This book evaluates how the pragmatist notion of habit can influence current debates at the crossroads between philosophy, cognitive sciences, neurosciences, and social theory. It deals with the different aspects of the pragmatic turn involved in 4E cognitive science and traces back the roots of such a pragmatic turn to both classical and contemporary pragmatism. Written by renowned philosophers, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and social theorists, this volume fills the need for an interdisciplinary account of the role of 'habit'. Researchers interested (...) in the philosophy of mind, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, social theory, and social ontology will need this book to fully understand the pragmatist turn in current research on mind, action and society. (shrink)

We challenge the classic experience/expression dichotomous account of emotions, according to which experiencing and expressing an emotion are two independent processes. By endorsing Dewey's and Mead's accounts of emotions, and capitalizing upon recent empirical findings, we propose that expression is part of the emotional experience. This proposal partly challenges the purely constructivist approach endorsed by the authors of the target article.

In a paper that recently appeared in this journal, we proposed a model that aims at providing a comprehensive account of our ability to intelligently use tools, bridging sensorimotor and reasoning-based explanations of this ability. Central to our model is the notion of generalized motor programs for tool use, which we defined as a synthesis between classic motor programs, as described in the scientific literature, and Peircean habits. In his commentary, Osiurak proposes a critique of the notion of generalized motor (...) program, and suggests that the limitations of our model can be solved by integrating it with the view that motor programs are generated by a previous mechanical reasoning, independent from sensorimotor knowledge. Here we reply that while on the one hand our reference to Peircean habits gets over the temptation to consider motor programs as fixed internal entities, it also rejects the view, endorsed by Osiurak, that intelligent practice is a mixture of antecedent abstract reasoning and subsequent motor execution. (shrink)