The book presents the first comprehensive survey of limits of the intentional control of action from an interdisciplinary perspective. It brings together leading scholars from philosophy, psychology, and the law to elucidate this theoretically and practically important topic from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary approaches. It provides reflections on conceptual foundations as well as a wealth of empirical data and will be a valuable resource for students and researchers alike. Among the authors: Clancy Blair, Todd S. Braver, Michael W. (...) Cole, Anika Fäsche, Maayan Davidov, Peter Gollwitzer, Kai Robin Grzyb, Tobias Heikamp, Gabriele Oettingen, Rachel McKinnon, Nachschon Meiran, Hans Christian Röhl, Michael Schmitz, John R. Searle, Gottfried Seebaß, Gisela Trommsdorff, Felix Thiede, J. Lukas Thürmer, Frank Wieber. (shrink)

This chapter takes up the classical problem of freewilI, arguing that its traditional understanding remains virulent up to the present and has been unduly declared obsolete by mainstream philosophy. The established division into "compatibilism" and "incompatibiIism" is rejected as misleading. However, after a brief clarification of the relevant notions of 'will' and 'freedom', drawing on the author's extended earlier research, it is argued in detail that it is not possible to meet the two central criteria of 'willing freely' if one (...) subscribes to determinism. First, one cannot specify any relevant notion of practical possibility. Second, unless one accepts strong metaphysical premises, one cannot rely, alternatively, on the criterion of processes of forming the will being "essential" (in some relevant sense) to the person in question. Still it is not necessary to dismiss 'freewill', as the conception of volitional states or processes as indetermined in part is ruled out neither by an unprejudiced scientific view of the world nor by the bad old argument from "blind chance". (shrink)

Can the risks of the scientific technical world be sufficiently delimited in a normative sense? The answer provided by this article is yes, assuming that the potentials of negligence liability are clarified and its principles consistently applied. An outline of the basic conditions for this endeavor proceeds from the distinctions drawn by the Analytical Theory of Action. "Negligence" is defined as taking risks beyond normative limits. It is treated on this basis as the generic concept for "intention". A normative theoretical (...) justification of "required care" is proffered. The care required is limited, however, on the one hand by its tie to the norm addressee's practical ability. On the other, it is elevated by the consistent, non-random designation of norms on risk-taking and by the systematic inclusion of the ability to have been addressed normatively at an earlier point in time. The question as to whether one can locate responsibility sometime prior to the harm accidentally caused will be discussed and affirmed. Lassen sich die Gefährdungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt normativ hinreichend eingrenzen? Die Antwort des Artikels ist ja, vorausgesetzt, daß die Ressourcen der Fahrlässigkeitshaftung präzisiert und konsequent angewandt werden. Ausgehend von Unterscheidungen der Analytischen Handlungstheorie werden die Rahmenbedingungen dafür umrissen. "Fahrlässigkeit" wird als Überschreitung normierter Risikogrenzen definiert und auf dieser Basis als Gattungsbegriff der "Vorsätzlichkeit" behandelt. Die Rede von der "gebotenen Sorgfalt" wird normentheoretisch gerechtfertigt. Sie wird jedoch einerseits eingeschränkt durch die Bindung ans praktische Können der Gebotsadressaten. Andererseits wird sie verschärft durch die konsequente, nicht zufallsabhängige Normierung von Risikozuständen, sowie durch die systematische Einbeziehung der normativen Ansprechbarkeit zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt. Die Frage der Möglichkeit einer "Vorverlegung" der Verantwortlichkeit wird aufgegriffen und affirmativ beantwortet. (shrink)

The present article attempts to investigate the 'philosophical foundations' of psychology and thereby of the social sciences in general with regard to a central problem, viz. the question of the 'inner'. It does this with special critical reference to an authoritative psychological theory, viz. the so-called 'mediation theory', and tries to show the necessity of interdisciplinary clarification. In the first part mediation theory was introduced as a variant of psychological behaviorism which attempts to substitute for the untenable total neglect of (...) 'inner' events a way of talking about them which is secured methodologically and retains a behavioral foundation. Of the three crucial questions raised by the project the second, viz. question, which concerns the theoretical status of the assumed inner mediators could be answered to the effect that they must be "hypothetical constructs" having the nature of real, phenomenally verifiable events, if, indeed, they are to figure as links in S-R-chains. Conceiving of them as "intervening variables", such a conception would exclude this function. The discussion of 'internalization' of behavior sequences as assumed by mediation theory has led to the conclusion that the relevant phenomena cannot, in this case, justify the necessity of a non-dispositional explanation which goes beyond 'external' performances ). Likewise the subject matter of question remained undecided; that is, the possibilities of phenomenally verifying the assumed 'inner' mediation processes which are only asserted to exist by the theory but are unspecified in content. Therefore, the observable performances in the case of sequential behaviour do not support the mediation theoretic solution of the problem of the 'inner'. (shrink)

Das Willensfreiheitsproblem, zumal als Problem von Willensfreiheit und Determinismus, ist eines der großen Rätsel der Menschheit, das allen Versuchen zu trotzen scheint, es rational zu lösen. Kritiker haben deshalb vermutet, die Frage selbst könne falsch gestellt oder von überholten Voraussetzungen abhängig sein. Dem tritt der vorliegende Band profund entgegen, systematisch wie geistesgeschichtlich. Er legt eingehend dar, inwiefern Willensfreiheit, verstanden als Freiheit der Willensbildung, von zwar begrenzter, aber zentraler und keineswegs nur kontextrelativer Bedeutung für das Selbstverständnis von Menschen als aktive Wesen (...) ist, die verantwortlich und normenorientiert handeln können. Zugleich werden die formalen Bedingungen für eine erfolgversprechende Neuaufnahme des alten Rätsels herausgearbeitet. (shrink)