Objective. We investigated associations between adults’ beliefs about the heritability of virtue and endorsements of the efficacy of specific parenting styles. Design. In Studies 1 (N = 405) and 2 (N = 400), beliefs about both the genetic etiology of virtuous characteristics and parenting were assessed in samples of parents and non-parents. In Study 3 (N = 775), participants were induced to view virtue as determined by genes or as determined by social factors. Heritability beliefs and authoritarian parenting endorsements were (...) subsequently measured. Results. Study 1 and Study 2 converged to reveal that tendencies to view characteristics as determined by genes were positively associated with endorsement of authoritarian parenting styles. This association occurred independent of individual differences in essentialism and rightwing authoritarianism. Study 3 revealed that exposure to genetic accounts of virtue increased beliefs that virtue is caused by genes, which in turn was positively associated with endorsements of authoritarian parenting responses to child problem behavior. Exposure to genetic accounts of virtue increased endorsement of authoritarian parenting among parents, but was unrelated to authoritarian parenting among non-parents. Conclusions. These studies suggest that genetic accounts of virtuous characteristics reliably relate to more positive beliefs about harsh and controlling parenting practices, illuminating an unrecognized cognitive factor associated with authoritarian parenting endorsement. (shrink)

We examined the association of parents’ genetic causal beliefs and parenting behaviors, hypothesizing a positive association between parents’ genetic causal beliefs and their use of psychological control. Study 1 (N = 394) was a cross-sectional survey and revealed that parents’ genetic essentialism beliefs were positively associated with their self-reported use of harsh psychological control, but only for parents who reported relatively high levels of problem behaviors in their children. Study 2 (N = 293) employed a 4-day longitudinal design and revealed (...) that parents’ genetic causal beliefs positively predicted the use of psychological control, especially on days when they perceived relatively high problem behaviors in children. Overall, the studies demonstrated that parents’ genetic causal beliefs about character positively predicted psychologically controlling and harsh responses to child problem behaviors, which may ultimately be detrimental to child development. (shrink)

This is an entry into a collective journal of the twenty-first century years of plague. It introduces the notion of ‘lawfare’ by way of the contemporary case concerning Lula da Silva and Brazil’s fall from grace. The latter is presented as an instance of violence in the international context, the managerial attitude to global disasters and, indeed, a plague. It chronicles the social struggles around the case and on that basis builds a somewhat playful manifesto for a new relationship (...) between legal scholarship, the law school and the imaginary of permanent catastrophe and plague. (shrink)

Ce recueil offre à ses lecteurs diverses pistes d’interprétation. Elles se distinguent tant par le contenu de ses chapitres que par la question plus large de la place essentielle des études touchant à l’éducation. L’ouvrage, véritablement interdisciplinaire, remet en question la relation entre l’éducation et le genre grâce aux contributions d’historiens, de spécialistes en science de l’éducation, de sociologues, de psychologues et d’enseignants allant de la maternelle à l’université. Le livre...

This book focuses on the relationships between phenomenology and theology, which have been varied and complex but seem currently in an inconclusive and loosely defined state. Methodological rigour is not much in evidence, and the two disciplines continue to defy any authoritative synthesis. While both disciplines grapple with questions concerning the fundamental structures of human experience, their relation is troubled by the elusive roles of Revelation and faith, which threaten the scientific autonomy of philosophy on one side and disable theologians (...) for consistent philosophical discourse on the other. This volume revisits that conundrum from various perspectives, as it at once repristinates some of the most vibrant points of encounter and opens possibilities for new beginnings. It begins with the theological musings into which leading phenomenologists have been drawn from the start, with special reference to Husserl, Heidegger, Michel Henry, as well as backward glances to Fichte, Schelling, and Blondel. A second section takes up specific theological themes and examines how phenomenological approaches can refine thinking on them. These include the Incarnation, the Resurrection, the Eucharist, Grace, and Prayer. A dialogue between phenomenology and classical theologians is staged in the third section: Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, Eckhart, Karl Rahner. The closing section ranges more widely, discussing atheism, non-realist theology, and Hinduism from phenomenological angles, and showing how these topics too come within the ambit of theology. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 59 Heft: 1 Seiten: 34-53.

