Este texto explora a relação entre imagens em movimento e suas formas de representação. Partindo do diálogo entre os campos da antropologia e da sociologia, contribuímos para a discussão acerca da conexão entre imagens, suas formas de representar e educação, através de um exercício de desconstrução crítica de imaginários coloniais. Propomos em seguida uma reflexão localizada em Heidegger, no modo como este observa o trabalho de Kant na Crítica da Razão Pura, particularmente no que ao representar da imagem diz respeito.

Em _Origens do Totalitarismo_, Hannah Arendt faz uma caracterização do totalitarismo como uma forma de governo inédita, fincada em duas novas camadas sociais, a ralé e as massas. Sua descrição do totalitarismo é realizada a partir de uma diferenciação com a tirania. Este trabalho buscou observar como o surgimento dos supracitados grupos sociais permitiram o surgimento dessa nova forma de governo. Vimos que a definição dela de povo diferencia-se da tradicional, quando afirma ser o povo diretamente relacionado à busca de (...) um sistema verdadeiramente representativo. Esta diferenciação é realizada em relação a dois grupos sociais, a ralé, que é composta do refugo da sociedade capitalista, dos _declassés_, daqueles que não encontram representação no sistema político, e que é também subproduto da burguesia, não se desligando desta, e as massas, que são formadas pelas pessoas desarticuladas e isoladas, neutras, indiferentes politicamente, atomizadas, supérfluas, resultantes de um mundo destruído. Para a autora, o totalitarismo emerge quando líderes da ralé passam a ser a força motriz das massas. O totalitarismo é mostrado como o criador de um simulacro da realidade, que aproveitou-se do esvaziamento do espaço público, começando a diferenciar-se da tirania pelo terror pós-eliminação da oposição, pelo líder ser parte da engrenagem e instrumento de desresponsabilização, por não se separar da propaganda, por seu amorfismo e pelo fato do campo de concentração ser o espelho e a miniatura da sociedade almejada. (shrink)

O presente trabalho retrata os resultados de uma pesquisa realizada nos moldes da observação participante e da etnobiografia com o objetivo de compreender a dinâmica existente entre o ensino e aprendizagem e os valores civilizatórios inerentes às práticas cotidianas de uma comunidade tradicional afro-brasileira. O estudo foi realizado por meio da observação e participação de atividades litúrgicas de um terreiro de Umbanda e Candomblé – o “Ilè Asè Tobi Babá Olòrigbìn” - localizado na cidade de Ituiutaba, MG. O ensinar como (...) uma responsabilidade partilhada, a reafirmação de princípios éticos/civilizatórios (como a circularidade, a ancestralidade, a corporalidade, a conduta), a centralidade da oralidade e as relações entre a vida comunitária e uma singularidade que se funda no coletivo foram aspectos percebidos como características de uma dimensão formativa que orienta os aprendizados no interior desse grupo. Considerando que o modelo praticado por essas comunidades seja um modelo de sucesso (que tem resistido ao tempo e a um histórico de opressão), destacamos o grande desafio de aprender com os ensinamentos dos territórios afro-brasileiros e encontrar maneiras de incorporá-los às nossas práticas educativas, para que assim, vislumbremos uma escola mais diversa e humanizada. (shrink)

Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Within empiricism, two approaches to the (...) nature of the abnormality/abnormalities involved have been touted by philosophers and psychologists. One-factor approaches have it that monothematic delusions are a normal response to anomalous experiences whilst two-factor approaches seek to identify a clinically abnormal pattern of reasoning in addition to anomalous experience to explain the resultant delusion. In this paper we defend a one-factor approach. We begin by making clear what we mean by atypical, abnormal, and factor. We then identify the phenomenon of interest and overview one and two-factor empiricism about its formation. We critically evaluate the cases for various second factors, and find them all wanting. In light of this we turn to our one-factor account, identifying two ways in which ‘normal response’ may be understood, and how this bears on the discussion of one-factor theories up until this point. We then conjecture that what is at stake is a certain view about the epistemic responsibility of subjects with delusions, and the role of experience, in the context of familiar psychodynamic features. After responding to two objections, we conclude that the onus is on two-factor theorists to show that the one-factor account is inadequate. Until then, the one-factor account ought to be understood as the default position for explaining monothematic delusion formation and retention. We don’t rule out the possibility that, for particular subjects with delusions there may be a second factor at work causally implicated in their delusory beliefs but, until the case for the inadequacy of the single factor is made, the second factor is redundant and fails to pick out the minimum necessary for a monothematic delusion to be present. (shrink)

