This work is essentially a history of the scholastic conception of dialectica from Garlandus Compotista to William Ockham, with an eye to rendering intelligible the puzzling nature of late medieval treatises on logical obligations. Such treatises seem to countenance violations of fundamental and indisputable logical rules, for example, that a disjunction is false if both of its disjuncts are false. In large part to explain this apparent surd development in medieval logic, Eleonore Stump has collected into a single volume twelve (...) separately published essays. Together they form an interesting and convincing argument. (shrink)

For two principal reasons, this is a welcome translation of Thomas Aquinas's treatment of faith. First, it is one of the very few English translations of Aquinas that has heeded Aquinas's own sage advice on translating--preserve the sense of the original but adapt its style to suit the language into which it is being translated. Most anglophone translators make Aquinas appear as if he concocted a highly technical language to impress his brother Dominicans. Jordan, on the other hand, rightly understands (...) that while Aquinas uses words and phrases in very precise ways, he never does so at the expense of their common, ordinary meanings. In fact, Aquinas's precise language is unintelligible without its being seen as rooted in ordinary language and naturally developed through the philosophical and theological traditions he inherited. Thus, by avoiding the obscure Latinate English that plagues other translations and, instead, rendering Thomas into felicitous English with due attention to the sources, Jordan's translation well reflects the accessibility of the original. (shrink)

This work is essentially an attempt to refute the theory of legal positivism, and at the same time to advance the author's own somewhat unique formulation of natural law theory. Though Juha-Pekka Rentto makes a comprehensive and almost eclectic use of authors as diverse as, for example, Thomas Aquinas and Lawrence Kohlberg, he seems determined to approach legal philosophy from the natural law tradition, while adding a few notable exceptions of his own. In his opinion, natural law theories which attempt (...) to build a system on some one first principle ignore the practical importance of natural law. In fact, he will go on to say later that "rule-like principles are otiose in that they either are against the appropriate reasons for action, or they add nothing to them". His own via media involves an interesting twist on Finnis's theory of practical reason. (shrink)