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of consensual (...) homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia. (shrink)

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary (...) view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one’s rational character, whether or not those activities are under one’s voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle. (shrink)

Edited by Ivette Fred-Rivera and Jessica Leech. What is the relationship between ontology and modality: between what there is, and what there could be, must be, or might have been? Throughout a distinguished career, Bob Hale’s work has addressed this question on a number of fronts, through the development of a Fregean approach to ontology, an essentialist theory of modality, and in his work on neo-logicism in the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of new essays engages with these themes (...) in Hale’s work in order to make further progress in our understanding of ontology, modality, and the relations between them. Some essays directly address questions in modal metaphysics, drawing on ontological concerns. Others raise questions in modal epistemology and its links to matters of ontology, such as the challenge to give an epistemology of essence. There are also several essays engaging with questions of what might be called ‘modal ontology’: the study of whether and what things exist necessarily or contingently. Such issues can be raised and addressed directly, but they also have an important bearing on the kinds of semantic commitments engendered in logic and mathematics, e.g., to the existence of sets, or numbers, or properties, and so on. It is thus explored in some chapters to what extent one’s ontology—and indeed, one’s ontology of necessary beings—interacts with other plausible assumptions and commitments. (shrink)

In his recent article, ‘A Gift to Theology? Jean-Luc Marion's ‘Saturated Phenomena’ in Christological Perspective’, Brian Robinette has critiqued Marion's phenomenology for confining theology to a one-sided approach to Christology, one that stresses only the passive, mystical reception of Christ. To correct this imbalance, Robinette brings Marion into dialogue with those more active Christologies or ‘prophetical-ethical’ liberation theologies of Gustavo Gutierrez, Johann Baptist Metz and others that stress a life-praxis focused on confronting evil and suffering. In this essay I am (...) arguing that Robinette has not fully developed the ‘logic’ of Marion's phenomenology of the ‘call and the gifted’, in which both a passive and an active element are operative. I explore more fully that very dynamic phenomenological process of the call-and-the-gifted as developed in Marion's work Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Once viewed in Christological perspective, and especially in light of Christ's death and resurrection, Marion's phenomenology entails an ethical trope consistent with the mission of Christ as rendered in Scriptural revelation, and thus the gap between Marion's work and the prophetical-ethical theologies of Gutierrez and Baptist Metz becomes narrowed. (shrink)

A dream team of philosophers relentlessly cross-examines the Perry Mason stories.

Newcomers and more experienced feminist theorists will welcome this even-handed survey of the care/justice debate within feminist ethics. Grace Clement clarifies the key terms, examines the arguments and assumptions of all sides to the debate, and explores the broader implications for both practical and applied ethics. Readers will appreciate her generous treatment of the feminine, feminist, and justice-based perspectives that have dominated the debate.Clement also goes well beyond description and criticism, advancing the discussion through the incorporation of a broad (...) range of insights into a new integration of the values of care and justice. Care, Autonomy, and Justice marks a major step forward in our understanding of feminist ethics. It is both direct and helpful enough to work as an introduction for students and insightful and original enough to make it necessary reading for scholars. (shrink)

abstract The possibility that organ sales by living adults might be made legal is morally distressing to many of us. However, powerful arguments have been provided recently supporting legalisation (I consider two of those arguments: the Consequentialist Argument and the Autonomy Argument). Is our instinctive reaction against a market of organs irrational then? The aim of this paper is not to prove that legalization would be immoral, all things considered, but rather to show, first, that there are some kinds of (...) arguments, offered in favour of legalisation, that are, in an important sense, illegitimate, and second, that even if legalisation might not be wrong all things considered, there are good reasons for our negative moral intuitions. Moreover, identifying these reasons will help highlight some features of moral decisions in non‐ideal situations, which in turn might be relevant to some other moral or policy choices. (shrink)

“ Moral luck” alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on oral responsibility claims that every kind of moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. (...) But circumstances are more difficult to avoid because the act of will itself has to be performed within the framework of circumstances that the agent cannot control at all, and these circumstances will dramatically bear on his/her responsibility. Therefore, the following anti-Kantian argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck or we accept it. If we reject it, then every attribution of responsibility becomes impossible. If we accept it, then we no longer have a good argument against consequential luck, the core of the Kantian rejection of moral luck. In this paper, I defend the Kantian position from this argument, claiming that both kinds of moral luck are relevantly different. This will, nevertheless, lead to a revision of the scope of our judgments of responsibility. They compare how someone acted with how others would act in identical 8or similar) circumstances. (shrink)

