One objection to conventional AI ethics is that it slows innovation. This presentation responds by reconfiguring ethics as an innovation accelerator. The critical elements develop from a contrast between Stability AI’s Diffusion and OpenAI’s Dall-E. By analyzing the divergent values underlying their opposed strategies for development and deployment, five conceptions are identified as common to acceleration ethics. Uncertainty is understood as positive and encouraging, rather than discouraging. Innovation is conceived as intrinsically valuable, instead of worthwhile only as mediated by social (...) effects. AI problems are solved by more AI, not less. Permissions and restrictions governing AI emerge from a decentralized process, instead of a unified authority. The work of ethics is embedded in AI development and application, instead of functioning from outside. Together, these attitudes and practices remake ethics as provoking rather than restraining artificial intelligence. (shrink)

This paper analyses the American Constitution of 1787 and the Spanish Constitutions of 1812 and 1978. The objective is to analyse their structures and the changes they have undergone throughout history, to find differences that can be explained by the different cultural values that these two groups normally display. As will be seen, the cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance, amongst others, is the one that has a greater presence in this study. The conclusions drawn from this study show that cultural (...) groups change throughout history, but the cultural roots that they inherit seem to be present through the times. (shrink)

Disgust seems to play an important role in moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether the role of disgust in moral judgment is limited to certain kinds of moral domains (versus many) and/or certain types of disgust (versus many). To clarify these questions, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis (k = 512; N = 72,443) on relations between trait disgust sensitivity and moral judgment (disgust-immorality association). Main analyses revealed a significant overall mean disgust-immorality association (r =.23). Additionally, moderator analyses (...) revealed significant specificity in disgust type and moral domain (grounded in Moral Foundations Theory): effects were stronger for (a) sexual disgust compared to pathogen disgust, (b) sanctity moral judgments compared to other domains of moral judgments, and (c) sexual-sanctity associations compared to other disgust type-moral domain pairings. (shrink)

Universal ranks in folk biological taxonomy probably apply to taxonomies of cultural artifacts. We cannot call folk biological cognition domain-specific and modular. Color categorization may manifest unique organization, which would result from known neurology and the nature of color as an attribute. But folk biology does not adduce equivalent evidence. A global process of increasing differentiation similarly affects folk taxonomy, color categorization, and other practices germane to Atran's anthropology of science; this is beclouded by claims of specificity and modularity.

Stoffregen & Bardy's proposal that perceptual systems can use information defined across two or more sensory domains is valuable and urgent in its own right. However, their claim of exclusive validity for global-array information is superfluous and perpetuated for incorrect reasons. The seeming ambiguities of individual arrays emanate from failures to consider relevant ecological constraints and higher-order variables.

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We extend the authors’ arguments on direct perception, specificity, and foundational principles to concerns for theories of joint action. We argue for the usefulness of the affordance concept in an ecological theory of social interaction; highlighting linkages between theories of affordance-based behavior and fundamental, physical principles.

In this paper we describe a test for Nijhout's hypothesis that the eyespot patterns on butterfly wings are the result of a threshold reaction of the epidermal cells to a concentration gradient of a diffusing degradable morphogen produced by focal cells at the centre of the future eyespot. The wings of the nymphalid butterfly, Bicyclus anynana, have a series of eyespots, each composed of a white pupil, a black disc and a gold outer ring. In earlier extirpation and transplantation experiments (...) it has been established that these eyespots are indeed organised around groups of signalling cells active during the first hours of pupal development. If these cells were to supply the positional information for eyespot formation in accordance with Nijhout's diffusion-degradation gradient model, then, when two foci are close together, the signals should sum, and this effect should be apparent in the detailed shape of the resulting pigment pattern. We give an equation for the form of the contours that would be obtained in this manner. We use this to test the morphogen gradient hypothesis on measurements of the outlines of fused eyespots obtained either by grafting focal cells close together, or by using a mutation that produces adjacent fused eyespots. The contours of the fused patterns were found to satisfy our equation, thus corroborating Nijhout's hypothesis to the extent possible with this particular type of experiment. (shrink)

