Cognitive Behavioral Therapy has become the dominant form of psychotherapy in North America. The CBT model is theoretically based on the idea that all external and internal stimuli are filtered through meaning-making, consciously accessible cognitive schemas. The goal of CBT is to identify dysfunctional or maladaptive thoughts and beliefs, and replace them with more adaptive cognitive interpretations. While CBT is clearly effective as a treatment, there is good reason to be skeptical that its efficacy is due to the causal mechanisms (...) posited by the CBT model. This paper will argue that the specific cognitive schemas posited by the CBT model likely do not play a direct role in the development or treatment of psychological illness. Cognitive schemas, as identified in CBT interventions, are likely to be the result of patient confabulation and epistemically under-supported practitioner-based identification. CBT interventions appear to impose coherence on patients’ psychological states, rather than identifying and modifying preexistent causally efficacious core beliefs. (shrink)

Several authors have recently argued that psychotherapy, as it is commonly practiced, is deceptive and undermines patients’ ability to give informed consent to treatment. This ‘deception’ claim is based on the findings that some, and possibly most, of the ameliorative effects in psychotherapeutic interventions are mediated by therapeutic common factors shared by successful treatments, rather than because of theory-specific techniques. These findings have led to claims that psychotherapy is, at least partly, likely a placebo, and that practitioners of psychotherapy have (...) a duty to ‘go open’ to patients about the role of common factors in therapy ; to not ‘go open’ is supposed to unjustly restrict patients’ autonomy. This paper makes two related arguments against the ‘go open’ claim. While therapies ought to provide patients with sufficient information to make informed treatment decisions, informed consent does not require that practitioners ‘go open’ about therapeutic common factors in psychotherapy, and clarity about the mechanisms of change in psychotherapy shows us that the common-factors findings are consistent with, rather than undermining of, the truth of many theory-specific forms of psychotherapy; psychotherapy, as it is commonly practiced, is not deceptive and is not a placebo. The call to ‘go open’ should be resisted and may have serious detrimental effects on patients via the dissemination of a false view about how therapy works. (shrink)

Psychotherapy is effective. Since the 1970’s, meta-analyses, and meta-analyses of meta-analyses, have consistently shown a significant effect size for psychotherapeutic interventions when compared to no treatment or placebo treatments. This effectiveness is normally taken as a sign of the scientific legitimization of clinical psychotherapy. A significant problem, however, is that most psychotherapies appear to be equally effective. This poses a problem for specific psychotherapies: they may work, but likely not for the reasons that ground their theoretical explanations for their effectiveness. (...) A prominent explanation for the findings of common efficacy in psychotherapy is to postulate that all successful therapies work by altering maladaptive meanings and providing patients with new, more adaptive meanings. This paper argues that the ‘meaning view’ of psychological change is likely mistaken; psychological problems are not normally problems of meaning nor are they directly ameliorated by changes in meaning. This paper then outlines a skill-based explanation for the findings of the common efficacy of psychotherapy. (shrink)

In ‘Psychotherapy, Placebos and Informed Consent’, I argued that the minimal standard for informed consent in psychotherapy requires that ‘patients understand that there is currently no consensus about the mechanisms of change in psychotherapy, and that the therapy on offer…is based on disputed theoretical foundations’, and that the dissemination of this information is compatible with the delivery of many theory-specific forms of psychotherapy (including cognitive behavioural therapy [CBT]). I also argued that the minimal requirements for informed consent do not include (...) information about the role of therapeutic common factors in healing (e.g., expectancy effects and therapist effects); practitioners may discuss the common factors with patients, but they are not part of the ‘core set’ of information necessary to obtain informed consent. In a recent reply, Charlotte Blease criticises these two arguments by claiming they are not supported by empirical findings about the therapeutic common factors. Blease’s response is based on serious misunderstandings of both CBT and what the common factor findings actually find. Nevertheless, addressing the reasons for these misunderstandings is instructive and gives us an opportunity to clarify what, exactly, needs to be explained to patients in order to obtain informed consent for psychotherapy. (shrink)

This paper presents a naturalist skill-based alternative to traditional function-based naturalist theories of mental health and disorder. According to the novel skill view outlined here, mental health is a skilled action of individuals, rather than a question of the functioning of mental mechanisms. Mental disorder is the failure or breakdown of this skill. This skill view of mental health is motivated by focusing on the process of mental healing. This paper argues that, when we start with a focus on how (...) and why individuals heal from mental disorders, we gain a better understanding of what mental health is: the exercise of self-regulatory metacognitive skill. (shrink)

There are at least three related issues that need to be resolved in this case: Who should be the patient’s medical decision-maker?, Should the patient be treated and possibly admitted?, and...