Neil Levy offers the most prominent moral principles that are specifically and exclusively designed to apply to neuroethics. His two closely related principles, labeled as versions of the ethical parity principle , are intended to resolve moral concerns about neurological modification and enhancement [1]. Though EPP is appealing and potentially illuminating, we reject the first version and substantially modify the second. Since his first principle, called EPP , is dependent on the contention that the mind literally (...) extends into external props such as paper notebooks and electronic devices, we begin with an examination of the extended mind hypothesis and its use in Levy’s EPP . We argue against reliance on EMH as support for EPP . We turn to his second principle, EPP , which is not dependent on EMH but is tied to the acceptable claim that the mind is embedded in, because dependent on, external props. As a result of our critique of EPP , we develop a modified version of EPP , which we argue is more acceptable than Levy’s principle. Finally, we evaluate the applicability of our version of EPP. (shrink)

The individual right of access to one’s own data is a crucial privacy protection long recognized in U.S. federal privacy laws. Mobile health devices and research software used in citizen science often fall outside the HIPAA Privacy Rule, leaving participants without HIPAA’s right of access to one’s own data. Absent state laws requiring access, the law of contract, as reflected in end-user agreements and terms of service, governs individuals’ ability to find out how much data is being stored and how (...) it might be shared with third parties. Efforts to address this problem by establishing norms of individual access to data from mobile health research unfortunately can run afoul of the FDA’s investigational device exemption requirements. (shrink)

The use of ‘placebos’ in clinical practice is a source of continued controversy for physicians and medical ethicists. There is rarely any extensive discussion on what ‘placebos’ are and how they work. In this paper, drawing on Louhiala and Puustinen's work, the author proposes that the term ‘placebo effect’ be replaced in clinical contexts with the term ‘positive care effect’. Medical treatment always takes place in a ‘context of care’ that encompasses all the phenomena associated with medical intervention: it includes (...) the particular method of treatment, the interpersonal relationships between medical staff and the patient and other factors, including physicians' and patients' beliefs in the power of the treatment. Together, these phenomena can result in a full spectrum of therapeutic effects to the patient—from no effects, to small effects, to large effects. In cases where there are significant therapeutic benefits to the patient, ‘positive care effects’ may be spoken of. Since the ethical codes of the General Medical Council and the American Medical Association demand transparency with respect to patient treatment and insist on complete openness in ‘placebo’ usage, the author argues that, as a matter of conceptual rigour and consistency, if the term ‘placebo effect’ is replaced by ‘positive care effect’, these ethical codes appear to insist on transparency about all such beneficial components of treatment. Given that this appears to be a counterintuitive obligation, the author concludes the paper with some comments on the clinical consequences of this conceptual revision, including a brief discussion of how this important debate might develop. (shrink)

Many alternatives or supplements to principalism seek to reconnect medical ethics with the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of the persons directly involved in ethically troublesome situations. This shift of attention, from deeds to doers, from principles to principals, acknowledges the importance of the moral agents involved in the situation — particular practitioners, patients, and families. Taking into account the subjective, lived experience of moral decision-making parallels recent efforts in the teaching of medicine to give the patient''s subjectivity — his or (...) her personal experience of being sick or disabled — epistemological parity with scientific medicine''s objective, biomedically-oriented view of the person''s sickness or disability.Moreover, the shift from principalism to principals signals a growing realization that ethical problems in the profession of medicine are inseparable from its practice. Philosophers and other humanists working in medicine should resist the temptation to institutionalize a professional role as solver of ethical problems, clarifier of values, or mediator of disputes and work instead to help practitioners practice medicine reflectively. (shrink)

Pareto principles are at the core of ethics and decision theory. The Strong Pareto principle says that if one thing is better than another for someone and at least as good for everyone else, then the one is overall better than the other. But a host of famous figures express it differently, with ‘not worse’ in place of ‘at least as good.’ In the presence of parity (or incommensurability), this results in a strictly stronger Pareto principle, which (...) I call Super‐Strong Pareto. Super‐Strong Pareto, however, yields cyclic betterness and is therefore false. I point out a number of influential arguments—concerning population ethics, collective action problems, and decision‐making in the face of parity and uncertainty—that crucially rely on Super‐Strong Pareto and are therefore unsound. I then turn to the most influential argument against the possibility of parity—Broome's collapsing argument—and argue that it likewise relies on Super‐Strong Pareto reasoning and is therefore question‐begging. Finally, I turn to the much‐neglected question of how to justify Strong Pareto. The answer I arrive at, which emphasizes tie‐breaking, yields a striking insight, namely that Super‐Strong Pareto amounts to the denial of insensitivity to mild sweetening. That is what makes it problematic in the presence of parity. (shrink)