Genetic research in human beings poses deep ethical problems, one being the problem of distributive justice. If we suppose that genetic technologies are able to produce visible benefits for the well being of people, and that these benefits are affordable to only a favored portion of society, then the consequence is obvious. We are introducing a new source of inequality. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to justify some concern for the distributive consequences of applying genetics to (...) human beings. This concern transcends a mere preoccupation for material equality. I argue that genetic inequality can undermine the very basis of social cooperation, at least regarding health care. The second section is more practical. My aim is to defend how, at least in some legal and cultural frameworks , the undesired distributive consequences of genetics are more likely to arise and more difficult to avoid. (shrink)

How to reciprocate a precious gift? In this case the gift was given to us twice. First, in the shape of Paget Henry’s pioneering reinvention of René Ménil’s “Aesthetic Marxism.” Through it, second, we’re led to rediscover the fantastic world of Ménil’s hitherto ignored but crucial contribution to contemporary philosophy: his systematization of the poetics of revolt. Our debt with Ménil and Henry is unpayable. Our humble response in this essay is to offer readers a map to the treasure that (...) is Ménil’s thought. We aim to offer a path across and beyond the sedimentation and pacifying effects of given frames of judgment and the imagination in today’s post-classical public sphere. We call it “fantastic critique,” largely inspired by our wider reading of Ménil’s work and specifically his original concept of the “velocity of the spirit.” It renews the Hegelo-Marxian revolutionary formula. Here. Keep it with you. It’s a precious gift. (shrink)

Most research on risk aversion in behavioral science with human subjects has focused on a component of risk aversion that does not adapt itself to context. More recently, studies have explored risk aversion adaptation to changing circumstances in sequential decision-making tasks. It is an open question whether one can identify evidence, at the single subject level, for such risk aversion adaptation. We conducted a behavioral experiment on human subjects, using a sequential decision making task. We developed a model-based approach for (...) estimating the adaptation of risk-taking behavior with single-trial resolution by modelling a subject’s goals and internal representation of task contingencies. Using this model-based approach, we estimated the subject-specific adaptation of risk aversion depending on the current task context. We found striking inter-subject variations in the adaptation of risk-taking behavior. We show that these differences can be explained by differences in subjects’ internal representations of task contingencies and goals. We discuss that the proposed approach can be adapted to a wide range of experimental paradigms and be used to analyze behavioral measures other than risk aversion. (shrink)

Written in the shape of a letter to a friend and long-time collaborator, this piece focuses on Drucilla Cornell’s most crucial lessons on a critical theory for the future: the intertwinement of aesthetics and politics; the need to figure and reconfigure techniques of liberation; the clarification that the decolonial turn is an ontological turn; the relationship between justice and negotiations; the reformulation of the feminine within sexual difference; and the impact of temporal naturalism. Together, they help us move beyond received (...) views in phenomenology and existentialism, toward gravitational thinking and the priority of imaging over the understanding if we are to rekindle the revolutionary spirit of public imagination. (shrink)

El artículo, de intención didáctica, intenta ser una presentación alternativa a la concepción del método en Hegel. Parte de la premisa de que ésta es tomada como una estrategia para reconciliar la modernidad ilustrada, particular-mente tras el evento de la Revolución Francesa de 1789, tanto con el proyecto fundacional epistémico de la modernidad temprana como con su pasado antagónico: La concepción de la racionalidad retórica y hermenéutica, tal y como ésta procede de Platón y Aristóteles. El método de Hegel se (...) inscribiría en un afán por fusionar los aspectos omnipotentes de las narrativas ilustradas con los métodos premodernos de vinculación finita y fragmentaria con el sentido de la realidad. El texto sugiere la caducidad del proyecto, ante la ostensible inviabilidad contemporánea ante el optimismo ilustrado que lo inspira. (shrink)