How do scientific innovations spread within and across scientific communities? In this paper, we propose a general account of the diffusion of scientific innovations. This account acknowledges that novel ideas must be elaborated on and conceptually translated before they can be adopted and applied to field-specific problems. We motivate our account by examining an exemplary case of knowledge diffusion, namely, the early spread of theories of rational decision-making. These theories were grounded in a set of novel mathematical tools and (...) concepts that originated in John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior and subsequently spread widely across the social and behavioral sciences. Introducing a network-based diffusion measure, we trace the spread of those tools and concepts into distinct research areas. We furthermore present an analytically tractable typology for classifying publications according to their roles in the diffusion process. The proposed framework allows for a systematic examination of the conditions under which scientific innovations spread within and across preexisting and newly emerging scientific communities. (shrink)

A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily (...) adequate broad-content psychology is nonetheless possible because Frege cases rarely occur in intentional-explanatory contexts, and they are not systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that demands intentional explanation. Thus, he claims, behaviors associated with Frege cases can be considered ceteris-paribus exceptions to broad-content intentional laws without significantly decreasing the explanatory power of intentional psychology. I argue that Frege cases are plentiful and systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that requires intentional explanation, specifically in the explanation of why certain actions are not performed. Consequently, Frege-case behaviors cannot be construed as ceteris-paribus exceptions to intentional laws without significantly eroding the explanatory power of intentional psychology and reducing the rationality of the agent. Fodor thus fails to save broad-content psychology from the prima facie objections against it based on Frege cases. (shrink)

The general concept of mental disorder specified in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is definitional in character: a mental disorder might be identified with a harmful dysfunction. The manual also contains the explicit claim that each individual mental disorder should meet the requirements posed by the definition. The aim of this article is two-fold. First, we shall analyze the definition of the superordinate concept of mental disorder to better understand what necessary criteria actually (...) characterize such a concept. Second, we shall consider the concepts of some individual mental disorders and show that they are in tension with the definition of the superordinate concept, taking pyromania and narcissistic personality disorder as case studies. Our main point is that an unexplained and not-operationalized dysfunction requirement that is included in the general definition, while being systematically violated by the diagnostic criteria of specific mental disorders, is a logical error. Then, either we unpack and operationalize the dysfunction requirement, and include explicit diagnostic criteria that can actually meet it, or we simply drop it. (shrink)

This article examines the diffusion and present day status of a family of unsubstantiated learning-retention myths, some of which are referred to as ‘the learning pyramid’. We demonstrate through an extensive search in academic journals and field-specific encyclopaedias that these myths are indeed widely publicised in academia and that they have gained a considerable level of authority. We also argue that the academic publishing of these myths is potentially harmful to both professional as well as political deliberations on educational (...) issues, and therefore should be criticized and counteracted. (shrink)

Advances in artificial intelligence have raised a basic question about human intelligence: Is human reasoning best emulated by applying task‐specific knowledge acquired from a wealth of prior experience, or is it based on the domain‐general manipulation and comparison of mental representations? We address this question for the case of visual analogical reasoning. Using realistic images of familiar three‐dimensional objects (cars and their parts), we systematically manipulated viewpoints, part relations, and entity properties in visual analogy problems. We compared human performance (...) to that of two recent deep learning models (Siamese Network and Relation Network) that were directly trained to solve these problems and to apply their task‐specific knowledge to analogical reasoning. We also developed a new model using part‐based comparison (PCM) by applying a domain‐general mapping procedure to learned representations of cars and their component parts. Across four‐term analogies (Experiment 1) and open‐ended analogies (Experiment 2), the domain‐general PCM model, but not the task‐specific deep learning models, generated performance similar in key aspects to that of human reasoners. These findings provide evidence that human‐like analogical reasoning is unlikely to be achieved by applying deep learning with big data to a specific type of analogy problem. Rather, humans do (and machines might) achieve analogical reasoning by learning representations that encode structural information useful for multiple tasks, coupled with efficient computation of relational similarity. (shrink)

The qualitative division between domain-general and domain-specific cognition is unsubstantiated. The distinction is instead better viewed as opposites on a gradual scale, which has more explanatory power and fits current empirical evidence better. We also argue that causal cognition may be more general than social learning, which it often involves.