According to Ruth Chang the three standard positive value relations: “better than”, “worse than” and “equally good” do not fully exhaust the conceptual space for positive value relations. According to her, there is room for a fourth positive value relation, which she calls “parity”. Her argument for parity comes in three parts. First, she argues that there are items that are not related by the standard three value relations. Second, that these items are not incomparable, and third, that (...) the phenomena she has focused on are not due to the vagueness of the comparative predicates. This paper focuses on the second part of the argument and an objection is presented. By assuming the Small Unidimensional Difference Principle, which is a key premise for the second part of the argument, Chang’s argument could be accused of begging the question. More so, by assuming this principle, the space for incomparability gets severely limited. If these worries are justified, then Chang’s argument for parity as a fourth form of comparability is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Consensus is lacking among research ethicists on the question of how broadly to understand the requirements of non-exploitation in international clinical research. Two types of principles have been proposed, minimalist and non-minimalist, grounded in two opposing conceptions of exploitation, transactional and systemic. Transactionalists have offered principles, which, it has been argued, are satisfied by minimal gains to vulnerable subjects measured against an unjust status quo. Systemicists have advanced principles with decidedly non-minimal mandates but only by conflating the obligations of clinical (...) research with those of First World citizenship. My aim here is to break this deadlock by offering grounds for a non-minimal requirement of international research ethics grounded in a transactional conception of exploitation. I do this by arguing that a subject's gains must be measured not only within the transaction, relative to her own starting point and to the share of gains enjoyed by her co-transactor, but also across transactions, so as to ensure parity of benefit to trial participants whenever, and wherever, parity of burden is assumed. (shrink)

This article examines the conceptual impact of equal pay legislation on Canadian trade unionism. Ambiguous, largely voluntary, legislation poses major challenges to unions negotiating wage parity for their members. Furthermore, the movement finds itself caught between conflicting responsibilities as champion of the underpaid and protector of traditional interests. The authors examine this challenge within the context of the historic development, and fundamental principles of trade unionism. They conclude that many of the conflicts discussed arise directly from established union practices (...) and must, therefore, be resolved by the movement and other affected parties together. (shrink)

A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem). Since there is no known endpoint (...) in the latter case, an extension of the idea of backward induction is used to determine the possible outcomes. The parity problem highlights the lack of robustness of backward induction, but it poses no conflict between foundational principles. On the other hand, two conflicting views of the future underlie the uncertainty problem, depending on whether the number of rounds is bounded (the players invariably shoot from the start) or unbounded (they may all cooperate and never shoot, despite the fact that the truel will end with certainty and therefore be effectively bounded). Some real-life examples, in which destructive behavior sometimes occurred and sometimes did not, are used to illustrate these differences, and some ethical implications of the analysis are discussed. (shrink)

Within debates concerning responsibility for ignorance the distinction between moral and factual ignorance is often treated as crucial. Many prominent accounts hold that while factual ignorance routinely exculpates, moral ignorance never does so. The view that there is an in-principle distinction between moral and factual ignorance has been referred to as the “Asymmetry Thesis.” This view stands in opposition to the “Parity Thesis,” which holds that moral and factual ignorance are in-principle similar. The Parity Thesis has (...) been closely aligned with volitionist accounts of moral responsibility, whereas the Asymmetry Thesis has been closely aligned with Quality of Will accounts. Two central questions are at work here: how ignorance excuses, and whether it excuses in the same way for both moral and factual ignorance. I will argue that these questions have often been confused in the present debate, and once we have distinguished more clearly between them, it seems that Quality of Will accounts are compatible with the Parity Thesis. And more generally: that the distinction between moral and factual ignorance is far less important in debates about responsibility for ignorance than it has often appeared. (shrink)

