Der auBere AnlaB zur Niederschrift dieses Buches war ein Schreiben des Springer-Verlages, Berlin. Darin wurde die Bitte ausgesprochen, bisher lediglich in Vortragen und Aufsatzen veroffentlichte Gedanken tiber wirtschaftliches Konstruieren weiter auszubauen und in einem Buche zusammenfassend darzulegen. Zu jener Zeit aber - es war kurz nach Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkrieges - hatte ich mich innerlich be­ reits von Betrachtungen solcher Art losgelost. Es schien mir wichtiger und vor allem dringlicher, zunachst nach einer Sinngebung und tiber­ geordneten Zielsetzung fUr das technische (...) Schaffen zu suchen. Die Be­ miihungen, beiden Anliegen gerecht zu werden, fiihrten mich schlieB­ lich zu der Ueberzeugung, daB ein Buch, in dem die neuartige Kon­ struktionslehre in die groBen ethischen, wissenschaftlichen und wirt­ schaftlichenZusammenhange-eingeordnetist, einem allgemeinenBedtirfnis unserer Zeit entsprechen dfirfte. Und so ist aus dem doppelten Erleben der Technik als Mensch und als Ingenieur die Zweiteilung und in der Folge die gesamteDisposition diesesBuches entstanden, das in gewissem Sinne als Fortsetzung des Fachstudiums, zugleich aber auch als erste Einfiihrung in die mannigfachen Bezirke des wirklichen technischen Geschehens gedacht ist. Die Ausarbeitung hat sich, hauptsachlich bedingt durch die Kriegs-und Nachkriegsereignisse, tiber volle zwolf Jahre hin­ gezogen; doch hoffe ich, daB das unmittelbare Erleben dieser Zeit und die innere Auseinandersetzung mit ihren Problemen dem Buche irgendwie zugute gekommen sind. Ich habe vielen zu danken: Zunachst Herrn R. Bingel t, ehemaliger Vorsitzender des Vorstandes der Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG., Berlin, ffir seine Anteilnahme und verstandnisvolle Forderung; dann meinen nachsten Mitarbeitem, vor allem Herrn O. (shrink)

Examination of attempts at theory reduction shows that a process of cognitive emergence is involved in which concepts of S, Cs, emerge from T. This permits the ‘bridge laws’ to be stated. These are not in conflict with incommensurability of the Cs with the CT. Cognitive emergence may occur asymptotically or because of similarities of mathematical expressions; it is not necessarily holistic. Mereologically and nonmereologically related theory pairs are considered. Examples are chosen from physics. An important distinction is made between (...) ‘theory reduction’ and ‘reductive explanation’. (shrink)

This essay is a discussion of Eve-Marie Engels' view on Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). In the first part two of the main doctrines of EE are criticized: (1.) that validity of human knowledge is to be explained as the result of evolutionary adaptation; yet (2.), that human cognitive capacities had been adequate to our ancestors life conditions but fail in relevant situations of modern world. In the second part the concept of reality underlying EE's adaptational view is discussed and compared with (...) Jean Piaget's concept of reality. Finally, it is held that some of the questions recently raised by proponents of EE, far from being new, have been dealt with already in historical epistemology. (shrink)

This essay is a discussion of Eve-Marie Engels' view on Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). In the first part two of the main doctrines of EE are criticized: (1.) that validity of human knowledge is to be explained as the result of evolutionary adaptation; yet (2.), that human cognitive capacities had been adequate to our ancestors life conditions but fail in relevant situations of modern world. In the second part the concept of reality underlying EE's adaptational view is discussed and compared with (...) Jean Piaget's concept of reality. Finally, it is held that some of the questions recently raised by proponents of EE, far from being new, have been dealt with already in historical epistemology. (shrink)

This paper investigates the moral permissibility of torture. After briefly considering some empirical evidence, it discusses the conflict between deontological and consequentialist approaches to torture. It is argued that, even if we are to take rights seriously, torture should at least be allowed if some conditions are satisfied. Finally, the paper discusses what those conditions should be and what sorts of torture are morally permissible.

Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some moral properties of belief itself make a difference to epistemic rationality. To date, almost all proponents of radical moral encroachment hold to an asymmetry thesis: the moral encroaches on rational belief, but not on rational credence. In this paper, we argue against the asymmetry thesis; we show that, insofar as one accepts the most prominent arguments for radical moral encroachment on belief, one should likewise accept (...) radical moral encroachment on credence. We outline and reject potential attempts to establish a basis for asymmetry between the attitude types. Then, we explore the merits and demerits of the two available responses to our symmetry claim: (i) embracing moral encroachment on credence and (ii) denying moral encroachment on belief. (shrink)

Computer simulation is shown to be philosophically interesting because it introduces a qualitatively new methodology for theory construction in science different from the conventional two components of "theory" and "experiment and/or observation". This component is "experimentation with theoretical models." Two examples from the physical sciences are presented for the purpose of demonstration but it is claimed that the biological and social sciences permit similar theoretical model experiments. Furthermore, computer simulation permits theoretical models for the evolution of physical systems which use (...) cellular automata rather than differential equations as their syntax. The great advantages of the former are indicated. (shrink)

Este artigo discute um dos pontos fundamentais da Ética de Otíried Hifi: a questão da troca transcendental. O autor, após a reconstrução da argumentação de Höffe no tocante à fundamentação dos direitos humanos, procura relacionar essa questão com o debate sobre o comunitarismo. Sustenta a tese de que nem o liberalismo nem o comunitanismo servem de base para a fundamentação de tais direitos.

