses, namely through geographical fixes. The geographical fix requires imperialist expansionism and the battering down of all barriers to the spatial movement of capital. Such a conception provides the necessary clarity in formulating the relations between capital and state that are sometimes missing from Ellen M. Wood's arguments in Empire of Capital. (shrink)

Re-framing discussion of the question, “What is law?“ in terms of the contexts in which the whole question makes sense allows us to see that jurisprudence is about boundary disputes concerning law – that is about what should count as law – and about responses to attacks on the value of law. Concern for these two issues constitutes the boundary challenge perspective. The boundary challenge perspective not only allows us fully to escape essentialism about law, it also provides us with (...) a better understanding of the relationship between the activity of discussing what should count as law and the activity of specifying the law in particular circumstances. The boundary challenge perspective provides a better explanation of that relationship than positivism or natural law. It allows discussion of change and resistance to change without significantly weakening the distinction between “is” and “ought”. It might also form the basis for further historical and sociological studies of law. (shrink)

Publication date: 26 January 2017 Source: Author: Hanna David Many gifted children are “double labeled”, namely in addition of being gifted they are also learning disabled and/or suffer from emotional, social or behavioral problems. This article will present the difficulties gifted children with a double label have to deal with, especially the difficulties in the educational system. Because of the double label the educational team faces a double challenge, in most cases without being equipped with the required knowledge or the (...) support they need. This article will describe three case studies; techniques for intervention with such children and their families will be suggested. (shrink)

This bibliography seeks to offer a comprehensive overview of nuclear criticism, tracing its development from the 1984 issue of diacritics which saw the publication of Derrida's seminal article “No Apocalypse, Not Now ” to the present day. Particular attention is paid to areas of interest which are underrepresented in the available literature, and every attempt has been made to offer a resource which is wide-ranging in outlook while providing a clear sense of the central texts which have shaped and reshaped (...) what we understand as nuclear criticism. Texts focusing solely on individual works have, by and large, been excluded. Brief notes accompany some of the entries, although it has not been practical to provide these for all the works mentioned: they should be taken as a record of an individual approach to the texts in question rather than as marks of overarching significance. (shrink)

Erdelyi's dialectical repression theory attempts to reconcile what appear to be incompatible perspectives in the contentious area of memory for trauma. He partially succeeds and makes a strong case that repression is “an empirical fact,” but makes a weaker case that distortions and omissions are due to the same mechanism and that recovered memories are necessarily unreliable. Available data do not suggest that the return of the repressed is any less accurate than the return of the non-repressed.

Volume 97, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 408-411.