Jackendoff's Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution (2002) achieves a major shift in the focus and methods of Generative Linguistics (GL). Yet some of the original restrictive features of GL, cognitivism and Cartesianism in particular, remain intact in the new work and take on a more extreme form with the addition of a phenomenalist ontology.

The representation of events, in primates at any rate, is a separate process from their emotional evaluation. The same holds for cognitive evaluation. Here too representation and evaluation are separate operations. Acknowledging the symmetry leads to the notion of free representation.

O'Brien & Opie's connectionist interpretation of and depends heavily on the notions of and that underlie the classic account. When the assumptions, shared by both accounts, are removed, the connectionist versus classic contrast appears to be between behavioral and linguistic accounts.

Byrne & Russon's account of program imitation in primates involves propositional attitudes (expectations and goals), which limits its falsifiability. Yet their account of priming shows exactly how imitation without attitudes would look. The challenge is to upgrade the notion of priming to give an account of low-level program imitation without invoking propositional attitudes.