Hegel uses the term Einsicht (‘insight’) throughout several key subsections of Chapter Six of the Phenomenology of Spirit (notably in ‘Faith and Pure Insight’ and ‘The Struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition’). Nowhere else in his work does the term enjoy such a sustained treatment. Commentators generally accept Hegel’s use of the term in the Phenomenology as simply referring to the type of counter-religious reasoning found in the French Enlightenment. I show how Hegel derives the term, through the lens of (...) Kant’s essay, ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ from the Pantheismusstreit, the philosophical debate between Mendelssohn and Jacobi about knowledge of God. The Aufklärung provenance of Einsicht shows how a deep complicity between faith and reason, in the form of immediate knowing, leads beyond the Terror to a happier outcome in the Morality section. Finally, passing reference to Einsicht in the Vorbegriff of the Encyclopaedia Logic confirms its role in the ethical and political vocation of Hegel’s Science. (shrink)

Lessing's death in 1781 was a severe blow to Mendelssohn. Mendelssohn wrote his last two works to commemorate Lessing and to carry on the work to which they had dedicated much of their lives.

Salomon Maimon's Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie [Essay in Transcendental Philosophy] (1790) challenges and reworks Kant's arguments in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure Reason] (1785, 2nd ed. 1787) about the foundations of natural science and of Newtonian physics in particular. Kant himself was impressed both with Maimon's grasp of his critical project and also with the force of his challenge to it. While Maimon's significance on the later development of German Idealism is now widely acknowledged, another aspect of (...) Maimon's Versuch has not been fully appreciated, namely, its engagement with the central questions of the Spinozastreit [Spinoza Quarrel] that erupted in 1785 with the publication of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn [Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Moses Mendelssohn]. The Spinoza Quarrel centered on whether and to what extent philosophy's rational understanding of God needs to be grounded in an unmediated and suprarational revelatory experience. This paper is the first extended effort at placing Maimon's Versuch into the context of the Spinoza Quarrel. I argue that the Spinoza Quarrel and Maimon's self-proclaimed philosophical mission in response to it—the replacement of revealed faith by reason—deeply inform the goals he pursues in his Versuch. I show how Maimon's Versuch can be read as not only a response to Kant, but also to Jacobi's defense of the revelatory nature of sense experience in David Hume über den Glauben (1787), the book in which Jacobi offers his own skeptical challenge to Kant's Kritik. Situating Maimon's Versuch as a response to Friedrich Jacobi's David Hume allows us to understand how one of Maimon's objectives in his Versuch is to keep Jacobian Glaube [faith] at bay by demonstrating, using a revised Kantian framework, the conditions of the impossibility of experiencing miracles. (shrink)

An important feature of so-called rational decision making, at least in times of crisis, is arational: that is, our ability to decide manifests features of our characters or the values we hold rather than our reasoning abilities.1 Such a position stands in obvious opposition to the Western philosophical tradition. Consider, by comparison, the view of Immanuel Kant, who held that reason could, and perhaps sometimes ought to, operate independently of (and in opposition to) our sentiments. Contrary to Kant, William James (...) argues in "The Sentiment of Rationality" that arational mental states and phenomena—such as feelings, emotions, values, and attitudes—are indispensable to practical rationality (317). The attempt to .. (shrink)

Moses Mendelssohn was the leading Jewish thinker of the German Enlightenment and the founder of modern Jewish philosophy. His writings, especially his attempt during the Pantheism Controversy to defend the philosophical legacies of Spinoza and Leibniz against F. H. Jacobi’s philosophy of faith, captured the attention of a young Leo Strauss and played a critical role in the development of his thought on one of the fundamental themes of his life’s work: the conflicting demands of reason and revelation. _ (...) Leo Strauss on Moses Mendelssohn_ is a superbly annotated translation of ten introductions written by Strauss to a multi-volume critical edition of Mendelssohn’s work. Commissioned in Weimar Germany in the 1920s, the project was suppressed and nearly destroyed during Nazi rule and was not revived until the 1960s. In addition to Strauss’s introductions, Martin D. Yaffe has translated Strauss’s editorial remarks on each of the passages he annotates in Mendelssohn’s texts and brings those together with the introductions themselves. Yaffe has also contributed an extensive interpretive essay that both analyzes the introductions on their own terms and discusses what Strauss writes elsewhere about the broader themes broached in his Mendelssohn studies. Strauss’s critique of Mendelssohn represents one of the largest bodies of work by the young Strauss on a single thinker to be made available in English. It illuminates not only a formerly obscure phase in the emergence of his thought but also a critical moment in the history of the German Enlightenment. (shrink)