There is too much that we do not know about COVID-19. The longer we take to find it out, the more lives will be lost. In this paper, we will defend a principle of risk parity: if it is permissible to expose some members of society (e.g. health workers or the economically vulnerable) to a certain level of ex ante risk in order to minimize overall harm from the virus, then it is permissible to expose fully informed volunteers (...) to a comparable level of risk in the context of promising research into the virus. We apply this principle to three examples of risky research: skipping animal trials for promising treatments, human challenge trials to speed up vaccine development, and low-dose controlled infection or “variolation.” We conclude that if volunteers, fully informed about the risks, are willing to help fight the pandemic by aiding promising research, there are strong moral reasons to gratefully accept their help. To refuse it would implicitly subject others to still graver risks. (shrink)

Many clinical ethicists have argued that ethics expertise is impossible. Their skeptical argument usually rests on the assumptions that to be an ethics expert is to know the correct moral conclusions, which can only be arrived at by having the correct ethical theories. In this paper, I argue that this skeptical argument is unsound. To wit, ordinary ethical deliberations do not require the appeal to ethical or meta-ethical theories. Instead, by agreeing to resolve moral differences by (...) appealing to reasons, the participants agree to the Default Principle—a substantive rule that tells us how to adjudicate an ethical disagreement. The Default Principle also entails a commitment to arguments by parity, and together these two methodological approaches allow us to make genuine moral progress without assuming any deep ethical principles. Ethical expertise, in one sense, is thus the ability and knowledge to deploy the Default Principle and arguments by parity. (shrink)

Some recent authors suggest that the extended view fails because it does not follow from functionalism. For although functionalism can tell us whether a system is cognitive, it does not show whether such a newly identified cognitive system can be attributed to the very same subject. I argue that Clark and Chalmers can dodge this attack by claiming that the Parity Principle is essentially an analogy. In their crucial thought experiment, it can be argued that Otto’s notebook is (...) similar to Inga’s biological memory in that they are functionally equivalent, and it seems that the only relevant difference between them is concerned with their being located inside/outside the skull/skin. Provided that Inga’s biological memory is part of Inga’s cognition, analogously, Otto’s notebook should also be regarded as part of Otto’s cognition. However, I argue that this alleged analogy does not hold because the location is not the only difference that matters. Otto’s notebook and Inga’s biological memory are taken as part of a whole for different reasons, and because of this, they actually belong to different kinds of wholes. Otto’s notebook is part of a whole because such a whole functions as a cognitive system, but Inga’s biological memory is part of a whole because it is within a “proper whole” whose boundary is determined by reproduction. As a result, the analogy does not really work. (shrink)

In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...) that moral reasons are no different in this respect from others. Ethics Without Principles offers detailed treatment and criticism of opposing positions of all sorts, with useful summaries. It also contains three chapters on the nature of what Dancy calls 'contributory' reasons, which, though the topic of much interest at the moment, are not often discussed in anything like the detail given here. And it offers a distinctive form of value-holism to go with the holism of reasons. As Dancy's definitive statement on particularism, the book will be required reading for all those working on moral philosophy and ethical theory. (shrink)

*North American Society for Social Philosophy (NASSP) Book Award 2019.* -/- *International Studies Association (ISA) - International Ethics Section Book Award 2021.* -/- Although military mores have relied primarily on just war theory, the ethic of cooperation in warfare (ECW)—between enemies even as they are trying to kill each other—is as central to the practice of warfare and to conceptualization of its morality. Neither game theory nor unilateral moral duties (God-given or otherwise) can explain the explicit language of cooperation in (...) developing and enforcing principles of military ethics and the law of armed conflict. -/- The ethic of cooperation is borne of various motivations: reciprocity, self-preservation, and efficiency, to be sure, but also a sense of warrior honor and concern with human rights. This shared morality can persist despite making it more difficult for one side or the other to win and, unfortunately, its well-meaning motivations often lead to unintended tragic consequences. -/- This book explores three manifestations of this significant yet overlooked ethic of cooperation in warfare: (1) for a “fair fight,” (2) to protect classes of individuals (e.g., non-combatants or prisoners of war), and (3) to end the war quickly. Such cooperation can take unexpected forms, from ad hoc decisions on the battlefield to institutionalization in international law, and is the source of some critical tensions in one of the most significant developments in warfare in recent years: namely, how to handle terrorism or other forms of warfare that lie outside the purview of international law. -/- Each type of ECW raises questions internal to that ethic, such as inconsistencies in the concept of “parity” across different weapons bans, contradictions within the warrior ethic that heavily influence—and therefore confuse—notions of the “fair fight,” the disconnect between what protections a person receives and his responsibility for the war (e.g., political leaders), or the limited decisiveness of outcomes generated by very short wars. -/- Their simultaneous application also generates significant tensions and raises questions about the proper relationship of ECW to the immediate goal of war itself, which is to win, and thus yield either a political settlement or a justicial decision. For example, the ECWs for a “fair fight” and to protect classes of individuals can make it harder to win the war, but even more concerning is that they can also kill more people, which in the latter case contravenes its very purpose. -/- Human history is in some ways the story of trying to concurrently wage and tame war, and the architecture of warfare itself is informed by the ECW, in particular: (a) the political nature of war, (b) the abdication from jus ad bellum judgments in order to concentrate on justice within war (jus in bello), and (c) the ways in which modern nation-states collude to define “legitimacy” in war. -/- The combination of these three features leave questions of justicial right and responsibility for war disturbingly unresolved, it also generates new challenges in a geopolitical context in which cooperative and non-cooperative (e.g. contemporary terrorism) forms of warfare clash. (shrink)

