Die Autorin zeigt, wie Klemens von Alexandria durch die heilsgeschichtliche Interpretation des Zeitbegriffs die antike Dialektik rezipiert, und wie er zur Konkretisierung einer ontotheologischen Dialektik im Sinne seiner christlichen Philosophie gelangt.

‘Neokantianism and Platonism’ indicates an important issue of Neo-Hellenic Philosophy during the 1920s and the 1930s. The protagonist was Johannes Theodorakopoulos. His Heidelberg dissertation Platons Dialektik des Seins (1927) follows the Neokantian theories of judgement (of Emil Lask and Heinrich Rickert) and explores Plato’s theory of judgement with emphasis on Philebos’ categories of peras and apeiron. Theodorakopoulos’ prolegomena to the Greek translation (1929) of Paul Natorp’s Platos Ideenlehre are relevant here. Nevertheless, Theodorakopoulos developed a personal interpretation of Plato’s philosophy and (...) almost demoted the Neokantian interpretation, as is clear in his Introduction to Plato (1941, in Greek) as also in his Heidelberg Vorlesungen 1969 entitled Die Hauptprobleme der Platonischen Philosophie. Besides, other interpretations of Plato came forward. Evangelos Papanoutsos wrote his Tübingen dissertation Das religiöse Erlebnis bei Platon (1926) under the supervision of Adickes. Konstantinos Georgoules, an earlier student of Husserl and Heidegger, published a translation of Plato’s Politeia (1939, in Greek) with a rather philological introduction.The Marxist Demetres Glenos, an opponent of Neokantianism, proposed a realistic interpretation of Plato’s Sophistes (1939, in Greek). Basileios Tatakes (an adherent of Henri Bergson) presented Plato’s philosophy as a reconciliation of reason and mysticism. (shrink)

The hermeneutic anthropology of human rights is a possible anthropology before human rights. It does not aim at a deductive demonstration of the validity of human rights, but it delivers a hermeneutic justification of them by taking into account the a priori link of self-understanding with living body. Three aspects are most relevant in this case: a) The human person not only exists, but also has a value which is recognized within the shared world of persons. The embodied presence of (...) persons is affirmed beyond pure facticity through the meta-grammatical terms " I ", "you" and "we". This mutual affirmation as an act of freedom indicates the primordial value of dignity, b) The human person has to arrange its uncertainty as a living being. It has to prevail over nature, in order to create an order of life. This consciousness of being able to act is the source of power. Nevertheless, power is produced as a kind of surplus through social interaction. The tension between power and recognition is always renewed and remains an open question for society, c) Human rights introduce moral demands on power. They define the political order of the society in such a way that the citizens can carry out their plan of life. Furthermore, they preserve the awareness of the limits, since human dignity indicates that the embodied presence of the human person and its world-character should not be defined apart from freedom and recognition. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology, as Helmuth Plessner has explored it, vindicates its relative priority towards ethics, because it can set out the anthropological prerequisites for considering the moral subject as the embodied person. This claim, however, is still an open question. Walter Schulz has argued that the prevalence of science in contemporary life brings ethics to the fore and forces philosophical anthropology to an auxiliary exploration of ‘leading figures of thehuman’. Jürgen Habermas endorses Plessner’s exploration of the issue of the body, in (...) order to oppose biotechnological naturalism. Thus, he enlarges his discourse on ethics through the ethics of the human species by defining the moral agent as the embodied person. Nevertheless, philosophical anthropology is a broader theoretical endeavour that cannot be reduced to ethics. (shrink)