The article tries to reconstruct the Wirkungsgeschichte of the De pace fidei and it focuses on some fundamental moments of its fate. Nicholas of Cusa was one of the first not just to recognize other religions' value, but also to individuate a source of richness in religious pluralism. His work had fortune since the years after its draft, the 1453, known and quoted by Eimerico da Campo, Giovanni of Segovia, Juan de Torquemada and Pope Pius II. The debate, alive and (...) still open, around the possible influence of the work to Italian humanistic context is reconstructed, in particular about Pico and Ficino. Trusted traces of reception of the work can be individuated in France, in authors like Bodin and Postel. Finally the article is focused on modern fate of the work in Germany: beyond the cultural contest into reception and translation had done, the work analyze the reception by the German philosopher Lessing and on his comparison with Cusanian ideas about the vision of tolerance elaborated by the last one. (shrink)

Humans have this extraordinary cognitive ability: They imagine inexistent objects, they treat them as if they were real, and by doing so they make them real. They thus give rise to a shared institutional reality that enables them to cooperate in ways that would be impossible otherwise. In this paper, we would like to revisit the account that HLA Hart gives of the practice of collective acceptance that makes a legal system possible. We try to provide an explanation of what (...) Hart calls the ‘internal point of view’, on the basis of experiments on institutional concepts, drawing on the paradigm known as ‘embodied cognition’. Experts and non-experts in law rated the role of several cognitive dimensions for a list of words referring to two kinds of abstract concepts (institutional and theoretical/scientific) and two kinds of concrete ones (food and artifact). Institutional concepts were distinguished into pure-institutional (e.g., ‘contract’, ‘state’, ‘property’) and meta-institutional (e.g., ‘norm’, ‘duty’, ‘justice’). The results provide an empirical account of how our way of thinking about institutions changes as we acquire expertise in the legal field, thus shading light on the cognitive underpinnings of the ‘internal point of view’. (shrink)

Monads, mirrors and minds. Mathematical thinking and “imago Dei” in the work of Nicholas of Cusa. This article introduces Nicholas of Cusa monadic vision of reality: the world acquires sense and value as contraction Dei, that is the ability of God’s infinite power to concentrate, individualise and actualise itself in each and every created thing by the infinite divine power. In the universal explicatio Dei the human mens has an exclusive and privileged role: it is not mere explication, but living (...) imago Dei. The mind is defined by Nicholas of Cusa on the base of the ability to give mensura, dimension of everything: the mind measures as numerates. However our mind numerates and knows, measuring, everything on the base of a Mathematics that originates things which is the one of divine mind. The human mind is image of God’s one inasmuch this one creates everything on the base of divine Mathematics while the human mind knows everything on the base of the Mathematics generated by itself. (shrink)

The article is about a theme in part neglected in part controversial of the interpretation of sources of Nicholas of Cusa thought: the platonic work and more specifically the dialogue Parmenides. The author examines the whole Cusanus’ work, annotations to platonic work included. In particular the article underlines a platonic presence in Nicholas of Cusa thought, directly come from the reading of Parmenides. Later the author focalizes his attention on Nicholas of Cusa dialogue de non aliud, getting to argue the (...) thesis that Cusanus had directly known different platonic dialogues and in specific the Parmenides and he deeply understood it, however he followed mostly Proclus’ interpretation of dialogue and platonic thought. In the second part, the article reconstructs the critics that Nicholas of Cusa moves to Plato, specifically when he ascribes to God a way of acting by necessity and not beeing able to catch the trinity of the One. The author proves philologically and speculatively how Nicholas of Cusa elaborates his own conception of the One by a critique dialogue with Plato and Proclus’ positions, making an original afterthought of the neoplatonic tradition. The core of Nicholas of Cusa conception is the idea of the One or God as freedom, freedom thought as the essence, not a mere divine attribute. Nicholas of Cusa elaborates his own freedom of the One conception by a double dimension: related to both world’s creation and trinitarian genesis of Himself. In the Nicholas of Cusa vision, Trinity and freedom contribute to define the essence itself of the One, even though Cusanus does not never forget the Deus absconditus is transcendent than itself Deus revelatus. Accord to Cusanus God as infinite is beyond One itself and Trinity itself. (shrink)

C'è un particolare che può apparire secondario, ma che assume un'importanza fondamentale per la ricostruzione della vicenda personale di Giordano Bruno. Si tratta dell'abito monacale.