According to a prominent suggestion in the ethics of transcranial neurostimulation the effects of such devices can be treated as ethically on par with established, pre-neurotechnological alterations of the mind. This parity allegedly is supported by situated cognition theories showing how external devices can be part of a cognitive system. This article will evaluate this suggestion. It will reject the claim, that situated cognition theories support ethical parity. It will however point out another reason, why external carriers (...) or modifications of the mental might come to be considered ethically on par with internal carriers. Section “Why Could There Be Ethical Parity between Neural Tissue and External Tools?” presents the ethical parity theses between external and internal carriers of the mind as well as neurotechnological alterations and established alterations. Section “Extended, Embodied, Embedded: Situated Cognition as a Relational Thesis” will elaborate the different situated cognition approaches and their relevance for ethics. It will evaluate, whether transcranial stimulation technologies are plausible candidates for situated cognition theses. Section “On the Ethical Relevance of Situated Cognition Theses” will discuss criteria for evaluating whether a cognitive tool is deeply embedded with a cognitive system and apply these criteria to transcranial brain stimulation technologies. Finally it will discuss the role diverse versions of situated cognition theory can play in the ethics of altering mental states, especially the ethics of transcranial brain stimulation technologies. (shrink)

The profession of psychology is one of many entities affected by the current economic recession. The question of what to do when clients cannot pay agreed-upon charges will need to be answered. Ethical issues related to setting the fee for psychotherapy, insurance coverage, abandonment, pro bono psychotherapy, and lack of resources are addressed in light of the 2002 American Psychological Association's Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct and other relevant literature. The impact of the Mental Health (...) Parity Act on the financial complexities that professionals in psychology now face is also discussed. Several recommendations are made for psychologists, calling them to be proactive in their communities, to be advocates for their clients, and to critically evaluate their financial practices. (shrink)

We are morally perplexed about nuclear weapons. Popular debate oscillates tediously between an apparently impractical idealism which would have nothing to do with the things, and a military and political realism which insists that we have to use such means to attain our legitimate ends. The choice, it too often seems, is between laying down our nuclear arms–thus avoiding the moral odium of resting our defence policies on threats to vaporize millions of civilians–but leaving ourselves open to domination by those (...) who do not feel such scruples, and on the other hand, retaining such weapons as long as our potential enemies possess them, constantly maintaining parity with the other side–in other words, proceeding with the arms race. The respective proponents of principle and of prudence typically fail to understand how others can possibly neglect the considerations which loom so large in their own minds. Each has at bottom a deeply held ethical view–that certain means may not be used for any end, or that certain ends are so important that they justify the use of almost any means. The disagreement is so irreconcilable that it spills out from TV studios and newspaper editorial pages on to the streets and the missile bases, and into the courts and the prisons. (shrink)

We are morally perplexed about nuclear weapons. Popular debate oscillates tediously between an apparently impractical idealism which would have nothing to do with the things, and a military and political realism which insists that we have to use such means to attain our legitimate ends. The choice, it too often seems, is between laying down our nuclear arms–thus avoiding the moral odium of resting our defence policies on threats to vaporize millions of civilians–but leaving ourselves open to domination by those (...) who do not feel such scruples, and on the other hand, retaining such weapons as long as our potential enemies possess them, constantly maintaining parity with the other side–in other words, proceeding with the arms race. The respective proponents of principle and of prudence typically fail to understand how others can possibly neglect the considerations which loom so large in their own minds. Each has at bottom a deeply held ethical view–that certain means may not be used for any end, or that certain ends are so important that they justify the use of almost any means. The disagreement is so irreconcilable that it spills out from TV studios and newspaper editorial pages on to the streets and the missile bases, and into the courts and the prisons. (shrink)