In the Antiatticista, as we call the scanty excerpt of a lexicon of the second century A.D., so abbreviated as to be often unintelligible, we find on p. 86. 20 the following article: Γενέσια оσης тε έоρтς &lsqbтς&rsqb δημотελоũς 〈έν &rsquoΑθήνααις, ΒоB7δρоγιѿνоς ΠέμΠтηι, Γενέσια καλоυένμς, καθόтι øησί Φιλόχоρоς καί Σόλων έν тоȊς &rsquoΑξоσι, καί тς тоũ όνόμαтоς χρήσεως оσης &rsquoΕλλ:ηνικς, тί κιλúει μή μόνоν έΠ тς δημотελоũς έоρтς á»á καί έΠί тςίδίας έκáσтоυ тáσσεσθα&iota. What rouses our interest in this note (...) is not the domestic quarrel between the Atticists of a stricter and of a more lenient observance about the meaning and the use of the word, but the facts themselves, which in the present case are fortunately clear enough. The lexicographer knows two entirely different facts: a material fact, the existence of a State festival in Athens called Genesia and celebrated on the 5th of Boedromion; a linguistic fact, the ’Ελλινικǹ χασις which denotes by Γενέσια not this State festival but some private celebration. For the latter, it is important to observe that by &rsquoΕλλνικ χασις the lexicographer does not mean Hellenistic Greek nor the usage of his own day, but the occurrence of the word in those authors whom the strict Atticists do not take as models of style, or who are not held to be Attic writers: it is to such authors, at least, that the lexicographer appeals in the preceding gloss: he there quotes ΕριΠίδης “Іωνι for γενέθλια and Herodotos for γενέσια. The latter passage could be the evidence for his linguistic fact, that ‘Hellenic usage’ applies the word γενέσια to a private celebration. (shrink)

Morning Hours is the first English translation of Morgenstunden by Moses Mendelssohn, the foremost Jewish thinker of the German Enlightenment. Published six months before Mendelssohn's death on January 4, 1786, Morning Hours is the most sustained presentation of his mature epistemological and metaphysical views, all elaborated in the service of presenting his son with proofs for the existence of God. But Morning Hours is much more than a theoretical treatise. It also plays a central role in the drama of the (...) Pantheismusstreit, Mendelssohn's "dispute" with F. H. Jacobi over the nature and scope of Lessing's attitude toward Spinoza and "pantheism". In Morning Hours Mendelssohn attempts to set the record straight regarding his beloved Lessing in this connection, not least by demonstrating the absence of any practical difference between theism and a "purified pantheism". (shrink)

Dieses Werk ist Teil der Buchreihe TREDITION CLASSICS. Der Verlag tredition aus Hamburg veroffentlicht in der Buchreihe TREDITION CLASSICS Werke aus mehr als zwei Jahrtausenden. Diese waren zu einem Grossteil vergriffen oder nur noch antiquarisch erhaltlich. Mit der Buchreihe TREDITION CLASSICS verfolgt tredition das Ziel, tausende Klassiker der Weltliteratur verschiedener Sprachen wieder als gedruckte Bucher zu verlegen - und das weltweit! Die Buchreihe dient zur Bewahrung der Literatur und Forderung der Kultur. Sie tragt so dazu bei, dass viele tausend Werke (...) nicht in Vergessenheit geraten. (shrink)

This scholarly edition is the first extensive English translation of Jacobi's major literary and philosophical classics. A key but somewhat eclipsed figure in the German Enlightenment, Jacobi had an enormous impact on philosophical thought in the later part of the eighteenth century, notably the way Kant was received And The early development of post-Kantian idealism. Jacobi's polemical tract Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn propelled him to notoriety in 1785. This work, As well as David (...) Hume on Faith, or Idealism and Realism, Jacobi to Fichte, And The novel Allwill, Is included in George di Giovanni's translation. In a comprehensive introductory essay di Giovanni situates Jacobi in the historical and philosophical context of his time, and shows how Jacobi's life and work reflect the tensions inherent in the late Enlightenment. (shrink)

“The Ethics of Belief,” by W.K. Clifford, explains the potential harm of believing just anything. In this chapter Stan Marsh shows off his critical thinking skills as he takes on TV psychics, various cults, and unsupported religious beliefs in a way that would've made Clifford proud. The chapter examines how Stan exposes the frauds and harms they bring, while defending scientific thinking and a healthy skepticism. Beliefs are acquired in various ways, most notably by observation and authority. Many people say (...) their beliefs, especially their religious beliefs, are based on faith. Stan realizes it's wrong to dismiss someone with unsupported beliefs as being stupid. He reminds us of Clifford's point that settling for easy answers not only weakens the mind, it prevents from finding real answers. In science, philosophy, and every rational pursuit where we require answers to questions, the spirit of inquiry—combined with hard work—is what leads to progress. (shrink)

