ObjectiveWe conducted the following cross-sectional study to comprehensively assess the anxiety among Chinese international students who studied online during the COVID-19 pandemic and its influencing factors.MethodsQuestionnaires were distributed through “Sojump,” and a total of 1,090 valid questionnaires were collected. The questionnaire was divided into two parts: general situation and anxiety assessment of students. The former used a self-made questionnaire, and the international general GAD-7 scale was used to measure anxiety. Chi-square test was used to analyze the differences between groups, and (...) logistic regression analysis was performed for the factors with differences.ResultsAnxiety was found in 707 of 1,090 international students. Chi-square test and multivariate Logistic regression analysis showed that the incidence of anxiety was higher in the group under 22 years of age than in the group over 22 years of age ; International students living in big cities had a higher incidence of anxiety than those living in rural areas ; international students who socialized 3 times or less monthly had a higher incidence of anxiety than those who socialized more than 3 times per month ; international students who expected purely online teaching had a higher incidence of anxiety than those who expected purely offline teaching or dual-track teaching ; international students with a subjective score of online learning experience of 6 or less had a higher incidence of anxiety than those with subjective scores of more than 6. However, gender, emotional status, BMI, major of study, vaccination status, and degree type had no significant difference in the incidence of anxiety among international students who studied online during the COVID-19 pandemic.ConclusionDuring COVID-19, international students who were younger, came from big cities, had low social frequency, expected purely online teaching, and had poor experience of online classes were risk factors for anxiety during online classes. (shrink)

本文全文包括导言、正文、结束语三个部分,其中正文又是由“法与理性”、“法与实践理性”、“法律实践中的理性”三个部分组成。.

本书收胡适的《一念》之诗引发奇想,进入时间遂道,直面当今公众,与中外哲人对话。书中融记叙、议论、描写于一体,图文并茂,实中领略到深刻的人生哲理。.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophical Enactment and Bodily Cultivation in Early Daoism: In the Matrix of the Daodejing by Thomas MichaelJing Tan (bio) and Xiangfei Bao (bio)Philosophical Enactment and Bodily Cultivation in Early Daoism: In the Matrix of the Daodejing. By Thomas Michael. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022. Pp. x + 278. Hardcover $115.00, isbn 978-1-3502-3665-3. Thomas Michael's Philosophical Enactment and Bodily Cultivation in Early Daoism: In the Matrix of the Daodejing (hereafter (...) Philosophical Enactment) brings forward new perspectives and pathways to one of the most important topics concerning the reconstruction of early Daoist history. The author has contributed two other original and insightful monographs to the study of Daoism, including In the Shadows of the Dao: Laozi, the Sage, and the Daodejing (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015) and The Pristine Dao: Metaphysics in Early Daoist Discourse (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005). Together with his newly published research article "The Original Text of the Daodejing: Disentangling Versions and Recensions" (Religions 13, No. 4, (2022): 325), Michael has displayed his erudition and expertise in the study of early Chinese religion and philosophy in both a sinological and philosophical way. His Philosophical Enactment sheds new light on the history of early Daoism. Writing the history of early Daoism is not easy, as Daoism is not ready-made and has no clear boundaries. The difficulty lies not only in its entanglement with, for instance, Confucianism and Legalism, but also in when Daoism began and how it transformed. Narrating the origin and the vicissitude of Daoism requires a prescribed narrative logic or a choice of philosophical paradigm. Piling up materials is not history writing. A typical pattern in writing the history of early Daoism is distinguishing the Daoist school of philosophy (daojia 道家) from Daoist religion (daojiao 道教).1 Indeed, this distinction brings much convenience to the history writing of Daoism and has been adopted by many scholars. Though some do not explicitly state this distinction, the structure of their writings indicates it.2 The distinction between daojia and daojiao was recognized by scholars long before Fung Yu-Lan 馮友蘭 (1895-1900) published his A Brief History of Chinese Philosophy in 1948. [End Page 1] Xu Dishan 許地山 (1893-1941) believes that such a distinction can be traced back to the "Three Ranks" (sanpin shuo三品說) in Liu Xie's 劉勰 (ca. 465-532) "On Eliminating Doubts" (Miehuo lun滅惑論).3However, the received distinction between daojia and daojiao is a retrospective one. It is the product of modern discipline classification and is based on the modern understanding of philosophy and religion. Such a distinction must have been unknown to the people before and during the Han. This distinction may also cause difficulties, for instance, how to classify Ge Hong 葛洪 (283-343) and his works. Wang Ka 王卡 (1956-2017) categorized Ge Hong as a Daoist philosopher,4 while Tang Yijie 湯一介 (1927-2014) assigns Ge Hong to Daoist religion. Tang even asserts that Ge Hong established a theoretical system for Daoist religion. 5 The practice of distinguishing and dichotomizing the Daoist school of philosophy and Daoist religion has been opposed by many researchers. The French Sinologist Henri Maspéro (1883-1945) argues that daojia and daojiao are not so distinct as is often received; they both belong to the same ancient tradition. Maspéro's opposition to the dichotomy was also supported by Joseph Needham (1900-1995), Kristof Schipper (1934-2021), and others.6Although many scholars find it difficult to sharply separate the Daoist school of philosophy from Daoist religion,7 and also find it improper to dichotomize these two concepts, they still commonly accept the distinction and then trying to bridge the two. However, the dilemma faced by scholars compels us to wonder about the appropriateness of the philosophical paradigm dictating this distinction. In other words, do we have a more appropriate alternative? Thomas Michael's Philosophical Enactment provides us with a new perspective for reconsidering the problem of the relationship between the Daoist school of philosophy and Daoist religion, while also being an excellent example of the history writing of early Daoism. According to the general view, the Daodejing belongs to Daoist philosophy because it offers systematic... (shrink)