Drawing upon the practice of caregiving and the insights of feminist care ethics, I offer a phenomenology of caregiving through the work of Eva Feder Kittay and Emmanuel Lévinas. I argue that caregiving is a material dialectic of embodied response involving moments of leveling, attention, and interruption. In this light, the Levinasian opposition between responding to another's singularity and leveling it via parity-based principles is belied in the experience of care. Contra much of response ethics’ and care ethics’ respective (...) literatures, this dialectic suggests that they are complementary in ways that productively illuminate themes of each. I conclude by suggesting that when response and care ethics are thought together through the experience of caregiving, such labors produce finite responsibility with infinite hope. (shrink)

It is hypothesised and argued that “the four principles of medical ethics” can explain and justify, alone or in combination, all the substantive and universalisable claims of medical ethics and probably of ethics more generally. A request is renewed for falsification of this hypothesis showing reason to reject any one of the principles or to require any additional principle(s) that can’t be explained by one or some combination of the four principles. This approach is argued to be compatible with (...) a wide variety of moral theories that are often themselves mutually incompatible. It affords a way forward in the context of intercultural ethics, that treads the delicate path between moral relativism and moral imperialism. Reasons are given for regarding the principle of respect for autonomy as “first among equals”, not least because it is a necessary component of aspects of the other three. A plea is made for bioethicists to celebrate the approach as a basis for global moral ecumenism rather than mistakenly perceiving and denigrating it as an attempt at global moral imperialism. (shrink)

A prominent objection to non-cognitive moral bio-enhancements is that they would compromise the recipient’s ‘freedom to fall’. I begin by discussing some ambiguities in this objection, before outlining an Aristotelian reading of it. I suggest that this reading may help to forestall Persson and Savulescu’s ‘God-Machine’ criticism; however, I suggest that the objection still faces the problem of explaining why the value of moral conformity is insufficient to outweigh the value of the freedom to fall itself. I also question whether (...) the objection is compatible with Neil Levy’s parity principle. Accordingly, I go on to consider an alternative relational freedom-based objection to NCMBEs that aims to explain the fundamental moral importance of the freedom that NCMBEs would violate. I argue that although this strategy might allow the critic of NCMBEs to bypass a powerful criticism of Harris’ objection, it also weakens the freedom-based objection’s compatibility with the parity principle. (shrink)

In a recent issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, several scholars wrote on the topic of ethics expertise in clinical ethics consultation. The articles in this issue exemplified what we consider to be two troubling trends in the quest to articulate a unique expertise for clinical ethicists. The first trend, exemplified in the work of Lisa Rasmussen, is an attempt to define a role for clinical ethicists that denies they have ethics expertise. Rasmussen cites the dependence of (...) class='Hi'>ethical expertise on irresolvable meta-ethical debates as the reason for this move. We argue against this deflationary strategy because it ends up smuggling in meta-ethical assumptions it claims to avoid. Specifically, we critique Rasmussen’s distinction between the ethical and normative features of clinical ethics cases. The second trend, exemplified in the work of Dien Ho, also attempts to avoid meta-ethics. However, unlike Rasmussen, Ho tries to articulate a notion of ethics expertise that does not rely upon meta-ethics. Specifically, we critique Ho’s attempts to explain how clinical ethicists can resolve moral disputes using what he calls the “Default Principle” and “arguments by parity.” We show that these strategies do not work unless those with the moral disagreement already share certain meta-ethical assumptions. Ultimately, we argue that the two trends of attempting to avoid meta-ethics by denying that clinical ethicists have ethics expertise, and attempting to articulate how ethics expertise can be used to resolve disputes without meta-ethics both fail because they do not, in fact, avoid doing meta-ethics. We conclude that these trends detract from what clinical ethics consultation was founded to do and ought to still be doing—provide moral guidance, which requires ethics expertise, and engagement with meta-ethics. To speak of ethicists without ethics expertise leaves their role in the clinic dangerously unclear and unjustified. (shrink)

When ethics committees evaluate the research proposals submitted to them by biomedical scientists, they can seek guidance from laws and regulations, their own beliefs, values and experiences, and from the theories of philosophers. The starting point of this paper is that philosophers can only be helpful to the members of ethics committees if they take into account in their models both the basic moral intuitions that most of us share and the consequences of people's choices. A moral view which can (...) be labelled as a consequentialist interpretation of mid-level principlism is developed, defended and applied to some real-life and hypothetical research proposals. (shrink)

Leveraging firsthand experience, BRAIN-funded investigators conducting intracranial human neuroscience research propose two fundamental ethical commitments: (1) maintaining the integrity of clinical care and (2) ensuring voluntariness. Principles, practices, and uncertainties related to these commitments are offered for future investigation.

