Is Yogācāra a system of idealist metaphysics or a theory of experience without metaphysical commitments? An increasing amount of literature has argued, since the 1980s, in favor of the second answer. In this paper, I propose to review the background to the question. In fact, most of the attempts to answer the question have been made with reference to Buddhist texts and concepts. However, labels such as “idealism” emerged from Western philosophy and are reflective of specific historical situations and problems. (...) Extending their use to other contexts requires that these specificities are taken into account. Building on an historical survey, I suggest that some essential features of Yogācāra correspond to features of an ancient Greek tradition of metaphysics that has been characterized as idealist: Neoplatonism. On this basis, I come back to the initial question and argue in favor of the idealist interpretation. (shrink)

Evagrius famously characterises divine nature as γνῶσις οὐσιώδης, ‘substantial knowledge’. In the Alexandrian, Cappadocian, and other intellectual contexts informed by Platonic, Aristotelian, and Philonic thought, characterisations of God as a noetic or intellectual being are fairly common. However, these traditions concur in using the term νοῦς rather than γνῶσις. How can we explain that Evagrius deviates from the metaphysical mainstream? In this paper, I review this question from an historical and systematic point of view. I propose to examine ancient theories (...) of Mind about the function and structure of the νοῦς, compare them to the Evagrian theory, and identify a possible explanation for the substitution of γνῶσις to the νοῦς. Since God is the key element in Evagrius's metaphysics, a clearer vision of the divine essence will help us appreciate the whole system more fully. (shrink)

abstract: One of the most prolific approaches to the comparative study of Buddhist and Christian philosophy has been the use of Buddhist anti-metaphysicism to overcome the allegedly obsolete metaphysical discourse of Christianity. This approach has been practiced, among others, by Edgar Bruns, Frederik Streng, Joseph O'Leary, and John Keenan. Keenan's 1980–1990s seminal works were determinative in that they appeared to rely on intuitive and evident premises: Christianity became infused with Greek metaphysical concepts early on; consequently, it adopted the forms of (...) essentialism and ontological discourse practiced in metaphysics. That discourse has now become obsolete and must be overcome; Buddhist anti-metaphysicism helps overcome it; hence, Christianity can learn from Buddhism. In this paper, I show that although Keenan presents the first of these claims as self-evident, it is in fact highly polemical. Its origins lie in Albrecht Ritschl's and Adolf von Harnack's Hellenization theory. While the theological and historical background to this theory has been debated, Keenan does not engage in these debates. Even more, he transforms the theory in such a way that it becomes incongruent with its inherent aim. Following the problems implied on these two levels, I suggest that Keenan's project makes itself vulnerable to incoherencies. In the end, I argue for the overcoming of antimetaphysicism as a basis for Buddhist-Christian dialogue. (shrink)

Holm Tetens, a philosopher from Berlin, reasons for the existence of God. In contrast to classical arguments for God’s existence, he uses a comparative way of reasoning. Tetens starts with naturalism, the prevalent metaphysics of present times, and tries to show that in comparison to that, theism is the more reasonable choice. Neither naturalism nor theism can be proven. Thus, Tetens has to find different criterion in other to show that theism is more reasonable than naturalism. In his understanding, a (...) human being is a morally responsible I–subject. Unlike naturalism, theism is compatible with this philosophical anthropology, making it the more reasonable metaphysic. This article aims to trace back Tetens argument and examines his claim that no metaphysic can pe proven by empirical data. A special emphasis is laid on Tetens’ concept of the morally responsible I–subject as the central criterion in order to choose between two metaphysics. (shrink)