本书共分五个章节, 主要对宗白华美学研究方法与风格作了探讨和研究, 具体内容包括凸显中华美学传统个性的方式、梳理美学学科思想的方法、宗白华美学散步风格论等.

什麼是當代新知識？它是怎麼發現、怎麼建構的？ 每個人所具備的知識都受到當代時空環境的影響，並且由於人生經歷不同，每個人對於同樣的知識也會有不同理解，並進一步創造或發現可以面對時代問題的新知識。 再現對當代的想像？東埔社布農族獨創排球新規則告訴你！ 在東埔社人創造的排球新規則中，第一局發球方同時發兩個球，只有兩個球都贏時才算得分，雙方各贏一球不算得分。第二局雙方各發一球，同樣是兩球都贏時才算得分，否則不算得分。這兩局都贏就算贏，只有平手戰到第三局 時，才恢復平常大家所熟悉的規則來決勝負。 新規則的創造是用來再現他們對於當代的想像。他們常說，以前只要努力工作就能成功，就如同過去打排球只打一個球，只要專心打這個球便可。但當代則完全不同，一個人必須同時注意許多事情而無法專心，就像同時玩兩個排 球一樣。 在文學作品、日劇啟發下，試圖找尋有效再現當代的觀念與解釋方式 ◆大江健三郎在《燃燒的綠樹》中，描繪既沒有教義、又沒有儀式、只有個人的修煉及諸教合一、以及一旦擴大就沒落等當代新興宗教的新現象，讓人重新思考如何有效處理當代的「宗教」問題。 ◆村上龍的《希望之國》中，日本國中生在北海道創立「國中之國」，使人意識到民族國家已經過時、不再是理所當然的存在，因它是會破產的。 ◆日劇「電車男」反映了網路不僅是新自由主義化的前提，更提示我們當代的人群結合方式早已超越了過去社會科學所強調的血緣、地緣，乃至於志願性團體等原則。 ◆「我們的教科書」中被霸凌的國中女生，創造出過去的我、當下的我、未來的我三個自我，來解決被同學視為不存在的透明人而導致自殺的問題，呈現當代多重自我的普遍化趨勢。 本書中，作者嘗試以自身生命經驗的體悟為基礎、以種種日常為啟發，提示我們現在與過去如何的不同，期盼人們也能從生活中體會新時代的痕跡。先感知才能有突破，才能思考如何創造「新知識」來面對新時代的挑戰，以及解 答未來我們將何去何從？本書試圖提供您一個探索及思考的方向。 好評推薦：（按姓氏筆畫排） 丁仁傑 中央研究院民族學研究所研究員 王甫昌 中央研究院社會學研究所研究員 李丁讚 國立清華大學社會學研究所教授 林開世 國立臺灣大學人類學博物館館長 陳文德 中央研究院民族學研究所兼任副研究員 黃冠閔 中央研究院中國文哲研究所研究員 張正衡 國立臺灣大學人類學系副教授 張隆志 國立臺灣歷史博物館館長 蔡怡佳 輔仁大學宗教學系教授 鄭瑋寧 中央研究院民族學研究所副研究員.

