Discussion of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is currently dominated by two opposing interpretations of the work: a metaphysical or realist reading and the 'resolute' reading of Diamond and Conant. Marie McGinn's principal aim in this book is to develop an alternative interpretative line, which rejects the idea, central to the metaphysical reading, that Wittgenstein sets out to ground the logic of our language in features of an independently constituted reality, but which allows that he aims to provide positive philosophical insights into how (...) language functions. McGinn takes as a guiding principle the idea that we should see Wittgenstein's early work as an attempt to eschew philosophical theory and to allow language itself to reveal how it functions. By this account, the aim of the work is to elucidate what language itself makes clear, namely, what is essential to its capacity to express thoughts that are true or false. However, the early Wittgenstein undertakes this descriptive project in the grip of a set of preconceptions concerning the essence of language that determine both how he conceives the problem and the approach he takes to the task of clarification. Nevertheless, the Tractatus contains philosophical insights, achieved despite his early preconceptions, that form the foundation of his later philosophy. -/- The anti-metaphysical interpretation that is presented includes a novel reading of the problematic opening sections of the Tractatus, in which the apparently metaphysical status of Wittgenstein's remarks is shown to be an illusion. The book includes a discussion of the philosophical background to the Tractatus, a comprehensive interpretation of Wittgenstein's early views of logic and language, and an interpretation of the remarks on solipsism. The final chapter is a discussion of the relation between the early and the later philosophy that articulates the fundamental shift in Wittgenstein's approach to the task of understanding how language functions and reveal the still more fundamental continuity in his conception of his philosophical task. (shrink)

In this article I examine several criticisms of the concept of vulnerability. Rather than rejecting the concept, however, I argue that a sufficiently rich understanding of vulnerability is essential to bioethics. The challenges of international research in developing countries require an understanding of how new vulnerabilities arise from conditions of economic, social and political exclusion. A serious shortcoming of current conceptions of vulnerability in research ethics is the tendency to treat vulnerability as a label fixed on a particular subpopulation. My (...) paper examines the role of this “label” metaphor in current statements of research ethics. In contrast to this prevailing “label” metaphor, my own positive account of vulnerability develops a dynamic way of understanding the structure of the concept of vulnerability based on the idea of “layers of vulnerability.” I examine several cases involving women, as they are sometimes labeled as a vulnerable population and sometimes not. My analysis demonstrates the essential role of this revised concept of vulnerability in bioethics and research ethics. (shrink)

This book is a guide to working with social science concepts. Concepts are the prisms through which we see the social world. They are foundational to the social science enterprise, and the quality of investigations hinges in part on how well researchers make use of them. Most social science concepts are drawn from ordinary language used in everyday ways; however, many social scientists "reconfigure" ordinary words to meet their research needs. They tinker with the meanings of words to fit their (...) theoretical aims and make them precise, useful tools of measurement and comparison. This book examines social science concepts through an interpretivist lens with the aim of providing concrete conceptual guidance for future research. Specifically, this book seeks to: 1) identify characteristic dangers that attend the making and use of reconfigured concepts; 2) lay out ways in which a select number of interpretivist approaches have been used to mitigate these dangers; 3) introduce practical tools that rework these interpretivist approaches into explicit and useable research methods; 4) show concretely how these elucidation tools can be gainfully used by social scientists working both within and outside of the interpretivist tradition. It will be an essential guide for social science research. (shrink)

Analytic aesthetics has had little to say about academic schools of criticism, such as Freudian, Marxist, feminist, or postcolonial perspectives. Historicists typically view their interpretations as anachronistic; non-historicists assess all interpretations according to formalist criteria. Insofar as these strategies treat these interpretations as on a par, however, they are inadequate. For the theories that ground the interpretations differ in the claims they make about the world. I argue that the interpretations of different critical schools can be evaluated according to the (...) truth or epistemic merit of these claims. (shrink)

The commentaries of Martin Heidegger on the lyric poems of German Romantic poet Friedrich Hölderlin are an extraordinary encounter between poetry and the penetrating thought of a powerful philosophical mind. The writings included here reveal much about Heidegger's innermost thoughts on poetry, language, and how we think. This is the first English translation of this important work.