Izvanučionička nastava poveznica je života i škole i neizostavna sastavnica suvremenog odgoja i obrazovanja. Obzirom na njezinu iznimnu pedagošku vrijednost, cilj je ovoga rada analizom školskih kurikuluma dobiti uvid u zastupljenost i oblike provedbe izvanučioničke nastave u osnovnim školama. U tu svrhu analizirana su 73 školska kurikuluma osnovnih škola na području Osječko-baranjske županije. Analiza sadržaja kurikuluma obuhvatila je različite oblike provedbe izvanučioničke nastave, njihovu zastupljenost u okviru razredne i predmetne nastave i u odgojno-obrazovnim područjima propisanim Okvirom nacionalnog kurikuluma. Ovim se (...) radom ukazuje na prednosti i nedostatke različitih oblika izvanučioničke nastave koji se ostvaruju unutar pojedinih odgojno-obrazovnih područja. Detektirana su odgojno-obrazovna područja u kojima je potrebno unaprijediti planiranje i realizaciju izvanučioničke nastave. Zaključuje se kako je didaktičko-metodička rješenja za unaprjeđenje potrebno tražiti unutar pojedinih odgojno-obrazovnih područja u kojima su uočene različitosti u učestalosti integracije izvanučioničke nastave. Outdoor education is a link between life and school and an indispensable component of modern education. Considering its exceptional pedagogical value, the main goal of this research is to get an insight into the presence and form of outdoor education implementation in elementary schools. For that purpose, seventy-three school curricula from Osijek-Baranja County were analyzed. The analysis of curriculum content includes not only different forms of outdoor education, their presence in one teacher education and subject teaching but also education areas prescribed by the national curriculum. The thesis points out the advantages and disadvantages of different forms of outdoor education within particulars education areas. Also, education areas in which improvements in planning and realization of outdoor education were detected. It is necessary to look for didactic methodical solutions in education areas in which diversity of outdoor education integration is noticed. (shrink)

Outdoor education is a link between life and school and an indispensable component of modern education. Considering its exceptional pedagogical value, the main goal of this research is to get an insight into the presence and form of outdoor education implementation in elementary schools. For that purpose, seventy-three school curricula from Osijek-Baranja County were analyzed. The analysis of curriculum content includes not only different forms of outdoor education, their presence in one teacher education and subject teaching but also education areas (...) prescribed by the national curriculum. The thesis points out the advantages and disadvantages of different forms of outdoor education within particulars education areas. Also, education areas in which improvements in planning and realization of outdoor education were detected. It is necessary to look for didactic methodical solutions in education areas in which diversity of outdoor education integration is noticed. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical descriptions made by classic Indian philosophical traditions about unusual forms of awareness during sleep. For instance, in the so-called state of witnessing-sleep or luminosity sleep, one is said to reach a state that goes beyond ordinary dreaming and abide in a state (...) of just awareness, a state in which one is not aware of anything else other than one’s own awareness. Moreover, for these traditions, this state is taken to be the essence or background of consciousness. Reports on such a state opens the door to exciting new lines of research in the study of consciousness, such as inquiry into the so-called “objectless” awareness during sleep—states of awareness that lack an ordinary object of awareness. In this two-staged research project, we attempted to find the phenomenological blueprints of such forms of awareness during sleep in 18 participants by conducting phenomenological interviews, informed by a novel tool in qualitative research, the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) method. Following a phenomenological analysis, we isolated a similar phase across 12 reported experiences labelled as ‘nothingness phase’ since it described what participants took to be an experience of ‘nothingness’. his common phase was characterised by minimal sense of self—a bodiless self, yet experienced as being ‘somewhere’—, the presence of non-modal sensations, relatively pleasant emotions, an absence of visual experience, wide and unfocused attention, and an awareness of the state as it unfolded. (shrink)

In general agreement with the target article, I relate Vörös and Bitbol’s elucidation of Varelian philosophical roots of enaction to a discussion of enaction put forward by Varela’s co-authors Rosch and Thompson in their introductions to the revised edition of The Embodied Mind. I align Vörös and Bitbol’s multi-layered understanding of enaction to Rosch’s distinction between its “phase 1” and “phase 2” accounts. I consider the implications of the relationship between the pseudo-subject and the meta-subject of the enactive account of (...) mind for the general enactivist conception of science and scientific knowledge. (shrink)

En la poesía española contemporánea resulta cada vez más frecuente la relación de la poesía con otras disciplinas artísticas y, en especial, con las artes visuales. El poemario “A orillas del Ems”, de María Victoria Atencia, que combina lo fotográfico y lo poético, puede verse como un ejemplo de este tipo de interrelación. Tomando como punto de partida el libro de fotografías “Telgte in Erinnerung”, de Renate Kruchen, la autora realiza una recreación poética, sirviéndose del mecanismo compositivo de la “écfrasis”. (...) En esta recreación, se mezclan o se combinan lo ajeno con lo propio y lo objetivo con lo subjetivo. A las imágenes de los otros se va superponiendo o entrelazando la voz, las experiencias y los recuerdos personales de su autora, en la construcción de un discurso en el que, aunque de forma velada, pueden encontrarse elementos personales, subjetivos y autobiográficos. A lo largo del texto se estudiarán algunas de las formas en las que estos elementos se introducen en el poemario, entre las que se encuentran la selección y ordenación del material fotográfico y poético; las superposiciones o coincidencias entre los dos discursos, el visual y el verbal; la relación entre lo presente y lo ausente; y la interacción de la hablante con los personajes de las fotografías y las relaciones ficticias de parentesco que establece con ellos. (shrink)