本书探讨了元代儒学学派与诗文流派之间的互动关系。全书分为上下两编，上编为总论部分，对南宋金元时期学术变迁与派别分化、学术与诗文的联动、理学门派传承与诗文流派的生成加以宏观性论述；同时重点考察了许衡与元 代中州文派、刘因与元代北方文派、许谦与元代金华文派、李齐贤与元代高丽文派等的儒学承传和文学创作。下编为考证部分，汇辑了元代高丽士人李齐贤研究资料，并考撰了“元代中朝（韩）越日间文学活动编年”。.

本书主要内容包括:经典力学和经典物理学的神圣庙堂;不识庐山真面目,只缘身在些山中;把经典力学的基本概念从奥林帕斯山上拉下来;危机是革命的前夜;爱因斯坦开拓奇妙的新世界;历史是一面最好的镜子等.

This paper explores the ethical and conceptual implications of the findings from an empirical study (reported elsewhere) of decision-making capacity in anorexia nervosa. In the study, ten female patients aged thirteen to twenty-one years with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, and eight sets of parents, took part in semistructured interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to identify aspects of thinking that might be relevant to the issue of competence to refuse treatment. All the patient-participants were also tested using the (...) MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment test of competence. This is a formalized, structured, interviewer-administered test of competence, which is a widely accepted clinical tool for determining capacity. The young women also completed five brief, self-administered questionnaires to assess their levels of psychopathology. The issues identified from the interviews are described under two headings: difficulties with thought processing and changes in values. The results suggest that competence to refuse treatment may be compromised in people with anorexia nervosa in ways that are not captured by traditional legal approaches. (shrink)

What is social entrepreneurship? In, particular, what’s so social about it? Understanding what social entrepreneurship is enables researchers to study the phenomenon and policy-makers to design measures to encourage it. However, such an understanding is lacking partly because there is no universally accepted definition of entrepreneurship as yet. In this paper, we suggest a definition of social entrepreneurship that intuitively accords with what is generally accepted as entrepreneurship and that captures the way in which entrepreneurship may be altruistic. Based on (...) this we provide a taxonomy of social entrepreneurship and identify a number of real cases from Asia illustrating the different forms it could take. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decision-Making as a Broader ConceptJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)KeywordsCompetence, decision-making, capacity, anorexia nervosa, autonomy, values, identityWe thank Demian Whiting for the thoughtful critique of aspects of our paper (Tan et al. 2006a). A primary aim of our research was to provide empirical grounds on which to stimulate discussion about the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC). Whiting criticizes in particular the concept of (...) 'pathological values' that we suggested might be relevant in the assessment of DMC and in the related issue of deciding when a patient's refusal of beneficial treatment should be overridden.Whiting's central concern is with DMC. Whiting argues that the absence of pathological values should not be a criterion for DMC. We are unclear whether he is also arguing that pathological values do not provide a reason of any kind for overriding treatment refusal. At the end of the paper he writes: "we cannot justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values... on the grounds that these patients lack DMC" (2009, XX). This seems to leave open the possibility that we may be able to justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values on grounds other than that they lack DMC. As we wrote in our response to the discussants of our original paper, "The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests" (Tan et al. 2006b, 300).In deciding on whether to use compulsory treatment, there are other relevant factors that may need to be considered, such as the seriousness of the decision, which determines the threshold for competence. However, in this response we consider three issues. First, we argue that the current concept of DMC is by no means so clear cut or generally agreed upon as Whiting implies, and that some of the lack of clarity relates to pathological values. Second, that the concept of DMC is itself dependent on accounts of autonomy, and that it is plausible that pathological values can affect autonomy. Third, we directly consider the question of whether a coherent account of pathological values might be given based on a concept of authenticity.The Current Criteria for DMCWhiting argues that the current criteria for DMC are correct and that an additional criterion along the lines of absence of pathological values should not be added. This argument assumes that there is a clear and agreed understanding of the current criteria. We believe this is not the case for three reasons.(i) Whiting begins his account of DMC by saying that it is normally taken to include: "(1) [End Page 345] understanding (and appreciation)" (2009, 341). Already there is an area of dispute, and the use of parentheses reflects this. The concept of 'appreciation' was developed by Grisso and Applebaum (Grisso, Appelbaum, and Hill-Fotouhi 1997). It is not included in either English common law development, for example (ReC), nor in the criteria specified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. More important, Grisso and Appelbaum in their comment on our original paper (2006) argue that our work advances thinking about 'appreciation' rather than requiring that we add new elements. The implication is that they believe that what we have called pathological values are relevant to the assessment of capacity and are already included in an account of capacity that incorporates the criterion of 'appreciation.' In our response, we argued that pathological values are not entirely captured within the account of appreciation that Grisso and Appelbaum had previously given. We do not want to revisit that issue here, but the point of relevance is that on one view (that of Grisso and Appelbaum) pathological values are already included in the current criteria for DMC as part of the concept of appreciation, whereas on Whiting's view they are not.(ii) Even if there were agreement over the wording and concepts relevant to DMC there is a further important issue: how are those concepts... (shrink)

