Members of Division 28 generally appear to agree that empirical demonstrations provide the most valid basis for building the sciences of psychopharmacology, neuropharmacology, and neurochemistry. This article discusses some of the beliefs, interests and concerns among members of Division 28. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Abstract The founding of the Division of Philosophical Psychology of the American Psychological Association is reviewed in the light of the relations between psychology and philosophy at that time. A history of events leading to the formation of the division (24) in 1962 is presented by its first president?elect. The major issues were the role of philosophy in scientific psychology, teleology, dualism, and freedom versus determinism.

RÉSUMÉ: La Philosophie de la nature de Hegel élabore une théorie complexe et systématique du monde naturel, qui est passée presque inaperçue dans la littérature secondaire. Selon cette théorie, la nature passe progressivement d'une division originale entre ses deux éléments constitutifs, la pensée et la matière, à leur unification finale, par une séquence rationnellement nécessaire d'étapes dans le processus. Cette progression naturelle présente une structure identique à celle de la progression que Hegel discerne parmi lesformes de la conscience subjective. (...) Une comparaison attentive entre les formes de la conscience et les étapes du développement naturelpeut dès lors servir à élucider cette théorie de la nature et à la dégager des longues discussions sur la science contemporaine auxquelles Hegel l'a inutilement associée. (shrink)

Cet article analyse un bref texte arabe qui propose une division des catégories d’Aristote, en catégories simples et catégories composées ; ce fragment est attribué à Aḥmad Ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Saraḫsī, philosophe du neuvième siècle et disciple majeur d’al-Kindī, le « premier philosophe des Arabes ». L’article montre que la division d’al-Saraḫsī trouve son origine dans la tradition alexandrine des commentateurs aristotéliciens. Le fragment est replacé dans le contexte de la philosophie arabe en analysant différentes divisions des catégories avancées, (...) respectivement, par Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, al-Kindī, les Frères de la Pureté et Abū l-Faraǧ ibn al-Ṭayyib. Des collections de définitions et de divisions philosophiques en grec et en syriaque constituent très probablement le mode de transmission de la division au monde de l’islam. Le fragment illustre également que, pour ce qui concerne la philosophie aristotélicienne, al-Saraḫsī ne suit pas toujours l’exemple de son maître al-Kindī. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Clear Division of Labor Within Environmental Philosophy?William M. Throop (bio)In discussions about the future of environmental philosophy, I have found myself supporting two positions that are in tension with one another. The first, which has been well explored in the last decade, is that environmental philosophy should have a more dramatic impact outside of academic circles. It should affect policy and guide the behavior (...) of non-philosophers, which usually requires that it deeply engage the empirical details of problems it addresses. The second is that environmental philosophy needs to improve its status within the larger philosophical community, which requires its practitioners to use methods that dominate mainstream philosophy and to be conversant with contemporary work in ethical theory, epistemology, metaphysics, and continental philosophy. Some have argued that this tension places a double burden on those training to be environmental philosophers; they must demonstrate both theoretical and practical excellence. I fear that such a standard will limit [End Page 147] the growth of environmental philosophy. It will be daunting to new environmental philosophers and achieved by only a few.With respect to this tension, I suggest that environmental philosophy should support a robust division of labor. Many new environmental philosophers should be recruited from cohorts trained primarily in core areas of philosophy. Most of these thinkers will probably focus on highly theoretical issues—issues that anyone in the field would recognize as philosophical.Their knowledge of environmental problems may be superficial and their audience likely will consist primarily of other philosophers. Their impact beyond philosophy may be quite limited (except for their students). I come from this tradition, and I am still delighted by the purely intellectual puzzles that our field generates. Work of this sort should be honored, but our field will be sterile if it is dominated by this kind of thought.I hope that many other new environmental philosophers will be trained in interdisciplinary environmental graduate programs or "applied" philosophy Ph.D. programs where they will acquire the interdisciplinary expertise necessary to address practical problems and to effectively engage non-philosophical audiences. This group of "practical" environmental philosophers should also include a host of practitioners in other fields who contribute to philosophical dialogue. I suspect that much work in this area will be case-based, empirically sophisticated and, where it addresses non-philosophical audiences, more reliant on compelling metaphors than on tight arguments. I doubt that it is fruitful to view this group as applying the work of the former group. The aims, the sources of insight and the standards of quality for the two groups are categorically different. For practical philosophers, the political feasibility of a proposal matters, and the arguments must have the capacity to move relevant stakeholders. The results of this work may appear to be philosophy-lite to those in the first group, but only if judged by standards that are inappropriate if we accept a division of labor in the field.This division of labor cannot be an apartheid. Many promising innovations in environmental philosophy will come from the interface between these groups. And unfortunately, a good bit of questionable work done in each group may result from a failure to understand progress that has been made by the other group. For example, philosophers focused only on theory may draw implications for action that fail to accord with current empirical information. Practical philosophers may [End Page 148] critique simplified metaethical positions that have long been abandoned in favor of more sophisticated versions. A healthy dialogue and a mutual respect should diminish these dangers. Such a division of labor has significant implications for graduate education, hiring and evaluation of faculty, and allocation of prestige within the field. The health and growth of environmental philosophy will depend on part on how we address these implications.William M. Throop Bill Throop is provost and professor of philosophy at Green Mountain College, an environmental liberal arts college in Poultney, VT. His background is in epistemology and philosophy of science, but in the last decade his work has focused on conceptual and ethical issues in ecological restoration and wilderness preservation. E-mail: [email protected] © 2007 Indiana University Press... (shrink)