The meaning of sustainability is the subject of intense debate among environmental and resource economists. Perhaps no other issue separates more clearly the traditional economic view from the views of most natural scientists. The debate currently focuses on the substitutability between the economy and the environment or between “natural capital” and “manufactured capital”—a debate captured in terms of weak versus strong sustainability. In this article, we examine the various interpretations of these concepts. We conclude that natural science and economic (...) perspectives on sustainability are inconsistent. The market-based Hartwick-Solow “weak sustainability” approach is far removed from both the ecosystem-based “Holling sustainability” and the “strong sustainability” approach of Daly and others. Each of these sustainability criteria implies a specific valuation approach, and thus an ethical position, to support monetary indicators of sustainability such as a green or sustainable Gross Domestic Product. The conflict between “weak sustainability” and “strong sustainability” is more evident in the context of centralized than decentralized decision making. In particular, firms selling “services” instead of material goods and regarding the latter as “capital” leads to decisions more or less consistent with either type of sustainability. Finally, we discuss the implications of global sustainability for such open systems as regions and countries. Open systems have not been dealt with systematically for any of the sustainability criteria. (shrink)

The meaning of sustainability is the subject of intense debate among environmental and resource economists. Perhaps no other issue separates more clearly the traditional economic view from the views of most natural scientists. The debate currently focuses on the substitutability between the economy and the environment or between “natural capital” and “manufactured capital”—a debate captured in terms of weak versus strong sustainability. In this article, we examine the various interpretations of these concepts. We conclude that natural science and economic (...) perspectives on sustainability are inconsistent. The market-based Hartwick-Solow “weak sustainability” approach is far removed from both the ecosystem-based “Holling sustainability” and the “strong sustainability” approach of Daly and others. Each of these sustainability criteria implies a specific valuation approach, and thus an ethical position, to support monetary indicators of sustainability such as a green or sustainable Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The conflict between “weak sustainability” and “strong sustainability” is more evident in the context of centralized than decentralized decision making. In particular, firms selling “services” instead of material goods and regarding the latter as “capital” leads to decisions more or less consistent with either type of sustainability. Finally, we discuss the implications of global sustainability for such open systems as regions and countries. Open systems have not been dealt with systematically for any of the sustainability criteria. (shrink)

This article presents a new hypothesis on the origin of life on Earth. According to this hypothesis, life arose within the limits of a particular material system representing a set of specific local environments integrated by a common circulating liquid medium where relatively short RNA molecules, viroid-like particles, are replicated with great accuracy. In each of the local environments, the synthesis of certain substances that are required for accurate replication and survival of the RNAs is carried out. The system, (...) which we called “diffuse organism,” is, in essence, a very rough and bulky analog of the structural-functional organization of the cell’s biosynthetic machinery. The diffuse organism was an organismal and evolving system at the same time. It seems that only such a system that has emerged in the only specimen as a result of a set of chance events operating under a system of universal physical and chemical laws was able to give rise to life and evolution by means of biological selection. The outlined scenario for the origin of life allows us to narrow down the still insuperable gap between prebiological chemistry and the first living systems without devising conceptions unrelated to the realities of life. (shrink)

Can hybridism about moral claims be made to work? I argue it can if we accept the conventional implicature approach developed in Barker (Analysis 2000). However, this kind of hybrid expressivism is only acceptable if we can make sense of conventional implicature, the kind of meaning carried by operators like ‘even’, ‘but’, etc. Conventional implictures are a form of pragmatic presupposition, which involves an unsaid mode of delivery of content. I argue that we can make sense of conventional implicatures, but (...) doing so requires we embrace a form of pure, non-hybrid expressivism. This is a cognitivist expressivism I have developed elsewhere. We need cognitivist expressivism to make sense of how we evaluate—judge as correct or incorrect—implicature-bearing sentences. Once we embraced the possibility of this pure expressivism, we might as well be pure expressivists about normative discourse too. I show how we can do that. The motivations for a specifically hybrid theory are dialectically undercut. (shrink)

Are the properties of communicative acts grounded in the intentions with which they are performed, or in the conventions that govern them? The latest round in this debate has been sparked by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone (2015), who argue that much more of communication is conventional than we thought, and that the rest isn’t really communication after all, but merely the initiation of open-ended imaginative thought. I argue that although Lepore and Stone may be right about many of the (...) specific cases they discuss, their big-picture, conventionalist conclusions don’t follow. My argument focuses on four phenomena that present challenges to conventionalist accounts of communication: ambiguity, indirect communication, communication by wholly unconventional means, and convention acquisition. (shrink)

It is argued that awareness of the distinction between dynamical and variational symmetries is crucial to understanding the significance of Noether's 1918 work. Specific attention is paid, by way of a number of striking examples, to Noether's first theorem, which establishes a correlation between dynamical symmetries and conservation principles.