I argue that an account of national responsibility, as both collective and inheritable, that allows for making sense of holding nations responsible as an entity for past international injustices and to make reparations for these injustices is not at odds with the demands of global egalitarianism. A global distributive commitment does not deny this account of national responsibility; to the contrary, we can properly appreciate the scope of national responsibility only in light of what global justice truly demands. Thus while (...) I agree with David Miller that we can hold nations accountable for past international injustices, I do not agree with Miller that this is in tension with global egalitarianism. (shrink)

Liberal nationalism is a boundary‐making project, and a feature of this boundary‐making enterprise is the belief that the compatriots have a certain priority over strangers. For this reason it is often thought that liberal nationalism cannot be compatible with the demands of global egalitarianism. In this essay, I examine the sense in which liberal nationalism privileges compatriots, and I argue that, properly understood, the idea of partiality for compatriots in the context of liberal nationalism is not at odds with global (...) equal concern for all persons. In particular, I argue that the three central goals and aspirations of liberal nationalism—promoting individual autonomy and cultural identity, the realization of deliberative democracy, and the aspiration for social justice within the state—do not entail or require a form of compatriot partiality that is inconsistent with the demands of global egalitarian justice. (shrink)

In two recent papers, Mr Robert Young maintains that all attempts by philosophers to bolster the-violation-of-law concept of miracles are bound to fail and propounds what he claims to be a novel non-reductivist concept of miracles which avoids the conceptual difficulties of the violation-model. His view of miracles is of god being ‘an active agent-factor in the set of factors which actually was causally operative’ [p. 123] in an event dubbed a miracle. God is put in among ‘the plurality of (...) causes’ [p. 122, S p. 33] that could determine the event, but if he acts in a miracle, then ‘his presence…alters the outcome from what it would have been if, contrary to fact , he had not been present’ [p. 122]. Young claims that his concept ‘is neither a violation of … laws nor is it a coincidental occurrence religiously interpreted’ [p. 122, S p. 33], and so it avoids the difficulties, which he thinks are faced by the violation-model, of having an intelligible notion of an occurrence of the physically impossible, and also the reductivism inherent in taking mere coincidences as miracles. He also suggests a procedure of settling the epistemological issue regarding particular alleged miracles, an inquiry he thinks he has made possible by having first given a sense to miracles. [p. 126]. (shrink)

In the 1920s, John Dewey's followers in China, led by his student Hu Shih, attempted to put his pragmatism into practice in their quest for democracy. This essay compares Hu Shih's thought, especially his emphasis on pragmatism as method, with Dewey's philosophical positions and evaluates Hu's achievement as a pragmatist in the context of the tumultuous times he lived in. It assesses Hu's claim that the means to democracy lies in education rather than politics, since democracy as a way of (...) life requires a cultural renewal beyond institutional changes. It argues that a problem‐centered approach to social change does not preclude radical action, even revolution. But pragmatism is against gratuitous use of violence in the service of wholesale and abstract ideals advocated by various “isms.” While Hu's experiment of democracy in China is a significant episode in the history of pragmatism, its “failure” does not prove that there are inherent flaws in the pragmatist method, that pragmatism is unviable for China. The failure needs to be understood in the context of the pragmatist conception of experiment, in which failures are to be expected; what is important is to learn from them to achieve better results in the next stage of inquiry. Hu Shih's pragmatism contains lessons for pragmatists and for those interested in the continued quest for democracy in China—the experiment continues. (shrink)