This paper discusses the positions of Italian philosopher Giulio Preti in relation to the quarrel between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Preti?s thought appears as a systematic thought permitting to overcome, through his logical, epistemological and linguistic reflection, the divide between these two approaches. The different features of his philosophy are analyzed here in detail and compared to the main theoretical assumptions of Analytic and Continental philosophy.

This paper discusses the positions of Italian philosopher Giulio Preti (1911?1972) in relation to the quarrel between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Preti?s thought appears as a systematic thought permitting to overcome, through his logical, epistemological and linguistic reflection, the divide between these two approaches. The different features of his philosophy are analyzed here in detail and compared to the main theoretical assumptions of Analytic and Continental philosophy.

For Marx, capitalism’s division of labour between mental and mate-rial labour is the condition of possibility for the creation of its alien, out of control, and contradictory effects. This paper will analyze the proletarian class, the capitalist class, and the world market qua ef-fects of the division of labour. The division of labour conceptualized fundamentally as a dynamic division between activity and passivity informs the analysis of these contradictory effects. This conceptual-ization of the division of (...) labour provides the framework for under-standing the striving toward activity and self-determination, de-scribed by Marx, of that which falls on the side of material labour. (shrink)

In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle sets out, for the first time in Greek philosophy, a logical system. It consists of a deductive system (I.4-22), meta-logical results (I.23-26), and a method for finding and giving deductions (I.27-29) that can apply in “any art or science whatsoever” (I.30). After this, Aristotle compares this method with Plato’s method of division, a procedure designed to find essences of natural kinds through systematic classification. This critical comparison in APr I.31 (...) raises an interpretive puzzle: how can Aristotle reasonably juxtapose two methods that differ so much in their aims and approach? What can be gained by doing so? Previous interpreters have failed to show how this comparison is legitimate or what important point Aristotle is making. The goal of this paper is to resolve the puzzle. In resolving this puzzle we not only learn more about the relationship be- tween division and the syllogistic in Aristotle. We will also learn something about the motivation for the syllogistic itself, by seeing the role that it plays in his philosophy of science. (shrink)

We give an overview of Lakatos’ life, his philosophy of mathematics and science, as well as of this issue. Firstly, we briefly delineate Lakatos’ key contributions to philosophy: his anti-formalist philosophy of mathematics, and his methodology of scientific research programmes in the philosophy of science. Secondly, we outline the themes and structure of the masterclass Lakatos’ Undone Work – The Practical Turn and the Division of Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Science, which (...) gave rise to this special issue. Lastly, we provide a summary of the contributions to this issue. (shrink)