What are the aims of legal philosophy? Which questions should it seek to address? How should legal philosophers approach and engage with their subject-matter, and what constraints are incumbent on them as they do so? What are the criteria of success of theories of law, and how do we know if they have been met? Can there be progress in legal philosophy? In Elucidating Law, Julie Dickson addresses these and other questions concerning the methodology, or the philosophy, of legal philosophy (...) and offers her own distinctive response to them. The book advocates that legal philosophers should espouse an approach that Dickson terms 'Indirectly Evaluative Legal Philosophy.' This distinctive approach can facilitate legal philosophers' understanding of aspects of the nature of law, whilst avoiding prematurely or inappropriately regarding law as inherently morally valuable. Law is a powerful, systemic, and institutionalized social tool. It should be understood in a manner appropriate to its character. (shrink)

The aim of this text is to elucidate certain aspects of the use of expressions such as “is true” and “it is true that” (henceforth “truth-expressions”) and, through this, some features of the concept of truth. It focuses on addressing the question of whether truth-expressions play the role of a predicate or an operator. The investigations pursued are intended to be grammatical—in Wittgenstein’s sense of the term. I begin with a short presentation of a widely held view about the role (...) played by truth-expressions. I then contrast the Wittgensteinian conception of grammar with that of linguistics. I sketch Frege’s, Wittgenstein’s, Prior’s and Brandom’s central ideas regarding the issue under consideration. As a further step, I investigate the role of truth-expressions by examining several sentences in which they occur, and discuss objections to the proposed analysis. On my approach, truth expressions play the role of a predicate only when applied to sentences, and in all other cases function as operators. One advantage of such a position is that it enables a dissolution of the problem of truth-bearers: where truth-expressions are operators, the issue simply does not arise, and where they are predicates, it is sentences that are the truth-bearers. (shrink)

Explanatory elucidation occurs when a theory has one or more of its assumptions explained by another independently successful theory. Because explanatory elucidation springs from independently supported theories, it improves the credibility of the assumptions it casts light on, hence its relevance for realists. But cases can be pointed to where explanatory elucidation has badly failed to identify truthful components. One way to address this challenge is by trying to find additional epistemic support for seemingly meritorious theory-parts. Resource (...) in this regard, I suggest, include some specific lines of probing that regularly turn up against theories in mature scientific disciplines. Together with explanatory elucidation, those lines single out, in diachronic fashion, theory components worthy of realist commitment, or so I argue. (shrink)

À propos de : Jean Vioulac, Approche de la criticité. Philosophie, capitalisme, technologie, Paris, PUF, 2018, 499 p. « Il s’agit de penser un événement » (13) annonce Jean Vioulac au départ de son ouvrage. Cet événement est celui auquel il a consacré, plus ou moins directement, ses trois précédents livres, et concerne l’achèvement de la philosophie dans l’accomplissement de son projet de rationalisation du monde à travers l’efficacité théorique de la science et l’effectivité pratique de la t...

A new integrated view on the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics is constructed. It is then proved that for superposition state vectors the theoretical quantum mechanical distribution for the momentum observable is devoid of operational definition, and hence cannot be the source of conditions of compatibility to be imposed upon a researched joint probability concept. A compatible joint probability concept is outlined.

ABSTRACTThe doctrine of the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist presents a particular challenge to its defenders: how is it so much as intelligible? This paper explores Dummett’s response to this question, centred on the notion of deeming. Whilst instructive, Dummett’s position is unsustainable as it stands, since it fails to secure the meaningfulness of the doctrine. Once deeming is brought together with an account of bodiliness and an appreciation of the nature of the Eucharist as a meal, however, (...) the way is open to demonstrating the intelligibility of the doctrine. This is a prerequisite even for its rejection as false. (shrink)

Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical Investigations, and generally few times in his works, it is commonly agreed that this is one of the most relevant issues in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Starting from the analysis of the contexts in which Wittgenstein makes use of this concept, the paper focuses on the different interpretations that have been given in secondary literature, and proposes a classification based on two axes of (...) debate: the monistic versus pluralistic interpretation, and the empirical versus transcendental interpretation. After placing some well-known readings in the resulting scheme, an attempt will be made to offer an evolutionary reading of Wittgenstein’s own ideas about forms of life. It will be argued that the empirical and plural view that seems characteristic of his writings in the Thirties, slowly appears to turn towards a monistic view, sometimes with transcendental tones, although within a pragmatic perspective. This turn remains nevertheless rooted in Wittgenstein’s general attitude towards philosophy intended as a conceptual inquiry with clarifying and therapeutic aims. (shrink)