La personalità di Shitao, pittore cinese attivo durante l’inizio della dinastia Qing, merita di essere compresa nella comparazione della sua particolare vita, del suo lavoro artistico – soprattutto nella fase di piena espressione, – e dei pensieri filosofici che ha rivelato nei suoi Discorsi sulla pittura. A partire dall’unione di questi fattori, Shitao stesso stabilì un legame tra l’«unico tratto di pennello» e l’olistica fusione del suo spirito con la natura.

This article deals with the methodologies commonly used in the framework of the structural approach to social representations. It concerns free and hierarchical evocations, the characterization questionnaire, the similarity analysis, the basic cognitive schemes model, the attribute-challenge technique and the test of context independence. More than a simple review of these methodologies, it offers a critical approach concerning the problems encountered and related to: thresholds or “cutoff points” used to diagnose the structure and the accuracy of the structural diagnosis, grouping (...) methods employed to reduce the corpus of verbal associations, the dilemma between reliability and feasibility, especially in field research, the adequacy and number of modalities of response in the framework of the structural diagnosis. Following this evaluation, this article suggests potential solutions to overcome these methodological limitations. Moreover, as methodological issues are closely related to theoretical questions, the link between social representation theory and identity approaches is discussed. (shrink)

Artefacts are usually understood in contrast with natural kinds and conceived as a unitary kind. Here we propose that there is in fact a variety of artefacts: from the more concrete to the more abstract ones. Moreover, not every artefact is able to fulfil its function thanks to its physical properties: Some artefacts, particularly what we call “institutional” artefacts, are symbolic in nature and require a system of rules to exist and to fulfil their function. Adopting a standard method to (...) measure conceptual representation (the property generation task), we have experimentally explored how humans conceptualise these different kinds of artefacts. Results indicate that institutional artefacts are typically opposed to social objects, while being more similar to standard artefacts, be they abstract or concrete. (shrink)

In this paper I take it for granted that legal institutions are artifacts. In general, this can very well be considered a trivial thesis in legal philosophy. As trivial as this thesis may be, however, to my knowledge no legal philosopher has attempted an analysis of the peculiar reality of legal phenomena in terms of the reality of artifacts, and this is particularly striking because there has been much discussion about artifacts in general philosophy (specifically analytic metaphysics) over the last (...) twenty years. In particular, the concepts of intention, function, plan of action, and history are in competition to explain the ontology of artifacts, and a similar competition can be found at the core of legal theory. Such a striking parallelism between the domain of artifacts and that of legal institutions is a clue for legal ontology that deserves further attention: I will offer my own interpretation of this parallelism in the first part of this paper (Sections 2 and 3). In providing a theory of legal institutions as artifacts, one could be led to the conclusion that law is essentially an artificial phenomenon, something which does not bear any significant relationship to the natural domain. However, I think that such a conclusion would be mistaken. In fact, this is the second thesis I want to explore in this paper: not only that legal institutions are artifacts, but also that they can be artifacts which in some sense "mirror," or imitate, some descriptions of the natural, pre-social reality we live in. What I would like to show is not that legal institutions are "natural" in the sense that they have some feature which is not human-dependent, as some natural law theorists would say, but rather that their conceptual content can depend on our conceptualization of the natural domain despite being entirely artifactual. This is what I will call the "institutional mimesis" behind several important instances of legal artifacts, and I will deal with it in the second part of this paper (Sections 4 and 5). (shrink)

Being part of the life of institutions requires a considerable amount of conceptual knowledge. In institutional settings, we must learn the relevant concepts to act meaningfully, and these concepts are internal in a peculiar way, namely, they are strictly relative to the rules of a given institution because they are constituted by those rules. However, institutions do not come out of nothing: They are inscribed in a social setting and this setting determines, at least in a broad sense, what is (...) the nature of the institution. Our social life therefore creates more or less defined contexts for meaningful institutional activities, and these contexts in their own turn involve concepts. In this paper, I address this question by distinguishing between three kinds of concepts relevant for an institution and trying to identify the different relations that these concepts have with constitutive rules. I then proceed to explain how this distinction can improve our understanding of practical reasoning in institutional context. (shrink)