In determining the time of Archilochos it is useless to begin with the eclipse—an event which strongly appeals to the modern mind, as it seems open to exact astronomical and mathematical computation. Even granted from the first and as a matter of course that Archilochos saw the eclipse and that it was total or nearly total in the place where he saw it, there are two objections: the astronomical data for the two eclipses of 711 B.C. and 648 B.C. are (...) as yet insufficient even for Paros and Thasos; we do not know for certain where the eclipse poem was written: probably it was in Paros, as the speaker is Lykambes, but it may be Thasos, not to mention Euboia, Crete, or Sicily. The whole thing is elusive, and Alan Blakeway, when he stated the case for 711—perhaps ‘too emphatically’, as he concedes—is quite clear in this respect. The most he affirms is that ‘there is nothing to choose between the two eclipses astronomically’; and what he asks for is a new examination of ‘the literary evidence without that unconscious bias in favour of the 648 B.C. eclipse which so far has influenced it’. That is quite a reasonable demand, and it is only with Blakeway's re-examination of the literary evidence that I find fault. (shrink)

In determining the time of Archilochos it is useless to begin with the eclipse—an event which strongly appeals to the modern mind, as it seems open to exact astronomical and mathematical computation. Even granted from the first and as a matter of course that Archilochos saw the eclipse and that it was total or nearly total in the place where he saw it, there are two objections: the astronomical data for the two eclipses of 711 B.C. and 648 B.C. are (...) as yet insufficient even for Paros and Thasos; we do not know for certain where the eclipse poem was written: probably it was in Paros, as the speaker is Lykambes, but it may be Thasos, not to mention Euboia, Crete, or Sicily. The whole thing is elusive, and Alan Blakeway, when he stated the case for 711—perhaps ‘too emphatically’, as he concedes—is quite clear in this respect. The most he affirms is that ‘there is nothing to choose between the two eclipses astronomically’; and what he asks for is a new examination of ‘the literary evidence without that unconscious bias in favour of the 648 B.C. eclipse which so far has influenced it’. That is quite a reasonable demand, and it is only with Blakeway's re-examination of the literary evidence that I find fault. (shrink)

God is good : the harmony between Judaism and enlightenment philosophy -- Philosophy and law : shaping Judaism for the modern world -- Either/or : Jacobi's attack on the moderate enlightenment -- Enlightenment reoriented : Mendelssohn's pragmatic religious idealism.

Metaphysics is a field where the positions of Kant and Mendelssohn differed significantly, from the essays for the Academy of Sciences right up to their last works. While Kant is increasingly doubtful of the objective validity of metaphysics and comes to admit only its subjective significance as a reflection of insuppressible human need, Mendelssohn continues to defend its objective validity with respect to sciences and natural theology. After reducing the valid proofs for the existence of God to the ontological argument, (...) Kant refuses this argument by means of his conception of existence as a position. Meanwhile, Mendelssohn upholds the legitimacy of such an argument and sees it as a bulwark against scepticism and Kant's paradox of the thing-in-itself. Notwithstanding these differences, they are allies in the defence of reason against visionary exaltation, as becomes apparent in the debate on spinozism between Hamann, Jacobi and Wizenmann on the one hand; and Mendelssohn on the other. The profound and pertinent dialogue between the two philosophers lasted more than 20 years and touched upon many subjects; such as the different methods in mathematics and philosophy, the philosophical meaning of intensive magnitude, the evidence, certainty and probability in metaphysics, natural theology and morals, reason, feeling and moral sense, pure religion and historical faiths, the meaning of human history. They agreed on attributing a fundamental role to freedom and on evaluating religions accordingly. Kant acknowledged the importance of M's Jerusalem for human emancipation. However; he criticised Judaism as a religion for slaves in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and so misunderstood M's affection for his own faith. They were also at variance over the progress of the human race; while Kant subscribed to the optimistic point of view and linked the efforts for human betterment to confidence in the progressive improvement of the human race even in the moral sphere, Mendelssohn rejected this evolutionary scheme and insisted upon the originality and diversity of human beings in different civilisations and times. Their differences were far from being resolved and the interest in Mendelssohn's thought during the Idealist period and later gives clear evidence of that. (shrink)

Performing reason: Mendelssohn on Judaism and enlightenment -- Jacobi and Mendelssohn: the tragedy of a messianic friendship -- In the year of the Lord 1800: Rosenzweig and the Spinoza quarrel -- Reinhold and Kant: the quest for a new religion of reason -- Beautiful life: Mendelssohn, Hegel, and Rosenzweig -- Mendelssohn, Rosenzweig, and political theology: beyond sovereign violence -- Beyond 1800: an immigrant Rosenzweig.

