A variation of Bell's theorem that deals with the indeterministic case is formulated and proved within the logical framework of Lewis's theory of counterfactuals. The no-faster-than-light-influence condition is expressed in terms of Lewis would counterfactual conditionals. Objections to this procedure raised by certain philosophers of science are examined and answered. The theorem shows that the incompatibility between the predictions of quantum theory and the idea of no faster-than-light influence cannot be ascribed to any auxiliary or tacit assumption of either determinism (...) or the related idea that outcomes of unperformed measurements are determinate within nature. In addition, the theorem provides an example of an application of Lewis's theory of counterfactuals in a rigorous scientific context. (shrink)

It is shown that (a) the conscious observer plays no essential part in the measurement process, and (b) environmental perturbations of whatever kind fail to account for the evolution of systems into “mixtures” or “dynamically decoupled” systems.

The discussion of whether quantum theory is compatible with the locality idea that no causal influence can act outside the forward light cone has recently been tightly linked to the corresponding question for a much simpler model theory that enjoys all of the pertinent properties of quantum theory but is much easier to fully comprehend. It is shown here that, contrary to recent claims, the model theory is incompatible with the locality idea mentioned above. The logical structure of the argument, (...) which is similar to the one employed for quantum theory, is discussed. (shrink)