One prevailing objection to consequentialism holds that the consequentialist cannot promote both agent-neutral value and her own personal friendships: the consequentialist cannot be a genuine friend. Several versions of this objection have been advanced, but an even more sophisticated version of the charge is available. However, even this more sophisticated version fails, as it assumes a traditional, context-insensitive, account of character traits. In this article, I develop and defend a novel account of character traits that is context-sensitive and also supports (...) a novel account of what friendship consists in. Application of the more plausible, contextual, account of character traits resolves the debate in favor of the friendly consequentialist. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper takes issue with the idea that there is a variety of moral theories available which can in some way usefully be applied to problems in ethics. The idea is reflected in the common view that those favouring a systematic approach would do well to abandon consequentialist thinking and turn to some alternative theory. It is argued here that this is not an option, since each of the usual supposed alternatives lacks the independent resources to meet the minimal (...) requirements of being a moral theory at all. The aim is to demonstrate that virtue ethics, rights theory and deontology lack the different forms of explanation that would make them genuinely alternative theories. The conclusion is that this part of ethics is much more of a unity than is standardly assumed and that, far from our being able to move on from consequentialism, certain problems that arise from its very nature are bound to remain central to any attempt at moral theory. (shrink)

Utilitarianism faces a difficulty in that what are typically regarded as natural goods seem to have possible occurrences that strike most people as morally reprehensible, yet which according to the theory must be taken to add to the good in the world. Thus, totake a recent treatment of the problem by Geoffrey Scarre, it would seem that even sadistic pleasures must contribute to human happiness and thus morally offset the concomitant suffering of the victim. Scarre has offered a defence of (...) utilitarianism, arguing that in fact such pleasures will undermine the self-respect that is required for happiness. In this paper I argue that a partial undermining is plausible but leaves the problem untouched, while a complete undermining can be established only by a stipulation that is unmotivated from a utilitarian point of view. (shrink)

What makes for a good book on ethics in medicine? Given that no one can do another’s moral thinking for them, this much at least: it should stimulate in the reader an inclination to critical reflection that will persist when the book goes back on the shelf. And, since no one can do another’s philosophical thinking for them either, this requirement is doubly true when the basis of the work lies in moral philosophy. In addition, where the book is likely (...) to be used as an introduction, it has to achieve this for readers who may have little experience of philosophy or natural sympathy with its problems and methods. No doubt there are various ways of attempting this task, but one is to try to draw readers into the subject by giving them a sense of what it is to be involved in doing philosophy, with all its characteristic difficulties and doubts, rather than merely studying the results of some that was done earlier. I think that Jennifer Jackson has produced an excellent book of this kind; one that should engage the interest of anyone prepared to make a little effort. It is a lively and refreshing work, full of argument and comprising a good mixture of scholarly caution and forthright commitment. Rather than looking at the many specific issues, however, I will concentrate on the philosophical position that underlies the work as a whole.The book begins by taking seriously the doubts that exist about the place of philosophy in medical ethics and does particularly well in making the appropriate concessions, while still giving a firm defence of its …. (shrink)

While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, arguably the most well-known extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this paper, (...) we argue that meditation provides a useful model for understanding a wider range of types of mental action than heretofore recognized. Conclusions yielded by two distinct bodies of current psychological research on meditation and cognition, and meditation and introspection, buttress meditation’s suitability for this role. (shrink)

Upton Sinclair, one of America's foremost and most prolific authors, addresses the cultivation of the mind and the body in this 1922 volume. Sinclair's goal was to attempt to tell the reader how to live, how to find health, happiness and success, and how to develop fully both the mind and the body. Part One: The Book of the Mind covers such subjects as faith, reason, morality, and the subconscious. Part Two: The Book of the Body develops such subjects (...) as errors in diet, the fasting cure, food and poisons, work and play, and diseases and their cures . (shrink)

A collection of essays that cover a range of topics of relevance to health care professionals. The book is intended to fill a gap between introductory texts on medical ethics and in-depth specialized books. It shows the importance of combining philosophical and ethical discussion.