This manuscript provides a revisionist reading of Hegelâ (TM)s 1802 essay, Faith and Knowledge, in which he critiques the various reconciliations of faith and reason proposed by his immediate predecessors and contemporary faith philosophers â " namely, Kant, Jacobi, Schleiermacher and Fichte. Hegelâ (TM)s agonistic interpretation of these â oereflective philosophers of subjectivity, â who he reads as settling for a form of reason that is â oeno longer worthy of the nameâ and a version of faith that â (...) oeno longer seems worth the bother, â not only demonstrates his growing facility with the dialectical method for which he is best known but it also anticipates his own speculative reconciliation of faith and reason. To view Hegelâ (TM)s reading of his predecessors as a series of misreadings, which is not uncommon among scholars of 19th century German philosophy, misses the most instructive aspect of this early but formative essay: Hegel, who was viewed by others if not also by himself as a philosophical latecomer, appropriated the thought of his precursors with an eye toward overcoming them. (shrink)

In this chapter we explore the importance of the Pantheism Controversy for the evolution of Kant’s so-called “Moral Argument” for the Highest Good and its postulates. After an initial discussion of the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason, we move on to the relationship between faith and reason in the Pantheism Controversy, Kant’s response to the Controversy in his 1786 “Orientation” Essay, Thomas Wizenmann’s criticisms of that essay, and finally to the Critique of Practical Reason. We argue (...) that while Kant used the Pantheism Controversy to reset his account of the Highest Good, its treatment in the Orientation Essay was susceptible to the objections raised by Thomas Wizenmann, and thus in need of the further advances found in the Critique of Practical Reason. (shrink)

This paper places Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason within the historical context of the pantheism controversy between Mendelssohn and Jacobi. I argue that reading Religion with this context in mind shines new light upon passages connected with the need for a moral archetype and prototype in the form of Christ, as well as various comments upon the relation between Christianity and Judaism. Within this new viewpoint, we can also see Religion as ultimately concerned with promoting Christianity, (...) broadly understood, as the most appropriate historical vehicle for the promulgation of rational religion, and thus as a cornerstone of the Enlightenment project. (shrink)

