Explores how the French theory of philosophy, which became popular during the last three decades of the twentieth century, spread to America and examines the critical practices that French theory inspired.

Responding to recent publications by Céline Lafontaine, François Cusset unties the illusions of the supposed knot between the US ideology of cybernetics and the “French Theory” represented by thinkers like Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard or Deleuze. Those who denounce a historical complicity between these two “anti-Humanist” movements in the name of a few superficial analogies miss the profoundly critical nature of French Theory towards capitalism. It is rather on the side of those technophobic Humanists so eager to denounce the Pensée (...) 68 that one finds today the most active accomplices of the liberalisation of French society. (shrink)

Sait-on que la science-fiction américaine, du roman " cyberpunk " à la saga Matrix, se nourrit largement de Jean Baudrillard? Que Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari inspirent aux Etats-Unis les pionniers de l'Internet comme de la musique électronique? Que Michel Foucault y est la référence majeure des luttes communautaires, tandis que Jacques Derrida est une star sans égale dans l'université? Après avoir croisé à New York la contre-culture des années 1970, les œuvres des philosophes français de l 'après - structuralisme (...) sont entrées dans les départements de littérature de l'université américaine, où elles ont bouleversé de l'intérieur tout le champ intellectuel. Réinterprétées, réappropriées au service des combats identitaires de la fin de siècle américaine, elles ont fourni le socle théorique sur lequel ont pu s'épanouir, contre la régression des années Reagan, les cultural studies, les gender studies et les études multiculturelles. C'est cette histoire, mal connue, de la french theory que François Cusset retrace ici. Il décrit le succès de cette étrange " théorie française " - la déconstruction, le biopouvoir, les micropolitiques ou la simulation -jusque dans les tréfonds de la sous - culture américaine. Il restitue l'atmosphère particulière des années 1970 et raconte la formidable aventure américaine, et bientôt mondiale, d'intellectuels français marginalisés dans l'Hexagone. Car le plus surprenant est que, pendant que l'Amérique les célébrait, la France s'empressait d'inhumer ces dangereux échevelés de la " pensée 68 " pour louer à nouveau l'humanisme citoyen et son vieil universalisme abstrait. Ce livre éclaire ce paradoxe en explorant une modalité méconnue, mais cruciale, du malentendu franco - américain. Au-delà, il brosse un portrait passionnant des mutations de l'espace intellectuel, culturel et politique américain des dernières décennies. (shrink)

Sait-on que la science-fiction américaine, du roman " cyberpunk " à la saga Matrix, se nourrit largement de Jean Baudrillard? Que Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari inspirent aux Etats-Unis les pionniers de l'Internet comme de la musique électronique? Que Michel Foucault y est la référence majeure des luttes communautaires, tandis que Jacques Derrida est une star sans égale dans l'université? Après avoir croisé à New York la contre-culture des années 1970, les œuvres des philosophes français de l 'après - structuralisme (...) sont entrées dans les départements de littérature de l'université américaine, où elles ont bouleversé de l'intérieur tout le champ intellectuel. Réinterprétées, réappropriées au service des combats identitaires de la fin de siècle américaine, elles ont fourni le socle théorique sur lequel ont pu s'épanouir, contre la régression des années Reagan, les cultural studies, les gender studies et les études multiculturelles. C'est cette histoire, mal connue, de la french theory que François Cusset retrace ici. Il décrit le succès de cette étrange " théorie française " - la déconstruction, le biopouvoir, les micropolitiques ou la simulation -jusque dans les tréfonds de la sous - culture américaine. Il restitue l'atmosphère particulière des années 1970 et raconte la formidable aventure américaine, et bientôt mondiale, d'intellectuels français marginalisés dans l'Hexagone. Car le plus surprenant est que, pendant que l'Amérique les célébrait, la France s'empressait d'inhumer ces dangereux échevelés de la " pensée 68 " pour louer à nouveau l'humanisme citoyen et son vieil universalisme abstrait. Ce livre éclaire ce paradoxe en explorant une modalité méconnue, mais cruciale, du malentendu franco - américain. Au-delà, il brosse un portrait passionnant des mutations de l'espace intellectuel, culturel et politique américain des dernières décennies. (shrink)