Context has always been central to Searle’s account of constitutive rules, as can be appreciated from his classic formulation, ‘X counts as Y in context C.’ But while the nature of X and Y in Searle have been widely discussed, the role of the context in which Y is constituted on the basis of X has not. So, in this paper, I will discuss how context shapes the process of constituting and creating meaning through rules and how, in doing so, (...) it affects the regulative action of constitutive rules. I extract from this argument the general thesis that the two main questions concerning constitutive rules-namely, ‘How can they be constitutive of meaning?’ and ‘How can they be rules even so, despite their constitutive role?’-can be solved by looking at the wider context, or ‘practice,’ within which these rules are framed, and that such an approach can give us further insight into the functioning of institutions. (shrink)

Although the notion of constitutive rule has played an important role in the metaphysical debate in social and legal philosophy, several authors perceive it as somewhat mysterious and ambiguous: the idea of a specific kind of rules that are supposed to be “magically” constitutive of reality seems suspicious, more a rationalistic fiction than a genuine explanation. For these reasons, reductionist approaches have been put forward to deflate the explanatory role of this notion. In this paper, I will instead try to (...) defend constitutive rules. My thesis is that the notion of constitutive rule is explanatorily helpful because it gives a complete account of an important phenomenon in the social and legal domain, namely, that of artifactual entities endowed with statuses that can have emergent normative properties. Conceiving of these entities as rule-constituted artifacts is an important part of what H. L. A. Hart called “the internal point of view” toward law, and for this reason constitutive rules should be included in an explanation of that point of view as an integral part of the life of institutions. The structure of my argument will be as follows. First, I will provide an example of an important phenomenon in the internal point of view, namely, the fact that individuals can have normative reactions not about the specific regulation of an institution but about its underlying purpose and rationale—what in the legal domain is called the ratio of a norm. Then I will identify two reductionistic approaches on constitutive rules. The first approach is exemplified by Brian Epstein’s idea that the phenomena explained by constitutive rules are better explained in terms of metaphysical (grounding/anchoring) relations. The second kind of reductionism is instead exemplified by the idea (held by several authors, among whom Alf Ross, Riccardo Guastini, Frank Hindriks, and Francesco Guala) that the phenomena explained by constitutive rules can be accounted for in terms of regulative rules plus a certain terminology. I will try to show that neither of these approaches can explain normative reactions to the ratio of an institution from an internal point of view: While the first cannot explain the fact that the reaction is strongly normative, the second cannot explain the fact that the reaction is about the ratio of a normative entity. Constitutive rules can instead explain both things and should be preserved as an important notion for the analysis of institutional ontology. By way of constitutive rules we create something: immaterial, rule-based institutional artifacts that can have emergent normative properties. (shrink)

The introduction of Linear Logic extends the Curry-Howard Isomorphism to intensional aspects of the typed functional programming. In particular, every formula of Linear Logic tells whether the term it is a type for, can be either erased/duplicated or not, during a computation. So, Linear Logic can be seen as a model of a computational environment with an explicit control about the management of resources.