The concept of minimal risk has been used to regulate and limit participation by adolescents in clinical trials. It can be understood as setting an absolute standard of what risks are considered minimal or it can be interpreted as relative to the actual risks faced by members of the host community for the trial. While commentators have almost universally opposed a relative interpretation of the environmental risks faced by potential adolescent trial participants, we argue that the ethical concerns against the (...) relative standard may not be as convincing as these commentators believe. Our aim is to present the case for a relative standard of environmental risk in order to open a debate on this subject. We conclude by discussing how a relative standard of environmental risk could be defended in the specific case of an HIV vaccine trial among adolescents in South Africa. (shrink)

This article examines the response of minority gamers as they adopt new innovations in Xbox Live. Using diffusion of innovation theory, specific attention is given to gamers’ rate of adoption of the new Xbox Live environment, which was a recent update to the Xbox Live interface. By employing virtual ethnography, observations, and interviews reveal that gaming duration and gender are significant factors in identifying a gamer’s successful rate of adoption of the new innovation. Female participants reveal that Xbox Live (...) intentionally targets males as the default gamer and enact changes based on their needs. The research concludes with a plea to Xbox Live to acknowledge minority gamers such as women to incorporate their needs within the decision-making process of new innovations. (shrink)

There is the popular notion according to which the world is built up in a hierarchical order, such that combining entities from the lower level results in entities of the next higher level, and so on. It seems beyond doubt in this view that the entities at the lowest level are some subatomic particles, to be followed at the next levels by atoms, molecules, biological organs and organisms including humans, and eventually societies. Accordingly, a scientific discipline is assigned to each (...) level, resulting in a disciplinary hierarchy that starts with physics and goes via chemistry, biology, and psychology to sociology. This popular notion has its merits as it assures us that both the world and our scientific knowledge are perfectly ordered in a harmonious but hierarchical manner. It provides philosophical food to discuss the interfaces between the ontological levels or disciplines in terms of reduction, emergence, supervenience, and so on. And it appeals to some philosophers who are interested in science but unable to read the about two million scientific publications per year, because it allows them to focus on the handful of publications in what is supposed to be the fundamental level of Everything. The hierarchical picture became popular in the 19th century just when most of our scientific disciplines emerged in a process of horizontal diversification, when each discipline carved out and established its own specific subject matter, methodology, theories, and problems and rejected just the idea of the hierarchical dependencies between the disciplines (Stichweh 1984). Despite its anachronism at the time of its popularization, the hierarchical picture was appealing to all those who felt lost in the exploding fields of science and who were yearning for the good old days in which a simple metaphysical scheme could provide order to the entire world. It is more than likely that the hierarchical picture is appealing still nowadays for the same reasons. It would not be worthwhile to discuss the anachronistic hierarchical picture, if it had not such a great appeal to many philosophers.1 In this paper I discuss only one particular problem of the hierarchical picture, the lack of matter or stuffs2 in the ontological hierarchy, which actually consists in a series of structures or forms.. (shrink)

This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are sometimes missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument—non-causal realism—and argue that any non-causal realist theory, no matter the subject matter, cannot be given a reasonable epistemology and so should be rejected. Finally I (...) discuss and respond to several possible responses to the argument. In addition to clearing up and avoiding numerous misunderstandings of arguments of this kind that are quite common in the literature, this paper aims to present and endorse a rigorous and fully general epistemological argument against realism. (shrink)