Uma das principais discussões na correspondência Leibniz-Clarke tem que ver com o melhor modo de conceber a liberdade da vontade. A relação entre a vontade e os motivos é semelhante à que se verifica entre a balança e os pesos? A vontade tem a capacidade de contrariar a inclinação mais forte? A noção de motivos que inclinam sem necessitar basta para defender a liberdade? Estas e outras perguntas constituem o campo de batalha em que duas diferentes perspectivas acerca da liberdade (...) humana e divina se enfrentam. O nosso artigo foca a posição de Leibniz a respeito deste tema, tal como se desenha nas cartas tro­cadas com Clarke. Nele, sublinhamos as preocupações fundamentais de Leibniz na tarefa de conceptualização da vontade livre, oferecemos um brevíssimo resumo da sua argumentação e partilhamos algumas dificuldades relativas à interpretação das teses apresentadas pelo filósofo alemão. (shrink)

When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule to use is of extreme importance. This paper presents an axiomatization of the rule which requires updating of all the priors by Bayes rule. The decision maker has conditional preferences over acts. It is assumed that preferences over acts conditional on event E happening, do not depend on lotteries received on Ec, obey axioms which lead to maxmin expected utility representation with multiple priors, (...) and have common induced preferences over lotteries. The paper shows that when all priors give positive probability to an event E, a certain coherence property between conditional and unconditional preferences is satisfied if and only if the set of subjective probability measures considered by the agent given E is obtained by updating all subjective prior probability measures using Bayes rule. (shrink)

Com este trabalho, buscamos verificar o quanto de poder o povo possui na forma de governo defendida no _Federalista_ em relação ao direcionamento do governo para os seus fins. Para isso, buscamos entender o papel dos conceitos de virtude e vontade na referida forma de governo e a relação de tais conceitos com o poder. Utilizamos como pano de fundo as ideias de Locke, Montesquieu e Rousseau sobre representação. Concluímos que o _Federalista_ se contrapõe a Rousseau e segue Montesquieu, trazendo (...) de volta a virtude como elemento principal de condução do governo aos seus fins, separando o povo dos governantes, que formariam agora uma classe profissional, e fazendo a substituição do cidadão para o homem ligado ao comércio e à vida privada. (shrink)

Beyond the eras a dialogue seems to have been established between Bruegel the Elder (1525-1569) and Antonin Artaud (1896-1948). The poet’s wonder at the « painting of the North », both realistic and emblematic, reveals his deepest ideal as an artist : painting, a « magical » operation, deploys a power of expression based on signs and no longer on words, which the theatre is also called upon to seize. The juxtaposition of Bruegel’s Triumph of Death and a famous drawing (...) by Artaud, Le Théâtre de la cruauté [The Theatre of Cruelty], highlights the striking convergences between the two artists. Through their pictorial works, both of them renew over the centuries the funerary and mythical symbolism of death, inherited from the macabre scenes of medieval paintings, but also from ancient times. Studying the references to theatrical iconography in Bruegel’s painting, where carnival and crudity of death reinforce each other, allows us to deepen the meaning of these resonances. For the two artists, form and poetic momentum meet so that representation, as a structure common to painting and theatre, fixes a moment of the world, while animating that moment to infinity, thanks to signs conceived as « true hieroglyphs » (Artaud), a problem that Michel Foucault associated with the strongest truth that the experience of madness carries. (shrink)

Context: Philosophical and - more recently - empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the research of lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with self-referentiality: every attempt at examining the experience seems to change the experience in question. This so-called “excavation fallacy” has been taken by many to undermine the possibility of first-person inquiry as a form of scientific practice. Problem: What is the epistemic character and value of reflectively (...) acquired phenomenological data? Can the study of experience, despite the excavation fallacy, rely on the act of reflection on lived experience and make sense and use of its results? Method: Through a philosophical discourse, informed by empirical first-person inquiry, we explore the experiential structure of the act of reflection and the formation of the corresponding belief about past experience. Results: We present a provisional first-person model of the experiential dynamics of retrospective reflection, in which the reflective act is characterized as enaction of belief about past experience that co-determines - rather than distorts - its results. From a constructivist perspective on the inevitable interdependence between the act of observing and the observed, the excavation “fallacy” is recognized as an intrinsic characteristic of reflection. Reflection is described as an iterative, self-referential process, guided by a context- and subject-specific horizon of expectations. Implications: Knowing the characteristics of the formation of beliefs about experience is essential for understanding first-person data and for the possibility of their acquisition and use in scientific practice, particularly in the context of second-person approaches to the study of experience. Constructivist content: We relate the proposed understanding of reflection to constructivist epistemology and argue that constructivism provides an epistemological foundation for the empirical study of experience more suitable than the traditional epistemological objectivism of cognitive science. We suggest that the constructive nature of the process of reflection calls for a collaboration between the fields of constructivism, phenomenology, and first-person research, and points towards the potential for their mutual enrichment. (shrink)