A textbook presenting basic moral principles from the ethical standpoint of the author. The author contends that these basic principles do not change very often or very rapidly, although the application of these principles is subject to constant revision. Much of the literature in ethics is devoted to the application of moral philosophy; this book provides a thorough study of the principles themselves.

The combinatorial parity principle states that there is no perfect matching on an odd number of vertices. This principle generalizes the pigeonhole principle, which states that for a fixed bipartition of the vertices, there is no perfect matching between them. Therefore, it follows from recent lower bounds for the pigeonhole principle that the parity principle requires exponential-size bounded-depth Frege proofs. Ajtai previously showed that the parity principle does not have polynomial-size bounded-depth (...) Frege proofs even with the pigeonhole principle as an axiom schema. His proof utilizes nonstandard model theory and is nonconstructive. We improve Ajtai's lower bound from barely superpolynomial to exponential and eliminate the nonstandard model theory. Our lower bound is also related to the inherent complexity of particular search classes . In particular, oracle separations between the complexity classes PPA and PPAD, and between PPA and PPP also follow from our techniques. (shrink)

One of the goals of medicine is to improve well-being, in line with the principle of beneficence. Likewise, scientists claim that the goal of human embryonic stem cell research is to find treatments for diseases. In hESC research, stem cells are harvested from a 5-day-old embryo. Surplus embryos from infertility treatments or embryos created for the sole purpose of harvesting stem cells are used in the research, and in the process the embryos get destroyed. The use of human embryos (...) for research purpose raises ethical concern. In this context, the religious leaders play the role to be the moral compass and “reality check” to engage with the public. In Malaysia, the Ministry of Health has outlined the Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Therapy, reflecting on Islamic principles. Since there has not been much focus on the viewpoints of other faiths in Malaysia, this study attempts to explore the ethical guiding principles deliberated by religious leaders from the Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic traditions and identify if there is a common ground between the mainstream religious views and principles of medical ethics, in relation to hESC research. Eleven religious leaders representing the Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic traditions were interviewed. Interestingly, though reasoning of religious leaders came from different angles, their underlying concerns revolve around the values of “do no harm” and “intention to save lives”. These values are also the key principles in medical ethics. The findings are applied to answer the question as to whether religious and medical guiding principles can co-exist and complement in ethical decision-making, without compromising the values. (shrink)

Ethics in the West too often equates morality with universal moral principles, thus imposing lifestyles and moral criteria that do not respect differences and local histories. Even Christianity proposes ethics that is based on eternal, absolute and universal truths or principles, independent of sociocultural and historical contexts. The problem is that these universal moral laws become a means of social control to exclude those who are different: non-Christian religions, nonwhite races, non-Western cultures, and poor and marginalized social classes everywhere. To (...) these can be added minorities marginalized because of sexual orientation, physical handicaps, and women of all sectors and cultures. Another kind of ethics is urgent. For these reasons, Christians in Latin America and other parts are seeking innovative ways of envisioning ethics from their marginalized and discriminated social locations in order to find another possible ethics, an ethics that is not universal and not based on eternal truths or principles, but rather is contextual and historical and that takes into account real-life realities. Only an ethics that does this will be liberative. Important steps toward this other possible ethics have been taken by the theology of liberation by developing a contextual and intercultural morality. (shrink)