The great value of this book does not lie in any new discovery but in its being the most comprehensive monograph to date on the major ideas of Jacobi's thinking as well as on the relationship of the "philosopher of faith" to the leading German thinkers of his time. The first chapters are devoted to a subtle analysis—focussing mainly on his novels—of the moral aspirations underlying his philosophical oeuvre. The next major theme is the well-known polemics with M. Mendelssohn on (...) Lessing's alleged Spinozism—and this is a good pretext for Prof. Verra to display his vast learning by passing in review the views of Herder, Gœthe, and Hegel on Spinoza and continuously referring to the highly important book of Heydenreich. The last three chapters deal with Jacobi's "mature" thought centered around the problem of an intuitive knowledge of reality and his violent polemics against philosophical demonstration as such, which leads necessarily—according to him—to Spinozistic pantheism, i.e., atheism. It is in these chapters that Jacobi's criticism of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling is treated. The footnotes are at the end of the chapters, and they should be read separately. They are sheer delight for anyone a little at home in this period of German intellectual history. There is also a forty page appendix: the bibliography of Jacobi's letters of which not less than 1291 are known to Prof. Verra.—M. J. V. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Werke, and: Vol. 1, Schriften zum Spinozastreit (1998), and: Vol. 2, Schriften zum transzendentalen Idealismus (2004), and: Vol. 3, Schriften zum Streit um die göttlichen Dinge und ihre Offenbarung (2000)Rolf AhlersFriedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Werke. Edited by Klaus Hammacher and Walter Jaeschke. Vol. 1, Schriften zum Spinozastreit ( 1998). Vol. 2, Schriften zum transzendentalen Idealismus ( 2004). Vol. 3, Schriften zum Streit um die göttlichen Dinge und ihre Offenbarung (...) ( 2000). Pp. x + 640. Cloth, € 168,00 (Vol. 1). Pp. vii + 823. Cloth, € 264,00 (Vol. 2). Pp. vi + 262. Cloth, € 78,00 (Vol. 3). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998, 2000, 2004.The new critical Jacobi Werke Ausgabe (JWA), accompanied by four volumes of the still incomplete Briefwechsel (in progress at Frommann-Holzboog Publishers since 1981), is a masterpiece of research on Jacobi, early German Idealism and early Romanticism. Now [End Page 491] available are Volumes I, II and III. Volume I (1998) carries the title Schriften zum Spinozastreit and contains Jacobi's Spinozabriefe in the three editions of 1785, 1789, and 1819, Wider Mendelssohns Beschuldigungen of 1786, and the Vorbericht (Preface) of the third edition of the Spinozabriefe of 1819. The running text of all writings contains all editions, variant readings clearly identifiable with page references in the margins, subscripted to identify the various editions. This method enables the identification of various disputes which Jacobi provoked and in which his writings played a role. The Anhang, appendix, to all texts contains a) a list of abbreviations, and b) the editorial principles used and also a description of the circumstances leading to the writing of the texts. But the bulk of the Anhang of each volume is c) the "Kommentar," the commentary. It provides the key to the highly nuanced and, without guidance, the often cryptic allusions and references of Jacobi's texts. This commentary (separately bound in Volumes I and II) really brings Jacobi's work to life. The end of the Anhang contains d) a bibliography of all works mentioned not only by Jacobi himself but also emerging in the literary debate unlocked by the commentary, as well as e) an extensive index of names. Volume II (2004) is Schriften zur Transzendentalphilosophie, and contains David Hume of 1787, the Sendschreiben an Fichte, Ueberflüssiges Taschenbuch, both of 1799, and other essays such as Three Letters to Köppen of 1803. Volume III (2000) is Schriften zum Streit um die Göttlichen Dinge and contains mainly the famous essay Von den Göttlichen Dingen of 1811 plus three other writings. This book deals with the controversy between Schelling and Jacobi while both were at Munich. Other major works of Jacobi, such as the novel Allwill, are to follow in later volumes.This critical edition of Fr. H. Jacobi (1743–1819) definitively revises the standard interpretation of the man and his work. The standard interpretation (advocated by such figures as Fr. Schlegel, Moses Mendelssohn, and H. Heine) views his thought as promoting irrationalism, specifically a religious irrationalism of faith, taking form in "personalism." Heine spoke of Jacobi as a "whiney old biddy." Fr. Schlegel characterized Jacobi's salto mortale as the "leap into the arms of divine mercy," promoting an irrational "philosophical non-philosophy" (KFSA XVIII 13, Nr. 101). Schlegel criticized Jacobi at the very end of in his Woldemar Review of 1796 thus: "So (Jacobi's) Woldemar is really an invitation to meet God..., and (his) theological masterpiece ends, as do all moral excesses, with a salto mortale... into the abyss of divine mercy" (Früher Idealismus und Frühromantik PlS I.1, ed. W. Jaeschke [Hbg: Meiner, 1995], 270). Carl Philipp Moritz credited Jacobi with "fanaticism and superstition."In contrast, Jacobi himself was quite critical of this characterization of his thought, especially in the Sendschreiben of 1799, and earlier in his Briefe. Jacobi already in 1786 thought it was "outrageous" for Mendelssohn to suggest he surrenders a philosophy of reason in favor of the Christian faith, or worse. He addresses this problem, which is still today the dominant view of the "irrationality" of his "leap," with admirable clarity in his letter to Neeb of May 30, 1817: "I do not at all advocate a head-first... (shrink)

Firstly, this article will examine in the text of 1786, Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren?, the chaining of the argumentation used by Kant to reply to the critique arised during the pantheism controversy about the passage from the finite to the infinite which became manifest in Germany in 1785 with the publication of: Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, where the author shows that his moral argument of God offers an alternative for (...) both the supernatural anti-rationalism of Jacobi and the uncritical rationalism of Mendelssohn. And it also intends to examine the critique of Jacobi to the text above mentioned of Kant contained in Appendix of the: David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, ein Gespräch. (shrink)

The theologians of the late German Enlightenment saw in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason a new rational defence of their Christian faith. In fact, Kant's critical theory of meaning and moral law totally subverted the spirit of that faith. This challenging new study examines the contribution made by the Critique of Pure Reason to this change of meaning. George di Giovanni stresses the revolutionary character of Kant's critical thought but also reveals how this thought was being held hostage to unwarranted (...) metaphysical assumptions that caused much confusion and rendered the First Critique vulnerable to being reabsorbed into modes of thought typical of Enlightenment popular philosophy. Amongst the striking features of this book are nuanced interpretations of Jacobi and Reinhold, a lucid exposition of Fichte's early thought, and a rare, detailed account of Enlightenment popular philosophy. (shrink)

The theologians of the late German Enlightenment saw in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason a new rational defence of their Christian faith. In fact, Kant's critical theory of meaning and moral law totally subverted the spirit of that faith. This challenging new study examines the contribution made by the Critique of Pure Reason to this change of meaning. George di Giovanni stresses the revolutionary character of Kant's critical thought but also reveals how this thought was being held hostage to unwarranted (...) metaphysical assumptions that caused much confusion and rendered the First Critique vulnerable to being reabsorbed into modes of thought typical of Enlightenment popular philosophy. Amongst the striking features of this book are nuanced interpretations of Jacobi and Reinhold, a lucid exposition of Fichte's early thought, and a rare, detailed account of Enlightenment popular philosophy. (shrink)