The new mythology for which the German Romantic period called was not envisioned as antithetical to empiricism or experiential/experimental knowledge, but rather as emerging in dialogue with it to form a cultural foundation for such inquiry. Central to the mytho-scientific project were problematic theories of sexual division and generativity that established cultural baselines. This article examines the mythological investments of two influential thinkers of the period—Goethe and Schelling. It then analyzes Goethe’s unique merger of mythological approaches to sex and (...) generation with empirical observation in The Metamorphosis of Plants. It next traces Schelling’s expansion of Goethe’s theories of nature beyond their empirical justifications to develop a metaphysics of sexual differentiation. Finally, the article illuminates Goethe’s final reply to the sexual dynamics of Naturphilosophie at the end of his life, through the analysis of a single poem, “Finding Again,” in the collection God and World. Ultimately and in spite of its empirical commitments, Goethe’s more flexible view of sexual correlations would lose ground to the powerful metaphysical mythology of sexual opposition as both scientific and cultural bedrock. (shrink)

In the good old days, when general philosophy of science ruled the Earth, a simple division was often invoked to talk about philosophical issues specific to particular kinds of science: that between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Over the last 20 years, philosophical studies shaped around this dichotomy have given way to those organized by more fine-grained categories, corresponding to specific disciplines, as the literatures on the philosophy of physics, biology, economics and psychology--to take the (...) most prominent four examples--have blossomed. In general terms, work in each of these areas has become increasingly enmeshed with that in the corresponding science itself, increasingly naturalistic (in at least one sense of that term), and in my view, increasingly interesting. (shrink)

In this article we revisit a number of disputes regarding significance logics---i.e., inferential frameworks capable of handling meaningless, although grammatical, sentences---that took place in a series of articles most of which appeared in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy between 1966 and 1978. These debates concern (i) the way in which logical consequence ought to be approached in the context of a significance logic, and (ii) the way in which the logical vocabulary has to be modified (either by restricting some (...) notions, or by adding some vocabulary) to keep as much of Classical Logic as possible. Our aim is to show that the divisions arising from these disputes can be dissolved in the context of a novel and intuitive proposal that we put forward. (shrink)

How do scientists generate knowledge in groups, and how have they done so in the past? How do epistemically motivated social interactions influence or even drive this process? These questions speak to core interests of both history and philosophy of science. Idealised models and formal arguments have been suggested to illuminate the social epistemology of science, but their conclusions are not directly applicable to scientific practice. This paper uses one of these models as a lens and historiographical tool in (...) the examination of actual scientific collectives. It centres on the analysis of two episodes from the history of photosynthesis research of the late nineteenth- to mid-twentieth centuries, which display a wide and coordinated intellectual diversity similar to Kitcher’s “division of cognitive labour”. The concept, I argue, captures important aspects of the photosynthesis research communities, but the underlying process unfolded in ways that differ from the model’s assumption in interesting ways. The paper unravels how the self-organised interplay of cooperation and competition, and the dynamics of individual and collective goals within scientific communities were influential factors in the generation of knowledge. From there, some thoughts are developed on how historical and philosophical approaches in the analysis of science can productively interact. (shrink)

Aristotle's syllogistic theory, as developed in his Prior Analytics, is often regarded as the birth of logic in Western philosophy. Over the past century, scholars have tried to identify important precursors to this theory. I argue that Platonic division, a method which aims to give accounts of essences of natural kinds by progressively narrowing down from a genus, influenced Aristotle's logical theory in a number of crucial respects. To see exactly how, I analyze the method of division (...) as it was originally conceived by Plato and received by Aristotle. I argue that, while Plato allowed that some divisions fail to rigorously investigate the essence, he began a program continued by Aristotle (and others in antiquity and the middle ages) of seeking norms for division that would apply in any domain whatsoever. This idea of a rigorous, general method was taken up and developed by Aristotle in his syllogistic. Aristotle also used Plato's conception of predication as parthood in his semantics for syllogistic propositions. As part of my argument, I prove that a semantics based on Platonic divisional structures is sound and complete for the deduction system used in the literature to model Aristotle's syllogistic. (shrink)

In epistemology and the philosophy of science, there has been an increasing interest in the social aspects of belief acquisition. In particular, there has been a focus on the division of cognitive labor in science. This essay explores several different models of the division of cognitive labor, with particular focus on Kitcher, Strevens, Weisberg and Muldoon, and Zollman. The essay then shows how many of the benefits of the division of cognitive labor flow from leveraging agent (...) diversity. The essay concludes by examining the benefits and burdens of diversity, particularly in the evaluative diversity that can be found in interdisicplinary science. (shrink)

