Indefinite Divisibility

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):239-263 (2016)
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Abstract

Some hold that the lesson of Russell’s paradox and its relatives is that mathematical reality does not form a ‘definite totality’ but rather is ‘indefinitely extensible’. There can always be more sets than there ever are. I argue that certain contact puzzles are analogous to Russell’s paradox this way: they similarly motivate a vision of physical reality as iteratively generated. In this picture, the divisions of the continuum into smaller parts are ‘potential’ rather than ‘actual’. Besides the intrinsic interest of this metaphysical picture, it has important consequences for the debate over absolute generality. It is often thought that ‘indefinite extensibility’ arguments at best make trouble for mathematical platonists; but the contact arguments show that nominalists face the same kind of difficulty, if they recognize even the metaphysical possibility of the picture I sketch.

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Author's Profile

Jeffrey Sanford Russell
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility.Jared Warren - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):81-122.
The World is the Totality of Facts, Not of Things.Agustín Rayo - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):250-278.
Infinitesimal Gunk.Lu Chen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):981-1004.
Intuitionistic mereology.Paolo Maffezioli & Achille C. Varzi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 18):4277-4302.
Ontology, Set Theory, and the Paraphrase Challenge.Jared Warren - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6):1231-1248.

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References found in this work

Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Physics.Daniel W. Aristotle & Graham - 2018 - Hackett Publishing Company.
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The seas of language.Michael Dummett - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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