Faith is a central attitude in Christian religious practice. The problem of faith and reason is the problem of reconciling religious faith with the standards for our belief-forming practices in general (‘ordinary epistemic standards’). In order to see whether and when faith can be reconciled with ordinary epistemic standards, we first need to know what faith is. This chapter examines and catalogues views of propositional faith: faith that p. It is concerned with the epistemology of such faith: what cognitive attitudes (...) does such faith require, what epistemic norms govern these attitudes, and whether Christian faith can ever adhere to them. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the extent to which philosophical and theological debates concerning the concept of nothingness have shaped the contours of the debate between faith and reason in modern times. First, I argue that Parmenides, the most famous contributor to the question of nothingness, bequeaths conclusions to the tradition that are more ambivalent than usually recognized. Second, I show that nothingness re-enters philosophical debate in the West due to the role the notion plays in the Trinitarian debate in (...) the early Christian church. Third, I argue that Descartes’s method of radical doubt and assertion of the existence of his own ego provide the contours of a response to the question of nothingness that is characteristic of modern thought. I conclude by gesturing towards a constructive proposal of my own. (shrink)

Paul Guyer's Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant is the product of over forty years of scholarly research. Guyer published his first article in 1976 and his first book in 1979. His work has encompassed the whole of Kant's corpus: while he began his career writing on Kant's aesthetics, he was concerned even then with the epistemological and practical contours of Kant's thinking. His subsequent work takes up these aspects of Kant's thought directly. Methodologically, too, Guyer's work has situated (...) his close analysis of Kant's texts within the context of contemporaneous debates of Kant's immediate predecessors. Reason and Experience in Mendelssohn and Kant bears the hallmarks of a... (shrink)

This study explored the extent to which perceived changes in religiosity from before to during the COVID-19 pandemic are associated with flourishing. Participants from a diverse set of faith communities in two United States metropolitan regions completed an online survey between October and December 2020. The survey included items capturing perceived changes in four dimensions of religiosity and a multidimensional measure of flourishing. Based on multilevel regressions, results indicated that self-reported decreases in each dimension of religiosity were associated with lower (...) overall flourishing. This pattern of findings was largely similar for the domains of flourishing, with some variation in the strength of associations that emerged. An increase in frequency of religious service attendance was associated with lower overall flourishing and lower scores on selected domains of flourishing, indicating possible evidence of religious coping. Faith communities might have to find ways of supporting members during the challenging COVID-19 period to prevent long-term declines in flourishing. (shrink)

This paper considers the increasingly common suggestion that a new form of warfare has emerged. It clarifies the notion of new wars and responds to an argument for the claim that in order to achieve military parity non-state actors must violate just war principles. I reject the claim that violation of just war principles is necessary and argue that we can make reasonable normative judgments about new wars in terms of just war theory. From there, I consider the possibility that (...) military parity can be achieved in a way that does not violate these principles and argue that it is permissible for relatively weak non-state actors to fight with fewer restrictions than conventional states. (shrink)

This paper considers the increasingly common suggestion that a new form of warfare has emerged. It clarifies the notion of new wars and responds to an argument for the claim that in order to achieve military parity non-state actors must violate just war principles. I reject the claim that violation of just war principles is necessary and argue that we can make reasonable normative judgments about new wars in terms of just war theory. From there, I consider the possibility that (...) military parity can be achieved in a way that does not violate these principles and argue that it is permissible for relatively weak non-state actors to fight with fewer restrictions than conventional states. (shrink)

Examining a series of modernist thinkers and composers who engaged with non-European cultures as they pursued pure sound as a privileged presence, White Musical Mythologies pairs Erik Satie with Bergson, Edgard Varèse with Bataille, Pierre Boulez with Artaud, and John Cage with Derrida to offer an ambitious intellectual history of the colonial roots of modernist musical thought. Each of the musicians studied in this book re-created or appropriated non-European forms of expression as they conceived music ontologically, often thinking music as (...) something immediate and immersive: from Satie's dabblings with mysticism and exoticism in bohemian Montmartre of the 1890s to Varèse's experience of ethnographic exhibitions and surrealist poetry in 1930s Paris, and from Boulez's endeavor to theorize a kind of musical writing that would "absorb" the sounds of non-European musical traditions to Cage, who took inspiration from Eastern thought as he wrote about sound, silence, and chance. Edmund Mendelssohn suggests that the Euro-American idea of "pure sound," and the twentieth-century quest to produce it, was premised on an assumed authority of "the West" over Europe's others. Intended for readers in philosophy, musicology, art theory, the history of modernism, sound studies, and postcolonial studies, this book demonstrates that we cannot fully understand French theory in its novelty and complexity without music and sound. (shrink)