There is at least one immediate sense in which legal discourse is perspectival: it qualifies acts and facts in the world on the basis of rules. Legal concepts are for the most part constituted by rules, both in the sense that rules define these concepts’ semantic content and that, in order to engage with legal practice, we must act according to those rules, not necessarily complying with them but at least having them in mind. This is the distinctive perspective of (...) law: however, it would be misleading to think that this is the only perspective we can have in legal discourse. That of rule-constituted legal concepts is the fundamental perspective -- the inevitable presupposition of most legal assertions -- but other perspectives are possible on top of this fundamental background: perspectives on law, stemming from the basic perspective of law. -/- In this paper, I will try to argue that some different perspectives regarding law can be accounted for by analyzing different kinds of concepts that emerge in connection with legal institutions. My argument will consist of three steps as follows. First, I will explain how legal concepts are constituted by rules, referring in this regard to John Searle’s analysis of institutional concepts as it emerges in his Making the Social World, of 2010, and amending this analysis according to some criticisms that in 1986 Neil MacCormick had raised against Searle with specific reference to the legal domain. -/- Second, I will show that there are some kinds of concepts relevant for an institution which are not captured by Searle’s analysis in terms of constitutive rules, even if this is amended according to MacCormick’s criticisms. This I will do by considering the game of chess as a simple system of rule-constituted concepts (concepts such as 'checkmate,' 'bishop,' 'king'). I will consider four examples of perfectly legitimate assertions regarding a match of chess -- these being (1) ‘I won’; (2) 'you made a good attack'; (3) 'you are cheating'; (4) 'you made good use of the first-move advantage,' and I will show that, while the first three assertions can be analyzed in terms of concepts (those of 'victory,' 'attack,' and 'cheating') which are not constituted by the rules of chess but are rather common to several different competitive games, being typical of the broader practice of competitive game-playing of which chess is an instance, the fourth assertion includes a concept (that of 'first-move advantage') which is peculiar to chess, just like a rule-constituted element, but is not constituted by the rules of chess. This analysis will lead to a new categorization of institutional concepts. Apart from rule-constituted institutional concepts, which are the only ones recognized by Searle, in order to account for cases (1), (2), and (3) I will distinguish between three kinds of meta-institutional concepts, namely, goal-oriented, mode-oriented, and value-oriented meta-institutional concepts, and then I will introduce the category of para-institutional concepts to account for case (4). -/- Finally -- and this is the third step of my argument -- I will explain how these different kinds of institutional concepts appear when we adopt different perspectives on the institutional frameworks we deal with. This will lead us to a categorization of possible perspectives regarding law that corresponds to the previous one regarding concepts. There is first a structural perspective regarding the instantiation of institutional elements which clearly involves rule-constituted institutional concepts -- as when we say 'I am making a will.' There is then a teleological perspective regarding the goal of our institutional acts which calls into question goal-oriented meta-institutional concepts -- as when we say 'I wrote that will in order for you to have a distinctive right to my property.' Then, we can adopt a strategical perspective regarding some peculiar ways in which institutional acts can be performed, and this has often to do with mode-oriented meta-institutional concepts -- as when we say 'the Labour Party is making parliamentary obstructionism so that the Government will fall before the enactment of the labour reform,' or 'workers start today a work-to-rule action.' Clearly, we can also adopt an evaluative perspective over institutional facts or acts, and here typically value oriented meta-institutional concepts emerge -- as when we say 'that rule is clearly unjust' or 'that contract is unfair.' Finally, we can limit ourselves to a descriptive perspective on phenomena which are peculiar to a given institutional setting, and here para-institutional concepts are often useful -- as when we say 'the Italian electoral system before 1990 led to a sort of reform paralysis' or 'a strict use of the criterion requiring proof beyond any reasonable doubt can be expected to entail a low conviction rate.'. (shrink)

Nel 1913 Adolf Reinach pubblica I Fondamenti A Priori del Diritto Civile, opera che rappresenta senza dubbio il capolavoro del giovane fenomenologo tedesco. Il saggio si staglia sul denso sfondo di questioni semantiche, ontologiche e psicologico-descrittive dibattute a cavallo tra Otto e Novecento nei circoli fenomenologici di Monaco e Gottinga. Tali questioni, che rappresentano il vero e proprio terreno fertile dell’opera, nei Fondamenti non diventano però tema esplicito dell’indagine. Quest...