The following paper aims to re-examine the nature of the moral self as expounded by the Care Ethicists with the prime objective of understanding its ontological potential. It will be argued that this philosophical endeavor of examining the nature of the moral self in light of the Care Ethics theory echoes ontological thoughts and ideas that orbit around themes such as relationality, emotionality, and contextuality. The paper seeks to exhaustively explore the moral significance of these detected ontological standards of the (...) Ethics of Care project. Through this engagement, an affinity between the moral and the ontological aspects of Care Ethics shall be identified. Discussing the proposed ontological significance and implication of the care theory, we shall determine if there is a possibility for developing a dialogue between the domain of ethics and ontology, and if so, then consider what the ontological roots of feminist Care Ethics are. Consequently, through this project, we shall present a revised narrative of morality altogether. (shrink)

비트겐슈타인은 자신의 철학적 탐구에서 일목요연한 묘사가 근본적으로 중요하다고 말 한다. 해커는 일목요연한 묘사를 규칙의 상세화로 본다. 반면에 베이커는 일목요연한 묘사 가 철학적 질병에 빠진 사람들을 치료하는 행위로 본다. 이리하여 비트겐슈타인의 문법적 탐구는 해커에서는 해명이 되고, 베이커에서는 치료가 된다. 그러나 둘 다 비트겐슈타인이 철학적 문제를 해결하기 위해 언어의 사용을 일목요연하게 묘사한다는 데, 따라서 일목요 연한 묘사가 비트겐슈타인의 철학적 활동의 핵심이라는 데에는 일치하고 있다. 본 논문은 일목요연한 묘사에 대한 이들의 해석을 비판하고 비트겐슈타인의 일목요연한 묘사를 그가 말한 언어 투쟁으로 해석하고자 한다. 비트겐슈타인에 의하면 (...) 철학적 문제는 우리의 언어 형식들에 대한 오해에 의해서 발생한다. 따라서 철학의 과제는 철학적 불안들이 사라지도 록 표현을 형성하는 것인데, 그러한 표현을 형성하는 것이 바로 일목요연한 묘사이다. 비 트겐슈타인에 의하면 철학적 문제는 우리의 언어가 하는 작업에 대한 통찰에 의해서 풀리 는데, 그러한 통찰을 얻기 위해서는 그 작업을 오해하려는 충동에 대항하여야 한다. 도대 체 지금 이 놀이가 행해져야 하는가, 그리고 어느 것이 올바른 놀이인가고 물을 수 있어야 한다. 우리 언어의 작업을 오해하려는 충동, 표현의 형식들이 우리에게 행사하는 마력은 우리의 언어 속에 각인되어 있는 오래된 그림들 또는 신화이며, 그것을 벗어나기 위해서는 언어에 대한 본능적 반항 속에 사람들에게서만 가능하다. 따라서 철학은 우리의 언어 수단 에 의해 우리의 오성에 걸린 마법에 대한 투쟁이다. 철학은 언어 투쟁이며, 그 투쟁의 무 기는 언어이고, 투쟁의 대상은 오성의 마법이며, 투쟁 방법은 일목요연한 묘사이다. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 2, Page 286-300, March 2022.

The elucidation of the gauge principle ‘‘is the most pressing problem in current philosophy of physics’’ said Michael Redhead in 2003. This paper argues for two points that contribute to this elucidation in the context of Yang–Mills theories. (1) Yang–Mills theories, including quantum electrodynamics, form a class. They should be interpreted together. To focus on electrodynamics is potentially misleading. (2) The essential role of gauge and BRST symmetries is to provide a local field theory that can be quantized (...) and would be equivalent to the quantization of the non-local reduced theory. If this is correct, the gauge symmetry is significant, not so much because it implies ontological consequences, but because it allows us to quantize theories that we would not be able to quantize otherwise. Thus, in the context of Yang–Mills theories, it is essentially a pragmatic principle. This does not seem to be the case for the gauge symmetry in general relativity. (shrink)