This book is an explanation and defence of a veiw of faith and reason that is found in the writings of Kierkegaard, a view often termed as fideism. The author distinguishes indefensible forms of fideism that involve a rejection of reason from a fideism that requires that reason becomeself-critical. An understanding of the limits of reason requires both an understanding of faith as above reason, as in Aquinas and Kant, and also as against what is taken as rational by most (...) human beings.The fiedeistic view of faith as involving a critique of reason is illustrated by concrete discussions of three traditional topics in the philosophy of religion: knowledge of God's existence, the problem of evil and the question as to how someone could know that a particular religion could be basedon a revelation from God.The book presents a careful distinction between different kinds of fideism, with a critical rejection of some kinds and a defence of others. The author shows that fideism does not have to be understood as a rejection of reason, rather as a critique of the limits of reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:272 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY than most that his great original intellects cannot be crammed into any conceptual pigeonhole. By juxtaposing them all as he does he deepens our understanding of each. ALAN B. SPITZER State University o/ Iowa Alla Soglia Dell" et~ Romantica. By A. Pupi. (Milan: Vitae pensiero, 1962. L. 3000.) Pupi's object in this book, At the Dawn o/the Romantic Age, is to recapture the milieu and (...) the personalities of those who had what Kant called "rational faith." The two main issues of the polemics which produced the Kantian theory of the supremacy of practical reason are formulated in Jacobi's and Mendelssohn's philosophies. Jacobi, rejecting Spinozism as atheism, appeals to faith as an element of all human knowledge and of reality (p. 49), using Kant to justify his appeal to practical faith and in this way evading the Kryptokatholicismus of which he was accused (p. 230). Mendelssohn, on the other hand, denies the existence of things in themselves, mistaking, according to Jacobi's version of Kant (p. 210), Kant's theory of the limits of human knowledge for a theory of knowledge as such (p. 279). Meanwhile, in the face of the fall of philosophical reason, Hamann praises reason as "God's original light" (p. 225). These are the terms of the polemic created by Kant's short treatise, What Does It Mean to See One's Way Clearly? We must never forget these sayings because "the Kantian language and other great systematic formulations are always based on them and have an organic continuity through the circular medium of men's daily and concrete speech" (p. 214). Kant intervenes in the dispute with the notion of Vernun/tglaube whose Griinde should be interpreted as the very nature of reason (p. 289). However, while we may interpret the word "opinion" (Meinung) as knowledge (Wissen), when the objective Griinde are given, the VernunItglaube will always be a Glaube because it is based only on "ge[iihltes Bediir[nis der VernunIt," and consequently its Grund must be taken as only subjective (pp. 288--290). What Kant wants to point out is that "thought detached from experience (pure reason) is no longer able to show that it knows reality, but it can see its own way in the sphere of the possible" (pp. 283--284); however, the Vernuntt of the Vernun/tglaube is neither the speculative and demonstrative reason, as Mendelssohn supposed, nor an obscure intuition "without the consent of reason," called "faith" by Jacobi. This is, in short, the theme of the book. I cannot agree with the author's thesis that the Kantian supremacy of practical reason settled the issue in the age-old dispute between philosophy and faith (p. 275). The very protest of Wizemann, which the author cannot omit, is an example of it, and certainly this was not the only protest; it was followed by lively criticism, particularly by Schelling, who soon expressed himself in his Philosophical Letters. See particularly the first letter (on p. 8 of the Italian Edition by G. Semerari, Florence: 1958). I think too that this attempt to make practice the objective guaranty of theoretical philosophy is somewhat problematic, all the more if one admits the impossibility of a theoretic reasoning about God's existence only in practice. It seems to me that the author, whose strict and relevant philology is admirable, leaves out too much of the theoretic problematicity of the subjects he faces, as, for instance, the ambiguity of the talk about faith, which is formally assertive but really hypothetical; the assertiveness, if practical, should be justified in action, not in talk. In consequence of his recourse to practice as a last resort for justification, Kant is compared to Pascal by Goldmann, who sees in both of them the theme of the "wager" (see pp. 445-446, Le Dieu Cachd, Paris, 1955) which shows, to my mind, the problematicity of the whole matter. This cannot be settled merely by historical exposition. The limitation of Pupi's study, though philologically rich and detailed, lies, according to BOOK REVIEWS 273 my judgment, in the fact that he has limited the historical inquiry to the scholarly study of documents and... (shrink)