This paper proposes a categorization of political action that entails three key elements. The first involves the tension between politics and the political sphere, and deals with the conflictive tendency of practices and logics that seek to establish an order in contrast with others that seek to undermine it. The second element refers to changes in the borders that define the sphere of that which is social-naturalized and that which is political-controversial. The third element, the political event, refers to the (...) moment of political production in which these two extremes are simultaneously intertwined and subverted. Finally, we offer some implications of the recognition of the “impossibility of fullness” as an essential aspect of all that is political, including politics itself. (shrink)

Luxury entails a public differentiating use of objects and commodities, which is grounded on the overlapping of the spending with commodities and the ostentation of perceptible signs stimulating social imitation. In the eighteenth century, the debates on luxury emphasized the importance of the scrutiny of the power of imagination as intimately related to the contagious and mimetic character of the use of luxury objects. Thus, “luxury” represents a conceptual and, more generally, a semantic momentum in the evolution of the description (...) of the society grounded on the influence of imitation. The several textual testimonies of the luxury debates in the eighteenth century, including Bernard de Mandeville’s contribution, attest the epistemological perplexity regarding the status of the psychic side of the definition of commodities, or economic goods, as utilities responding to specific human needs: the escalade of the emulation in the acquisition of luxury objects seems to deny any relevant connection of luxury to basic needs. This justifies the reference to imagination as the psychic source of the needs connected to luxury consumption and the absence of a direct correspondence between luxury goods and needs. B. Mandeville’s views on the theme of luxury and overconsumption in his Fable of the Bees and other writings are a privileged starting point for the explanation of these aspects of the evolution of the modern commercial society. -/- Keywords Luxury • Commercial society • Imitation • Consumption • Utility. (shrink)

Elena Esposito’s interview is a great opportunity to ponder on the applications of Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory to current social themes. Among these, I consider the meaning of a theory of ….

Open peer commentary on the article “The Circular Conditions of Second-order Science Sporadically Illustrated with Agent-based Experiments at the Roots of Observation” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: I address Füllsack’s main conclusions in his article regarding the meaning of second-order observations. Especially envisaged are the epistemological and ontological difficulties raised by his scrutiny of the merging between systemic-internal conditions of second-order reflexivity and the thematic-theoretical accounts of selection, intentionality and purposiveness in evolutionary systems.

O conhecimento está limitado a representações de sistemas psíquicos e às suas contrapartes linguísticas? O significado deve ser restrito aos conteúdos proposicionais? "Sequencialidade doSentido e Formas Cognitivas" desafia os pressupostos tradicionais em redor das respostas a estas questões. No presente trabalho caracterizam-se os sistemas que recorrem a formas cognitivas, a partir dos seus elementos e dos tipos de operações que concretizam. Estes sistemas são Sistemas baseados no Sentido nos seus elementos e nas operações que articulam tais elementos. Trata-se de sistemas (...) psíquicos e sociais. Assim se restringe a noção de sentido às concretizações psíquicas e sociais do processamento interpretativo de sinais, apenas para o propósito de identificar o objeto teórico do presente trabalho. Há todo um processamento de sinais na realidade físico-biológica, e cognição correspondente, que não adquire valor interpretativo para sistemas psíquicos ou sociais. O conhecimento e as formas cognitivas são mais vastos que o processamento interpretativo de sinais, mesmo que se admita que é na consciência e nos atos comunicativos que a cognição adquire um estatuto proposicional pleno e se pode, assim, tornar um objeto para a avaliação lógica. O conhecimento foi entendido de dois modos: i) como um processo de que resulta a forma cognitiva, tradicionalmente chamada representação, devido a ter sido exemplificada e escrutinada em sistemas psíquicos formados por elementos da consciência (representações); ii) à luz de operações com múltipla instanciação, por isso não limitadas à consciência humana. (shrink)

Introduction to a special issue on False Beliefs that are Useful.