This article presents a seven-step corpus-based approach to discourse analysis that starts with a detailed analysis of each individual text in a corpus that can then be generalized across all texts of a corpus, providing a description of typical patterns of discourse organization that hold for the entire corpus. This approach is applied specifically to a methodology that is used to analyze texts in terms of the functional/communicative structures that typically make up texts in a genre: move analysis. The resulting (...) corpus-based approach for conducting a move analysis significantly enhances the value of this often used methodology, while at the same time providing badly needed guidelines for a methodology that lacks them. A corpus of ‘birthmother letters’ is used to illustrate the approach. (shrink)

The virtues are under fire. Several decades’ worth of social psychological findings establish a correlation between human behavior and the situation moral agents inhabit, from which a cadre of moral philosophers concludes that most moral agents lack the virtues. Mark Alfano and Christian Miller introduce novel versions of this argument, but they are subject to a fatal dilemma. Alfano and Miller wrongly assume that their requirements for virtue apply universally to moral agents, who vary radically in their psychological, physiological, and (...) personal situations; I call this the ‘content problem.’ More troubling, however, the content problem leads to what I call the ‘structural problem:’ Alfano and Miller each structure their argument against the virtues as a modus tollens argument and, owing to the breadth of the content problem, each must constrain their argument with a ceteris paribus clause. But the ceteris paribus clause precludes each argument’s validity. More important, however, the resulting conception of virtue implicitly endorsed by Alfano and Miller holds that virtues are idealized models; but since idealized models do not even purport accurately to describe the world, neither novel version of EAV gains any empirical traction against the virtues. The upshot is an old story whose moral has yet, within the empirical study of the virtues, adequately to be internalized: it is imperative that the empirical observation of character traits proceed via longitudinal studies. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a local account of character traits that posits traits like close-friend-honesty and good-mood-compassion. John Doris also defends local character traits, but his local character traits are indistinguishable from mere behavioral dispositions, they are not necessary for the purpose which allegedly justifies them, and their justification is only contingent, depending upon the prevailing empirical situation. The account of local traits I defend posits local traits that are traits of character rather than behavioral dispositions, local traits that (...) are necessary to satisfy one of their central purposes, and local traits whose justification is dependent upon theoretical rather than empirical considerations. (shrink)

In recent decades, social psychology has produced an expansive array of studies wherein introducing a seemingly morally innocuous feature into the situation a subject inhabits often yields morally questionable, dubious, or even appalling behavior. Several fascinating lines of philosophical enquiry issue from this research, but the most pragmatically salient question concerns how we ought most effectively to develop and maintain the virtues so that such putatively morally problematic behavior is less likely to occur. In this paper, I examine four empirically (...) embedded accounts of virtue cultivation: Hagop Sarkissian’s social signaling, Mark Alfano’s virtue labeling, Nancy Snow’s self-punishment, and Peter Railton’s implementation intentions. But none of these accounts of virtue cultivation provides adequate resources for regulating our affective states, whose attention-constricting and behavior-priming functional roles are likely at the root of much of our less than virtuous behavior. Instead, I defend an account of virtue cultivation that proceeds via meditation, which can help us to identify and regulate our emotions and moods. Further, meditation enables us to develop the attentional focus, emotional intelligence, and sense of social connection that ground the virtues and, thus, our virtuous behavior. (shrink)

Introduction -- Global traits of character -- Traits as dispositions -- Situational traits of character -- Situational traits and social psychology -- Situational traits and the friendly consequentialist.

Democracy surrounds us like the air we breath, and is normally taken very much for granted. Across the world democracy has become accepted as an unquestionably good thing. Yet upon further examination the merits of democracy are both paradoxical and problematic, and the treasured values of liberty and equality can be used to argue both for and against it. In the historical section of the book, Ross Harrison clearly traces the history of democracy by examining the works of, amongst others, (...) Plato and Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. Informed by facts and detailed knowledge of these famous thinkers, Harrison provides a clear and cogent justification of democracy. (shrink)

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Volume 5, Issue 2, Page 161-174, May 2011.