In his 1786 essay on the pantheism controversy, ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’, Kant implies that ‘the maxim of reason's self-preservation [Selbsterhaltung]’ is reason's first principle for orienting itself in thinking supersensible objects. But Kant does not clearly explain what the maxim or principle of reason's self-preservation is and how it fits into his larger project of critical philosophy. Nor does the secondary literature. This article reconstructs Kant's discussion of the principle of reason's self-preservation in (...) ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ It suggests that this principle is best understood as the discipline of pure reason. The principle of reason's self-preservation performs the same methodological function that Kant assigns to the discipline of pure reason. This principle establishes the rule of law in reason and subjects reason to its own laws. In so doing, it prevents reason's dialectical errors and also grounds reason's faith (Vernunftglaube), which in turn systematically conditions the practical use of reason. (shrink)

Charles Hodge engaged the leading thinkers of his day to defend the human ability to know God. This involved him in affirming the importance of both orthodoxy and piety in the life of a Christian. His work involved expanding on the insights of the Westminster Confession of Faith as it applied to the theory of salvation and the role of Christ.

The topics of Questions i-iv of St. Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius are of vital interest to the Christian philosopher and theologian. Written while Aquinas was a youthful Master of Theology, the Questions show his solidarity with Christian tradition, his wide acquaintance with Scripture and the Fathers of the Church, and his creative use of philosophy in addressing theological issues. Question i treats of the possibility of our knowing God, and the human limitations of this knowledge. (...) Question ii concerns theology as a science which reaches out to God by faith in his revealed word and uses philosophical reasoning to throw light on the contents of revelation. In Question iii Aquinas takes up the nature of faith, showing its relation to religion and its necessity for the welfare of the human race. He argues for the catholicity or universality of the Christian faith and defends the orthodox teaching of the trinity of Persons in the one God. Question iv turns to a set of philosophical problems occasioned by Boethius' treatise on the Trinity: the factors that cause a plurality in genera, species and individuals. In this connection Aquinas makes one of his most controversial statements of the principle of individuation. (shrink)

F. H. Jacobi (1743–1819), a key figure in the philosophical debates at the close of the eighteenth century in Germany, has long been regarded as an irrationalist for allegedly advocating a blind 'leap of faith'. The central claim of this essay is that this venerable charge is misplaced. Following a reconstruction of what a charge of irrationalism might amount to, two of Jacobi's most important works, the "Spinoza Letters" (1785) and "David Hume" (1787), are scrutinized for traces of irrationalism. Far (...) from being an irrationalist, Jacobi is best read as questioning the analytical-geometrical model of rationality popular among his contemporaries, and of proposing a more naturalistic theory of rationality that situates it more firmly in human psychology, the ultimate import of which lies in a reconceptualization of the relation between faith and reason. (shrink)

F. H. Jacobi , a key figure in the philosophical debates at the close of the eighteenth century in Germany, has long been regarded as an irrationalist for allegedly advocating a blind ‘leap of faith’. The central claim of this essay is that this venerable charge is misplaced. Following a reconstruction of what a charge of irrationalism might amount to, two of Jacobi's most important works, the Spinoza Letters and David Hume , are scrutinized for traces of irrationalism. Far from (...) being an irrationalist, Jacobi is best read as questioning the analytical-geometrical model of rationality popular among his contemporaries, and of proposing a more naturalistic theory of rationality that situates it more firmly in human psychology, the ultimate import of which lies in a reconceptualization of the relation between faith and reason. (shrink)

A gênese histórica da paróquia e seu desenvolvimento estrutural em relação à história da Igreja é a problemática central à qual este texto está subordinado. Por esta razão, o texto parte da etimologia do termo paróquia à compreensão de suas origens e matrizes dentro da concepção do cristianismo nascente e em suas raízes bíblicas, sem a pretensão de apresentar críticas e reformulações da estrutura paroquial. O respectivo trabalho toma como alicerce os decorrentes períodos e fatos históricos da Igreja para caracterizar (...) e contextualizar o desenvolvimento da paróquia que, desde os primórdios, está subordinada a estruturas de autoridades eclesiais. O seguinte texto vale-se de documentos importantes que contextualizam a visão, função e organização da paróquia como parte fundamentalmente integrante do corpo eclesial, bem como conceituam juridicamente esta comunidade de fé, célula da Igreja Particular. Após um apanhado geral da genealogia eclesiástica, com o desenvolvimento paroquial no seu interior, o presente trabalho atem-se a contextualizar a visão que a paróquia assumiu dentro da eclesiologia do XXI Concílio Ecumênico da Igreja Católica, o Concílio Vaticano II e do Código do Direito Canônico de 1983 em comparação com o Código Pio-beneditino. Com isso, o presente texto intui proporcionar fundamentos a futuros estudos e questionar a efemeridade. (shrink)