In some neuropsychological disorders memory distortions seemingly fill gaps in people’s knowledge about their past, where people’s self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people’s capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people’s sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological wellbeing. Here we consider both psychological benefits and epistemic costs, and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot (...) be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves. (shrink)

Recent research has suggested that both the Honesty-Humility dimension, psychopathic traits and cheating attitudes are important predictors of academic dishonesty. The present study examined: a) the incremental role of triarchic psychopathic traits in academic cheating over the Honesty-Humility dimension; b) the incremental role of cheating attitudes over personality; c) the mediating role of cheating attitudes in the relationship between different psychopathic components and academic cheating. Two-hundred-and-ninty-seven students (59% female, 23 years on average) completed several questionnaires: the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM), (...) The HEXACO-PI-R Honesty-Humility scale, Attitudes Toward Cheating Scale, and the Academic Cheating Behaviours Scale. As expected, triarchic psychopathy added incremental variance in explaining academic cheating, after controlling for Honesty-Humility. Cheating attitudes explained additional 24% after controlling for personality traits. Meanness lead to more lenient attitudes toward cheating, which lead to more academic cheating behaviours. On the other hand, the effects of boldness and disinhibition were not mediated by attitudes towards cheating. Overall, the results suggest that the psychopathic traits display the effects on the academic cheating via several different mechanisms. The findings have both important theoretical and practical implications. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é discutir o pensamento político de Espinosa confrontando-o, por um lado, com o que poderíamos chamar a “ideologia dominante" da época, o pensamento cristão, aqui examinado a partir da correspondência com o dinamarquês N. Stensen, e, por outro lado, com o quadro teórico em que a questão política está então a ser recolocada, o pensamento de Hobbes. Além da conhecida explicitação do que o distingue em relação a Hobbes ( Carta L, a J. Jelles), é na (...) Correspondência que Espinosa expõe a articulação entre a política e os grandes temas de sua metafísica, como são a doutrina da causa imanente e o binômio liberdade/necessidade. Lugar privilegiado de auscultação da opinião dominante e, por isso, exercício em si mesmo exemplarmente político, as cartas são também o espaço textual em que a metafísica se expõe às suas consequências políticas e a teoria se confronta com a prática, oferecendo uma visão de Espinosa que, se está longe do "positivista" hobbesiano, não está menos longe do visionário afastado da realidade que o circunda e o condiciona. (shrink)

This essay originated from a re-reading of Umberto Eco's Six Walks in the Fictional Woods (1994) and from discussions of Charles Darwin's illnesses. The question of historical truth arises whenever we seek to validate a scientific analysis of a fictional incident. Whereas Darwin may actually have suffered from several health conditions, Robinson Crusoe's illness is the product of Daniel Defoe's imagination. But the search for a medical diagnosis must follow the same methods in both cases. After eight months as sole (...) inhabitant of his island, Crusoe is taken ill. A detailed description of the symptoms is duly registered in his diary, along with his attempts at finding its possible nature and origin. The island, according to Crusoe, lies in the tropical waters of the Caribbean Sea, not far from the coast of Venezuela. From the standpoint of medical geography, his illness is a tropical disease that was prevalent in South and Central America in the seventeenth century. Five possible diseases are suggested and discussed. (shrink)

A definition of virtual or virtuality is not an easy task. Both words are of recent application in Philosophy, even if the concept of virtual comes from a respectable Latin tradition. Today’s meaning brings together the notions of potentiality, latency, imaginary representations, VR, and the forms of communication in digital media. This contagious, and spontaneous synonymy fails to identify a common vein and erases memory as a central notion. In the present essay, I’ll try to explain essential features of the (...) concept of virtual, taking the investigation of memory troubles in Pierre Janet’s work as an exemplification. Pierre Janet’s work represents a rare combination of medical observation and description of symptoms of mental illnesses, therapeutic guidance in hypnosis and philosophical writing about the main psychological themes of an epoch in transition from a Metaphysics of the Soul to the modern Experimental Psychology. Pierre Janet’s intellectual evolution since the 1880s until the end of his life is dominated by the philosophical project of a theory of the psychic system supported by three basic pillars: a concept of personality, a theory of memory and a sketch of a general theory of conduct. Such complex endeavour cannot be abstracted from the initial connections with Jean-Martin Charcot’s school at La Salpêtrière which meant a turning point in the tradition of the “animal magnetism” concerning the treatment of epileptic-hysterical symptoms along with the contributions of Hyppolite Bernheim’s “Nancy School” of hypnotism. J.-M. Charcot’s or H. Bernheim’s theorising about the organic and psychological aspects of the hypnotic treatment of the hysterical symptoms was already aware of the difficulty in dealing with the extent of the dissimulation of the patients regarding the symptoms of the illness, under hypnotic suggestion, even if Charcot insisted in the identification and cataloguing of the organic expressions, such as contractures or the posture of the body in arc during the attacks. The precise location of the “great hysteria” in the organic-psychic corridor was itself a riddle. If a symptom is a special type of sign, in the case of the “great hysteria” nobody knew for sure what it stood for. The clinical symptom of the attack stood for an organic trouble with cerebral causes, a psychological interruption of the normal sensorial and muscular movements or a disguise of the female desire? Pierre Janet described many hysterical patients, somnambulism and multiple personality since his articles in La Revue Philosophique de la France et l’ Étranger, a Journal founded by the philosopher, experimental psychologist and his intellectual predecessor Théodule-Armand Ribot. The description of the case of the “great hysterical” Lucie, treated by him, is an example of a theoretical hypothesising on multiple personality and discontinuity of memories fragments. There are more cases revealing the same relation between hysteria, somnambulism, personality dissociation and “alternating memory”. Decisively inspired by and corroborating P. Janet’s ideas, S. Freud conceived also the essential of the hysterical sicknesses as disorders of memory. The theme of memory came even more to the foreground in the dissertation L’Automatisme Psychologique. Here, the strange world of somnambulism was scrutinised along with hysterical contractures and convulsions, anaesthesia, the compulsion to repetition, obsessions, “automatic writing” in hysterical patients, multiple personality and “alternating memories”. In the depicted cases memory could not be taken as a homogenous series of remembrances or as a stock of disposable information but as a variable of the depth of the personalities’ inner formation. The so-called “seconde existence” of some somnambulists referred not only unconscious representations and unconscious thoughts but complete or inceptive latent personalities provided with multiple virtual existences and multiple memories. Hypnosis was the privileged technique to access to such multiple memories ignored by the official personality. Later and after the writing of his M.D. Dissertation, Contribution à l’ Étude des Accidents Mentaux chez les Hystériques, P. Janet addressed again the themes of memory and alternating memories in a series of lectures at the Collège de France but now according to the larger framework of a general theory of conduct which included a description of the social actions participating in the narrative construction of personal memories, and the role of social memory. (shrink)