La recepción durante el siglo XX se preguntó si la filosofía nietzscheana era a-, im- o anti-política, es decir, si podía ser asimilada por la democracia, o si era antimoderna, elitista y reaccionaria. El italiano Roberto Esposito ha propuesto leerla como formando e informando el paradigma de la biopolítica. Se discuten cuatro lecturas de esa biopolítica: como formadora del paradigma de la inmunidad, como tanatopolítica, como liberal y neoliberal, y como biopolítica afirmativa. Twentieth-century readers wondered if Nietzschean philosophy was apolitical, (...) impolitic, or anti-political; that is, if it could be assimilated by democracy or if it was antimodern, elitist, and reactionary. The Italian philosopher Robert Esposito has proposed reading Nietzsche's philosophy as forming and informing the biopolitical paradigm. Four readings of these biopolitics are discussed: as part of the paradigm of immunity, as thanatopolitics, as liberal and neoliberal, and as affirmative biopolitics. (shrink)

In this paper the author reflects upon the past, the present and the future of philosophical education within the framework of a democratic mode of living, integrating three levels of argumentation: an autobiographic level, triggered by the encounter with an old school notebook that belonged to the author’s father; a conceptual level, in which the author recalls John Dewey’s pragmatist approach to philosophy; and a descriptive and proactive level, in which the author examines recent developments concerning the teaching of philosophy (...) and proposes a perspective on philosophical education in tune with these. The author underscores the importance of different displacements and transformations undergone by the practice of teaching philosophy during the last century, and sets up a contrast between the old practices, intended to provide a “correct view of the world”, and the urge for philosophy to provide a critique of society and knowledge. In this way, the author draws on Dewey’s ideal, according to which philosophy should carry out both a critique and a reconstruction of present experience. Finally, the author sets forth ten challenges for future philosophical education. (shrink)

This article examines a specific case of lying, at the same time judicial and mediatic, promoted from the highest levels of political power, the Leon Trotsky case, from the perspective of the work done by the International Commission of Investigation chaired by the American philosopher John Dewey. After a general justification and contextualization of the subject, and a historical account of the events that surrounded the “Moscow Trials” and the constitution of the Dewey Commission, some of the reasons why the (...) commission concluded that such processes had been judicial assemblies are reported. It closes with a reference to the way Dewey later denounced the media falsification of these events through the book Mission to Moscow. (shrink)

Resumen: La problematización de la relación entre individuo y sociedad ha atravesado la historia de las ciencias sociales. El objetivo de este escrito es mostrar la originalidad de los planteamientos de Freud sobre el tópico, a través de un análisis comparativo con las aproximaciones propias de las corrientes socioantropológicas de la escuela de Cultura y Personalidad y de la Sociología Francesa. Nuestra investigación se basó en un análisis bibliográfico tanto de algunos textos socioantropológicos claves sobre dicho debate, como de la (...) producción freudiana pertinente. La interpretación del material freudiano se organizó según tres tópicos: a) la afirmación de la determinación simbólica del síntoma, b) la borradura metodológica de la distinción individuo sociedad, y c) la teorización de una eficacia mítica, transindividual y transhistórica. Concluimos subrayando los aportes del pensamiento de Freud a la discusión: la afirmación de la determinación simbólica ofrece las condiciones para la superación de la relación de externalidad entre el polo del individuo y el de la sociedad, y el consecuente rechazo a una relación especular entre ambos. (shrink)

Resumen: La problematización de la relación entre individuo y sociedad ha atravesado la historia de las ciencias sociales. El objetivo de este escrito es mostrar la originalidad de los planteamientos de Freud sobre el tópico, a través de un análisis comparativo con las aproximaciones propias de las corrientes socioantropológicas de la escuela de Cultura y Personalidad y de la Sociología Francesa. Nuestra investigación se basó en un análisis bibliográfico tanto de algunos textos socioantropológicos claves sobre dicho debate, como de la (...) producción freudiana pertinente. La interpretación del material freudiano se organizó según tres tópicos: a) la afirmación de la determinación simbólica del síntoma, b) la borradura metodológica de la distinción individuo sociedad, y c) la teorización de una eficacia mítica, transindividual y transhistórica. Concluimos subrayando los aportes del pensamiento de Freud a la discusión: la afirmación de la determinación simbólica ofrece las condiciones para la superación de la relación de externalidad entre el polo del individuo y el de la sociedad, y el consecuente rechazo a una relación especular entre ambos.: The relation between individual and society has been a main topic across the history of social sciences. The aim of this paper is to show the originality of Sigmund Freud's ideas about the topic, through a comparative analysis with the approaches of the socio-anthropological currents of the school of Culture and Personality and of French Sociology. Our research was based on a bibliographical analysis of some key socio-anthropological texts on this debate, as well as the relevant Freudian production. The interpretation of the Freudian material was organized according to three topics: a) the affirmation of the symbolic determination of symptoms, b) the methodological erasure of the individual society distinction, and c) the theorization of a mythical, transindividual and transhistorical efficacy. We conclude by emphasizing the contributions of Freud's thought to the discussion: the affirmation of symbolic determination offers the conditions for overcoming the externality relation between the pole of the individual and that of society, and the consequent rejection of a specular relationship between the two. (shrink)

