The classical view of the relationship between necessity and apriority, defended by Leibniz and Kant, is that all necessary truths are known a priori. The classical view is now almost universally rejected, ever since Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam discovered that there are necessary truths that are known only a posteriori. However, in recent years a new debate has emerged over the epistemology of these necessary a posteriori truths. According to one view – call it the neo-classical view – knowledge (...) of a necessary truth always depends on at least one item of a priori knowledge. According to the rival view – call it the neoempiricist view – our knowledge of necessity is sometimes broadly empirical. In this paper I present and defend an argument against the neo-empiricist view. I argue that knowledge of the necessity of a necessary truth could not be broadly empirical. (shrink)

In recent decades, economists have played an active role in shaping public policy by publicly recommending the adoption of certain policies. These recommendations are often based on normative assumptions that are not the product of economic analysis; nor are they shared by the laypeople to whom these recommendations are made. Inducing people to adopt public policies for reasons that are neither the product of expertise, nor shared by the people, is a form of manipulation that violates the ideals of a (...) liberal democratic society. Thus, the economists’ recommendations constitute an abuse of their expertise. (shrink)

Of course, as scholars have long known, this example has serious limitations. For one thing, a substantial form, as the scholastics understood it, is much more dynamic than a mere shape. For example, the substantial form of an oak tree somehow explains how and why an oak tree can do everything that it does. So the substantial form of an oak tree could not be something as simple or crude as its shape. Nevertheless, the example of the bronze statue does (...) have the virtue of illustrating one of the chief advantages of hylomorphism as a philosophy of the human person. Although we can talk about the bronze and the shape of the statue, respectively, it still seems correct to say that the statue is exactly one thing, not two things. Likewise, although we can talk about the matter and the form of a human being, the hylomorphist insists that a human being is exactly one thing, not two things accidentally conjoined. (shrink)

According to Eric Mack, the Wilt Chamberlain Argument makes two distinct points against all patterned and end-state theories of justice. First, the pattern theorist cannot explain how innocuous actions can give rise to an injustice. Second, the enforcement of a pattern theory requires constant redistribution of holdings, and that prevents people from forming legitimate expectations about their future holdings. This paper responds to both of these points. Mack’s first point denies or disregards the relevance of harmful consequences to the justice (...) or injustice of a distribution. The second point is based on a requirement that is either too demanding to be plausible, or too permissive to undermine pattern theories. The failure of Mack’s arguments illustrates the difficulty of resolving substantive political debates with a priori arguments alone. When faced with objections, the only possible defense of the Wilt Chamberlain argument resorts to empirical claims, which stand in need of empirical evidence. (shrink)

Christian orthodoxy essentially involves the acceptance of the New Testament as authoritative in matters of faith and conduct. However, the New Testament instructs slaves and women to accept a subordinate status that denies their equality with other human beings. To accept such a status is to have the vice of servility, which involves denying the equality of all human beings. Therefore the New Testament asserts that slaves and women should deny their equality with other human beings. This is false. Moreover, (...) these same passages in the New Testament implicitly assert that slavery and the subordination of women are morally permissible. This isalso false. Therefore orthodox Christianity is false. (shrink)

Christopher Hill and Joseph Levine have argued that the conceivabilities involved in anti-materialist arguments are defeated as evidence of possibility. Their strategy assumes the following principle: the conceivability of a state of affairs S constitutes evidence for the possibility of S only if the possibility of S is the best explanation of the conceivability of S. So if there is a better explanation of the conceivability of S than its possibility, then the conceivability of S is thereby defeated as evidence (...) of possibility. Hill and Levine proceed to offer alternative explanations of these conceivabilities, concluding that these conceivabilities are thereby defeated as evidence. However, this strategy fails because their explanations generalize to all conceivability judgments concerning phenomenal states. Consequently, one could defend absolutely any theory of phenomenal states against conceivability arguments in just this way. This result conflicts with too many of our common sense beliefs about the evidential value of conceivability with respect to phenomenal states. The general moral is that the application of such principles of explanatory defeat is neither simple nor straightforward. (shrink)