In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions, since there is no consensus yet on what causes delusions. Some of the defining features of delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence. Other defining features of delusions are psychological and focus on whether delusions are harmful, as (...) in the definition of delusions as beliefs that disrupt good functioning. Even if the epistemic features go some way towards capturing what otherwise different instances of clinical delusions have in common, they do not succeed in distinguishing delusions as a clinical phenomenon from everyday irrational beliefs. Focusing on the psychological features is a more promising way to mark the difference between clinical and non-clinical irrational beliefs, but there is wide variability in the extent to which delusions are psychologically harmful, and some everyday irrational beliefs can affect functioning in similarly negative ways. In this chapter we consider three types of belief that share similar epistemic features and exhibit variation with respect to how psychologically harmful they are: (1) delusions of thought insertion, (2) alien abduction beliefs, and (3) self-enhancing beliefs. In the light of the similarities and differences among these cases, we highlight the difficulty in providing an answer to what makes an irrational belief delusional. (shrink)

Jessica Wilson has recently offered a more sophisticated version of the self-defeat objection to Cartesian scepicism. She argues that the assertion of Cartesian scepticism results in an unstable vicious regress. The way out of the regress is to not engage with the Cartesian sceptic at all, to stop the regress before it starts, at the warranted assertion that the external world exists. We offer three reasons why this objection fails: first, the sceptic need not accept Wilson’s characterization of the sceptical (...) thesis and thus need not start her regress; second, even if she did commit to the regress, it would not undermine scepticism in the way Wilson envisages; and third, the appeal to mental state scepticism which is necessary to generate the second and subsequent steps in the regress is not justified. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce (...) the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs. (shrink)

The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial (...) domain. Unlike the trivial domain, non-trivial research cannot assume the view from nowhere on which the observed phenomena could be regarded as existing independently of the process of observation. Presenting first-person inquiry and quantum mechanics as two of its examples, we show that non-trivial research violates several fundamental observational presuppositions of the trivial domain, exemplified in the principles of classical physics. Drawing on Niels Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics and the constructivist notion of enaction, we stress the constructive, participatory, and irreversible nature of observation in the non-trivial domain. We discuss the possibility of developing a non-representationalist epistemology of the non-trivial, and consider the implications of our discussion for research in the non-trivial domain, as well as for the general understanding of the scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Context: The enactive approach to cognition affirms the relevance of the study of lived experience within cognitive science. Problem: Taking experience as the phenomenon of investigation, while at ….

I critically examine developmental approaches to the notion of habituation in the Nicomachean Ethics. Such approaches conceive of habituation in terms of upbringing. I challenge this view. Developmental approaches provide a restrictive view of habituation. I argue that it is possible for the habituation of character to occur after upbringing. My interpretation avoids the charge that Aristotle only granted the possibility of virtue to those who have had a good upbringing.

On psychosomatics based on Jaina philosophy.

Dans l’imaginaire philosophique de J.-M.G. Le Clézio et de Göran Tunström, le rapport centralité / marginalisation occupe une place extrêmement importante. Les personnages de ces deux écrivains sont souvent intégrés dans des sociétés plus ou moins ouvertes, où l’isolement représente l’élément central. Ayant une certe philosophie implicite, mais loin de proposer l’image d’une société parfaite, les romans de J.-M.G. Le Clézio et de Göran Tunström, décrivent, tout aucontraire, la vie des enfants dans une collectivité qui ne les aime pas, où (...) règnent la pauvreté, ainsi que la haine. S’assumer le statut de marginalisé dans un monde aliéné nous démontre à quel point ce thème reste significatif pour la compréhension des personnages. (shrink)

Papers presented at a national seminar on Vedic texts and the knowledge systems of India, held at Kalady during 9-11 December 2009.