RECENT attempts to explain and justify Aristotle's principle of non-contradiction have focused to a great extent on the dialectical dimension of Aristotle's account. For example, T. Irwin maintains that Aristotle justifies the PNC by arguing that there is a sub-set of dialectical opinions which no one can rationally give up. J. Lear supports the importance of the dialectical dimension by summarizing Aristotle's defense of the PNC as follows: The opponent of the PNC tries to argue dialectically that one should not (...) accept it. "Aristotle's point is that there is no conceptual space in which such a rational discussion can occur." By appealing to the limits of rationally, externally, expressible discourse as the basis of the PNC, Irwin and Lear fail to take seriously the more explicitly psychological and metaphysical bases of the PNC. C. Kirwan, and most recently, R. Smith also either argue against or ignore the role of the psychological and metaphysical bases. Smith goes so far as to argue that common axioms like the PNC are simply empty statement schemata of universal validity, i.e., general verbal forms or patterns which no one can deny with intelligibility. (shrink)

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Soochow Gambling Task (SGT) are two experience-based risky decision-making tasks for examining decision-making deficits in clinical populations. Several cognitive models, including the expectancy-valence learning model (EVL) and the prospect valence learning model (PVL), have been developed to disentangle the motivational, cognitive, and response processes underlying the explicit choices in these tasks. The purpose of the current study was to develop an improved model that can fit empirical data better than the EVL and PVL (...) models and, in addition, produce more consistent parameter estimates across the IGT and SGT. Twenty-six opiate users (mean age 34.23; SD 8.79) and 27 control participants (mean age 35; SD 10.44) completed both tasks. Eighteen cognitive models varying in evaluation, updating, and choice rules were fit to individual data and their performances were compared to that of a statistical baseline model to find a best fitting model. The results showed that the model combining the prospect utility function treating gains and losses separately, the decay-reinforcement updating rule, and the trial-independent choice rule performed the best in both tasks. Furthermore, the winning model produced more consistent individual parameter estimates across the two tasks than any of the other models. (shrink)

Character traits have several vital functions. They should enable us to assess others morally, inform us of others’ behavioral tendencies, and accurately explain and predict others’ behavior. But traits of character, as they have traditionally been understood, cannot adequately serve these purposes. For character traits are traditionally thought to be context-insensitive. The Contextual Account of Character Traits, which I here develop and defend, posits traits that are context-sensitive. Context-sensitive character traits are more receptive to the complexity of human psychology and (...) behavior and, hence, they not only adequately, but excellently, satisfy their theoretic and pragmatic functions. (shrink)

In _ Psychiatry in the Scientific Image, _Dominic Murphy looks at psychiatry from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy of science, considering three issues: how we should conceive of, classify, and explain mental illness. If someone is said to have a mental illness, what about it is mental? What makes it an illness? How might we explain and classify it? A system of psychiatric classification settles these questions by distinguishing the mental illnesses and showing how they stand in relation to one (...) another. This book explores the philosophical issues raised by the project of explaining and classifying mental illness. Murphy argues that the current literature on mental illness -- exemplified by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders -- is an impediment to research; it lacks a coherent concept of the mental and a satisfactory account of disorder, and yields too much authority to commonsense thought about the mind. He argues that the explanation of mental illness should meet the standards of good explanatory practice in the cognitive neurosciences, and that the classification of mental disorders should group symptoms into conditions based on the causal structure of the normal mind. (shrink)

AT POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 1.1.71B15 AND FOLLOWING, Aristotle identifies six characteristics of the first principles from which demonstrative science proceeds. These are traditionally grouped into two sets of three: group A: ex alêthôn, prôtôn, amêsôn; group B: gnôrimôterôn, proterôn, and aitiôn. The characteristic, which I believe has been underrated and somewhat misinterpreted by scholars and commentators from Philoponus to the present day, is the characteristic of truth. In this paper I propose to present a textually based interpretation of truth that shows (...) the following: that truth is necessarily linked to being. The example given of nonbeing, the commensurability of the diagonal with the sides of a square, suggests more than simple truth is required for first principles and premises of demonstrative science; and that Aristotle later in the APo changes this characteristic to necessary truth, for he recognizes that truth alone is an insufficient basis for scientific demonstration. The referents of necessary truth are eternal being, and the need for eternal being demands that universals exist extramentally for Aristotle. Finally, one of the important ways that universal genera and species exist for Aristotle are as real, causal principles. (shrink)