THE ARTICLE ARGUES THAT RECENT ATTEMPTS, TO REFUTE THE NEO-HUMEAN CONTENTION 1. THAT MIRACLES CONSIDERED AS VIOLATIONS OF NATURAL LAWS ARE IN PRINCIPLE UNIDENTIFIABLE, AND 2. THAT IN ANY CASE CRITICAL HISTORY WOULD ALWAYS RULE AGAINST ACCEPTING PURPORTED EVIDENCES FOR MIRACLES, ARE UNSUCCESSFUL EVEN THOUGH SUGGESTIVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THEY EITHER EVADE THE ISSUE, OR FAIL TO FULLY COGNISE THE PURPORT OF THE CONTENTION. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT ONCE MIRACLES ARE CONSIDERED WITHIN THEIR RELIGIOUS CONTEXT, SITUATIONS COULD BE (...) ENVISAGED WHERE THE NEO-HUMEAN POSITION WOULD BE UNDULY SCEPTICAL. (shrink)

Developed here is a Confucian balance between two key democratic ideals, liberty and community, by focusing on the Confucian notion of li (ritual), which has often been considered hostile to liberty. By adopting a semiotic approach to li and relating it to recent studies of ritual in various Western disciplines, li's contribution to communication and its aesthetic dimension are explored to show how emphasizing harmony without sacrificing reflective experience and personal fulfillment renders li a concept of moral empowerment of free (...) individuals in community. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Studying Penguins to Understand BirdsJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), Ray Fitzpatrick (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)Keywordsanorexia nervosa, treatment decision-making, competence, valuesWe are grateful to Grisso, Appelbaum, Charland, and Vollmann for their thoughtful commentaries on our paper. We would like to respond by picking up on some of the points they make, although we do not address all the issues raised.Our general aims in the paper are (...) less immediately pragmatic than are the central concerns of Grisso and Appelbaum. Our interest is primarily in a number of ethical, and related conceptual, issues that arise from empirical data. In the long run, of course, we believe that these ethical and conceptual issues are important to the care of people with mental disorders, but our focus is philosophical.Our central interest is what justifies overriding treatment refusal. We are unhappy with a "status" approach according to which, for example, the mere fact that a person suffers a mental disorder provides grounds for overriding her wishes. Such an approach, it seems to us, fails to identify reasons, and discriminates against those with mental disorder, a view shared by the Law Commission (The Law Commission 1995). We are, on the other hand, attracted by the approach that grounds any overriding of treatment refusal on lack of capacity (or competence) to make treatment decisions. The concept of capacity has been well developed through legal cases and conceptual analysis, not least by Grisso and Appelbaum themselves. We were struck, however, first through clinical experience, and subsequently from the pilot study reported in our paper, that many patients with anorexia nervosa who refuse treatment do not necessarily lack capacity, using the current criteria, and yet show features or give reasons that raise serious doubts as to whether it is right to respect their refusal of treatment.To avoid reliance on a "status" approach, the issue with which we are grappling is whether the concept of capacity (and therefore lack of capacity) can be developed to encompass some of our findings, and whether it is ethically right to do so. Charland makes the important point that the concept of competence, or capacity, has both a descriptive and a prescriptive component. It is for this reason that the question of whether, for example, we should extend the criteria for capacity is part of the question of when it is morally right to override treatment refusal.Grisso and Appelbaum suggest that our work advances "our thinking about appreciation, rather than requiring that we add new elements" (2006, 297). From our perspective, and at this stage, it is a secondary issue whether we are suggesting a development of appreciation, or a new element (e.g., "pathological values"). The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in [End Page 299] such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests.We chose to study anorexia nervosa for various reasons, but we expect that the issues raised have a more general relevance (such as to substance abuse and impulse control disorders as Grisso and Appelbaum and Charland suggest). We do not expect the results to be relevant to all, or even most, mental disorders. Our main interest is not the specific management of people with anorexia, but how the data challenge, and help to develop, the concept of capacity, and the ethical analysis of overriding patient refusal of treatment. Our paper aims to address what we understand Charland to be referring to by the "pretheoretical desiderata" (2006, 283) of the concept of capacity. One reason why we chose anorexia as the focus of this work is because it is different from many mental disorders in the issues that it raises. In this it is, perhaps, rather like studying penguins to better understand the concept of bird just because penguins, although clearly birds, have unusual features.We agree, therefore, with Grisso and Appelbaum's caution that it would be unwise to jump in and change the MacCAT-T on the basis of the results... (shrink)

