i would hazard to guess that nearly everyone would agree that In situations of peril, it is permissible to use another’s property without her permission if that is the only way to save oneself from serious harm.1But that If one damages or consumes that property, one ought to compensate its owner.It turns out, however, that the conjunction of N1 and N2 is surprisingly difficult to justify. That is because if you accept N1, you are also likely to accept A property (...) owner would wrong an imperiled trespasser if the owner prevented her from using his property if that were the only way she could save herself from serious harm.N3 implies that the permission granted in N1 issues from a right. This generates a... (shrink)

The idea that respect for persons comprises the core of morality has long been associated with Kant and the ethics of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In particular, the second formulation of the categorical imperative , the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-itself – ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ – is often glossed (...) as enjoining us to respect persons as such. On what I think may fairly be called the received view, the injunction to respect persons as such is thus, for Kant, co-extensive with morality itself. (shrink)

The rule of law is widely perceived to be a public law doctrine, concerned with the way governmental authority conforms to dictates of law. This book explores the idea that the rule of law instead concerns the conditions under which any relationship - that among citizens as well as that between citizens and the state - becomes subject to law.

On November 27, 1905, the steamship Reynolds was moored to Vincents owner, the Lake Erie Transportation Company, was held liable for the cost of the damage. Defendant’s appeal against an order denying a new trial was dismissed by a two to one majority of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in an opinion that has since enjoyed considerable and consistent attention. 1.

While the roots of the common law of restitution reach back hundreds of years, the idea that it constitutes a domain of private law was first clearly articulated in the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Restitution in 1932. The U.S. was at the forefront of development in the law of restitution but interest has declined. Recently John Langbein offered an explanation, first in terms of law and economics and then through legal realism. Realism, by Langbein’s estimation, has exacted “a terrible (...) toll” on doctrinal study in the postwar period. One of the principal aims of The Law and Ethics of Restitution, Hanoch Dagan writes, is to disprove this claim. Realism, properly understood, is supportive of doctrine and, he argues, in this context, provides a better account of the law than the prevailing view. This book is a challenging and important work not only in the law of restitution but also in legal theory. My main interest in this Critical Notice is to ask whether the kind of justification for liability in restitution Dagan offers is compelling. While part of what separates Dagan from Langbein is their understanding of legal realism, I take Dagan to be right on this point, and ask whether he’s made the case in favour of a realist account of restitution. I do that by considering two examples of the doctrinal analyses that form the bulk of the book: first by outlining a pair of issues on which Dagan takes a position by setting up the question he aims to ask, and then by considering his rejection of the view to which>The Law and Ethics of Restitutionoffers an alternative. (shrink)

It is a recurring idea in the history of political philosophy that concepts and doctrines of private law are illuminative of public law and political philosophy. Central among these are contract and the trust. In this paper, I consider the prospects of a third: estoppel. The public law context in which estoppel is most commonly invoked is criminal law, and there especially in the service of understanding the defenses of entrapment and what I call officially induced mistake of law. My (...) question is how well it serves this role – how well the structure of the self-disentitlement that provides the rationales for the defences of entrapment and OIML on the non-exculpatory approach to each is articulated on the model of state estoppel, as I call it. I will argue that it fares well, and so that estoppel merits inclusion on the list of concepts and doctrines of private law that are illuminative of public law and political philosophy. In conclusion I will ask what the moral-expressive content of its deployment in that context is, and argue that, while the doctrines of contract and trust work as means to articulate claims about the basis and limit of political authority, the claim that some cases of state self-disentitlement can be modelled on estoppel represents a commitment to some core principles of the rule of law. (shrink)

This is a review of Marco Barducci's recent book Hugo Grotius and the Century of Revolution, 1613-1718.