Spacetime measurements and gravitational experiments are made by using objects, matter fields or particles and their mutual relationships. As a consequence, any operationally meaningful assertion about spacetime is in fact an assertion about the degrees of freedom of the matter (i.e. non gravitational) fields; those, say for definiteness, of the Standard Model of particle physics. As for any quantum theory, the dynamics of the matter fields can be described in terms of a unitary evolution of a state vector in a (...) Hilbert space. By writing the Hilbert space as a generic tensor product of “subsystems” we analyse the evolution of a state vector on an information theoretical basis and attempt to recover the usual spacetime relations from the information exchanges between these subsystems. We consider generic interacting second quantized models with a finite number of fermionic degrees of freedom and characterize on physical grounds the tensor product structure associated with the class of “localized systems” and therefore with “position”. We find that in the case of free theories no spacetime relation is operationally definable. On the contrary, by applying the same procedure to the simple interacting model of a one-dimensional Heisenberg spin chain we recover the tensor product structure usually associated with “position”. Finally, we discuss the possible role of gravity in this framework. (shrink)

In a recent article M. Colyvan has argued that Quinean forms of scientific realism are faced with an unexpected upshot. Realism concerning a given class of entities, along with this route to realism, can be vindicated by running an indispensability argument to the effect that the entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist. Colyvan observes that among our best scientific theories some are inconsistent, and so concludes that, by resorting to the very same argument, we may incur a commitment (...) to inconsistent entities. Colyvan's argument could be interpreted, and in part is presented, as a reductio of Quinean scientific realism; yet, Colyvan in the end manifests some willingness to bite the bullet, and provides some reasons why we shouldn't feel too uncomfortable with those entities. In this paper we wish to indicate a way out to the scientific realist, by arguing that no indispensability argument of the kind suggested by Colyvan is actually available. To begin with, in order to run such an indispensability argument we should be justified in believing that an inconsistent theory is true; yet, in so far as the logic we accept is a consistent one it is arguable that our epistemic predicament could not be possibly one in which we are justified in so believing. Moreover, also if our logic admitted true contradictions, as Dialetheism does, it is arguable that Colyvan's indispensability argument could not rest on a true premise. As we will try to show, dialetheists do not admit true contradictions for cheap: they do so just as a way out of paradox, namely whenever we are second-level ignorant as to the metaphysical possibility of evidence breaking the parity among two or more inconsistent claims; Colyvan's examples, however, are not of this nature. So, even under the generous assumption that Dialetheism is true, we will conclude that Colyvan's argument doesn't achieve its surprising conclusion. (shrink)