Peter Strawson makes a crucial distinction between reactive attitudes and the objective attitude. Reactive attitudes such as gratefulness, anger and indignation imply that we take each other seriously as responsible agents. The objective attitude implies that we stop taking each other seriously. Strawson argues that the objective attitude is not merely psychologically difficult: it is inconceivable that we would systematically refrain from taking each other seriously and stop discussing with each other or blaming ourselves or others. Strawson, however, only discusses (...) the reactive attitudes from a general point of view. In this paper, we argue that the reactive attitudes of remorse and moral indignation are forms of ”symbolic restoration’. Retributive punishment should also be interpreted from this perspective. Consequently, our concern with moral blame cannot be understood independently from a concern with the harm that has occurred. Our attitude to the outcome determines our attitude to the agent. The concern with the mental state is secondary: it is structured by its place within the practice of symbolic restoration. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to introduce a complexity in the debate on the meaning of religion today. This complexity relates to the tension between an internal and an external perspective on religion. I will try to show how the disagreement between some protagonists in the debate and also the difficulties these protagonists face can be clarified by taking into account the difference between both perspectives. In the first part I discuss Marcel Gauchet’s view on the meaning of religion (...) today. In the second part I confront Gauchet with an ambiguity in his definition of religion. This ambiguity can also be found in Gauchet’s discussion with Luc Ferry, although neither Gauchet nor Ferry are capable of adequately dealing with the problem. This is because both authors are bound to an external perspective on religion, which doesn’t allow them to distinguish its specific content from other forms of meaningfulness. This is why we will concentrate in the third part on Taylor’s internal approach to religion. However, in the fourth part, we will demonstrate how such an approach is in tension with the normative ambitions Taylor seems to cherish. (shrink)