In this article, I will begin by describing recent divisive concepts legislation, which bans teaching about aspects of racism, sexism, and equity, speculating briefly on the motivations behind it and the implications resulting from it. I will then describe how discussing divisive concepts in classrooms may be a helpful way for students to better understand the particular concepts and for students to take a stand on them. While I will briefly argue for the importance of classroom discussion of divisive concepts, (...) my central claim will be that we must do more than merely discuss these concepts. Instead, we should engage in classroom inquiry about them. Inquiry positions students to not be silent regarding divisive concepts, as some legislation may cause, and inquiry positions students to not just talk about divisive concepts, but to solve social problems related to them in our world today. In other words, inquiry enables us to do something about divisive concepts, rather than just learning about them, as some educators currently advocate in calls for discussion. And inquiry is certainly more effective than banning divisive concepts or pushing them to the background, as recent legislation attempts to do. I argue that rather than excluding divisive concepts or the divisions they may provoke from our classrooms, we need educative spaces where we inquire into what divides us, why we are divided, and how we might respond to such division. Within that inquiry, we can better attend to our divisions while also taking up the specific concepts prohibited in recent legislation. (shrink)

This Volume traces the development of one of the most divisive debates in Buddhist philosophy in which leading parts were taken by Nagarjuna, Bhavaviveka and ...

Aristotle proposed in the famous part of his 6th Book of Metaphysics a triple categorization of speculative sciences (physics, mathematics, first philosophy). Some scholars have considered this classical division as an unlawful and inconsistent Platonic residue of the parallelism between knowledge and reality. Others have numbered Aristotle among the upholders of the scholastic doctrine of the so-called degrees of abstraction. After having profoundly examined texts of the Corpus Aristotelicum (Metaphysics E 1, 1025b 1 - 1026a 32; On the (...) soul A 1, 403a 27 - 403b 19) not only we can refute the accusation of Platonism and the unlawful and anachronistic attribution of degrees of abstraction doctrine to the Stagirite, but principally understand the real importance of Aristotle's proposition. That is to say: its role in determining the epistemic character of the science on which all this deep inquiry takes place: the "filosofia prima". (shrink)

Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does this by addressing and refuting (...) three arguments: the argument from blameworthiness, the argument from agency, and the argument from authority. In turn, I show that none of these arguments work as responses to the division of normativity – if normativity generally is divided, so too must be blameworthiness, agency, and authority. (shrink)

This article defends three claims. First, that collection and division in the Phaedrus are described as procedures that underlie human speaking and thinking in general, as well as philosophical inquiry, and are not identified with either. Second, that what sets the dialectical use of these procedures apart from their ordinary use are philosophical suppositions independent of the procedures of collection and division themselves; for that reason, collection and division cannot be identified with dialectic as such. Third, that (...) the second part of the Phaedrus is concerned with the broader question how noble or beautiful speaking, in general, may be said to depend on dialectic as much as it is concerned with the question how rhetoric, as a kind of expertise, is related to dialectic. (shrink)

Justice makes demands upon us. But these demands, important though they may be, are not the only moral demands that we face. Our lives ought to be responsive to other values too. However, some philosophers have identified an apparent tension between those values and norms, such as justice, that seem to transcend the arena of small-scale interpersonal relations and those that are most at home in precisely that arena. How, then, are we to engage with all of the values and (...) norms that we take to apply to us? In this article, I discuss one way that we might hope to resolve the tension and its relation to John Rawls's `basic structure restriction'. The prospect of resolution is offered by the idea of a `division of moral labour', according to which the pursuit of certain values is assigned to institutions and not to individuals. According to Rawls's basic structure restriction, principles of justice are applicable only to the institutions of the basic structure of society. The possibility of a connection between the division of moral labour and the basic structure restriction readily suggests itself. Taking G.A. Cohen's well-known `incentives' critique of the basic structure restriction as a starting point, I consider five ways in which that restriction might be defended by appeal to the division of moral labour. I conclude that none of these defences succeeds, for none convinces that the conditions in which it makes sense to apply the division of moral labour idea obtain for Rawls's conception of distributive justice. Although the division of moral labour is an attractive proposal, it can do no work in a Rawlsian context. Key Words: Cohen • distributive justice • egalitarian ethos • equality • Rawls. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'division'. The fallacy of division occurs when one incorrectly infers that the characteristics, attributes, or features of the group as a whole will also be found in the individuals comprising the group. The easiest way to avoid this fallacy is never to assume that the characteristics, attributes, or features of the group as a whole will also be found in the individuals comprising the group. (...) One must inspect and evaluate the characteristics, attributes, or features of the whole separately from the parts of which the whole is comprised. Inferences from a whole to a part can be made, however, if additional assumptions are added to the argument that link together the property had by the whole with the property had by the part. (shrink)