Much of the current work on AI ethics has lost its connection to the real-world impact by making AI ethics operable. There exist significant limitations of hyper-focusing on the identification of abstract ethical principles, lacking effective collaboration among stakeholders, and lacking the communication of ethical principles to real-world applications. This position paper presents challenges in making AI ethics operable and highlights key obstacles to AI ethics impact. A preliminary practice example is provided to initiate practical implementations of AI (...) ethics. We aim to inspire discussions on making AI ethics operable and focus on its impact on real-world applications. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethics without Principles: Another Possible Ethics—Perspectives from Latin America by Roy H. May JrRamon LuzarragaEthics without Principles: Another Possible Ethics—Perspectives from Latin America Roy H. May Jr. EUGENE, OR: PICKWICK PUBLICATIONS, 2015. 80 PP. $16.00Roy May presents a collection of five essays that critique deontological ethics. He argues that deontology stands outside sociocultural and historical contexts, ignoring concrete human differences and the local histories of diverse human cultures. (...) Therefore, it is a false universal, an otherworldly, legalistic, and ideologically hegemonic construct. Consequently, it provides no space for diverse Latin American experiences and contexts. Such ethics do not liberate marginalized groups precisely because they do not take their concrete lived experiences and contexts into account. May proposes instead a nominalist, contextual, postmodern ethics. He traces the history of this ethic from Ockham, through its development in classical and modern Protestant thought, and finally Latin American liberation theology, Protestant and Catholic. It is a program to generate a dialogue over moral conduct and its significance for human [End Page 215] relationships and the concrete situations and conditions of daily life lived in diverse ways while modeled after the example of Jesus Christ.In the first essay, May proposes a contextual ethic where the lived context of human moral agents includes a reliance on moral experience and wisdom for clues to the best course of moral action. Engaging Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Lehman, and Latin American contextual ethicists, he rejects the idea that formal principles undergird Christian behavior. Contextual ethics is instead based on an obedient response to God's activity in the world, resulting in love of neighbor, building human life, seeking God's will in history, following Jesus's concrete moral example practiced in history, and participating in a Christian community that seeks the Kingdom of God. In the second essay, May sketches a method for an ethics of liberation, arguing how the analysis of concrete situations by moral agents could produce concrete norms of conduct. An ethics of alterity results, where marginalized people are freed from oppression and opened to horizons of new life. The third essay argues that a contextualist ethic must be Christomorphic instead of Christocentric. People practice "creative loyalty" to Jesus's example by engaging the other and his or her needs within one's particular context (34). This activity imitates but does not replicate how Jesus treated people in his context. In the fourth essay, May argues how a contextual ethic enables its practitioners to engage in "moral interrogations" of concrete life experiences and actions from which wisdom is gained (51). He calls for an intercultural ethics whereby diverse peoples in their respective contexts engage in mutual learning and respectful dialogue. The last essay speaks to the result of this dialogue: a polyphonic global discussion among people faithful to God and open to new life.May's exposition of contextual ethics is an excellent summary for people seeking to understand its origins, history, and ideas. Unfortunately, his criticism of deontological ethics causes him to miss a rich vein of thought. Those medieval scholastics who believed in universals knew well that such universals instantiated themselves in a myriad of ways. Lived, concrete, historical experiences serve as portals to the universal norm, which is not so much a bland uniform abstraction as a mosaic where diverse human experiences combine to help us realize that such norms exist. The mistake is made when one thinks her piece of the mosaic is the entire mosaic, which makes deontological ethics vulnerable to the problems May wants to avoid. Moreover, contextual ethics could defeat the intercultural dialogue he seeks precisely because the lack of an agreed objective measure leads to human power struggles over defining the terms of any ethical discussion. [End Page 216]Ramon LuzarragaBenedictine University at MesaCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Central to ethical debates in contemporary mental health research are the rhetoric of parity of esteem, challenges underpinned by the social construct of vulnerability and the tendency to homogenis...

Business ethics is usually taught either from a philosophical perspective that derives guiding normative principles from abstract theories of philosophical ethics or from an atheoretical perspective that has students analyze cases that present difficult ethical issues and propose solutions on a casuistic basis. This article proposes a third approach—the Principles Approach—that derives guiding normative principles teleologically from the nature of market activity itself. The articledemonstrates how the Principles Approach can meet the four main challenges facing those who teach ethics (...) in business schools—the challenges of definition, abstract, cultural relativism, and integration. (shrink)

Why did Levinas choose Isaiah 45:7 ("I make peace and create evil: I the Lord do all that") as a superscription of his essay on evil? This article explores the role of evil in Levinas's religious ethics. The author discusses the structure of evil as revealed phenomenologically and juxtaposes it to the structure of subjectivity found in the writings of Levinas. The idea of the "ethical anthropic principle," modeled upon the cosmic anthropic principle, is then used to (...) link evil to the responsibility of the subject. The link is subsequently extended to God. This is proposed as one way of understanding the meaning of Isaiah 45:7. (shrink)