In May 1968, Gilles Deleuze was an established philosopher teaching at the innovative Vincennes University, just outside of Paris. Félix Guattari was a political militant and the director of an unusual psychiatric clinic at La Borde. Their meeting was quite unlikely, yet the two were introduced in an arranged encounter of epic consequence. From that moment on, Deleuze and Guattari engaged in a surprising, productive partnership, collaborating on several groundbreaking works, including _Anti-Oedipus_, _What Is Philosophy?_ and _A Thousand Plateaus_. François (...) Dosse, a prominent French intellectual known for his work on the Annales School, structuralism, and biographies of the pivotal intellectuals Paul Ricoeur, Pierre Chaunu, and Michel de Certeau, examines the prolific if improbable relationship between two men of distinct and differing sensibilities. Drawing on unpublished archives and hundreds of personal interviews, Dosse elucidates a collaboration that lasted more than two decades, underscoring the role that family and history—particularly the turbulent time of May 1968—play in their monumental work. He also takes the measure of Deleuze and Guattari's posthumous fortunes and the impact of their thought on intellectual, academic, and professional circles. (shrink)

Il est assez rare qu’un concept philosophique s’échappe de l’arène académique. C’est pourtant le cas du concept de spécisme, qui a fait une entrée remarquée dans la sphère publique au cours de la dernière décennie. Il est désormais au cœur du débat de société sur nos devoirs envers les animaux non humains. Hélas, ce concept et les enjeux qu’il soulève sont souvent mal compris. Nombreux sont les auteurs qui contestent sa légitimité alors qu’ils le maitrisent mal. D’autres l’utilisent plus volontiers (...) sans toutefois mieux le comprendre. Les confusions qui entourent cette notion l’empêche de contribuer à la discussion autant qu’elle le pourrait. Le présent ouvrage entend remédier à cet état de faits en donnant de la notion de spécisme une présentation à la fois assez précise pour rendre justice aux discussions philosophiques dont elle fait l’objet et suffisamment claire pour être accessible à quiconque s’intéresse au statut moral des animaux. Il se divise en deux parties. La première aborde des questions ontologiques : Qu’est-ce exactement que le spécisme ? À quelles conditions existe-t-il ? Ces conditions sont-elles remplies dans les faits ? Quant à la seconde, elle porte sur des questions éthiques : Le spécisme peut-il être justifié ? Faut-il au contraire le condamner au même titre que le racisme et le sexisme ? (shrink)

Observed biological growth curves generally are sigmoid in appearance. It is common practice to fit such data with either a Verhulst logistic or a Gompertz curve. This paper critically considers the conceptual bases underlying these descriptive models.The logistic model was developed by Verhulst to accommodate the common sense observation that populations cannot keep growing indefinitely. A justification for using the same equation to describe the growth of individuals, based on considerations from chemical kinetics (autocatalysis of a monomolecular reaction), was put (...) forward by Richardson, but met with heavy criticism as a result of his erroneous derivation of the basic equation (Snell, 1929). It errs on the side of over-simplicity (Priestley & Pearsall, 1922). Von Bertalanffy (1957) subsequently based a justification on the assumption that, as a first approximation, the rates of catabolism and anabolism may be assumed to be proportional to weight and power (still vacant places, between the maximal possible and the already accumulated population sizes. This point of view was fiercely challenged by Nicholson (1933), Milne (1962), Smith (1954) and Rubinov (1973). And indeed, what is meant by vacant places has never become entirely clear. Finally Lotka (1925) devised a third leading approach by just truncating a Taylor expansion around zero of the differential law for autonomous growth after the second degree term. (shrink)

Animal ethicists often distinguish between direct and indirect defenses of speciesism, where the former appeal to species membership and the latter invoke other features that are simply associated with it. The main extant charge against indirect defenses rests on the empirical claim that any feature other than membership in our species is either absent in some humans or present in some nonhumans. This paper challenges indirect defenses with a new argument, which presupposes no such empirical claim. Instead, the argument from (...) discordance resorts to the following principle: a certain feature can only justify discriminating on the basis of that feature. (shrink)

On pourrait croire que le thème de l’émancipation a disparu de la Théorie Critique dans sa version la plus récente, en particulier chez Habermas. Mais on devrait plutôt dire que l’intérêt à l’émancipation, notion que Habermas avait dans un premier temps reprise à Max Horkheimer, a émigré dans l’immanence de l’État de droit démocratique. Jusqu’où la reconstruction habermassienne de l’État de droit permet-elle tout à la fois de revitaliser et de conférer un sens nouveau aux visées pratiques, sociales et politiques, (...) émancipatrices? Telle est la question qui nous retiendra. (shrink)