Inflectional morphology has been taken as a paradigmatic example of rule-governed grammatical knowledge (Pinker, 1999). The plausibility of this claim may be related to the fact that it is mainly based on studies of English, which has a very simple inflectional system. We examined the representation of inflectional morphology in Serbian, which encodes number, gender, and case for nouns. Linguists standardly characterize this system as a complex set of rules, with disagreements about their exact form. We present analyses of a (...) large corpus of nouns which showed that, as in English, Serbian inflectional morphology is quasiregular: It exhibits numerous partial regularities creating neighborhoods that vary in size and consistency. We then asked whether a simple connectionist network could encode this statistical information in a manner that also supported generalization. A network trained on 3,244 Serbian nouns learned to produce correctly inflected phonological forms from a specification of a word's lemma, gender, number, and case, and generalized to untrained cases. The model's performance was sensitive to variables that also influence human performance, including surface and lemma frequency. It was also influenced by inflectional neighborhood size, a novel measure of the consistency of meaning to form mapping. A word-naming experiment with native Serbian speakers showed that this measure also affects human performance. The results suggest that, as in English, generating correctly inflected forms involves satisfying a small number of simultaneous probabilistic constraints relating form and meaning. Thus, common computational mechanisms may govern the representation and use of inflectional information across typologically diverse languages. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Beitrag setzt die Überlegungen eines Forschungsentwurfs fort, dessen erster Teil im Band 63/2 dieser Zeitschrift erschien. Die historische Formel des sog. ›Disjunktionsprinzps‹ entwickelt Panofsky u.a. in dem 1944 im Kenyon Review erschienenen Artikel Renaissance and Renascences. Die grundsätzliche Mobilität antiker Kulturelemente, die er seiner Formel zuschreibt, impliziert einen bei ihm bisher unbenannten kulturtheoretischen Zugang mit deutlicher Nähe zum ethnologischen Modell der Diffusion. Ausgehend davon entwirft Panofsky mittels einer kulturmorphologischen Vorgehensweise ein transepochales Modell kultureller Tradierung. Dies ermöglicht es ihm, (...) seine Vorstellung einer hierarchischen Gliederung menschlicher (Kultur‑)Epochen am Beispiel der Antikenrezeption zu festigen. Um sich den kulturtheoretischen Implikationen in Panofskys Ausführungen zu nähern, sollen hier jene Stationen beleuchtet werden, die Panofskys intellektuellen Horizont möglicherweise mitgeformt haben – so z.B. die Prägung durch Aby Warburg, der seine Ausbildung in Bonn u.a. unter der Lehre Karl Lamprechts absolvierte. Zum anderen wird Panofskys Argumentation mit den Ideen deutscher Diffusionisten verglichen. Die vergleichende Methode offenbart nicht nur erstmalig deutliche Analogien, sondern zeigt, wie Panofsky mittels Antikenrezeption eine spezifische Vorstellung von der menschlichen Kulturgeschichte vorgibt. The article continues the considerations of a research draft, the first part of which was published in volume 63/2 of this journal. Panofsky develops the historical formula of the socalled ›principle of disjunction‹ in the article ›Renaissance and Renascences‹ published in the Kenyon Review in 1944. The fundamental mobility of ancient cultural elements, which he ascribes to his formula, implies a previously unnamed cultural-theoretical approach with a clear proximity to the ethnological model of diffusion. On this basis, Panofsky uses a cultural morphological approach to design a transepochal model of cultural transmission. This enables him to consolidate the idea of a hierarchical structure of human (cultural) epochs using the example of the reception of antiquity. In order to approach the cultural-theoretical implications in Panofsky’s remarks, those stations that may have shaped Panofsky’s intellectual horizon will be examined – e.g. the influence of Aby Warburg, who completed his education in Bonn under the teachings of Karl Lamprecht, among others. On the other hand, Panofsky’s argumentation is compared with the ideas of German diffusionists. The comparative method not only reveals clear analogies for the first time, but also shows how Panofsky uses the reception of antiquity to provide a specific idea of human cultural history. (shrink)

I interpret George Eliot as objecting to John Locke in Middlemarch – more specifically, his theory of ideas – by means of her account of Dorothea’s experiences of Edward Casaubon at dinner.