Emotions involve transformations of the relationships that exist in the “natural” world as well as in social worlds. Thus, the emotions that humans construct are based on affective processes that exist independently from human society and are not necessarily constituted by the interplay of culture and genetic or physiological processes.

Bien se sabe que el alemán Carl Schmitt interpretó la posición del soberano en términos teológico-políticos: como el príncipe medieval cristiano cuya función consistía en prevenir y deferir el fin. Apuntalando las cercanías entre Schmitt y su mentor intelectual Thomas Hobbes, puede verse que en últimas la posición del decisor soberano es aquí la de quien intenta administrar o controlar el riesgo de la ocurrencia de eventos catastróficos en el futuro. Se argumenta en este ensayo que dicha forma de relacionarse (...) con la temporalidad y el infinito —apocalíptica, autoritativa, y catastrofista— caracteriza tanto a la estética como a la economía y la política de autoridad que predominan en nuestra época. Se trata de un inesperado retorno de lo religioso en el corazón mismo de la modernidad, que anima la radicalización decisionista de los discursos político y económico, y sus presentaciones en la cultura popular tras la introducción de la guerra en el centro de la promesa moderna del progreso. (shrink)

Se analizará la manera en que la influencia teórica de las ciencias biológicas y médicas sobre la noción de “vida” imponen una transformación de las construcciones políticas, ideológicas y legales de un Estado que puede ser descrito como biopolítico. Para esto, se acudirá al análisis de la transformación de la idea operativa de “vida” desde la perspectiva agambiana de la politización de la muerte y la pretensión de disolver el umbral de decidibilidad entre vida y muerte para tomar, luego, tres (...) ejemplos de instancias legales en las que puede terminarse con la vida sin contradecir el propósito biopolítico de protegerla; esto es, instancias en las cuales no existe penalización ante la finalización de la vida. Estos tres ejemplos, que se presentarán de manera progresiva son: a) la eutanasia, b) el aborto y c) la contracepción. Es importante aclarar que no se pretende defender ni condenar en un plano moral las instancias de decisión sobre la disposición de una vida distinta de la propia, ni tampoco dar argumentos para que algo así se haga. Por el contrario, lo que aquí se pretende es aportar una dimensión explicativa –y analítica– desde el marco de la biopolítica, siguiendo, quizá, la sugerencia agambiana respecto de la necesidad de adoptar una perspectiva de este tipo para poder tener una comprensión adecuada de ciertos fenómenos políticos. (shrink)

Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception (...) and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe two emerging defenses of high-level perception, one of which appeals to a certain class of perceptual deficits and one of which appeals to adaptation effects. I sketch a challenge for the latter approach. (shrink)

Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, that is, it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge (...) are not safe, that is, it is not the case that in all or nearly all near worlds where the relevant claim is believed true, that claim is in fact true. Thus, certain instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge refute both the view that knowledge is necessarily sensitive and the view that knowledge is necessarily safe. (shrink)

I argue that we sometimes visually perceive the intentions of others. Just as we can see something as blue or as moving to the left, so too can we see someone as intending to evade detection or as aiming to traverse a physical obstacle. I consider the typical subject presented with the Heider and Simmel movie, a widely studied ‘animacy’ stimulus, and I argue that this subject mentally attributes proximal intentions to some of the objects in the movie. I further (...) argue that these attributions are unrevisable in a certain sense and that this result can be used to as part of an argument that these attributions are not post-perceptual thoughts. Finally, I suggest that if these attributions are visual experiences, and more particularly visual illusions, their unrevisability can be satisfyingly explained, by appealing to the mechanisms which underlie visual illusions more generally. (shrink)