In a recent address to the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Alfred Freddoso has claimed that dualism is both religiously and morally pernicious. He contends that dualism runs afoul of the Catholic teaching that the soul is the form of the body, and that dualism leaves the body with nothing more than instrumental moral worth. On the contrary, I argue that dualism per se is neither religiously nor morally pernicious. Dualism is compatible with a rich teleology of embodiment that will underwrite (...) all of the same moral insights about the body that traditional hylomorphism supports. (shrink)

In this paper we set out a view on which internalist proper basicality is secured by sensory experience.

Book reviewed in this article:M DePaul (ed), Resurrecting Old–Fashioned Foundationalism.

Trenton Merricks argues that we need propositions to serve as the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments (Merricks 2015). A modally valid argument is an argument in which, necessarily, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is also true. According to Mer- ricks, the premises and conclusions of modally valid arguments have their truth conditions essentially, and they exist necessarily. Sentences do not satisfy these conditions. Thus, we need propositions. Merricks’ argument adds a new chapter to the longstanding (...) debate over the exis- tence of propositions. However, I argue that Merricks’ argument does not quite succeed. Merricks has overlooked one viable alternative to pos- tulating propositions. However, this alternative employs the relation of being true-at-a-world, which is difficult to analyze. Thus, the soundness of Merricks’ argument ultimately depends on the comparative merits of accepting propositions as abstract entities, versus accepting truth-at-a- world as an unanalyzed relation between sentences and possible worlds. (shrink)

_How Do You Know?_ explores problems of knowledge that arise in everyday life. If you are not an expert, how can you know that another person is an expert? If experts are politically biased should you still trust them? More generally, how should you approach the testimony of other people: treat it all as "innocent until proven guilty," or is that too simple? Does the internet make us better knowers, or is it just a minefield of misinformation? Is it always (...) irrational to believe a conspiracy theory? Suppose someone just as intelligent and well-informed as you are disagrees with you about something, how should that affect your belief? Can we have knowledge of what is right and wrong? _How Do You Know?_ approaches these issues through the lens of social epistemology and via the preeminently social genre of philosophical dialogue. Its characters think and speak like real people in the world today, discussing and debating issues that are current, practically relevant, and even controversial—while equipping readers with tools and concepts to see more clearly for themselves. (shrink)

Evidentialism about belief in God is the proposition that a person is justified in believing in God only if she has evidence for her belief. Alvin Plantinga has long argued that there is no good argument for evidentialism about belief in God. However, it does not follow that such evidentialism is unjustified, since it could be properly basic. In fact, there is no good argument against the proper basicality of evidentialism about belief in God. So an evidentialist about belief in (...) God can accept it as properly basic. (shrink)

The subject of this dissertation is the entitlement to modal beliefs, such as the belief that a proposition is necessarily true, or the belief that a proposition is possibly true. My thesis is that the entitlement to modal beliefs has two dimensions, one active and one passive. In the active dimension, someone is entitled to a modal belief just in case he has conducted the appropriate thought experiments. In the passive dimension, someone is entitled to a modal belief just in (...) case the belief fits his evidence, which is constituted by the conceivability or inconceivability of the proposition in question. Thus, my principal contention is that conducting thought experiments, and taking conceivability as evidence of possibility, is both necessary and sufficient for entitled modal belief. Insofar as these methods are a priori, this implies that our entitlement to our modal beliefs is always partially a priori. ;I begin by clarifying the fundamental concepts of entitlement, modality, and apriority. Then I proceed to state and defend a two-dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori. According to such an account, our entitlement to every necessary a posteriori truth is achieved by an a priori deduction from two or more claims, at least one of which is a priori. The a priori dimension of this entitlement involves the very same methods and sources of entitlement as other modal beliefs---thought experiments and states of conceivability or inconceivability. I go on to defend thought experiments and conceivability against skeptical attacks. Much of the criticism of thought experiments turns on a refusal to countenance the relevant sort of modality. However, I defend this sort of modality in an opening chapter of the dissertation. Much skepticism about the epistemic value of conceivability is founded on an illicit demand for a noncircular demonstration of its reliability. However, if universally accepted, this demand would undercut the evidence of the senses as well. Other objections to conceivability are also considered and found wanting. In conclusion, I argue against conventionalism about modality, and defend a form of rationalism in modal epistemology. (shrink)