This article explores the question of truth in the work of Jacques Derrida and Alain Badiou. Specifically, it investigates Badiou’s claim that deconstruction is a form of sophistry. Badiou positions himself against Derrida in preference for a philosophy committed to Truth, Being and the event. The sophist, in contrast to the philosopher, denies the existence of truths and the category of truth. Despite this hostility, Badiou argues that the two must coexist. Badiou also explores the relationship between existence and inexistence (...) insofar as différence represents what Badiou labels the passion of Inexistance. The article concludes with how the two philosophers envision the place of truth in the future of philosophy: the flash of an event which punctures a hole in knowledge (Badiou) or the necessity of embracing the deconstructive nature of truth, language and knowledge (Derrida). (shrink)

Personal Versus Political Affairs in Churchill's This is a Chair There are plenty of issues in the world to petition and fight for, yet each individual also has "battles" at home to contend with. Which is of more importance? We often separate the two indefinitely. In studying Caryl Churchill's work This Is a Chair, however, I would suggest the personal and political to be intimately related and possibly each even a causation of the other. To take care of one (...) may be eliminating the problem of the other as well. Might political problems stem from petty, personal qualms? Even more specifically might jeopardizing moral norms affect the greater social order? If so, this would be a revelation and fresh pursuit in solving many of the monumental political issues which are faced today. (shrink)

We criticize the lack of neuroanatomical precision in the Grodzinsky target article. We propose a more precise neuroanatomical characterization of syntactic processing and suggest that syntactic procedures are supported by the left frontal operculum in addition to the anterior part of the superior temporal gyrus, which appears to be associated with syntactic knowledge representation.

The medieval notion of instrumental cause is not limited to what we call today “instruments” or “tools.” It extends way beyond the realm of technology and includes natural entities, for instance, the accidents by which a substance acts on another substance, sensible species in the air acting on a visual faculty, sacraments, bodily organs, and sometimes creatures with respect to God’s action. In all these cases, instrumental causes, like secondary causes in general, are subordinated to a principal cause and contribute (...) to its action and effects. However, the manner in which they do so makes them different from regular secondary causes, and the specifics are not easy to pinpoint. At the occasion of discussions about creation ex nihilo and sacraments, John Duns Scotus challenges Thomas Aquinas’s theory of instrumental causality. Whereas Aquinas does not strongly distinguish between artifacts and natural agents, and postulates a complex superposition of layers of causation, Scotus offers a novel view that clearly separates artificial instrumentality and natural instrumentality, and in both cases explains causation with great economy. Scotus’s in-depth discussion has far-reaching implications. It completely transforms the understanding of instrumental causality in general. (shrink)

In the present research we investigated gender-specific beliefs about emotional behaviour. In Study 1, 180 respondents rated the extent to which they agreed with different types of beliefs (prescriptive, descriptive, stereotypical, and contra-stereotypical) regarding the emotional behaviour of men and women. As anticipated, respondents agreed more with descriptive than with prescriptive beliefs, and more with stereotypical than with contra-stereotypical beliefs. However, respondents agreed more with stereotypical beliefs about the emotional behaviour of women than with those about men. These results (...) were replicated in Study 2 with a sample of 75 students and 80 nonstudents. In Study 3, a sample of 279 respondents rated the extent of agreement with the same items, this time with respect to then own emotional behaviour. A similar pattern of results was obtained, although agreement rates were higher than in Study 1 and 2. (shrink)

In his article, “Should Space Travel be Human or Robotic? Reasons for and against full automation for space missions,” Maurizio Balistreri explores the ongoing debate regarding whether space travel, exploration, and extra-terrestrial colonization should be the domain of humans or robots. Balistreri explores both technical and normative arguments for why extraterrestrial ventures ought to be wholly robotic or human, ultimately taking no explicit side in the debate. However, in this article we argue that by even posing the question in this (...) binary fashion, Balistreri and others are making a mistake at the outset. We show that there are certain missions and aims which require humans and others that plausibly may be undertaken solely by robots, but for all missions and aims there is likely to be some degree of human-robot pairing. More than this, we show that the question should not be whether space travel, exploration, or extra-terrestrial colonization ought to be generally human-centric or robot-centric, but rather that each and every mission should be examined on its own, as the values and disadvantages of humans versus robots are apt to be highly specific to the realities of particular discrete missions. (shrink)

