The importance of emotions is supported by many authors of the ethics of care in contrast to the rationalistic paradigm of justice. However, the reference to the emotions remains generic. By focusing on three paradigmatic typologies, I propose to investigate this aspect further, and distinguish between the different emotions that motivate care. I will try, first, to offer a reflection on which emotions are likely to motivate ethical action within an ethics of care; second, to survey different potential obstacles to (...) these emotions and propose how they might be overcome to more successfully achieve good care and ethical action. (shrink)

The innovative characteristic of the book lies in its tackling the topic of individualism from the original point of view of a theory of passions. It underlines the importance of the problem of the passions both in forming individual identity and building the social bond. It proposes to contrast the pathological effects of egoistical passions , which are dominant in modernity, with empathetic and solidaristic passions, exemplified in the phenomenon of the gift.

Da sempre svalutato e marginalizzato dalla riflessione filosofica, il tema della cura č tornato a imporsi all'attenzione, particolarmente all'interno del pensiero femminista. A partire dal testo di Carol Gilligan In a different voice, si č sviluppato un dibattito che coinvolge molti approcci disciplinari. Ciň che tuttavia resta ancora inesplorato č il problema delle motivazioni che stanno a fondamento della relazione di cura. Qui la filosofia puň offrire il suo fondamentale contributo: riabilitare la cura significa ripensare il soggetto, per opporre al (...) paradigma moderno di un soggetto sovrano quello di un soggetto in relazione. La de-rimozione e la valorizzazione della costitutiva vulnerabilitÀ del soggetto consente di fondare l'universalitÀ della cura e di uscire dalla falsa alternativa tra individualismo e altruismo: vale a dire di pensare un soggetto capace di cura in quanto si riconosce a sua volta bisognoso di cura. (shrink)

The re-emergence of a diffuse need for community in the context of the global age compels us to rethink the concept of "community" in the light of the changes and transformations that are unfolding today. The community cannot be considered as a residual phenomenon of resistance to the processes of modernization, but must be recognized as a new phenomenon which accompanies the processes of globalization. The following contribution investigates the fundamental sources of the need for community in the world today, (...) and identifies principally two: 1) community as a response to the pathologies of individualism (insecurity, loss of meaning, atomism, loss of solidarity); 2) community as a response to the dynamics of exclusion that affect societies that are ever more multicultural in character. Also if community largely tends today to assume pathological forms that harbour the potential for conflict and violence, the need for community is legitimate insofar as it expresses a need for belonging and solidarity, a need for the affirmation of identities and a demand for recognition. In my view, the global era offers the bases for sharing in this sense insofar as it gives rise to the idea of the community of the human kind, a community united by interdependence of processes and events, brought together by its shared vulnerability in the face of the new risks and challenges that are produced by globalization. (shrink)

The first thesis of this article is that the concept of responsibility takes on an unprecedented meaning in the twentieth century resulting from the emergence of a new dimension of the other: to be responsible comes to mean not just to account for oneself in relation to the other, but also to take the other into account, to take care of the other—what I call responsibility towards (the other). The main reason for this change consists in the emergence of global (...) risks and the necessity, as underlined by Hans Jonas, to be responsible for the destiny of the world and future generations. The problem, as explored in the article’s second thesis, is that this implies the existence of a subject who is capable of responsibility. Jonas’s insights on this point are insufficient, since he only recognizes duty as the fundament for his ethics of responsibility and thus neglects the problem of motivation. This is a particularly crucial problem today as we are witnessing the presence of a pathological subject, characterized by a split in his faculties (between doing and imagining, knowing and feeling). To underline this fact, this article makes use of Günther Anders’s reflections, which provide a psycho-anthropological analysis of the subject, showing his pathologies and the necessity, from a moral perspective, to overcome his scission. Finally, this author suggests, as the article’s third thesis, that this overcoming is the necessary fundament for the perception of risk, which in turn reinstates the subject’s perception of his own vulnerability. Responsibility thus finds a motivation, which is neither altruistic nor duty-centred, in the awareness of our own vulnerability and the bond with the destiny of humankind as a whole. (shrink)