La storia del termine laicus, nel corso del Medioevo, mostra un'interessante evoluzione. Inizialmente laico ha un valore positivo e si riferisce semplicemente al popolo di Dio; si passa successivamente a una valutazione chiaramente negativa dall'XI al XIII secolo. In questo periodo si definisce il laico secondo una doppia negazione: come il non chierico e il non monaco, e come idiota e illitteratus, cioè il cristiano privo di istruzione. Si torna a importanti posizioni di apprezzamento positivo nel XIV-XV secolo, anche (...) in connessione con l'espandersi dell'uso del volgare, in cui laico e illetterato non coincidono più e si afferma una figura nuova di cristiano autentico: il laico che vive nel mondo in modo utile a sé e agli altri, dedito all'esercizio delle virtù e alla frequentazione della cultura.The history of the term laicus, in the course of the Middle Ages, shows an interesting development. Initially laicus has a positive value and refers simply to the people of God; later a clear negative meaning becomes prevalent: from the 11th to the 13rd century. In this period laicus is defined according to a double negative sense: as the non-clerical and the not-monk, and as idiota et illitteratus, i.e. the Christian without learning. A new important positive meaning appears during 14th and 15th century, also connected with the diffusion of vernacular languages, in which laicus and illitteratus don't overlap and the term means a new figure of authentic Christian: the layman who lives in the world in a useful way to himself and others, devoting himself to the exercise of virtue and to study of learning. (shrink)

The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...) the differences between the well-Known english writers on moral philosophy from sidgwick to the present day are of little importance." (staff). (shrink)

The earth is the archetypal image of the origin of humanity, but throughout the history of Western culture it has given way to other, more heavenly allegories. Enlightenment as a paradigm of knowledge consolidated itself in Western philosophical thought in a very convincing way as a production of meanings. Through this rereading of the first Greek metaphysics, thought gradually distanced itself from its materiality, from its humanity, from the possibility of admiring the concrete world, getting closer and closer to the (...) need to create abstract objects, which, as ethical limits, political, aesthetic and epistemological, we end up meeting again in our lives. Visibility seems to be the basis of a Western mental habitus: recognition, officiality, legitimacy and certainty become visible signs with which we compare and validate our own experiences. The earth, as a less transparent element, with greater ability to hide, occult, encrypt represents, however, an image that is better suited to the discussion plan proposed in this text. The relationship with reality, in terms of visibility and invisibility, requires a new perception of the world: the underlying structure no longer assumes a transcendent level, but is understood as a plane of immanence, in which meaning is interior, produced by compositions; an amalgam of networks that intertwine in an imperceptible, invisible underground plane. What we propose here is not a vertical perspective, but a horizontal one like the ground. It is from this earthly thought that we want to reflect on what happens in philosophy and childhood; in philosophy with childhood and in the childhood of philosophy. In the present attempt of an ecophilosophy of education, the discussion plan requires a deviation from the guiding images with which we learn to do research. The intention of the following investigation is to look for another type of map: a kind of subterranean cartography, which pays attention not to what we can see, which has well-defined names and categories, but to what is hidden and inhabits a plane that is muddy, earthly, indistinguishable and absolutely alive. According to the Lipmanian model of Philosophy for Children, the subterranean and rhizomatic processes of the research community will be examined, comparing them to other collective movements that characterize the vegetable communities of plants that inhabit the natural world. Finally, three concepts considered relevant to escape the limits found in some contemporary pedagogical postures will be illustrated, suggesting other paths in the relationship between philosophy, childhood and education: reciprocity, passivity and invisibility. (shrink)

The opposition between nature and culture has always been paradigmatic in the philosophy of society, and in this sense it is certainly striking that, in contemporary theories of collective acceptance in social ontology—theories which actually entail the presence of individual mental content in the form of beliefs—the shaping role of culture has not found significant recognition. However, it cannot but be trivially true that cultural presuppositions play a role in the maintenance and development of beliefs on rules and other kinds (...) of abstract artifacts. But once we recognize that the reality of social institutions is at least culturally-dependent, the question emerges whether there is still room for nature as a possible determinant of social reality. Many authors maintain that there is and argue that there are objective natural features shared by human beings which are necessary conditions to explain the emergence of institutional structures within society. This is a culture-independent relation between nature and social institutions. In this paper, however, I will try to argue that there is another, very peculiar, way in which nature can work as a possible determinant of social reality, a way which is instead culture-dependent. In particular, I will give three examples of this kind of culture-dependent relations—examples about states, corporations, and contracts—and I will introduce a new concept to account for it, that of “institutional mimesis.” I will then provide an explanation of how institutional mimesis can have an impact on the content of collective acceptance by appealing to two influential theories in contemporary cognitive psychology. Finally, I will explain the ontological significance of institutional mimesis using Ian Hacking’s concept of historical ontology. (shrink)