The UK-based deliberations that led up to the legalisation of two new ‘mitochondrial donation’ techniques in 2015, and which continued after that time as regulatory details were determined, featured a division of advisory labour that is common when decisions are made about new technologies. An expert panel was convened by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, charged with assessing the scientific and technical aspects of these techniques. Meanwhile, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics addressed the ethical issues. While this (...) class='Hi'>division of labour was undertaken in the name of thoroughness, I argue here that it can have the unintended consequence that hybrid questions that simultaneously involve ethical and technical aspects—especially questions about where to set evidential thresholds for the acceptance of new technology—do not receive enough attention. (shrink)

The UK-based deliberations that led up to the legalisation of two new ‘mitochondrial donation’ techniques in 2015, and which continued after that time as regulatory details were determined, featured a division of advisory labour that is common when decisions are made about new technologies. An expert panel was convened by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), charged with assessing the scientific and technical aspects of these techniques. Meanwhile, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics addressed the ethical issues. While this (...) division of labour was undertaken in the name of thoroughness, I argue here that it can have the unintended consequence that hybrid questions that simultaneously involve ethical and technical aspects—especially questions about where to set evidential thresholds for the acceptance of new technology—do not receive enough attention. (shrink)

The question of the division of cognitive labor has given rise to various models characterizing the way scientists should distribute their efforts. These models often consider the scientific community as a self-governed sphere constituted by rational agents making choices on the basis of fixed rules. Such models have recently been criticized for not taking into account the real mechanisms of science funding. Hence, the question of the utility of the DCL models in guiding science policy remains an open one. (...) In this paper, we show that two unconsidered dimensions would have to be taken into account. First, DCL studies miss the existence of distinct levels of epistemic objectives organizing the research process. Indeed, the scientific field is structured as a system of hierarchical, interconnected practices which are defined both by their inherent purposes and by various superposed external functions. Second, I criticize the absence of ontological considerations, since the epistemological significance of pluralism is highly dependent on the nature of the object under study. Because of these missing dimensions, current DCL models might have a limited usefulness to identify good practices of research governance. (shrink)

Some hold that the lesson of Russell’s paradox and its relatives is that mathematical reality does not form a ‘definite totality’ but rather is ‘indefinitely extensible’. There can always be more sets than there ever are. I argue that certain contact puzzles are analogous to Russell’s paradox this way: they similarly motivate a vision of physical reality as iteratively generated. In this picture, the divisions of the continuum into smaller parts are ‘potential’ rather than ‘actual’. Besides the intrinsic interest of (...) this metaphysical picture, it has important consequences for the debate over absolute generality. It is often thought that ‘indefinite extensibility’ arguments at best make trouble for mathematical platonists; but the contact arguments show that nominalists face the same kind of difficulty, if they recognize even the metaphysical possibility of the picture I sketch. (shrink)

The aim of this article is twofold: first, to identify and address three central divisions in the field of authentic education that introduce ambiguity and at times inconsistencies within the field of authentic education. These divisions concern a) the relationship between autonomy and authenticity; b) the division between the two basic attitudes towards ‘care’ in the authenticity literature, and; c) the well-worn division between objective and subjective realms of knowledge and identity construction. Addressing these divisions through Charles Taylor's (...) distinction between active and passive aspects of authenticity, I believe, will lead to a better understanding of the main issues involved in conceptualising and applying authenticity-based education. Second, to present what I call The Postconventional Authentic Relation-to-Self as a basis for overcoming and reconciling the above divisions. I shall conclude by providing some examples of the way the perspective envisioned by PARTS can be applied to educational practices. (shrink)