I argue that explanations of doxastic transparency which go via an appeal to an aim or norm of belief are problematic. I offer a new explanation which appeals to a biological function of our mechanisms for belief production. I begin by characterizing the phenomenon, and then move to the teleological and normative accounts of belief, advertised by their proponents as able to give an explanation of it. I argue that, at the very least, both accounts face serious difficulties in this (...) endeavour. These difficulties are a function of seeking an explanation of transparency at the agential level, either with the subject aiming at truth, or being guided by a norm of truth. I adopt a motivational account of belief, one which severs the connection between belief and truth, and supplement this with an account of actual world beliefs. My alternative explanation is found at the sub-intentional, non-agential level, secured by biology. This explanation casts transparency not as related to the nature of deliberation over what to believe, but rather as contingently characterizing the beliefs of some believers, namely those with a particular biological history. My explanation thus parts company with what has come before along two dimensions: it moves away from transparency being something related to the agent’s aims or commitments, and it understands it as a contingent phenomenon. I close by considering an objection to my view—that transparency must not be understood as a contingent phenomenon—and a nearby alternative position which avoids this consequence. I respond to this objection and give reasons not to endorse the nearby alternative. I conclude that my explanation does not face the difficulties of those offered by teleologists and normativists, and, that by moving away from agential explanations, and casting transparency as contingent, we can provide a successful explanation of it. (shrink)

I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I begin by endorsing a principle of parsimony when confronted with unfamiliar phenomena. I introduce implicit bias in terms congenial to what most philosophers and psychologists have said about their nature in the literature so far, before moving to a discussion of the doxastic model of implicit bias and objections to it. I then introduce unconscious imagination and argue that appeal to it (...) does not represent a departure from a standard view of imagination, before outlining my model and showing how it accommodates characteristic features of implicit bias. I argue for its advantages over the doxastic model: it does not violate the parsimony principle, it does not face any of the objections so far raised to doxasticism, and it can accommodate the heterogeneity in the category of implicit bias. Finally, I address whether my view limits our ability to hold people accountable for their biases (it does not), and whether it is consistent with what we know about intervention strategies (it is). I conclude that implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. (shrink)

I give a biological account of epistemic normativity. My account explains the sense in which it is true that belief is subject to a standard of correctness, and reduces epistemic norms to there being doxastic strategies which guide how best to meet that standard. Additionally, I give an explanation of the mistakes we make in our epistemic discourse, understood as either taking epistemic properties and norms to be sui generis and irreducible, and/or as failing to recognize the reductive base of (...) epistemic normativity. This explanation will appeal to the claim that the beliefs which constitute our epistemic discourse are false but adaptive, and are the outcome of a non-truth tracking process. The opponents of my position are philosophers who take epistemic normativity not to be reducible in this way, and to involve sui generis properties and norms governing belief. The aim of the paper is to show that epistemic normativity can be explained by appeal to the biological functions of our mechanisms of belief-production. (shrink)

In his recent book Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono offers a thoroughgoing defence of delusions as biologically malfunctioning beliefs, greatly elaborating on his earlier defence of this view. Miyazono has it that delusions have biological doxastic functions, and that delusions involve direct or indirect malfunctions of this kind. In this short piece, I focus on Miyazono’s defence of a two-factor approach to delusion formation as it appears in Chapter Four. Miyazono approaches his discussion of the debate between one- and two-factor (...) theories having already defended the key thesis of the book: that delusions are malfunctioning beliefs. Of course, that thesis might be thought to mesh nicely with the two-factor theorist’s claim that there is a cognitive abnormality present in delusion formation or maintenance. However, I will discuss Miyazono’s defence of the two-factor position in isolation from its role in his overall account of delusion. Miyazono abstracts away from the particulars of Max Coltheart’s two-factor view, and takes himself to be investigating the plausibility of two-factor theories without the specific commitments of Coltheart’s view. Miyazono also captures under the two-factor heading theories which locate the second factor in belief maintenance rather than just in belief formation. He puts forward a new argument for a two-factor approach which goes via inference to the best explanation. I begin by arguing that Miyazono’s starting motivation for a two-factor approach rests on a misrepresentation of the one-factor approach. Then, I turn to the four components of Miyazono’s inference to the best explanation argument, and argue that in each case, we do not have grounds for positing a second factor. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a development of a variety of approaches for examining lived experience in the context of cognitive science. However, the field of first-person research has yet to develop a pragmatic epistemological framework that would enable researchers to compare and integrate – as well as understand the epistemic status of – different methods and their findings. In this article, we present the foundation of such a framework, grounded in an epistemological investigation of gestures involved in acquiring data on (...) experience. We examine the acts of turning towards one’s experiential field and attending to experience within the process of reflection. We describe what we call the _horizon of attending to experience_ by analogy to the “experimental arrangement” in quantum observation: this horizon, we argue, co-defines experiential phenomena that end up being observed and reported; at the same time, it itself forms an element of experience and is therefore amenable to phenomenological investigation. Drawing on the constructivist notion of enaction, we show that acknowledging the inherently constructive nature of attending to experience and accepting one’s lack of epistemic access to the “original”, observation-independent pre-reflective experience is not a dead end for first-person research when situated in a constructivist (but not relativist) understanding of the reflective act and its results. Expanding the notion of the horizon to encompass all epistemic acts involved in producing phenomenological data and final results of a first-person study (i.e., _horizon of the method_), we suggest some lines of inquiry that would allow researchers to identify and articulate horizons of particular methods, opening a way towards integrating past and future findings of different complementary first-person approaches into a comprehensive map of lived experience. (shrink)