Business ethics is usually taught either from a philosophical perspective that derives guiding normative principles from abstract theories of philosophical ethics or from an atheoretical perspective that has students analyze cases that present difficult ethical issues and propose solutions on a casuistic basis. This article proposes a third approach—the Principles Approach—that derives guiding normative principles teleologically from the nature of market activity itself. The articledemonstrates how the Principles Approach can meet the four main challenges facing those who teach ethics (...) in business schools—the challenges of definition, abstract, cultural relativism, and integration. (shrink)

Providing a bold and original rethinking of environmental ethics, Ben Minteer's Refounding Environmental Ethics will help ethicists and their allies resolve critical debates in environmental policy and conservation practice. Minteer considers the implications of John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy for environmental ethics, politics, and practice. He provides a new and compelling intellectual foundation for the field - one that supports a more activist, collaborative, and problem-solving philosophical enterprise. Combining environmental ethics, democratic theory, philosophical pragmatism, and the environmental social sciences, Minteer makes (...) the case for a more experimental, interdisciplinary, and democratic style of environmental ethics - one that stands as an alternative to the field's historically dominant "nature-centred" outlook. Minteer also provides examples of his pragmatic approach in action, considering a wide range of application and issues, including invasive species, ecological research, biodiversity loss, protected area management, and conservation under global climate change. (shrink)

Providing a bold and original rethinking of environmental ethics, Ben Minteer's Refounding Environmental Ethics will help ethicists and their allies resolve critical debates in environmental policy and conservation practice. Minteer considers the implications of John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy for environmental ethics, politics, and practice. He provides a new and compelling intellectual foundation for the field - one that supports a more activist, collaborative, and problem-solving philosophical enterprise. Combining environmental ethics, democratic theory, philosophical pragmatism, and the environmental social sciences, Minteer makes (...) the case for a more experimental, interdisciplinary, and democratic style of environmental ethics - one that stands as an alternative to the field's historically dominant "nature-centred" outlook. Minteer also provides examples of his pragmatic approach in action, considering a wide range of application and issues, including invasive species, ecological research, biodiversity loss, protected area management, and conservation under global climate change. (shrink)

Many nonanthropocentric environmental ethicists subscribe to a ``principle-ist'''' approach to moral argument, whereby specific natural resource and environmental policy judgments are deduced from the prior articulation of a general moral principle. More often than not, this principle is one requiring the promotion of the intrinsic value of nonhuman nature. Yet there are several problems with this method of moral reasoning, including the short-circuiting of reflective inquiry and the disregard of the complex nature of specific environmental problems and (...) policy arguments. In the present paper, we advance an alternative, pragmatic contextualist approach to environmental ethics, one grounded in the moral theory of John Dewey. We present the results of an empirical study of public environmental ethics and natural resource management attitudes to support our position, and we conclude with a few recommendations for future inquiry in the field of environmental ethics. (shrink)

Technology could be used to improve morality but it could do so in different ways. Some technologies could augment and enhance moral behaviour externally by using external cues and signals to push and pull us towards morally appropriate behaviours. Other technologies could enhance moral behaviour internally by directly altering the way in which the brain captures and processes morally salient information or initiates moral action. The question is whether there is any reason to prefer one method over the other? In (...) this article, I argue that there is. Specifically, I argue that internal moral enhancement is likely to be preferable to external moral enhancement, when it comes to the legitimacy of political decision-making processes. In fact, I go further than this and argue that the increasingly dominant forms of external moral enhancement may already be posing a significant threat to political legitimacy, one that we should try to address. Consequently, research and development of internal moral enhancements should be prioritised as a political project. (shrink)

Decision-making adhering to the “principle of autonomy" takes place within the wider context of decision-making processes in modern society. Within the medical area, as regards the decision through informed consent, the patient's intention assumes vital importance. The principle of autonomy is derived from the modern thought that the essence of human being is the reason. It becomes difficult, however, to rely on decision-making based on the principle of autonomy when a person’s intention is not clear and the (...) opinions of those who are involved differ from each other. Here, I think that the principle of consensus, which seeks the agreement of those who are concerned, becomes as important as the principle of autonomy. This paper examines the problems of certainty, reliability, andcreativity of medical action through the consideration of the principle of consensus. (shrink)