I study the diffusion of codes of conduct in the German textile and apparel industry between 1997 and 2010. Using a longitudinal case study design, I aim to understand how the diffusion of this practice was affected by the way important “infomediaries”—a trade journal and a professional association—shaped its understanding within the industry. My results show that time-consuming processes of meaning reconstruction by these infomediaries temporarily hampered but finally facilitated the broader material diffusion of codes of conduct within the industry. (...) These findings detail existing conceptualizations of code diffusion as they demonstrate how infomediaries—through creation, use, and reconstruction of explanatory accounts as well as frames of reference—participate in defining the relevance and meaning of CSR practices. I move beyond prior empirical work as I explicitly assess not only processes of meaning construction evolving around a CSR practice but also how these processes over time coincide with quantitative patterns of its material diffusion. Implications of my findings for existing research on the diffusion of codes of conduct specifically and CSR practices in general as well as for conceptualizations of diffusion from institutional theory are discussed. (shrink)

This article focuses on Max Weber’s understanding of “ethos” in “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” and the benefits afforded by this concept. The reference is not accidental as it is in this work that Weber could consistently explicate his ethical argument. The idea of ethos becomes clearer in comparison with the concept of habitus, which is actively used today in social science. It is shown that the distinction between ethos and habitus may be more productive than the (...) conflation common in modern research. The category “ethos” is compared with the value-rational action from the later typology of action in Weber’s “Economy and Society”, while habitus is associated with traditional action from the same typology. The concept of ethos is further clarified by the example of Weber’s opposition of traditionalism and ethical modern Western capitalism. By focusing on ethical issues and using character as a theoretical tool, Weber not only puts forward a convincing interpretation but lays the foundations for a specific line of analysis in social and economic science. The category of ethos in conjunction with the value-rational type of action acquires special significance due to the potential for novelty and change that is embedded in it. (shrink)

Theories and models are not equivalent. I argue that an orientation towards models as a primary carrier of nursing knowledge overcomes many ongoing challenges in philosophy of nursing science, including the theory–practice divide and the paradoxical pursuit of predictive theories in a discipline that is defined by process and a commitment to the non‐reducibility of the health/care experience. Scientific models describe and explain the dynamics of specific phenomenon. This is distinct from theory, which is traditionally defined as propositions that (...) explain and/or predict the world. The philosophical case has been made against theoretical universalism, showing that a theory can be true in its domain, but that no domain is universal. Subsequently, philosophers focused on scientific models argued that they do the work of defining the boundary conditions—the domain(s)—of a theory. Further analysis has shown the ways models can be constructed and function independent of theory, meaning models can comprise distinct, autonomous “carriers of scientific knowledge.” Models are viewed as representations of the active dynamics, or mechanisms, of a phenomenon. Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes. Importantly, mechanisms are by definition not static: change may alter the mechanism and thereby alter or create entirely new phenomena. Orienting away from theory, and towards models, focuses scholarly activity on dynamics and change. This makes models arguably critical to nursing science, enabling the production of actionable knowledge about the dynamics of process and change in health/care. I briefly explore the implications for nursing—and health/care—knowledge and practice. (shrink)

Abed Azzam offers a fresh interpretation of Nietzsche's engagement with the work of Paul the Apostle, reorienting the relationship between the two thinkers while embedding modern philosophy within early Christian theology. Paying careful attention to Nietzsche's dialectics, Azzam situates the philosopher's thought within the history of Christianity, specifically the Pauline dialectics of law and faith, and reveals how atheism is constructed in relation to Christianity. Countering Heidegger's characterization of Nietzsche as an anti-Platonist, Azzam brings the philosopher closer to Paul through (...) a radical rereading of his entire corpus against Christianity. This approach builds a compelling new history of the West resting on a logic of sublimation, from ancient Greece and early Judaism to the death of God. Azzam discovers in Nietzsche's philosophy a solid, tangible Pauline structure and virtual, fragile Greek content, positioning the thinker as a forerunner of the recent "return to Paul" led by Badiou, Agamben, Žižek, and Breton. By changing the focus of modern philosophical inquiry from "Nietzsche and philosophy" to "Nietzsche and Christianity," Azzam initiates a major challenge to the primacy of Plato in the history of Western philosophy and narrow certainties regarding Nietzsche's relationship to Christian thought. (shrink)