In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions. Some of the defining features of delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence). Other defining features of delusions are psychological and they focus on whether delusions are harmful, as in the definition of delusions as beliefs that disrupt (...) good functioning. Even if the epistemic features go some way towards capturing what otherwise different instances of clinical delusions have in common, they do not succeed in distinguishing delusions as a clinical phenomenon from everyday irrational beliefs. Focusing on the psychological features is a more promising way to mark the difference between clinical and non-clinical irrational beliefs, but there is wide variability in the extent to which delusions are psychologically harmful, and some everyday irrational beliefs can affect functioning in similarly negative ways. In this chapter we consider three types of belief that share similar epistemic features and exhibit variation with respect to how psychologically harmful they are: (1) delusions of thought insertion, (2) alien abduction beliefs, and (3) self-enhancing beliefs. In the light of the similarities and differences between these cases, we highlight the difficulty in providing an answer to what makes an irrational belief delusional. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into (...) this process of deliberation, he has not, contra Steglich-Petersen, already adopted the truth aim with regard to p. In closing, we further suggest that proponents of the truth aim hypothesis need to focus on aim-guidance, not mere aim attribution, for their approach to have explanatory utility so underlining the significance of Owens’ argument. (shrink)

Culture plays an important role in defining ethics standards because dissimilar cultures socialize their people differently, according to what is acceptable behaviour. The potential significance of ethnic groups for marketing justifies inquiry into the moral judgments, standards, and rules of conduct exercised in marketing decisions and situations arising from decisions whether or not to focus on individual ethnic groups within an economy. Identifying and targeting ethnic groups for marketing purposes are tasks fraught with many ethical difficulties. In a multicultural society (...) consisting of a dominant group and many diverse, minority groups defined by ethnicity, these problems can be expected to increase substantially. Consequently, marketers may include minority ethnic consumers in their mainstream marketing programs. In itself, this has ethical consequences. Alternatively, if marketers seek to target individual minority ethnic groups within the same economy a further set of ethical consequences needs to be considered. This paper reviews the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic groups and their relevance for marketing strategy within an economy where there is a dominant group and also significant minority ethnic groups. The ethical consequences for minority communities arising from the use of non-ethnic, mainstream marketing programs are examined. An alternative approach, ethnic marketing, is also examined and its ethical consequences in terms of other groups within the one country appraised. The ethical dilemma and tradeoffs facing marketers within advanced, culturally diverse countries are then considered. (shrink)

Devido à sua adoção no Inglês, as línguas nacionais divulgaram o termo de proveniência latina medium e o seu plural media para designar formas simbólicas e materiais de comunicação da sociedade moderna. O uso do termo no plural é recente e também a atenção teórica que despertou. É sob “Teoria dos Media”, “Filosofia dos Media”, “Filosofia dos novos Media”, etc. que a investigação empírica e teórica se tem desenvolvido nas últimas décadas em uma variedade de disciplinas e encruzilhadas disciplinares. O (...) termo inglês sobrepõe‑se ao latino e assim desperta antigos ecos. Nas outras línguas nacionais a potenciação destas ressonâncias interlinguísticas poderá não ser a mesma, como acontece no Inglês. No entanto, em media o cruzamento do Inglês e do Latim revela acerca do termo aquilo que teoricamente e do ponto de vista semântico é necessário ter em conta, a saber ‑a mediação. Os termos medium e media não definem objetos isoláveis nos seus predicados materiais, mas, antes, uma polimorfia material na mediação, que está aí, no mundo da perceção, enquanto forma e/ou reproduz comunicação. Ao mesmo tempo que parecem designar formas da perceção, os media não são corpos ou organismos nem estados psíquicos. O presente trabalho dá conta dos problemas suscitados pelos nexos entre comunicação, perceção e técnica nos media, identifica a herança clássica nas Filosofias da Técnica e as viragens modernas. É uma reflexão meta‑teórica sobre teoria dos media. (shrink)