Today the modern Darwinian theory of evolution is the unifying theory within the biological sciences. A consideration of its implications for feminism is, however, impossible without a critical evaluation of its history of male bias. The aim of this article is therefore threefold. First, to explain what sexual selection entails. Second, to discuss male bias in and feminist reactions to Darwinian theory in general and sexual selection theory in particular. Third, to demonstrate that it would be a loss for feminism (...) to keep rejecting an evolutionary framework if we want to understand the roots of gender difference. This article is informed by a Darwinian feminist perspective. (shrink)

I think it will be generally admitted that if Oxford philosophers have any claim to have added in recent years to the store of our philosophical ideas, it lies in their published works on the theory of conduct. I don’t think it can be claimed that, even in this sphere, they have given us many new and illuminating positive truths. After reading Mr. Ross, Professor Prichard, and Mr. Joseph, we are left, I think, with the impression that the whole subject (...) is much more intricate and puzzling than we should have thought possible. I intend in this paper to try and discover what is true in the theories of these three moralists on one of the most difficult and puzzling of ethical problems, viz., “What Renders a Right Act Right?” Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, in the main, stand together; it is regrettable that Professor Prichard's published work is so very meagre. And if in quoting from his article in Mind , 1912, on “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake,” I am doing him an injustice in attributing to him any views which he no longer holds, I am sorry; but modesty in publishing has its penalties, and anyhow, the article is too guilty an offender to get off free, for its annoying subtleties started the whole trouble, and led indirectly to Some Problems in Ethics and the Right and the Good. (shrink)

Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire. By Liang Cai. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2014. Pp. xii + 276. $85, $27.95.

Cycling in traffic requires a combination of motor and perceptual skills while interacting with a dynamic and fast-changing environment. The inferior perceptual-motor skills in individuals with developmental coordination disorder may put them at a higher risk for accidents. A key skill to navigate in traffic is to quickly detect hazardous situations. This perceptual-cognitive skill was investigated in young adults with DCD using simulated traffic situations in a hazard perception test in cycling. Nine individuals with DCD and nine typically developing individuals (...) participated in the study and completed the test while their gaze was tracked using a remote eye tracking device. A questionnaire was used to determine cycling experience and the perception of cycling and anticipation skill in traffic. Despite a longer period to master the motor skill of cycling, individuals with DCD reported to be able to safely cycle in traffic around the same age as TD young adults. In the hazard perception test, individuals with DCD fixated the hazards later, less frequently and for a shorter duration than the TD participants, however, the participants with DCD did not wait longer to react to the hazard than the TD participants. Interestingly, individuals with DCD rated the traffic situations in the test as significantly more dangerous than the TD participants. In conclusion, the differences exposed in the hazard perception test may imply an increased risk of accidents in individuals with DCD. In further research and practice it is recommended that both the motor and the perceptual aspects of cycling are addressed. (shrink)

Various passages of the "Huainanzi" (ca. 139 B.C.) that bear upon the topic of emotions are brought together and the connections among these are demonstrated. There is a special focus on anger and desire. Emotions are analyzed as motions of qi that arise almost inevitably from a person's interactions with his environment. The "Huainanzi" adopts two models to describe the sagely way of dealing with these "motions": an active model in which the heart is seen as the faculty in control, (...) and a passive model in which the heart is described as a mirror. (shrink)

The relationship between feminism and the biological sciences has always been particularly tense and hostile. Feminists have been inclined not to trust what scientists had to say about the sexes, with science often being pronounced a “white, male enterprise.” But why should feminism and the biological sciences remain at odds? And what might be gained from a reconciliation? In Who's Afraid of Charles Darwin? Griet Vandermassen shows that, rather than continuing this enmity, feminism and the biological sciences, and in (...) particular evolutionary psychology, have the potential and the need to become powerful allies. Properly understood, the Darwinian perspective proposed in this volume will become essential to tackling the major issues in feminism. (shrink)

En este trabajo presentamos los fundamentos teóricos de una propuesta para el abordaje didáctico de concepciones teleológicas de los y las estudiantes en la enseñanza de la Biología. La propuesta en cuestión supone acudir al modo en que Darwin lidió con las concepciones teleológicas dominantes entre sus contemporáneos, para proponer una estrategia general a través de la cual se podría incidir sobre las intuiciones teleológicas de los estudiantes, de modo que se pueda facilitar el aprendizaje de la teoría de la (...) selección natural. Sugeriremos también que esta propuesta implica un modo original de apelar a la analogía entre el cambio teórico en la Historia de la Ciencia y el aprendizaje de las ciencias. (shrink)

Summary For the study of the first year of life, Sander, Stern, and Gomez each chose the adult–infant relationship as the unit of analysis; they followed its development, respectively, in moments of meeting, in the proto-conversation and in the focus of attention. The authors explicitly refer to the Gestalt theory and support the need to interpret the behavior of the child as part of a wider context, as the experiences of a person in relation since birth.