The first horn of the Responsibilism Dilemma turns on the fact that the concept of responsibility is neutral between positive appraisal and negative appraisal. To say that someone is responsible is not ipso facto to say whether she is praiseworthy or blameworthy. Being responsible for something is simply a matter of having the appropriate sort of control over it, regardless of whether that control is exercised well or badly. So responsibility is, at most, a necessary, but not a sufficient condition (...) for positive appraisal. Now, the concept of epistemic justification obviously entails a positive appraisal. So if responsibility, as such, is neutral between positive and negative appraisal, whereas epistemic justification entails a positive appraisal, then obviously there is a conceptual gap between mere responsibility and epistemic justification. It seems obvious to me that Hetherington is right about this. However, it seems just as obvious that it is innocuous to the responsibilist to concede that responsibility is only a necessary, and not a sufficient condition for justification. That is because responsibility, thus understood, is simply a matter of having control, regardless of whether that control is exercised well or badly. Only control that is exercised properly could be sufficient for a positive epistemic status. All of this seems rather mundane. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in property dualism—the view that some mental properties are neither identical with, nor strongly supervenient on, physical properties. One of the principal objections to this view is that, according to natural science, the physical world is a causally closed system. So if mental properties are really distinct from physical properties, then it would seem that mental properties never really cause anything that happens in the physical world. Thus, dualism threatens to (...) lead inexorably to epiphenomenalism. In this paper, I will argue that the only way for a property dualist to avoid epiphenomenalism is to deny that the human body is strictly identical with the sum of its microphysical parts. I will go on to argue that the only way to sustain such anti-reductionism about the human body is to embrace some sort of substance-hylomorphism. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in property dualism—the view that some mental properties are neither identical with, nor strongly supervenient on, physical properties. One of the principal objections to this view is that, according to natural science, the physical world is a causally closed system. So if mental properties are really distinct from physical properties, then it would seem that mental properties never really cause anything that happens in the physical world. Thus, dualism threatens to (...) lead inexorably to epiphenomenalism. In this paper, I will argue that the only way for a property dualist to avoid epiphenomenalism is to deny that the human body is strictly identical with the sum of its microphysical parts. I will go on to argue that the only way to sustain such anti-reductionism about the human body is to embrace some sort of substance-hylomorphism. (shrink)

Knowledge can be transmitted by a valid deductive inference. If I know that p, and I know that if p then q, then I can infer that q, and I can thereby come to know that q. What feature of a valid deductive inference enables it to transmit knowledge? In some cases, it is a proof of validity that grounds the transmission of knowledge. If the subject can prove that her inference follows a valid rule, then her inference transmits knowledge. (...) However, this only pushes the question back to the inference that was made in this proof. What feature of that inference enables it to transmit knowledge? A vicious regress looms here. Every proof requires a valid inference, and every valid inference must follow at least one rule of inference. So every proof must follow at least one rule of inference. Therefore not every valid inference that transmits knowledge can acquire this power through a proof, on pain of vicious infinite regress. So it must be possible to transmit knowledge by making an inference that follows an underived rule. A deductive inference that follows an underived rule is what I will call a basic deductive inference. It must be possible to transmit knowledge by making a basic deductive inference. But how is this possible? What feature of a basic deductive inference gives it this power to transmit knowledge? (shrink)