是東漢哲學家、思想家桓譚的主要論着，但早己亡佚。今存之輯本有《指海》內佚名氏輯本、清孫馮翼輯本、清嚴可均輯本、黃以周輯本，及近人朱謙之輯本，但均有不足。有鑒於此，吳則虞先生於1962年着有新輯本，收錄 二百餘條，以類相從，分為八卷，並添加附編，匯涵桓譚佚文、存疑、訂訛之文；記載桓譚事跡、著述、評論之文。 桓譚，后漢時人，官至給事中。博學多識，破讖緯迷妄，去虛妄偽飾，先於王充、張衡，具有唯物啟蒙學者之學識，是漢時哲學思想家。《新諭》是桓譚主要論着，但早已亡佚。據歷史記載，明有二卷本，清有孫之騌輯本，皆不 傳。另有《指海》內佚名氏輯本、清孫馮翼輯本、清嚴可均輯本、黃以周輯本及近人朱謙之輯本。從今日的學術、校勘、編排諸方面來看，諸本均有不足：或短椾零篇，漫無倫紀；或望文歸屬，強系篇名；或條目重復，內容雜陳 迭見；或引用刻本，多有遺漏；或雖沿用十七卷篇目之名稱，但其條目已不能再顯現原書各篇的思想內容。有鑒於此，吳則虞先生於一九六二年着有新輯本，收錄二百余條，以類相從，分為八卷，並添加附編，匯涵桓譚佚文、存 疑、訂訛之文；記載桓譚事跡、著述、評論之文；最后殿以輯校引用書目及版本之詳目，以便於讀者查閱與研究。此書成為目前桓譚《新論》集大成之著作。.

This essay argues two main points by analyzing Sengzhao’s contentions regarding several basic Buddhist concepts such as emptiness, being, and nonbeing. First, Sengzhao synthesizes Daoist methods of argumentation into his description of the middle path and other Buddhist concepts. Second, he revives Daoist concepts, giving them Buddhist meaning and expressing them in Buddhist terms. In the process, he consciously differentiates Madhyamika Buddhism from earlier Buddhism as understood from a Daoist perspective, such as the teachings of the School of Original Non-Being (...) and the School of No-Mind. However, because his understanding of the middle path is not sufficiently deep, he wavers between Buddhist and Daoist understandings of terms such as prajñā and nirvāṇa, rest and movement, and name and reality. Despite these inconsistencies, his discourse, as the first attempt to differentiate Madhyamika from Daoism, is still a milestone in the development of Chinese Buddhism and has exerted a far-reaching influence on later generations. (shrink)

Sometimes, scientific models are either intended to or plausibly interpreted as representing nonactual but possible targets. Call this “hypothetical modeling”. This paper raises two epistemological challenges concerning hypothetical modeling. To begin with, I observe that given common philosophical assumptions about the scope of objective possibility, hypothetical models are fallible with respect to what is objectively possible. There is thus a need to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate hypothetical modeling. The first epistemological challenge is that no account of the epistemology of (...) hypothetical models seems to cohere with the most characteristic function of scientific modeling in general, i.e., surrogative representation. The second epistemological challenge is a version of “reliability challenges” familiar from other areas. There is a challenge to explain how hypothetical models could be a reliable guide to what is possible, given that they are not and cannot be compared against their nonactual targets and updated accordingly. I close with some brief remarks on possible solutions to these challenges. (shrink)

Differences in guidance from various organisations is preventing uniform standards of practiceThe emphasis in medical law and ethics on protecting the patient’s right to choose is at an all time high. Apart from circumscribed situations, for instance where the Mental Health Act 19831 is applicable, the only justification for medically treating an adult patient against his or her wishes is on the basis of common law, using the principle of best interests, and only when he or she lacks capacity to (...) refuse treatment. As a result, it is important that clinicians should be able to assess capacity to refuse treatment. Given that judgements of incapacity involve deciding that a person does not have the ability to refuse treatment, a great deal of care needs to go into the assessment and characterisation of incapacity.There is divergence between the characterisation of capacity that is used by the courts and that which is recommended by the British Medical Association . The BMA usefully expands on the first element of capacity as set out in the standard legal definition of capacity in the Re C judgment2 but ignores the other two elements. By doing this, the BMA makes it unclear whether it is rejecting these as relevant to capacity; it also misses the opportunity to expand on these elements in a clinically useful way.We will begin with a description of the BMA’s advice3 and the standard English legal definition of capacity.2,4 Then we will show that there are important discrepancies between these two sources of advice. We think that the BMA ought to clarify its position on capacity in order to safeguard the interests of physicians, healthcare workers, and patients.THE RE C TESTMr C was a patient in a psychiatric secure hospital who had chronic paranoid schizophrenia with …. (shrink)