This dissertation contains both a philosophical examination of the Huainanzi's views on morality and an historical investigation of the factors that led to the demise of Liu An, King of Huainan, and his kingdom in 122 B.C. It shows how in early Han times moral values, ideas about morality and historical praxis shaped and influenced one another. ;Part one argues that during the second decade of Emperor Wu's reign a major shift in morality occurred. When Liu An offered the Huainanzi (...) to Emperor Wu during an official court-visit in 139 B.C., he used the text to affirm himself as a person possessing both the practical expertise and the moral authority necessary to qualify as a player on the political scene. Officials whose primary goal lay in strengthening the grip of the central government over the empire, and who had risen to power during the twenties, sought to demonstrate how an independent moral stance was inherently disloyal. Around 122 B.C. they accused Liu An of plotting revolt and obtained a conviction. For the officials, loyalty coincided with submissiveness to the emperor's will. ;Part two shows that a reason for the officials' dislike of the Huainanzi is the text's refusal to articulate well-defined moral rules. How to act in a particular situation is up to the agent who has to rely on the judgment of his own heart. When an agent's heart is cultivated like the heart of a sage person, his actions will follow human nature and the hierarchy of values it contains and therefore be good actions. Part two further analyzes the Huainanzi's claim that persons who have cultivated their hearts according to the text's precepts are not only virtuous persons, but also extremely effective agents. Thus the Huainanzi puts forward pragmatic as well as moral reasons for why a person possessing the heart of a sage should be accorded a political voice. ;Even as the moral viewpoint that Liu An and the Huainanzi represent was condemned in 122 B.C., it retained its force as a vehicle for criticizing government practice. (shrink)

In his Quaestiones supra librum De Caelo et Mundo which are preserved in the manuscripts Vienna, Dominikanerkonvent 150/120, fols. 47ra-68va and Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 3493, fols. 95ra-136rb, Peter of Auvergne deals with the question of whether there is one world or whether there can be many worlds 24). Peter raises this question because Aristotle refutes the existence and possibility of a plurality of worlds in De Caelo I, 8-9. I shall first discuss the three sets of questions on De Caelo (...) attributed to Peter of Auvergne . In the second section I shall present the answers of authoritative ancient and medieval scholars on the problem of whether a plurality of worlds exists or is possible . Finally I shall examine Peter’s question and indicate its probable sources. (shrink)

Several medieval commentators on De caelo II, 7 investigate the question of whether local motion causes heat. I analyse the theories of Averroes, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne, John of Jandun, John Buridan and Nicole Oresme and two anonymous theories. Although all of these authors agree that local motion generates heat, each of them presents his own explanation of the heating effect of motion. Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, John of Jandun and John Buridan argue that motion is the (...) per se cause of heat. Their explanations of the heating effect of motion are based on metaphysical considerations such as the relation between a subject and its characteristics or perfections and the causal order in a genus. Albert the Great, Peter of Auvergne, Nicole Oresme and the anonymous commentators, on the contrary, defend the thesis that motion is the accidental cause of heat. Their explanations refer to physical processes caused by motion. (shrink)

Traces of and tracks towards philosophy and philosophizing in Flemish secondary education At present philosophy has only a minor place in the Flemish secondary education curriculum. In the first part of the article, I defend the view that philosophy deserves a place as an autonomous subject in the final two years of secondary school. I sketch the content of such a philosophy course and I propose a didactical model for this course. The second part of the article discusses social tendencies (...) that explain the current debate over whether there should be more philosophy in secondary schools. In the third part I try to explain why philosophy still lacks a structural place in Flemish secondary education. Finally I present a survey of ‘traces’ of philosophy and philosophizing in Flemish secondary education and I formulate a conclusion. (shrink)