This chapter contains sections titled: References and Further Reading.

We have all become used to the rapid change around us, and with it, the shifting landscape of medical ethics. It appears, however, that the acceleration phase of change in biomedical sciences is only just beginning, and we need to be prepared for new challenges ahead. This issue of the journal considers several of them: in epigenome editing, 1 in bioprinting 2 and in cryonics. 3 With all of these developments, we need to be doing our ethical thinking proactively rather (...) than reactively; and we need to consider not only what we think the ethical problems might be but what frameworks we have for arguing how we should address them. There are several approaches that could be taken 4 each with their own advantages and limitations. The most fun—and the one we are perhaps best at—is to consider hypothetical scenarios, the ethical controversies associated with... (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

"Vortrag, gehalten auf der Vortragsveranstaltung der Nieders'achsischen Landesregierung am 15. Mai 1975.".

Theories of embodied cognition assume that concepts are grounded in non-linguistic, sensorimotor experience. In support of this assumption, previous studies have shown that upwards response movements are faster than downwards movements after participants have been presented with words whose referents are typically located in the upper vertical space. This is taken as evidence that processing these words reactivates sensorimotor experiential traces. This congruency effect was also found for novel words, after participants learned these words as labels for novel objects that (...) they encountered either in their upper or lower visual field. While this indicates that direct experience with a word's referent is sufficient to evoke said congruency effects, the present study investigates whether this direct experience is also a necessary condition. To this end, we conducted five experiments in which participants learned novel words from purely linguistic input: Novel words were presented in pairs with real up- or down-words ; they were presented in natural sentences where they replaced these real words ; they were presented as new labels for these real words ; and they were presented as labels for novel combined concepts based on these real words. In all five experiments, we did not find any congruency effects elicited by the novel words; however, participants were always able to make correct explicit judgements about the vertical dimension associated to the novel words. These results suggest that direct experience is necessary for reactivating experiential traces, but this reactivation is not a necessary condition for understanding the corresponding aspects of word meaning. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introduction to higher-order metaphysics as well as to the contributions to this volume. We discuss five topics, corresponding to the five parts of this volume, and summarize the contributions to each part. First, we motivate the usefulness of higher-order quantification in metaphysics using a number of examples, and discuss the question of how such quantifiers should be interpreted. We provide a brief introduction to the most common forms of higher-order logics used in metaphysics, and indicate a (...) number of questions which can be raised in such systems using logical vocabulary alone. Using a further example, we return to applications of higher-order logics in metaphysics. We also mention key developments in the history of higher-order logic as it pertains to metaphysics. Finally, we mention certain arguments which have been raised against the use of higher-order logic, and some ways of responding to them. (shrink)

It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent (...) with the unity of nature in the sense of a substantive monism. (shrink)

This article points out, descriptive moral psychology of human behavior patterns in the handling, in fact, from the outset exceed the boundaries of philosophy, and Cole tried to resort to ethics Fort formalism in order to avoid this problem in practice, can not be established. • Henry Rachael is further motivation for ethical behavior and the psychological concept of Cole Castle together. Although this is certainly an important contribution to the Fort Cole, but Cole Fort critical reflection on the lack (...) of methodology adopted only; secondly that the ideology behind their psychological factors; finally made ​​sense to remedy in the treatment program: to give up on life and psychological describe their condition or results of work. Authors propose a new proposal of psychology, first identified the relationship between psychologists and their research object, this object is, as the subject of people; secondly, from the possibility of speech. Description, either by himself or a third person described in the description, will be replaced by speech interaction. Authors proposed the concept of an interactive framework of doctrine, in which Cole and Rachael • Fort Henry's theory of language games can get a different position. This article attempts to demonstrate that the descriptive psychology, in its treatment of ethical problems, seems to have transgressed the boundary line against philosophy. This problematic situation cannot be circumvented by resorting to an ethical formalism-as L. Kohlberg does in his research program. Rachael M. Henry pushes one step forward to tie the psychodynamic aspect of moral behavior with Kohlberg's concept. The present author, all in affirming the important contribution of Kohlberg to psychology, indicates the insufficiency of a mere reflection of methods in Kohlberg's works. Then he dissects the ideologemes behind Kohlberg's psychology. At last he suggests a therapeutic proposal: the demand for describing psychic life, its conditions or effects, shall be dropped. The author proposes instead a program of new psychology that derives first from the relation of psychologist to his object, the human as subject; and second, from the possibilities of speech in communicative interaction. Description, whether made by oneself or by a third person, shall be substituted by speech interactions. These interactions are considered as successful when the partners in a discussion declare themselves to be understood. Within the framework of this interactionist concept, Kohlberg's and Rachael M. Henry 's theories could assume the status of various language-games. (shrink)