The question of the division of cognitive labor has given rise to various models characterizing the way scientists should distribute their efforts. These models often consider the scientific community as a self-governed sphere constituted by rational agents making choices on the basis of fixed rules. Such models have recently been criticized for not taking into account the real mechanisms of science funding. Hence, the question of the utility of the DCL models in guiding science policy remains an open one. (...) In this paper, we show that two unconsidered dimensions would have to be taken into account. First, DCL studies miss the existence of distinct levels of epistemic objectives organizing the research process. Indeed, the scientific field is structured as a system of hierarchical, interconnected practices which are defined both by their inherent purposes and by various superposed external functions. Second, I criticize the absence of ontological considerations, since the epistemological significance of pluralism is highly dependent on the nature of the object under study. Because of these missing dimensions, current DCL models might have a limited usefulness to identify good practices of research governance. (shrink)

La dualité.objectif-subjectif constitue pour le dualisme une structure a priori par essence : ceci se vérifie aussi bien avec le couple contemporain de l'en-soi et du pour-soi qu'avec, sur une autre base, le couple cartésien de la chose étendue et de la chose pensante. Dans le champ théorique actuel règne, de facto, un double monisme juxtaposé qui se partage entre le réductionnisme phénoménologique et celui du néomatérialisme, aussi systématiques l'un que l'autre. Aussi la difficulté générale inhérente au dualisme, loin de (...) disparaître avec cette scission, a-t-elle pris une forme nouvelle. Au lieu de se réduire à une expérience subjective pure (comme dans la phénoménologie) ou à la seule expérience objective (dont se réclame l'explication néomatérialiste), l'auteur du présent essai explore une voie nouvelle pour interpréter la dualité du côté de l'ontologie, grâce à une division préalable et proprement ontologique. La détermination du fondement de cette dualité ne doit plus relever de l'expérience (toujours particulière), mais d'une déduction plus générale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In this article I deal with a problem concerning the ‘divisions of nature’ in Maximus the Confessor’s Ambiguum 41. These ‘divisions’ are five categories that describe how creatures differ from one another and God in natural, physical ways. Later, Maximus discusses the way that the human person may follow Christ to mediate between these divisions. This becomes problematic however as the ascetic practice associated with this mediating power occurs within a sphere we usually define as ‘ethical’. In conflating these physical (...) and ethical dimensions it becomes unclear how our actions can overcome and unite the physical differences described in Maximus’ divisions of nature’. In this article I demonstrate how this problem may be overcome by using Maximus’ own logic of division and unity within this very Ambiguum. It is shown that Maximus does not see these two spheres of ‘physical’ and ‘ethical’ as separate. The ethical is part of the natural trajectory of the physical. Maximus is simply talking about the natural world and the way in which it moves towards its Creator. I build upon Tollefsen’s work on universals and Cvetković’s on circle and radii analogy in order to support this position. Finally, I suggest that we ought to think of Maximus’ ‘divisions of nature’ in this Ambiguum rather as ‘divisions and unity of nature’, since physical differences also promise the possibility of movement of all creation toward unity with God. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 2, November 1994, pp. 219-240 Infinite Divisibility in Hume's First Enquiry DALE JACQUETTE The Limitations of Reason The arguments against infinite divisibility in the notes to Sections 124 and 125 of David Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding are presented as "sceptical" results about the limitations of reason. The metaphysics of infinite divisibility is introduced merely as a particular, though especially representative problem, among several (...) that Hume discusses. Hume first writes: The chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief object of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of absurdity and contradiction.1 There follows an intuitive appeal to the apparent incoherence of the consequences of infinite divisibility in the geometry of space and measurement of time. Hume enlists natural belief against the infinite divisibility thesis in the mathematics of extension: But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning, the Dale Jacquette is at the Department of Philosophy, The Pennsylvania State University, 246 Sparks Building, University Park PA 16802 USA. e-mail: [email protected] 220 Dale Jacquette clearest and most natural; nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles; and yet, when these are once received, how can we deny, that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any rectilinear angle, that as you may increase the diameter of the circle in infinitum, this angle of contact becomes still less, even in infinitum, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent, and so on, in infinitum? The demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter opinion be natural and easy, and the former big with contradiction and absurdity. (EHU 156-157) The implied sense of contradiction is then extended by Hume to the problem of infinite divisibility in time. The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard to time than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a contradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgment is not corrupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be able to admit of it. (EHU 157) The contradictions involved in traditional concepts of extension and time demarcate the limits of which reason is capable. But Hume's answer is more complex than merely surrendering to skepticism over the prospects of reason achieving understanding in the metaphysics of space and time. He tries to show that what he calls "Pyrrhonian" skepticism is ultimately self-defeating in its application of reason against reason. In place of a negative conclusion, he offers another solution to the paradoxes of infinite divisibility. What is remarkable about Hume's pronouncements against the infinite divisibility of extension and time, that may signal a change in his methodology if not his overall position on divisibility in the Enquiry from that of A Treatise of Human Nature, is his straightforward claim that natural belief rebels against the concept of infinite divisibility as its consequences apply to the metric of space and time.2 As in the Treatise, Hume pits natural disbelief in infinite divisibility against abstract metaphysical reason. But in the Enquiry, he does not invoke reason merely to correct the excesses of natural belief for the skeptical deflation of natural belief, say, in the necessity of causal connection, or the existence of mind-independent continuants. On the contrary, Hume Studies Infinite Divisibility in Hume's First Enquiry 221 Hume here appears instead to invoke natural disbelief in... (shrink)