The contradictions between food poverty affecting a large section of the global population and the everyday wastage of food, particularly in high income countries, have raised significant academic and public attention. All actors in the food chain have a role to play in food waste prevention and reduction, including farmers, food manufacturers and processors, caterers and retailers and ultimately consumers. Food surplus redistribution is considered by many as a partial solution to food waste reduction and food poverty mitigation, while others (...) criticize charitable initiatives as inadequate responses, that inhibit governments from responsibly protecting the citizens right to food. This paper frames food assistance as “hybrid systems”, situating at the intersection of territorial food, public welfare and third sector voluntary systems. Based on available literature and reflections on previous research examining food banks in Italy, we develop a system dynamics conceptual mapping. The aim is to model a set of relations and dynamic mechanisms associated with variables relevant to food waste generation, food recovery for social purposes and food poverty alleviation. The analysis of feedback interactions highlights the vulnerabilities of food assistance systems that occur when addressing food poverty by reducing food surplus. In summary, as the awareness on food poverty and food surplus arises, incentives to food recovery and redistribution strengthen the role of food assistance actors, increasing their exposure to drivers of change, such as retailers’ standards for food surplus prevention. This paper contributes to the current academic debate on charitable food assistance, with insights for policy makers and other systems’ actors. (shrink)

"Bibliographical notes": pages [243]-244.

Exploring the metaphysics of deep disagreements, Ranalli identifies several essential features shared by all such disputes. These very features constitute a set of adequacy conditions that any satisfactory theory of deep disagreements must meet. The paper explains how Coliva’s Wittgensteinian hinge theory can satisfy Ranalli’s persistence desideratum. According to this condition, any appropriate theory must explain why deep disagreements tend to be persistent and thus unresolved without presupposing that they are rationally irresolvable. First, the work critically discusses how Coliva utilizes (...) her proposed view to account for this desideratum. Second, the paper points out that Coliva’s response is partly problematic because of Ranalli’s definition of deep disagreements for Wittgensteinian hinge theories, which over-generates instances of genuine deep disagreements. Third, the work argues that Coliva’s theory can satisfy Ranalli’s persistence desideratum by resolving a deep disagreement between an anti-vaccination advocate and a proponent of vaccination using an expanded version of Pritchard’s side-on approach. Finally, the paper critically engages with Coliva on the solvability of deep disagreements. (shrink)

This article contains a discussion and edition of two questions on the eternity of the world in Galfridus de Aspall’s Questiones super De celo et mundo (book I), viz. his question of whether the world is generable and perishable speaking about proper generation (i.e., generation from pre-existent matter) (q. 99) and his question of whether it was Aristotle’s intention to argue that the world began in some way (q. 100). These questions are preserved in the mss. Cambridge, Peterhouse 157, ff. (...) 17va-b (on which the edition is based) and Todi, Biblioteca Comunale 23, ff. 210ravb. Aspall holds, on the one hand, that the world is generable and perishable in this sense that it has from itself a potentiality to non-being. On the other hand, the elements in their totality are ungenerable, because their inclination to non-being is stopped by the power of the celestial orb. Aspall interprets Aristotle’s statement that the world is ungenerable and imperishable in this sense that Aristotle meant that the world is not generated from pre-existent matter, but that he did not hold that the world did not begin by creation. The main source of Aspall’s questions is Averroes’ Commentarium magnum on De celo. In q. 99 Aspall holds that he agrees with Averroes, but he misunderstands Averroes’ position. In q. 100 he states that he disagrees with Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle. (shrink)

During more than a century scholars have argued that the translatio vetus of De sensu can be dated to the first decade of the 13th century or to the 12th century. My investigation of the manuscripts which contain the translatio vetus of De sensu and my survey of the earliest references to De sensu in the Latin West reveals that there is no evidence that this translation was made during the 12th century. The absence of De sensu in 12th century (...) manuscripts and the absence of references to De sensu in treatises of the late 12th and early 13th century could indicate that the translatio vetus was only made at the beginning of the 13th century. If one assumes that the translation of De sensu was made much later than the translations of De anima and De memoria by James of Venice, this could help explain why in the earliest tradition, it is not De sensu but De memoria that follows on De anima. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the translatio vetus of De sensu already existed during the 12th century, but was not used because scholars were more interested in the other newly translated Aristotelian works or because the translation of De sensu was too difficult to understand. The fact that the 13th- century manuscripts transmit a text that is strongly corrupted and contaminated could indicate that the tradition started much earlier, during the 12th century. De generatione stelllarum, which can possibly be dated before 1225, contains several citations from the translatio vetus of De sensu. It could be the earliest evidence of the use of the translation of De sensu. The anonymous De potentiis anime et obiectis, written by a theologian between 1228 and 1232, is the earliest work that can be dated with certainty and contains a quotation from De sensu. From the 1240s onwards, De sensu was widely commented on and used in treatises on the soul and in encyclopaedic works. Adam of Buckfield’s commentary on De sensu seems to have been very influential and deserves further study. (shrink)