Renowned philosopher and prominent French critic François Noudelmann engages the musicality of Jean-Paul Sartre, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Roland Barthes, all of whom were amateur piano players and acute lovers of the medium. Though piano playing was a crucial art for these thinkers, their musings on the subject are largely scant, implicit, or discordant with each philosopher's oeuvre. Noudelmann both recovers and integrates these perspectives, showing that the manner in which these philosophers played, the composers they adored, and the music they (...) chose reveals uncommon insight into their thinking styles and patterns. Noudelmann positions the physical and theoretical practice of music as a dimension underpinning and resonating with Sartre's, Nietzsche's, and Barthes's unique philosophical outlook. By reading their thought against their music, he introduces new critical formulations and reorients their trajectories, adding invaluable richness to these philosophers' lived and embodied experiences. The result heightens the multiple registers of being and the relationship between philosophy and the senses that informed so much of their work. A careful reader of music, Noudelmann maintains an elegant command of the texts under his gaze and appreciates the discursive points of musical and philosophical scholarship they involve, especially with regard to recent research and cutting-edge critique. (shrink)

A defence of the 'pragmatic' theory of anaphora (which stresses the analogy between anaphora and deixis) against an argument put forward by Gareth Evans.

ABSTRACTWhat does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what would best serve the core purposes of (...) the representational practice within which the thought or utterance is located. In thus favoring a “relational model” in metasemantics, we share Ronald Dworkin's goal of explaining fundamental legal disagreements, and also his reliance on constructive interpretation. But what we delineate is a far more general and explanatorily resourceful metasemantics than what Dworkin articulated, which also bypasses some controversial implications for the nature of law that Dworkin alleged. (shrink)

Я интерпретирую философские взгляды Вернера Гайзенберга как прагматизм и неметафизический реализм виттгенштайновского типа. «Замкнутая теория» – виттгенштайновское правило/концепт. В отличие от Бокулич, предпочитающей позицию Дирака относительно природы связей между различными физическими теориями, я отдаю предпочтение позиции Гайзенберга. Моя позиция, интерпретирующая Гайзенберга, также прямо противоположна позиции Поппера: критерием устоявшейся научной (замкнутой) теории является её нефальсифицируемость. -/- I interpret philosophical views of Werner Heisenberg as a pragmatism and non-metaphysical realism of a Wittgensteinian kind. The “closed theory” is a Wittgensteinian rule/concept. Unlike Alisa (...) Bokulich, favouring Dirac’s position about inter-theoretical relations, I favour Heisenberg’s one. My position, interpreting Heisenberg’s notion of a closed theory, is also in direct opposition to Popper’s one: the criterion of an established scientific (closed) theory is its non-falsifiability. (shrink)

Response to Alex Byrne's paper 'Knowing what I see'.

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed (...) to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not thesufficient and necessaryconditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

Illusionism about phenomenal consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. This thesis is widely judged to be uniquely counterintuitive: the idea that consciousness is an illusion strikes most people as absurd, and seems almost impossible to contemplate in earnest. Defenders of illusionism should be able to explain the apparent absurdity of their own thesis, within their own framework. However, this is no trivial task: arguably, none of the illusionist theories currently on (...) the market is able to do this. I present a new theory of phenomenal introspection and argue that it might deal with the task at hand. (shrink)

Plato’s works have been the object of countless interpretations and recuperations ever since Greek antiquity. In the context of prenazi Germany, the writer Hans F.K. Günther published a work in defence of eugenic theories (aiming to improve man through authoritarian laws), allegedly based on the work of the Athenian philosopher and entitled Platon als Hüter des Lebens (“Plato as Protector of Life”). The present article tries to set forth what is at stake in that propaganda piece, its historical context, as (...) well as the disquieting implications of such an “appropriation” of classical philosophy to purely political ends. (shrink)

Phenomenal consciousness appears to be particularly normatively significant. For this reason, sentience-based conceptions of ethics are widespread. In the field of animal ethics, knowing which animals are sentient appears to be essential to decide the moral status of these animals. I argue that, given that materialism is true of the mind, phenomenal consciousness is probably not particularly normatively significant. We should face up to this probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness and move towards an ethic without sentience.

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead (...) us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb. (shrink)

La philosophie bergsonnienne a rendu le monde de ses contemporains moins opaque, les aidant à lui trouver un sens. Si la France cartésienne coïncide avec les partisans de la démocratie parlementaire ancrée à gauche, celle de Bergson recrute ses plus gros bataillons dans la droite nationale, conservatrice, mais également dans une gauche antiparlementaire, révolutionnaire.

Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...) of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: Notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem,” which I think is a part of the illusion problem. In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion. (shrink)