원효사상의 체계와 내용을 관통하는 원리, 원효철학의 모든 것을 직조해 내는 근본원리, 원효의 모든 통찰을 수렴하는 상위원리는 ‘통섭’이다. 통섭과 화쟁은 특히 밀접한 관계를 맺고 있다. 화쟁의 꽃이 필 때라야 통섭의 열매가 맺는다. 원효의 화쟁사상은 그 시대 불교사상계의 분열적 혼란을 해결하기 위한 미시 해석학적 방법이다. 이 글에서는 원효 화쟁철학에서 주목되는 ‘문門구분의 사유방식’을 중심으로 화쟁철학의 형성과 발전단계를 추적해 보았다. ‘문門구분을 통한 화쟁’을 중심에 두고, 다른 두 축인 ‘모든 쟁론의 인식적 토대에서 자유로울 수 있는 마음지평(一心) 열기’와 ‘언어 환각에서 풀려나 언어를 사용하기’를 양 옆에 세운 (...) 후, 이 세 축이 서로 맞물려 힘을 보태면서 끝없이 상승해 가는 구도. - 이것이 원효의 화쟁에 대한 필자의 독법이다. 통섭이나 화쟁의 통찰을 전개할 때 구사하는 ‘문門구분’의 ‘문門’은, ‘일련의 타당한 인과계열’ ‘조건적으로 타당한 의미맥락’을 의미하는 경우가 대다수이다. 원효는 이 ‘문門 구분 사유방식’을 『대승기신론』의 일심이문一心二門에서 포착하여 확대, 발전시켜 간 것으로 보인다. 원효는 기신론의 ‘이문二門 구별’에서 ‘문門 구별의 연기적 사유’를 포착한 후 다양한 유형의 이문二門구별로 발전시킨다. 그리고 이를 통해 이론과 주장들을 조건적으로 이해함으로써 사실에 부합하는 정확한 이해에 접근하려 한다. 아울러 다양하게 분석한 이문二門들의 ‘통섭通攝적 관계’를 밝힘으로써, 배타적으로 엇갈리는 이론과 주장들이 화해할 수 있는 자리를 마련한다. 이렇게 볼 때 연기적 사유의 원효적 유형인 ‘문門구별의 사유방식’은 크게 세 단계에 걸쳐 발전하고 있다. 첫 단계는 기신론의 ‘진여/생멸 이문二門 구별’에서 문門 구별의 사유방식에 눈뜬 것이며, 두 번째 단계는 이 ‘문門구별의 사유방식’을 활용하여 ‘문二門 구별의 다양한 방식들’을 전개하는 것이고, 세 번째 단계는 ‘문門구별의 사유방식’을 통해 상이한 이론과 관점들이 ‘서로 열고 서로 안을 수 있는’ 통섭通攝과 화쟁和諍의 공간을 마련하는 것이다. 그리고 원효의 ‘문門구별 사유방식’은 이 세 번째 단계를 발전의 정점으로 삼는다. (shrink)