This article examines the argument that biodiversity is crucial for well-functioning ecosystems and that such ecosystems provide important goods and services to our human societies, in short the ecosystem services argument (ESA). While the ESA can be a powerful argument for nature preservation, we argue that its dominant functionalist interpretation is confronted with three significant problems. First, the ESA seems unable to preserve the nature it claims to preserve. Second, the ESA cannot explain why those caring about nature want to (...) preserve it. Third, the ESA might undermine its own goal because it potentially decreases environmental motivations. (shrink)

In this paper, I reinterpret the conflict between rewilders and those who want to preserve traditional agricultural landscapes. By showing that underlying both positions is a common outlook in which nature preservation can be described as a primarily interpretative act geared towards the preservation of meaning by establishing a successful contact with external reality, I hope to refocus the debate away from the current stalemate. Too often, the debate ends in a dispute about what counts as 'real nature'. By interpreting (...) nature preservation - whether it is directed at rewilding or at preserving old agricultural landscapes - as an act that is a response to nature's meanings, we will refocus attention on the real issue underlying preservation: articulating the ways nature is meaningful to us. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically assess the position the Dutch environmental- philosopher Martin Drenthen develops on the philosophical import of the “wilderness-concept,” especially with regards to the practical implications he draws from it for nature-preservation-practices.By situating Drenthen’s work in the context of the Dutch debate on which kind of nature should serve as the basis for Dutch preservationist policies, I typify Drenthen’s position as inhering in the tension between an “engaged” environmental philosophy that tries to give a substantive account of (...) nature and a “meta” position that tries to criticize all substantive positions taken up within the debate.I show how by interpreting nature as “non-appropriable alterity” Drenthen succeeds in holding on to that tension, and how this nature-concept translates to the debate on preservationist strategies. By doing so, I grant Drenthen that his nature-concept has considerable merit in critiquing certain self-defeating forms of preservationist strategies.Next, I argue that by interpreting nature as “non-appropriable alterity,” Drenthen’s analysis can however be read as a plea for getting rid of historically grown intuitions surrounding nature-preservation, but that without such intuitions we cannot have a meaningful debate on which nature-preservation-measures are preferable over others. I then establish that many of our intuitions are derived from what is commonly known as the “Arcadian” tradition and that, although this tradition does seem to put forward a highly “external” nature concept, it can be seen as a starting-point for a “conversation process” with nature itself.My concluding claim is that an Arcadian tradition made flexible through such a “conversation process” does give us criteria for evaluating conservation practices, without the latter being reduced to simply projecting cultural idiosyncrasies upon nature, while the ultimate consequence of the Drenthian position is a situation in which everything is of equal value, whereby we loose all bearing when evaluating which conservation-practices are valuable and which not. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the possibility of a rich account of ecological restoration. Starting from the apparent one-sided focus on science and technology within the nature conservation community in Flanders, Belgium, I first present an intuitive case against a restorative practice solely based on science and technology. I then argue that what constitutes good restorative practice must be informed by the historical Arcadian tradition in which nature appreciation and subsequent conservation in the West have taken shape. However, the way (...) in which nature is perceived through that tradition seems highly external and stylized, and thus the question can be raised whether restorative practices based on this tradition can do nature itself any justice. Following the lead of Dutch sociologist Kris van Koppen, I argue that it can when the tradition is made flexible through a “conversation process” with nature. Such a conversation process can beachieved by engaging people in a sensual and bodily way in the restoration process. The result is that the richer account of the restorative practice contributes to the constitution of meaningful places that resist easy manipulation through science and technology. (shrink)

According to Michael Soulé, the debate over whether we should or should not actively manage our nature preserves has driven a deep wedge between “wilderness purists,” who advocate a hands-off approach to nature, and “nature managers,” who want to give nature a helping hand whenever the “fullness of the biota” is under threat. Although both camps share the same formal goal, i.e., preserving “authentic nature,” managers and purists have differing views about what the “authenticity of nature” stands for. By introducing (...) a third way of conceptualizing the authenticity of nature that holds the middle-ground between the authenticity of the purists and the managers—namely, natural areas as authentic relics—a bridge can be found between the two positions. As in the case of heath restorations in Flanders, Belgium, the theory of relics can provide an alternative way in which the concept of authenticity is used when evaluating preservation or restoration projects. Moreover, the conception of natural areas as relics is already tacitly at work within certain preservation and/or restoration practices. A comparison of the theory of relics with Robert Elliot’s anti-restoration thesis as put forward in Faking Nature shows that the theory of relics can, to a large degree, save Elliot’s anti-restorationist’s stance in a world that is waking up to the reality of the “end of nature,” while at the same time softening the rigid rejection of all restorative practices implied in the anti-restoration thesis. (shrink)