Chapitre premier. Le concept de concept : un "concept" à sept composantes -- chapitre II. Statut problématique du concept de concept : le danger d'auto-réfutation -- chapitre III. Renvoi à une instance génétique plus profonde : la question de la pensée pure ... -- chapitre IV. Interférence et autrui dans le discours philosophique.

Leiter (2016) charges public philosophy with being “neoliberal”. To understand that charge better, I define, in §1, three versions of public philosophy which might be concerned and two pictures of its practice targeted by Leiter. I also compare two deliberative sites wherein those pictures may play out. In §2, I sketch how Leiter’s two paradoxes for “neoliberal” public philosophy lead to a revised public philosophy. §3 questions the paradoxes’ empirical grounding and scope. Lastly, in §4, I assume Leiter’s picture and (...) illustrate how philosophical dialogue, through appeal to personal self-image and “moral perceptions”, may still influence public discourse. I conclude that Leiter both over- and understates his case and that his conclusions require greater scrutiny. (shrink)