First published in Italian in 2008 and appearing here in English for the first time, Janus's Gaze is the culmination of Carlo Galli's ongoing critique of the work of Carl Schmitt. Galli argues that Schmitt's main accomplishment, as well as the thread that unifies his oeuvre, is his construction of a genealogy of the modern that explains how modernity's compulsory drive to achieve order is both necessary and impossible. Galli addresses five key problems in Schmitt's thought: his relation to the (...) state, the significance of his concept of political theology, his readings of Machiavelli and Spinoza, his relation to Leo Strauss, and his relevance for contemporary political theory. Galli emphasizes the importance of passing through Schmitt’s thought—and, more important, beyond Schmitt’s thought—if we are to achieve insight into the problems of the global age. Adam Sitze provides an illuminating introduction to Schmitt and Galli's reading of him. (shrink)

Is The Prelude a philosophical poem? It is, of course, many things besides: it is an autobiography; it contains profound reflections on psychology, education and politics; and there are passages of an almost purely lyrical character. Does it also contain philosophical poetry? On this question, the critics of Wordsworth are divided. Coleridge and Raleigh answer Yes; Arnold, Bradley, Dr. Leaves, from their different points of view, agree in answering No. I believe that the first answer is right, although it has (...) usually been supported by the wrong reasons. I believe the second answer to be wrong, although many of the arguments that are supposed to lead to it are in themselves sound enough. Those who say that The Prelude is not a philosophical poem, usually mean that it does not offer a coherent system of philosophy—that it expresses an original outlook and a personal wisdom, but that the only systematic philosophy in it comes at second-hand from Hartley or Coleridge and contributes not at all to the poem. And this is largely true. But the mistake is, to identify philosophy with system, philosophizing with “a philosophy.” This is a mistake that has been repudiated again and again by many of the greatest philosophers, from Socrates and Plato to Locke and Kant and others. I shall argue that The Prelude achieves philosophical poetry, because in it Wordsworth grapples with philosophical problems—problems which arise out of the story of his own early life—which are actually forced upon him by the poem itself; and because he tries to answer these problems in a way which would be possible only in poetry. (shrink)

The political writings of Kant and of Hegel present two contrasts, whose connection and explanation have never been adequately explored. The first contrast is in respect of the quality of their discussions of ‘home’ politics—in Kant's language, the ‘problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution’. Here Hegel shines. However much one may dislike the tone of voice, the vocabulary, the style and the arrangement of its arguments, his Philosophy of Right , especially when supplemented by his more topical political writings, (...) presents an array of dicta, judgments and arguments of notable penetration, balance and prescience. Consider for instance his account of the very different political functions of free associations and of representative bodies, and his perception of the symbolic—but crucially symbolic—role of head of state. On these, as on many other issues, Hegel's views deserve the credit that has of late begun to be restored to them. Whatever his philosophical failings, he had a remarkable sense of the key junctures of different strands in the life of politics; so that, although the kind of state he describes and admires retains little practical relevance today, his exposition of it remains a valuable training-ground in political appreciation. By contrast Kant's philosophy of the state, as we find it in Part II of his Philosophy of Right , in Part II of Theory and Practice and in Appendices I and II of Perpetual Peace , is at first sight little more than an academic exercise. It amounts to a restatement, in dehistoricized terms and in accordance with Kant's rationalist theory of morals, of Rousseau's central political teachings, viz. that an original, unanimous, unrescindable contract explains political allegiance, and that the idea of a General Will is a sufficient criterion of political justice within the state. From these two basic positions Kant develops a theory of civic obedience far more restrictive than that of Rousseau or indeed than that of Hobbes. Throughout, Kant accepts—in the spirit which one might accord to revelation—Rousseau's assumptions that government can be confined to issues that fall under a General Will, and that such a Will can be ‘found’ for the resolution of every political issue, so that honest men need never disagree about what the General Will is. But to say this is to say that Kant's concern with home politics is little more than academic. (shrink)

One Morality or many? Liberal morality and Socialist morality; bourgeois morality and Georges Sorel's “morality of producers”; Protestant morality and Catholic; Greek morality and Christian; “aristocratic” morality and “slave” morality, “open” morality and “closed” morality—what, if any, is the relevance of such distinctions as these to moral philosophy?